Supreme Court dismisses appeals on default judgment and amendment motions due to lack of substantive legal grounds.

THE SUPREME COURT

Appeal No.: 111/1990

Appeal No.: 430/2010

O’Donnell J.

Clarke J.

Dunne J.

Between

JOHN ROONEY

Plaintiff/Appellant

- and -

THE MINISTER FOR AGRICULTURE AND FOOD, THE MINISTER FOR FINANCE, THE TAOISEACH, IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL, DONAL MCDAID, PATRICK DELANEY, THE IRISH FARMERS’ ASSOCIATION, ERAD, THE MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR

DISEASE ERADICATION, ALAN GILLIS, PATRICK DELANEY, DENIS COFFEY, TERENCE O’CONNOR, DENIS G. HICKEY, JAMES

NOONAN AND JOHN MALONE – AS BOARD MEMBERS OF ERAD, THE MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR DISEASE ERADICATION, THE

MINISTER FOR THE PUBLIC SERVICE and

THE OMBUDSMAN

Defendants/Respondents

Judgment of O’Donnell J. delivered the 28th day of January 2016

1 The matters which came before this Court on the 9th of December 2015, were in themselves relatively simple but concerned

proceedings of considerable age and unusual factual and procedural complication. Mr. Rooney the plaintiff and appellant, has

represented himself since the outset of these proceedings in 1987, but has in that time been able to qualify as a barrister in England,

and be admitted to the Bar in Northern Ireland and subsequently in this jurisdiction. The appeals themselves concern two motions

which would be familiar to the most junior lawyer. The first is perhaps the most basic and commonly encountered application brought

in civil proceedings: a motion for judgment in default of defence (“the Motion for Judgment”). Rather ironically in the present context,

the normal function of a motion for judgment in default of defence is to seek to ensure that proceedings continue to move towards a

hearing at a reasonable pace. Hundreds of these motions are dealt with before the High Court each Monday, and rarely involve any

contention, still less, appeals. The second matter is a motion which is also regularly encountered in these Courts, a motion to amend

a Statement of Claim (“the Motion to Amend”). While sometimes such a motion can involve more argument than a standard motion for

judgment in default of defence, nevertheless, it is normally dealt with by the application of familiar principles, and can be argued and

disposed of quite quickly and involving few papers. In this case however, the hearing of both matters in this Court involved

voluminous and almost impenetrable papers, lengthy preparation, and occupied considerable court, time although relatively little of

that time was occupied by the substance of the motions themselves.

2 What makes these appeals remarkable however is that the proceedings themselves were commenced in 1987, and concerned

events which occurred in 1983. The motion for judgment dates from 1990. The motion to amend the Statement of Claim, in the

context of this case, is almost youthful having been commenced in 2001 and been determined in the High Court in 2010. It will be

necessary to trace the very tangled path of these proceedings and some parallel proceedings in more detail, later in this judgment.

But it is right to acknowledge that this lapse of time, whatever the explanations and excuses, is unacceptable. In 2013, the European

Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) held that the delay in bringing the proceedings to a conclusion was itself a breach of Mr. Rooney’s

Article 6 rights to have his case determined within a reasonable time. It is true that the substance of this case was disposed of in

1991 and that some aspects of the delay were understandable if not excusable. However, some aspects of the delay were caused by

Mr. Rooney’s own actions, and by the multiplicity of proceedings he commenced, and by what proved to be a misplaced belief that a

common sense solution could be found. It is also the case that on occasions judges went to considerable lengths to deal with the

cases, and considerable latitude was extended to Mr Rooney. The fact remains however that the continued existence of these

proceedings 28 years after they were first initiated is not justifiable, even in a system where the progress of litigation is controlled by

the parties and not by the court itself. Insomuch as the delay has been contributed to or caused by the administration of justice

within the courts, that is sincerely regrettable. Repeated court appearances impose a considerable stress not just on an individual

member of the public, but also on those close to them. Litigation is not in itself an intrinsically desirable activity and repeated

litigation is a curse which blights many lives, well beyond the central actor, and not limited to those on his own side of the case.

3 This case illustrates a number of truths which will be familiar to any person with experience of the law: the system of administration

of justice is human; it is unavoidably imperfect; resources are limited; court time is expensive and scarce; errors can be made by

even the most capable and well intentioned people; short cuts, to paraphrase Lord Scarman, can often be treacherous, exacting a

heavy price in delay anxiety and expense; and once a case goes awry it is disproportionately difficult to right it and it often becomes

prey to misunderstandings, misconceptions and misfortunes. It is often the case that a person who litigates on their own behalf has

some sense of grievance about an issue which is neither fanciful nor necessarily completely ill founded; that rejection of a complaint,

even if the correct and just outcome, can often generate obduracy and suspicion that the decision was made for reasons of

prejudice; that litigants will often respond with misconceived applications and more intemperate allegations; that the inevitable

rejection of such applications feeds an easily triggered sense of conspiracy, which often leads the litigant into conflict with the

courts, and individual judges. Some litigants, and not just those who represent themselves, prefer the comfort of focusing exclusively

on the debatable ruling or judicial comment reinforcing a sense of grievance rather than recognise the forest of problems in the overall

case. The cycle continues and becomes almost a form of litigious perpetual motion.

4 Judicial decisions however conscientiously rendered, are, regrettably but inevitably, not always perfect justice. Courts, even final

appellate courts reaching decisions after lengthy proceedings and refined argument, are not always right. Courts cannot achieve

infallibility but they can provide a hearing, a reasoned decision and ultimately and most basically, finality. It is the right of all parties

that proceedings should end. A right guaranteed by both the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights is to have a

case determined, in the sense not just decided, but also brought to an end. Finality is an important part of the process. Cases, like

any contest, can end neatly with satisfaction on all side, or messily with recrimination, but they must end. The end result may be

criticised but it must be accepted.

The Origins of the Dispute

5 The roots of this dispute go back, I believe, to 1983. It is necessary to qualify any statement in relation to the facts of this case

with two observations: First, from the very outset, the proceedings have been complicated by a proliferation of documents,

proceedings, and multiple applications. Second, the papers which the Court had available to it on this appeal while voluminous, are

still quite limited, and anything but comprehensive in the information they provide as to the multiple disputes between Mr. Rooney and

these and other defendants. Some of the information must be gleaned from secondary accounts. Since many of the applications in

this and related litigation have involved disputes about what was said and done on previous occasions in court, even that exercise is

fraught with confusion, and sometimes contradictory accounts. I do not say this to criticise the presentation of papers to us by Mr.

Rooney, who is representing himself and has limited resources, but rather to explain why my account of the background facts is

somewhat tentative.

6 It appears that in 1983, Mr. Rooney’s herd was tested for bovine tuberculosis. That is a Class B disease under the Disease of

Animals Act 1966 (“the 1966 Act”). It has been a serious problem in the agriculture sector in Ireland, and no one disputes the

necessity of the State introducing comprehensive measures to detect the disease, and prevent or restrict its spread. As in many

other areas of mass screening, the testing process employed is indicative of the presence of the disease rather than definitive.

Scientific proof, was, at least at that time, only available post-mortem. If an animal reacted to the tuberculin test, it was a “reactor”,

with significant consequences, both legal and practical, for the treatment of that animal, and the herd. In Mr. Rooney’s case, the

process of testing reached the point that in an affidavit he said that 26 reactors were identified in a herd of 103 on a small holding.

There is no doubt that this was a significant blow to a young man trying to make his way in the world. Mr. Rooney had complaints

about the manner in which the testing was carried out and therefore the accuracy of the results. That is not an issue that this Court

can resolve. I do not wish however, to suggest in any way, that his complaints may or may not have been justified. It is enough for

present purposes to say that Mr. Rooney was genuinely aggrieved. This was the starting point for his many disputes with the

Department of Agriculture which led him to investigate the law relating to animal testing. In particular it appears Mr. Rooney formed

the view both that he was entitled as a matter of law (in this case the 1966 Act and/or the Constitution) to compensation both for

the reactor cattle and for the impact on his farming business, and (whether as a matter of law or fact) that such amounts would be

greater than was available under the complex range of measures which were then operated under the national scheme for the

eradication of the disease.

The Regime in 1983 for the Detection and Control of Bovine Tuberculosis

7 The Act of 1966 is a general provision which deals with many species, and many diseases. However the incidence of bovine

tuberculosis within the national herd has been a very widespread and persistent problem. Under s.20 the Act of 1966 provision was

made for the testing of animals to detect the presence of any disease and for the isolation of animals. Regulations were made under

the Act dealing with the specific case of bovine tuberculosis. At the relevant time these regulations were laid down by the Bovine

Tuberculosis (Attestation of the State and General Provisions) Order 1978 (S.I. 256/78) (“the Order”). The Order specified the form of

testing and the manner in which it should be carried out. It also provided for the consequences of a positive test. There was an

obligation to isolate the reactor from the remainder of the herd to remain and to isolate the herd from adjoining holdings. The farm

became a restricted holding and movement permits were required for the movement of any animals. In relation to the reactor

affected, any movement permit would only be granted for the purposes of removing the animal for slaughter.

8 The Act provides for compensation when the Act is operated in a particular way. In respect of Class B diseases, such compensation

provisions were triggered if, but only if, the Minister “took possession of’ an animal under section 20. Compensation then became

payable under section 22. Section 58 made provision for a scheme of compensation. However, and presumably because of the

widespread nature of the bovine tuberculosis problem, this mechanism was not normally adopted when dealing with affected herds.

When a reactor was identified after testing, the Minister did not “take possession” of the herd or the affected animal. Instead the

mechanism of the Order came into play: the holding became restricted and movement was restricted. By this process, farmers were

effectively required to have reactors slaughtered. But the Minister never took possession of the reactor; instead the farmer remained

the owner and sold the reactor at a ‘carcase price’ to a meat factory. There was in addition a scheme providing for grants to affected

farmers which was not provided for in the Order. The amount of the grant was the subject of negotiation between farmers’

organisations and the Department of Agriculture, and took into account market values. A farmer whose herd was affected by bovine

tuberculosis received money for the affected animal from two sources: the factory paying the carcase price and the non statutory

scheme payment from the Department. This scheme was widely advertised, and the subject of active negotiation, but its legal basis

was simply an administrative procedure which as was held in McKerrig v Minister for Agriculture [1989] I.L.R.M. 82 created a private

contract between the Department and any affected farmer in an individual case. It is the operation of this non statutory scheme (and

the non-operation of the statutory compensation provisions) which lie at the heart of Mr. Rooney’s long-running legal disputes with

the Minister for Agriculture, the State and others.

9 The issues which came for the court on 9th December 2015 do not involve the resolution of any of the legal issues which might

arise from this type of arrangement. A number of observations can however be made even at this point. First, the administration of a

very substantial grant system on a purely administrative basis, and without either utilising or adapting the statutory scheme, was

unusual and likely to lead to disputes. In McKerrig v Minister for Agriculture [1989] I.L.R.M. 82, O'Hanlon J. made some observations

which are relevant to the present case :

“It all seems to be a remarkably informal way to spell out and organise a scheme on which, apparently,

hundreds of millions of pounds have already been spent. One result of that element of informality is the

present litigation, in which neither side can say with certainty whether the payments are made on an ex

gratia or contractual basis and have to come to Court to seek an answer to that problem. Another

extraordinary feature of the schemes which emerged in the course of the evidence is the fact that by the

combination of the payment received from the meat factory for the animal sold for slaughter, and the grant

payment, a diseased animal may be more profitable than a healthy one, so that the scheme can hold out an

inducement to unscrupulous persons to propogate rather than to eradicate disease in their herds.”

Second, it was recorded in the judgment in Rooney No. 1, that it was said in argument that the reason the non-statutory scheme

was set up was that given the very prevalence of bovine tuberculosis in the country, the establishment of the machinery for a

compensation scheme under section 58 would itself been very costly and presumably inefficient. The system of requiring private sale

of reactors and providing for a grant scheme was undoubtedly cheaper to administer, and perhaps more flexible and effective. Third,

there does not appear evidence in the course of any of these proceedings to suggest that a greater amount would be paid to farmers

if the reactor was acquired by the Minister and compensation paid under the Act. The very fact that the non-statutory scheme was

the product of agreement with farming organisations suggests otherwise. Furthermore while the system of restriction and movement

orders imposes some constraint on the property rights of the citizen it does not expropriate them, and, such restriction is at least in

principle capable of being justified on grounds of the public policy interest in preventing the spread of disease. The method of

payment to farmers via the non-statutory scheme supplementing the carcase value had been found to be consistent with the

Constitution by Murphy J, in Grennan v. the Minister for Agriculture (Unreported, High Court 4th October 1995); a finding approved by

Laffoy J. in Rooney No.2. (Unreported, High Court, 13th February, 2004). Finally there is a latent ambiguity in the concept of

compensation in this type of situation, which has been touched on in the recent decision of this court in Rafferty v. the Minister of

Agriculture [2014] I.E.S.C. 61. At times it appears to have been assumed by Mr. Rooney that if a legally enforceable entitlement to

compensation arose (whether by statute or by reference to constitutional rights), such compensation would not be based on the

value of the reactor once tested, but rather based on the assumption that the animal was disease-free. In many ways this is at the

heart of much of the dispute here. Much depends on whether one approaches the non-statutory scheme as compensation for the loss

of a healthy animal (which Mr. Rooney assumes) or rather as an ex gratia grant which serves the purpose of reducing the financial

impact on the farmer of the fact that an animal or animals have been the subject of a positive test for a significant disease and

thereby encouraging farmers to cooperate with the scheme.

The Commencement of Proceedings: 1987 No. 1120 Sp Ct 6

10 On the 19th of November 1987, Mr. Rooney issued a special summons. The proceedings at this point were against the Minister for

Agriculture and Food, Minister for Finance, the Taoiseach, Ireland and the Attorney General. The endorsement of claim sought a

‘declaratory judgement or declaratory order from this Honourable Court that [Mr. Rooney] is legally and constitutionally entitled to

compensation under and in accordance with the Disease of Animals Act 1966, and also under and in accordance with the Bovine

Tuberculosis (Attestation of the State and General Provisions) Order 1978 (SI 256) of 1978. The plaintiff also asks this Honourable

Court on making the declaratory order to grant the remedy or relief of exemplary damages or whatever relief that courts or the

Honourable court thinks fit”. The special summons came before the High Court on the 21st of December 1987. Mr. Justice Barr

directed that the matter proceed to plenary hearing which required the delivery of a Statement of Claim. On the 15th of January

1988, Mr. Rooney’s first Statement of Claim was delivered. A defence was delivered on the part of the State defendants on the 11th

of March 1988. Mr. Rooney amended the Statement of Claim thereafter, on 18th May 1988 and 1st March 1989. On the 16th of

October 1989, he sought and obtained an order from the then President of the High Court, Mr. Justice Hamilton, permitting him to

withdraw the existing Statement of Claim and to substitute a new Statement of Claim. Accordingly, on the 6th of November 1989, a

fresh Statement of Claim was filed in lieu of service. I will call this statement of claim the “November 1989 Statement of Claim”. This

was a very lengthy document running to 13 pages, and included a claim not simply for the alleged difference between the amount he

received and what he contended he was entitled to for the reactors which were slaughtered , but also very substantial damages

alleged to be consequential, and also for exemplary damages. The proceedings now named as defendants a large number of additional

bodies including the Ombudsman, ERAD, the Irish Farmers’ Association and a number of members of that association. It does not

appear that any order was ever obtained joining these parties as defendants although nothing turns on this. The claim in the

Statement of Claim repeated the relief sought in the special summons, but now also asked that a “special case” be tried in the

following terms:

“that the system of grant payments as operated by the first defendant in his implementation of the Act (No.6

of 1966) through the disease eradication schemes, are unconstitutionally illegal, when they are used as an

alternative to compensation, or in a manner that fails to comply with the compensation provisions of the 1937

constitution. That self disposal of reactor animals as per directions of the first defendant, in no way

whatsoever diminishes herd owners legal and constitutional right of entitlement compensation, or in no way

whatsoever relieves the first defendant of his duty to honour and safeguard such entitlement which is herd

owners as of right”.

The statement of claim also sought injunctions restraining the cooperation of the non-statutory scheme

compelling the use of the statutory compensation provisions and “consequential damages”.

The Three Motions

11 On the 2nd of February 1990, the State defendants attempted to deliver their defence. However, Mr. Rooney had in compliance

with the rules, written to the defendants extending the time for the delivery of a defence until the 25th of January 1990. When no

defence had been delivered as of that point, he issued on the same day (the 25th of January 1990), the motion for judgment in

default of defence, which was returnable for the 19th of February 1990. This is the motion for judgment which is the subject matter

of the first part of these proceedings, and I will refer to it hereafter as simply “the motion for judgment”. In the meantime, a number

of other parties to the proceedings, being the last named defendant, the Ombudsman, and the fifth, sixth and seventh named

defendants who were the representatives of the Irish Farmers’ Association, brought separate motions to strike out the claims against

them on the grounds that the November Statement of Claim disclosed no cause of action against them. All these matters came before

Mr. Justice Barron in the High Court on the 19th of February 1990. There is no dispute that Barron J. acceded to both applications to

strike out the portions of the claim against the respective defendants, that is the Ombudsman and the Irish Farmers’ Association

parties, and refused the plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the grounds that a defence had been delivered by the time the motion

came on.

12 The next step was that Mr. Rooney appealed these three orders to the Supreme Court, (Appeal No. 111 of 1990) and the case

appeared to have come before the Supreme Court on the 12th of October 1990 (Griffin, Hederman and O’Flaherty JJ.). On that

occasion however, the Supreme Court did not decide the appeal on the motions. Instead the court observed that the substance of

Mr. Rooney’s claim was that he contended that there was no power to have a non-statutory or extra-statutory scheme. In his special

summons he had sought the trial of a special case on this point, and accordingly the Supreme Court decided to adjourn the hearing of

the appeal on the motions and ordered that that special case be tried. Two things should be noted at this point. First, Mr. Rooney

told this Court that Mr. Justice Costello in the High Court had previously (on the 30th July 1990) refused to direct the hearing of a

special case and that accordingly the head note to the reported decision of the Supreme Court was wrong in suggesting that Mr.

Justice Costello had adjourned Mr. Rooney’s application for a special case. There is some secondary evidence of this in the papers, in

that in separate proceedings there is a reference by Mr. Rooney to the terms of an order of Costello J. of 30 July 1990 (but not the

order itself). However, this is not relevant to anything this Court has to decide, not least because Mr. Rooney clearly had sought the

hearing of a special case, and was happy to have it determined in accordance with the Supreme Court order. Second, there seems

little doubt, that the order of the Supreme Court of the 12th of October 1990, was made to accommodate Mr. Rooney in the hope of

short circuiting proceedings that were clearly already becoming over elaborate. A lay litigant, particularly with limited resources, could

find themselves caught in a procedural net, and the subject of motions and orders for costs, which might ultimately prevent the

substance of the case getting to hearing. Here it seems the court sought to cut to the heart of the case and ensure that it was

dealt with at an early stage and resolved one way or another. If Mr. Rooney succeeded, then he would get a remedy, and if he lost,

then at least he would know the outcome promptly. There was nothing to be gained from Mr. Rooney’s point of view in pursuing the

hearing of the appeals on the motions. They were only holding up the trial of the case. It was virtually certain that the court would

have to uphold the order striking out the proceedings against the Irish Farmers’ Association parties and the Ombudsman, and the only

question on the motion for judgment in default of defence, were the terms that the defendants would be permitted to deliver their

defence, which might involve some consideration of costs, but since Mr. Rooney was a lay litigant, such expenses were minimal.

Accordingly, the motions were a distraction from the case, and the order fixing the special case was in ease of Mr. Rooney. This step

ensured that the issue of primary concern to Mr. Rooney was heard and determined. There is no indication if it was brought to the

Supreme Court’s attention that Costello J. had refused an order fixing a special case (if indeed he did so) but even if so, the decision

of the Supreme Court to direct a the hearing of a special case was at worst an informality since it was made without a formal appeal

of the Costello J.'s order. Yet again however nothing turns on this aspect. Mr Rooney had been seeking the hearing of the special

case, and both parties acted upon the Supreme Court and argued the special case both in the High and Supreme Courts.

The Trial of the Special Case

13 The special case came on for hearing in the High Court very shortly thereafter in January 1991, before Lavan J., who delivered a

careful judgment and dismissed the claim. That decision was appealed to the Supreme Court. The appeal came on for hearing in

November 1991, before a three person court, McCarthy, O’Flaherty and Egan JJ. On the 19th of December 1991, Mr. Justice

O’Flaherty delivered a judgment with which the others members of the court agreed, dismissing the appeal on the special case. That

judgment is reported at [1991] 2 I.R. 540. In essence, O’Flaherty J. held that the Minister was entitled to set up a non-statutory

scheme. The Court could review the decision to establish such a scheme, but could only set it aside if the court was satisfied the

decision was mala fides or involved an abuse of power. The Court doubted that it had the power to require the Minister to make an

order under s.20 of the 1966 Act, but in any event, it certainly could not do so in the absence of proof of mala fides or an abuse of

power. It was not necessary for the court to inquire whether there was any constitutional requirement to provide compensation for

herd owners who have diseased animals, since even if the Minister was obliged to do so, he had done so by the terms of the non-

statutory scheme which had as O’Flaherty J. put it “in effect provided for this”.

14 I have obtained the order made by the Supreme Court in respect of the special case. The key portion of the order provides:

“IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the said Appeal be dismissed and that the said Judgment and Order of

the High Court do stand affirmed and that accordingly the Plaintiff’s claims as detailed in the Special Case (as

amended) do stand refused.

And in the circumstances of the case the Court makes no Order as to the costs of the said Appeal.”``

The facts that costs were not awarded against Mr. Rooney even though he clearly failed on the appeal, is in my view of some

significance. It certainly can hardly be characterised as hostility or unfairness to him, and was in fact a substantial indulgence.

The Adjourned Motions

15 Judgement having been delivered on the main issue the court then turned to deal with the motions which had been adjourned from

the 12th of October 1990 and pending the determination of the special case. As might have been anticipated the decision of the

court on the special case meant that these were matters of little controversy other than on the question of costs. The court

dismissed the appeals against the orders striking out the claims against (1) the Ombudsman, and (2) Donal McDaid, Patrick Delaney

and the IFA, and did so with costs in favour of those parties. The order in that appeal: (111/1990) is as follows:

“The Motion on the part of the Plaintiff pursuant to Notice of Appeal dated the 14th day of March 1990 by way of

Appeal from (inter alia) two Orders of the High Court (Mr. Justice Barron) both made on the 19th day of February

1990 whereby this action was dismissed as against (1) the Defendants Donal McDaid Patrick Delaney and the Irish

Farmers’ Association and (2) the Defendant the Ombudsman and for an Order seeing aside the said Orders and

referring the relevant Motions back to the High Court on the grounds and as set forth in the said Notice of Appeal

coming on for hearing before this Court this day

Whereupon and on reading the said Notice of Appeal the said Orders of the High Court (perfected on the 21st day

of February 1990) the Affidavits and documents referred to in the said Orders and the report of the learned Trial

Judge and on hearing the Plaintiff in person and the respective Counsel for the said Defendants

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the said Appeal be dismissed and that the said Orders of the High Court stand

affirmed accordingly

And on the application of Counsel for the Defendants Donal McDaid Patrick Delaney and the Irish Farmers’

Association IT IS ORDERED that the Plaintiff do pay to them the costs of this Appeal when taxed and ascertained.”

16 It seems quite clear that this order only deals with the two motions brought by the respective defendants to have the proceedings

struck out against them on the grounds that they were frivolous and vexatious and bound to fail. However, it appears that Mr.

Rooney had access to a transcript of the oral proceedings on 19 December 1991 and was later able to refer the Supreme Court to it

in proceedings which culminated in the judgment of Mr. Justice Finnegan (Unreported, Supreme Court, 9th March, 2010). I have not

seen the transcript but that judgment sets out the relevant exchange. McCarthy J. who was presiding was recorded as saying:

“In the circumstances no grounds have been advanced by the plaintiff in regard to the substantial nature of these

appeals as to whether or not the Ombudsman and the three defendants for the Irish Farmers’ Association should be

dismissed out of the action and having established that the orders made by Mr. Justice Barron were the correct

orders I will dismiss these appeals accordingly.”

O’Flaherty J. and Egan J. were recorded as agreeing. It is then stated that counsel for the State said:

“There is an appeal outstanding.”

This is clearly a reference to the motion for judgment in default of defence. McCarthy J. replied:

“I think effectively it would be better to let it stand.”

It seems clear therefore that the Court did not make a final order disposing the appeal on the motion for judgment. This is the genesis

of the first issue which this Court has to deal with.

Observations on the Motion for Judgment

17 Looked at from this remove, it seems at least possible to me that this was not an error or oversight on the part of the Court (as

Finnegan J. later suggested), but a well-intentioned attempt, if misguided and certainly unsuccessful as matters turned out, to allow

the proceedings to expire naturally, without the further aggravation that could be caused by further hearings and orders for costs. In

the light of the court’s determination of the special issue, there was no possible answer to the application brought by the defendants

to strike out the claims made against them. The motion for the judgment was also redundant because the High Court and the

Supreme Court had now determined the substance of the controversy between the plaintiffs and the defendant. It is true that Mr.

Rooney might have argued that technically he had been entitled to bring the motion, and therefore should recover costs, even if

there could be no question of entering judgment against the State defendants. However, Mr. Rooney was representing himself, and

therefore at most could have recovered expenses and would not have been entitled to a professional fee, if the matter had been

pressed to its logical conclusion. On the other hand, it would then be difficult to argue that all matters should not be pressed to their

logical conclusion and an order for costs made on the substantive appeal in favour of the Minister and the matter returned to the High

Court for an application to enter judgment in favour of the State parties with consequential costs. Certainly given the fact that Mr.

Rooney had been unsuccessful on the main appeal, the overall cost outcome on 19th December 1991 was favourable to him.

18 All of this is however necessarily speculative. Nothing happened in relation to the uncompleted motion for a very long time.

Eventually in 2009 the matter came before the Supreme Court again, and Finnegan J. delivered judgment on the 9th of March 2010,

(Hardiman and Macken JJ. concurring). Having recorded his conclusion that the motion for judgment remained outstanding, he

continued:

“There was clearly an oversight and no determination was made on the appellant’s appeal in relation to the motion

seeking judgment in default of defence.

By the date of the hearing of the motions before Mr. Justice Barron the defences had indeed been delivered and the

appellant’s complaint is that they were not delivered within the time limited by the Rules of the Superior Courts.

Ordinarily in these circumstances the only issue on the hearing of the motion would be in relation to the costs of

the motion. The action proceeded thereafter to a full hearing on the special case which necessarily involved

consideration of the defences delivered. Notwithstanding this the appellant seeks to be allowed to wind back the

clock and obtain judgment in default of defence. It is in the interests of justice that this outstanding issue in these

protracted proceedings be determined without further delay.”

Once again, this determination was favourable to the plaintiff. Even though it seemed clear that no useful order could be obtained by

the plaintiff at this point, nevertheless if he was insisting on a hearing of his entitlement to claim judgment in default of defence, then

that should be permitted. It is pursuant to this determination and order that the motion for judgment aspect of this matter comes

before this Court for determination. It is however regrettable that further delays occurred before it was heard. That may have been

due, at least in part, to the fact that other proceedings were being agitated at the same time.

The Next Steps in the Substantive Proceedings, 1987: No 1120 Sp

19 In the immediate aftermath of the decision of the Supreme Court on the 19th of December 1991, the parties did not take any step

to bring the matter back before the High Court to have any final order made in the proceedings. It does seem clear that on the

pleadings as they stood as of that point, there was nothing of substance left to be determined. While there was a claim for damages,

that claim was clearly contingent and consequential on the core issue which had already been extracted and determined by the

decision of O’Flaherty J. for the Supreme Court on the 19th of December 1991, and whether Mr. Rooney agreed with it or not, that

much certainly had been determined.

20 Mr. Rooney did not apply to have the motion for judgement appeal dealt with. Instead he pursued a number of other issues. It

appears that Mr. Rooney brought an application to the Supreme Court to have the two appeals— 111/1990 (the procedural appeals

including the motion for judgment and the striking out rulings), and 224/1991 (the decision on the special case)) reheard by a court of

five. There could be no question of any such order being made, and in due course the application was dismissed. The plaintiff then

sought to have an issue referred to the European Court of Justice. It appears that on the 27th of July 1992, Costello J. in the High

Court refused this order. Again, the order is not in the papers supplied to this Court but the matter is referred to in a number of the

chronologies submitted by Mr. Rooney. If Costello J. did refuse to make a reference – and I am prepared to accept that he did – then

he was entirely correct to do so, as at that stage it could not be said that on the pleadings as they stood that any issue of European

law was raised. Thereafter, in 1994, it appears that Morris P. made no order on a motion brought by Mr. Rooney for directions whether

his action had been fully determined by the delivery of the judgment of the Supreme Court on the special case proceedings. Again,

there is no record of this order among the papers, but I am prepared to accept the reference in Mr. Rooney’s chronology for present

purposes. It is not clear what argument was made on this motion by either party, but the fact that the application was brought by

Mr. Rooney does give some indication of Mr. Rooney’s thinking as of that point as to what, if anything, was left in the proceedings

1987 No. 1120 Sp. Court 6.

Commencement of Rooney No 2: The 1995 Proceedings

21 There followed a reasonably lengthy period during which nothing occurred in relation to the 1987 proceedings. In fact, and

unfortunately, it appears that in 1994 a further issue arose in relation to Mr. Rooney’s herd. When after testing it appeared that one

animal may have been a reactor, Mr. Rooney refused to move the reactor in accordance with the regulations, and insisted that he

was entitled to compensation under the 1966 Act. This, as was subsequently pointed out, was directly contrary to the outcome of

the decision in Rooney No 1. Whatever arguments he might wish to make about the correctness or comprehensiveness of the 1987

proceedings, it certainly had decided that he was not entitled to compensation under the 1966 Act. That decision was final.

Nevertheless there followed a very distressing stand off when the health of the cattle was put at risk. Eventually Mr. Rooney

commenced proceedings in 1995 against the State parties which has been referred to as “Rooney No. 2”. That was a comprehensive

challenge to the non-statutory scheme and involved oral evidence and a ten day hearing but which only came to trial ten years later

in 2004. I will return to the detail of those proceedings later at the appropriate point in this account.

22 Six years after the incident with his herd which gave rise to the Rooney No. 2 proceedings, the plaintiff once again applied in July

2000 to the Supreme Court to set aside the order of the Supreme Court in the proceedings 111/1990 (the three procedural motions)

and 224/1991 (special case determination). That was heard by the Supreme Court on a two day period on the 4th and 5th of July

2000. This was now the second time (at least) Mr. Rooney had sought to set aside the determination of the Supreme Court on the

19th December 1991. On the 23rd of October 2000, the Supreme Court delivered a judgment rejecting the application.

The Motion to Amend the Statement of Claim is issued: January 2001. An ‘Isaac Wunder’ Order is made in

Supreme Court.

23 Having failed to have the decision of the Supreme Court set aside Mr. Rooney brought a motion in January 2001 to amend the

November 1989 Statement of Claim. (Jumping ahead somewhat for the purposes of identification, this was the motion which was

eventually heard in the High Court in 2010, and the appeal from the High Court decision is the second issue in the present

application.) This was now ten years since the Supreme Court had delivered judgment on the special case.

However, that motion was not proceeded with at the time. Instead on the 12th March 2001, Mr. Rooney brought an application to the

Supreme Court seeking to have the decision of the Supreme Court on appeals 111/1991 and 224/1991 set aside on the grounds

apparently that he contended that the Supreme Court had been in error in directing the trial of a special case on the plaintiff’s action

when the facts were disputed. This was a challenge to the order of the 12th of October 1990 made by Griffin, Hederman and

O’Flaherty JJ., and was clearly yet a further, and even more futile attempt, to undermine the judgment of the Supreme Court on the

special case issue. The order of 12th October 1990, was clearly a final order. Moreover it granted relief which Mr. Rooney had sought,

and was acted on by him, the other parties, the High and Supreme Courts. No purpose could be served by entertaining the application

to seek to set aside an order directing the hearing of a special case which had been heard, determined and appealed, all more than a

decade previously. Moreover , only the previous year the Supreme Court had refused to set aside the decision in the special case The

Supreme Court in due course dismissed the application on the 5th of October 2001 and made an order restraining Mr. Rooney from

“taking any further step in these proceedings other than in relation to the taxation of costs whether in the High Court or this Court

except with the leave of this Court such leave to be sought by application in writing made to the registrar of this Court”. This is an

order popularly known as an Isaac Wunder order. The courts only make such orders with considerable reluctance. The order in this

case only related to the current proceedings, and only restrained Mr. Rooney from taking a further step in the proceedings without

leave of the Court. Thereafter, perhaps as a result of this order, things went quiet in the 1987 proceedings, and Mr. Rooney seems to

have turned his attention and energies to the 1995 proceedings.

The High Court hears Rooney No 2, the 1995 proceedings.

24 In 2004 Mr. Rooney’s claim in relation to the events of 1993-1996 came on for hearing before the High Court. Evidence was called

and there was a full hearing of the claim. The proceedings were at hearing for ten days. On the 13th of July 2004, Ms Justice Laffoy

delivered a 59 page judgment which dismissed the plaintiff’s claims. While the hearing before this Court on 9 December 2015 with

which this judgement is concerned with only involves matters in the 1987 proceedings, a number of the matters in the 1995

proceedings are relevant to these present proceedings. In the first place, the Statement of Claim in Rooney No. 2 is helpfully recorded

in the judgment of Laffoy J. It shows that the claim as formulated was closely connected to the 1987 proceedings. He sought to

include the Statement of Claim in Rooney No.1 in the 1995 proceedings, along with a further set of proceedings (the 1993

proceedings). The Statement of Claim provided as follows:

“1. The Plaintiff is a Farmer. The first, second and third Defendants are actively involved in the government through

the workings of the government or in the offering of legal advice to the government.

2. The statement of claim delivered on the 6th day of November, 1989 by John Rooney in Rooney v. The Minister

for Agriculture and Food [1987] No. 1120 Sp. Ct. 6 is included in this statement of claim (copy duly signed, annexed

to same).

3. Statement of claim delivered on the 2nd day of March, 1993 by John Rooney in Rooney v. The Minister for

Agriculture and Food 1993 No. 706P is included in this statement of claim (copy duly signed, annexed to same).

4. That the Bovine TB Eradication Scheme is being operated, contrary to Bunreacht na hÉireann, contrary to the

law of the European Union and Directives 64/432/EEC (as amended); 77/391/EEC, contrary to the European

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and, mal fides is specifically alleged.

5. That the Bovine TB Eradication Scheme as operated under the Bovine Tuberculosis (Attestation of the State and

General Provisions) Order, 1989, is being operated contrary to the objectives of the Diseases of Animals Act, 1966

(a consolidating Act) and further that the Bovine Tuberculosis (Attestation of the State and General Provisions)

Order, 1989, is ultra vires the Disease of Animals Act, 1966 and, that mala fides is specifically alleged.

6. The Plaintiff's cattle herd has been unlawfully restricted from the 7th day of April, 1993 and, mala fides is

specifically alleged.

7. That the Defendants, their servants or agents have maliciously interfered with and damaged the Plaintiff's

farming business causing loss and damage and further that the Plaintiff has been deprived of the peaceful

enjoyment of his possessions contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human

Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

8. That the Defendants, their servants or agents have breached the Plaintiff's constitutional right to privacy in their

manner of dealing with and passing of private and confidential sensitive constitutional communications dated 8th

March, 1994.

9. That the Defendants, their servants or agents have damaged the Plaintiff's reputation causing loss and damage.

10. That the Defendants, their servants or agents have trespassed upon the Plaintiff's property and chattels

causing loss and damage.

AND THE PLAINTIFF CLAIMS

(1) For loss and damages suffered at the hands of the Defendants, their servants or agents.

(2) Damages for Defendants, their servants or agents breaching of the Rule of Law.

(3) Costs: being time and monies expended in preparing for litigation.”

25 A number of points may be made about this Statement of Claim. First, the 1987 proceedings referred to are Rooney No.1, and the

proceedings with which this Court is concerned on these applications. The judgment of Laffoy J. records that Mr. Rooney informed the

Court that the 1993 proceedings referred to in paragraph 3 were no longer in existence. It is also important that the plaintiff’s claim

however formulated, was one for damages. Finally, it was specifically pleaded and claimed in general terms that the scheme was

contrary to the Constitution and contrary to the law of the European Union and specifically Directive 64/432/EEC and 77/391/EEC. No

particulars were sought of these pleas, and accordingly the argument was not restricted in any narrow way. Indeed, as Finnegan J.

later observed in his judgment on the appeal delivered on the 18th of November 2010, the argument ranged over issues which had

been determined in Rooney No. 1. As he stated:

“In what can only be regarded as a significant concession to the appellant the learned trail judge dealt with matters

which were clearly res judicata.”

26 Laffoy J. herself observed at page 41 of her judgment that the defendants had met the case by endeavouring to deal with all the

submissions made by the plaintiff:

“In particular, the defendants did not seek to rely on the well established jurisprudence that the doctrine of res

judicata extends to matters which might have been brought forward by a party to litigation as part of the subject in

contest but which were not brought forward because of negligence, inadvertence or even accident (Henderson v

Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100, which was recently followed by the Supreme Court in Carroll v Ryan [2003] 1 IR

309).”

Again, this approach taken by the defendants and the trial judge in Rooney No.2 can only be seen as being exceptionally fair to Mr.

Rooney.

27 I have set out the terms of the Statement of Claim because in the course of this appeal. Mr. Rooney handed in what he described

as an amended Statement of Claim which he said he had sought to deliver in Rooney No. 2 in the course of the proceedings but was

refused permission. The entirety of that Statement of Claim was underlined indicating that it was new. It contained 18 detailed

paragraphs and subparagraphs and subheadings and showed perhaps the effect of Mr. Rooney’s legal studies. For present purposes it

will be sufficient to identify the claims made by the plaintiff which were as follows:

“And the plaintiff claims

(i) A Declaration that Council Directive 77/391/EEC and 78/52/EEC have not been validly transposed into the law of

the Republic of Ireland.

(ii) A Declaration that the non-statutory system of reactor grants operating as part of the TB scheme and

brucellosis scheme is repugnant to the provisions of Article 15.2.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann.

(iii) A Declaration that the 1989 TB order is ultra vires first named Defendant's powers under the 1966 Act.

(iv) If necessary such order by way of injunction or mandamus directing first named Defendant to put in place a

statutory system of compensation for animals slaughtered under the instructions of official veterinarians acting as

servants or agents of the 1st named Defendant in the operation of the TB scheme and the Brucellosis Scheme.

(v) A Declaration that the bovine tuberculosis testing procedures applied by 1st named Defendant's servants or

agents, in respect of the bovine tuberculosis testing of the Plaintiff’s cattle herd, did not comply with the provisions

of Council Directive 64/432/EEC (as amended)

(vi) A Declaration that 1st named Defendant is precluded by the provisions of s.6 of the Diseases of Animals Act

1966 from imposing a charge or causing a charge to be levied on herd owners in respect of the costs of testing

animals under the TB and Brucellosis Schemes.

(vii) Damages for breach of constitutional rights.

(viii) Damages for trespass.

(ix) Such further Orders or Declaratory or other relief in keeping the Defendants' obligation under European Union

law and under Bunreacht na hÉireann as this Honourable Court deems and just.

(x) Further or other reliefs

(xi) Costs.”

For present purposes it is necessary to note the claim at paragraph (ii) that the statutory scheme was contrary to Article 15.2.1 of

the Constitution.

28 In a lengthy and careful judgment delivered on the 13th of July 2004, Ms. Justice Laffoy dismissed all the claims. Laffoy J.

dismissed the claim that the scheme was contrary to the Constitution, relying in part on the decision of Murphy J. in Grennan v The

Minister for Agriculture:

“Had the plaintiff complied with the requirements of the 1989 Order the contentious animal would have been one of

the animals slaughtered under the scheme in 1993 in the belief, or on the suspicion, of being affected with bovine

tuberculosis. Given the prevalence of the disease and the potential volume of reactors, I agree with the conclusion

of Murphy J. in the Grennan case that the scheme in place between 1993 and 1996 was an entirely reasonable

method of reconciling the interest of a herd owner, such as the plaintiff, whose diseased, or suspected diseased,

animal was directed to be slaughtered and the requirements of the common good in preventing the further spread of

disease and that the scheme accorded with the Constitution.”

In relation to the challenge that the scheme was contrary to European law, Laffoy J. was prepared to assume

a failure to implement the directive into Irish law, but since this was a claim for damages, held that the

plaintiff had suffered no loss:

“What happened was that the plaintiff's herd was lawfully restricted under Irish law. Shortly thereafter, when the

contentious animal was declared to be a reactor, despite being persistently urged to do so, the plaintiff refused to

have the animal slaughtered and to initiate the process which would have led to de-restriction. The plaintiff claims

damages for the losses he alleges flowed from the restriction of his herd between 1993 and 1996. That situation

was brought about by the plaintiff's own conduct.”

Later she held:

“The losses which the plaintiff alleges he incurred between 1993 and 1996 could have been wholly avoided if the

plaintiff had complied with the provisions of the 1989 Order in relation to herd restriction, herd testing and the

slaughter of reactors, to which he professes having no objection.”

Accordingly, the plaintiff had not established that there was a causal link between the losses in respect of which he claimed damages

and the State’s obligation to implement Article 3.2 of Directive 78/52/EEC. Even taking the narrow view and that the plaintiff was

confined solely to the loss in relation to the contentious animal, the plaintiff had simply not established by evidence that there would

have been any difference between the measure of compensation under such a scheme, and that which was available to him under the

non-statutory scheme.

The Appeal to the Supreme Court in Rooney No. 2

29 On appeal to the Supreme Court in 2009, it is clear that once again the argument was not limited to narrow issues. In particular,

the first substantive ground addressed by Finnegan J. at page 12 of his judgment was phrased in this way:

“The learned trial judge failed to deal with Article 15 of the Constitution and the decision of the Supreme Court in

O’Neill v Minister for Agriculture and Food [1997] 2 I.L.R.M. 435.

It seems clear therefore that the Article 15 issue had certainly been ventilated in the appeal. It is only fair to

record that Mr. Rooney took issue with this sentence in the judgement because he considered that it did not

properly recite the grounds he relied on. He said that he had relied on three Articles of the Constitution,

Article 15.2.1 Article 40.3 and Article 43, before Laffoy J. but the judgement did not record the fact that he

had relied on Article 15.2.1. He suggested however that Mr. Justice Finnegan’s judgement in the portion set

out above recited grounds which were not the grounds he had argued. He said:

“Mr. Justice Finnegan completely twisted what I said. I never said it. It is mentioned in the Supreme Court

judgement of 18th of November 2001 that Mr. Rooney argues – and I’ll say that slowly because important to take a

note – that Mr. Rooney argues that he relies on Article 15.2.1 as authority of the State cannot implement European

Union law using administrative rules and circulars. In my submissions to the Court and in my written and oral

submissions, the argument I put before those three judges were that Ireland could not implement EU law using

administrative rules and circulars. I used Brown v the Attorney General as the authority and I used Commission v

Belgium and both Ms. Justice Laffoy and Ms. Justice Macken and Mr. Justice Hardiman and Mr. Justice Finnegan on

the transcript the DAR will bear this out. I solely relied on Article 15.2.1 and O’Neill v Minister for Agriculture is

absolute authority that the Irish Government the Executive could not change the law, could not bring in a non-

statutory scheme because it was repugnant to Article 15.2.1 of the Constitution. Now I am very – I don’t like to

say it, but it was a crime upon Bunreacht na hÉireann to put that in a judgement and the DAR will bear it out.”

(The DAR is a digital audio recording system which is operative in the courts.)

It is not necessary to address the detail of Mr. Rooney’s criticism here of the manner in which the matter is addressed in the

judgement of Mr. Justice Finnegan. Mr. Rooney’s statement does seem to make it clear that he did rely on Article 15.2.1 of the

Constitution and O’Neill v The Minister for Agriculture [1997] 2 I.L.R.M. 435 , and accordingly the argument that a non-statutory

scheme was a breach of that Article was advanced before the Supreme Court.

The Motion to Amend the Statement of Claim in the 1987 proceedings

30 It appears in the aftermath of the decision in Rooney No 2 that Mr. Rooney made an application in 2006 to reactivate the

application to amend the Statement of Claim in Rooney No. 1. Clarke J. re-entered the motion. It appears there was a further lengthy

hearing before Smith J. on the question of whether that application was now captured by the terms of the decision of the Supreme

Court on the 5th of October 2001 restraining further action without leave of the Supreme Court. Smith J. held that the application

was covered by the Order and that accordingly the application could not proceed since leave had not been obtained. That matter

was appealed to the Supreme Court in circumstances where the court also addressed the question of whether the Motion for

Judgment had been disposed of or still remained to be determined under Appeal No. 111/1990. In relation to Appeal No. 217/2007,

Finnegan J. held (in the same judgment delivered on the 9th March 2010) that the Isaac Wunder order “should be interpreted narrowly

and as relating to the special case only”. Accordingly, the High Court should proceed to hear and determine the claim to amend the

Statement of Claim. Finnegan J. came to this conclusion because he considered that the order had been made while this decision in

the special case is pending. In fact, as I think Mr. Rooney recognised this was probably an error, since the vexatious litigant order

was made 10 years after the special case had been determined, but if so it favoured him. The thrust of the judgement was clearly

directed towards permitting Mr. Rooney to bring the application. Again, this was an order in favour of Mr. Rooney and which was, if

anything, generous to him.

31 Pursuant to this decision of the Supreme Court of the 9th of March 2010, the matter came back before Mr. Justice Murphy in the

High Court on the 18th of November 2010. This should be recalled was an application to amend the Statement of Claim in Rooney No.

1 in relation to proceedings issued in 1987 and a final version of a Statement of Claim delivered in 1989 and adjudicated upon by both

the High Court and Supreme Court as of December 1991. On the argument to this appeal Mr. Rooney said that it was “practically

similar” to the amended Statement of Claim which he had not been permitted deploy in Rooney No. 2. There are substantial

similarities, but the amended Statement of Claim here contains additional parties and some different claims. In particular, and

surprisingly, it purports to seek to make claims against both the IFA defendants and the Ombudsman who had of course been struck

out of the proceedings in 1991 and were not involved in the 1995 proceedings at all. The Statement of Claim contains 20 paragraphs

and the claims are as follow:

"(i) A Declaration that Council Directive 77/391/EEC and 78/52/EEC have not been validly transposed into the law of

the Republic of Ireland.

(ii) A Declaration that Council Directive 64/432/EEC (as amended) has not been validly transposed in to the law of

the Republic of Ireland.

(iii) A Declaration that the non-statutory system of reactor grants operating as part of the TB scheme and

Brucellosis Scheme is repugnant to the provisions of Article 15.2.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann.

(iv) A Declaration that the 1978 TB order is ultra vires first named Defendants’ powers under the 1966 Act.

(v) If necessary such order by way of injunction or mandamus directing 1st named Defendant to put in place a

statutory system of compensation for animals slaughtered under the instructions of official veterinarians acting as

servants or agents of the first named defendant in the operation of the TB Scheme and the Brucellosis Scheme.

(vi) A Declaration that the bovine tuberculosis testing procedures applied, by first named Defendant's servants or

agents, in respect of the bovine tuberculosis testing of Plaintiff’s cattle herd, did not comply with the provisions of

Council Directive 64/432/EEC (as amended).

(vii) A Declaration that 1st named Defendant is precluded by the provisions of s.6 of the Diseases of Animals Act,

1966 from imposing a charge or causing a charge to be levied on herd owners in respect of the costs of testing

animals under the TB and Brucellosis Schemes.

(viii) A Declaration that the 6th named Defendant by its predecessor the National Farmers Association negotiated

with the 1st, 2nd and/or 3rd named Defendants the bringing into force of non-statutory TB reactors grants in

respect of cattle slaughtered under the TB scheme (at the direction of the 1st named Defendant).

(ix) A Declaration that the 1st named Defendant his servants or agents wrongfully and directly interfered with the

Plaintiff’s cattle herd.

(x) A Declaration that the (Ombudsman) last named defendant failed to investigate fairly or adequately the

substance of Plaintiff’s said allegations.

(xi) A Declaration that the first named Defendant his servant or agent from after the 19th day of December 1990

knowingly operated an unlawful and unstatutory reactor grant/movement permit based direction to slaughter

scheme in the face of the High Court decision handed down by Mr. Justice Lardner in Lucey & Madigan and The

Minister for Agriculture and Food [1989] No. 64 Judicial Review.

(xii) Damages for breaches of constitutional rights.

(xiii) Damages for trespass.

(xiv) Such further Orders or Declaratory or other relief in keeping with the Defendants’ obligations under European

Union law and under Bunreacht na hÉireann deems meet and just.

(xv) Further or other relief.

(xvi) Costs."

It is apparent that the there are broad similarities between the proposed amendment, and what was sought to be introduced in the

1995 proceedings. For present purposes the significance is however the fact that both documents include a specific plea that the

non-statutory scheme was contrary to Article 15 of the Constitution and European law, as it was contended that the non-statutory

scheme should have been provided for and administered on a statutory basis. As we have seen it does appear that this matter was

argued to some extent in Rooney No 2.

A Third Set of Proceedings: 2013

32 Before turning to the two issues which were the subject of the hearing on the 9th of December 2015, it is necessary to address

one further set of proceedings. Almost three years ago on the 19th of December 2012, Mr. Rooney commenced a further set of

proceedings raising complaints about the manner in which the Supreme Court had dealt with his previous appeals seeking an injunction

restraining the execution of costs orders that had been made against him. A Statement of Claim was delivered on the 14th of March

2013. Paragraph 4 referred to 1985 dispute (“the 1985 proceedings”) and paragraph 5 to the 1993 dispute (“the 1995 proceedings”).

In respect of each set of proceedings he maintained that the “real question and controversy” had not been dealt with. The reference

to “real question and controversy” is a reference to the test normally applied in an application to amend pleadings. He sought

declarations among other things that the proceedings had not reflected the true issues between the parties, and consequently that

those issues had not merged in the judgments in both cases. In replies to particulars he confirmed that he was not seeking to impugn

the judgments delivered in the 1987 and 1995 proceedings. However, he also brought a motion in the same proceedings seeking to set

aside both judgments contending among other things, that it was “beyond argument that reactor grants are repugnant to the

provisions of Article 15.2.1 of the Constitution”. The proceedings also made complaints about the conduct of some of the members of

the judiciary who have heard Mr. Rooney’s cases.

33 The proceedings were case managed by the late Mr. Justice Feeney. As might have been predicted, an application was brought by

the defendants to strike out the proceedings on the grounds that they failed to disclose a cause of action and were frivolous and

vexatious and bound to fail. On the 4th of July 2013, Feeney J. delivered a further lengthy judgment (Unreported, High Court). At

page 23 of the transcript of the judgment he observed, correctly in my view:

“It is manifest from the judgments of all courts and in particular from the judgments in Rooney No.2 that Mr. Rooney

was given every opportunity to make the case he sought to make based upon his claim as made by him and

formulated by him in his pleadings. Mr. Rooney pleaded his own case. The claims in those proceedings were

considered after he had been given a full opportunity to expound such claims. Now after he has lost he seeks to

reformulate his claim based upon a different basis which he did not plead. He cannot do that as the case is

complete and the reason was no duty on either the lawyer of the other side or on the court or the judges to direct

or advise or identify any matter to be pleaded or claimed by Mr. Rooney. It was a matter for Mr. Rooney to ensure

that any question and controversy was identified by him and pleaded by him and it was not for any other person.

The claimed breach of duty is a claim based upon an obligation to identify the real issues. There is no such duty.

The duty on the court is to decide the case as pleaded by a plaintiff, lay or otherwise. The duty on the lawyers for

the defence is to defend the case as pleaded and not to identify other or extra or real issues that might have been

pleaded by the Plaintiff.”

Feeney J. referred with approval to a judgment of Mr. Justice Michael White in Rayan Restaurant v Keane & anor (17th of January

2012) approving Canadian authority which identified the following matters as tending to show that a proceeding is vexatious:

“(a) the bringing up of one or more actions to determine an issue which has already been determined by a court of

competent jurisdiction.

(b) Where it is obvious that an action cannot succeed or where the action would lead to no possible good or if no

reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief.

(c) Where the action is brought for an improper purpose including harassment and oppression of other parties by

multivarious proceedings brought for purposes other than the assertion of legitimate rights.

(d) Where issues tend to be rolled forward in to subsequent actions and are repeated and supplemented often with

actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings.

(e) Where the person instituting proceedings has failed to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings.

(f) Where the respondent persistently takes unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions.”

Accordingly, Mr. Justice Feeney granted the defendants' application. It was submitted on behalf of the State parties that this

decision was not under appeal. Mr. Rooney did not dispute this but did remark at one point that he intended to bring an application to

set it aside (as well as the judgment in 1991 and another he referred to as 387/2004)

34 A further twist in the story comes because an application had been made to the European Court of Human Rights by Mr. Rooney.

He complained that the 1987 and 1995 proceedings had not been disposed of within a reasonable time as was his entitlement under

Article 6.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”). Article 6.1 so far as relevant reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to … a hearing within a reasonable

time by [a] … tribunal …”

The European Court of Human Rights delivered a very clear judgment reciting the events in these cases and in particular the fact that

the judgment of the 9th of March 2010, had identified the fact that the motion for judgment had not been dealt with by reason of a

clear “oversight”, and that the motion to amend the pleadings was not itself captured by the vexatious litigant order. Since these

matters remained in being, the 1987 proceedings had not been determined within a reasonable time. The Court also awarded limited

compensation to Mr. Rooney. Although he claimed €65,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and €600,000 for pecuniary loss the

court ruled that he should be entitled to €26,000.

35 The decision of the European Court of Human Rights established that Mr. Rooney’s proceedings had not been completed within a

reasonable time; a conclusion that is beyond argument in the unfortunate circumstances of these cases. However, as the recital of

the proceedings may indicate, while it is regrettably clear that there were unsatisfactory, and ultimately unacceptable delays in the

resolution of the matters in this case, it cannot be said that Mr. Rooney has not been afforded both considerable court time and

resources, not least in the latest application.

36 It is apparent from this lengthy recital that what came before this Court on the 9th of December 2015 were the two outstanding

aspects of the 1987 proceedings, namely, the motion for judgment in default of defence refused by Mr. Justice Barron on the 19th of

February 1990, and which the Supreme Court did not formally deal with on the 19th of December 1991, and the application to amend

the Statement of Claim which was initiated in 2001 , re-entered on the 31st of July 2006, determined and refused by Mr. Justice

Murphy on the 18th of November 2010 , and appealed to this Court.

Motion for Judgment in Default of Defence

37 As Finnegan J. observed, when determining that the motion for judgment had not been formally dealt with by the Supreme Court,

the matter itself was one which normally would not trouble any court. Pleadings are necessary so that the respective parties and the

court know the matters which are an issue which have to be determined. Where a Statement of Claim is amended, time extended,

and a motion issued, it is virtually unheard of, and indeed would often be unjust, if the court were to enter judgment against a

defendant who wished to defend the proceedings and produced a defence. In such circumstances the normal issue is only whether an

order for costs should be made in favour of the moving party, and if a formal order is necessary to extend the time for delivery of the

defence. In this case, the position was even stronger in that the State parties had already delivered a defence to the claim as

originally formulated.

38 The position of the parties such as the Ombudsman and the Irish Farmers’ Association is not relevant: once it was determined,

correctly, that the claim against them should be struck out, then there could be no question of requiring them to enter a defence. It

is very difficult to conceive therefore of circumstances in which it could be seriously asserted that because of the failure to deliver

the defence by the 25th of January 1990, that Mr. Rooney should have been entitled to judgment against the State defendants. It

would be surreal to contemplate granting a default judgment now, when the proceedings had been heard, decided, appealed and

determined against Mr Rooney a quarter of a century ago. Nevertheless, Mr. Rooney was entitled to have the issue determined, and it

was for this purpose that this aspect of the matter was listed for hearing.

39 In the event, on the hearing of this appeal, when asked why the High Court was wrong not to have granted judgment Mr. Rooney

made it clear he did not seek judgment or any other relief which the motion sought. He said:

“You have actually hit the nail on the head. The court shouldn’t grant judgment against the defendants. Do you

know what the court should do? The court should allow me to put in a proper statement of claim.”

He repeated this:

“The court should allow a proper statement of claim to go in so that takes us to the amended statement of claim.”

Mr. Rooney confirmed that this was the issue in the second appeal, and explained his position as follows:

“Really all this 28 years, there is a very simple solution to this and that is, the 1987 proceedings cries out for not a

farmer’s statement of claim. I would class the statement of claim that was delivered on 6th of November 1999, it is

a very good farmer’s statement of claim but it is not a lawyer’s statement of claim and it doesn’t assist the court

and I’ll tell you what it doesn’t allow the court to do with respect Judge O’Donnell, Judge Clarke and Judge Dunne, it

doesn’t allow the court uphold the Constitution. It doesn’t facilitate it because the only way the statement – the

amended statement of claim – does, in my respectful submission, allow the court uphold Article 15.2.1 because it

has it in it. All the 1987 proceedings, they cry out for a simple, they cry out for the amended statement of claim.

Say, for example, for the declaration of the TB Scheme is repugnant to Article 15.2.1 because it’s – do you know

what the department done, the IFA done, in my respectful submission, in August 1976? They put the Department of

Agriculture in breach of Article 15.2.1. When I say don’t give judgment, in case you three judges have

misinterpreted me, I would say don’t give judgment against the department, give them a chance to defend it but

don’t give judgment on the basis that you’re allowing me, you accept the court accepts that I have a right as of

course an order 27 of the Rules of the Superior Courts I have the right to deliver a proper statement of claim

without liberty anybody …”

40 It will be apparent therefore, that Mr. Rooney recognised, sensibly, that the order Mr. Justice Barron made was itself

unimpeachable. The only possible issue in relation to it, was the absence of a formal order extending time for delivery of the defence

and the question of costs. However, in circumstances where the Department had already a defence delivered and on file, and the

case proceeded to hearing and the special case was determined both in the High Court and Supreme Court, any question of extending

time for delivery of the defence is irrelevant. The defence delivered was treated as effective for the purposes of both the High Court

and Supreme Court hearings, where in addition, considerable latitude was afforded to Mr. Rooney in arguing his case. In those

circumstances, it would be an act of futility, which would only add to the surreal aspects of this case, if this Court were to go

through the motions of extending time now.

One other possible issue on the motion is costs. Mr. Justice Barron did not award costs to the plaintiff. Although Mr. Rooney did not

ask us to address that matter specifically, I propose to do so. Normally when a defendant does not lodge a defence within the time

limited by the rules or within the time extended by the plaintiff, costs are awarded to the Plaintiff unless there are countervailing

factors. Here however, there were three features of the case. First, Mr. Rooney had been very quick to issue the motion for judgment

which he issued on the 25th of January 1990, the day the time extended by him expired. That was the earliest possible date on which

he could have brought the motion for judgment. Second, since he was not legally represented he could not obtain an order for costs,

but could have obtained at best an order for the payment of his expenses. Third, and perhaps most critically, the Supreme Court on

the same day dismissed his appeal on the substantive issue, but did not make any order for costs. In the circumstances Mr. Rooney

got very much the better part of the Court’s ruling on costs that day, and it is perhaps understandable that the Court did not

proceed to determine the motion for judgment and award expenses to Mr. Rooney. In the circumstances I would dismiss Mr. Rooney’s

appeal against Barron J.’s order. I will deal with the question of costs of the appeal on this point at the end of this judgment.

The Motion to Amend the Statement of Claim.

41 As the extract from the transcript of the proceedings above indicate, Mr. Rooney’s substantial application was that to amend the

Statement of Claim in proceedings 1987 No. 1120 Sp. Court 6. That application must be approached on the basis that the

determination of the Supreme Court of the special case decided the core legal issue raised in that case. The matters which remained

on the pleadings (damages and costs) were purely consequential upon a successful determination of the special case. Once that was

determined against Mr. Rooney, there was no independent claim giving rise to these reliefs, and had the matter been pressed to a

conclusion in 1991, there could have been no answer to an application to dismiss the claim, with all probability of an award of

additional costs being made against Mr. Rooney. This application is therefore not an application to amend proceedings not yet heard

so that the true issues in controversy between the parties can be determined, as Mr Rooney argued. Rather it is an attempt to graft

a new argument on to a case that, if not dead, was on life support.

42 The application to amend the proceedings must also be viewed against the background of the multiple other applications brought

by Mr. Rooney and the claims made which were determined in the 1987, 1995 and 2013 proceedings. Furthermore, in that regard it is

in my view particularly noteworthy that in the 1995 proceedings the State defendants did not rely on Henderson v Henderson (1843)

3 Hare 100 or the principle of res judicata, and the court in turn allowed Mr. Rooney to address issues that might otherwise be

considered to have been determined in the 1987 proceedings. The clear intention of both the defendants in the case, and the court,

was to allow Mr. Rooney to ventilate his claims untrammelled by the requirements of both law and procedure that normally constrain

litigants – and for good reason.

43 It is apparent that the application to amend the Statement of Claim is to introduce an argument touched on in the oral argument

cited above, namely, that the existence of a non-statutory grant scheme is a breach of Article 15.2.1 of the Constitution. This

argument had been ventilated by Mr. Rooney indirectly in the proceedings before Feeney J. and is closely related to the claims

debated in 1987 and 1995.

44 While this application is nominally to amend the proceedings commenced in 1987, it is in fact an attempt to introduce in to the

claim an entirely new legal claim as to the alleged invalidity of the non-statutory scheme. In addressing this application it is I think

worth asking what the position would be if fresh proceedings were commenced in December 2015, in relation to the alleged invalidity

of a scheme in relation to events which occurred in 1987. I think it is plain that no such proceedings would be issued because any

sensible litigant would recognise that they were doomed to fail. Any claim for damages would be barred by the provisions of the

Statute of Limitations. Any claim for equitable relief would be met by a claim of laches. Furthermore, the capacity of the Court to hear

and determine factual matters which occurred almost 30 years previously must be questioned. However, if the plaintiff attempted to

commence new proceedings arising out of matters which had been the subject of an earlier case, any such proceedings would be

bound to fall foul of the rule in Henderson v Henderson which has been restated in A v The Medical Council [2003] 4 IR 302, and

Carroll v Ryan [2003] 1 IR 309. If the issues raised were not already res judicata because of the determination made in those

proceedings, then they were matters which plainly could have been raised in 1987 and addressed. When it is further appreciated that

notwithstanding these principles, Mr. Rooney was allowed in the course of the 1993 proceedings to make extensive argument as to

the legality and alleged invalidity of the non-statutory scheme, then such a conclusion would be irresistible. Indeed, Mr. Rooney

recognised as much when asked why he had not commenced separate proceedings he replied:

“Sure I’d be entitled to be kicked out in Henderson v Henderson because it [the claim] should be in the first ones.”

45 In my view Mr. Rooney’s analysis is correct. Furthermore, the logic of this analysis cannot be avoided by framing the application as

one to amend the Statement of Claim in proceedings which have been determined in substance and have been dormant for a quarter

of a century. The principle in Henderson v Henderson and A v the Medical Council, and Carroll v Ryan, is that court resources and

judicial time should not be wasted by bringing further proceedings to advance claims which could have been advanced in earlier

proceedings. Nor should an opposing party be subjected to the cost and stress involved in repeated court applications which seek to

ventilate matters which could have been advanced in one set of proceedings. That logic applies here with greater, indeed almost

overwhelming, force.

46 In Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 A.C. 1 Lord Bingham identified the principle is having much in common with cause of action

estoppel and issue estoppel :

“the underlying public interest is the same: that there should be finality in litigation and that a party should not be

twice vexed in the same matter”.

Later Lord Bingham said: ‘there will rarely be a finding of abuse unless the later proceedings involve what the court regards as unjust

harassment of a party.”

In a later case Woodhouse v Consignia plc [2002] 1 W.L.R. 2258 Lord Justice Brooke observed:

“at least as important is the general need in the interests of justice to protect the respondents to successive applications in such

circumstances from oppression. The rationale for the rule in Henderson v. Henderson… is a rule of public policy based on the

desirability, in the general interest as well as that of the parties themselves, the litigation should not drag on forever and that the

defendant should not be pressed by successive suits when one would do.”

These observations apply with peculiar force in this case. There were two full hearings and appeals and multiple applications to

challenge and set aside those proceedings, all of them unsuccessful. A further round of argument in the High Court and almost

inevitably on appeal would undoubtedly amount to oppression and unjust harassment of a party which has been the subject of

repeated court proceedings. In my view it makes no difference in this regard that the 1987 proceedings were not formally concluded.

The principle is not dependent on a conclusion of the prior proceedings, although that will normally be the case. It is based upon the

fact that arguments are sought to be advanced later which could have been advanced at an earlier stage and determined, and where

subsequent attempts to ventilate the arguments amounts to harassment.

47 It may be that Mr. Rooney is entitled to complain about the time it has taken to bring these proceedings to their formal conclusion.

But he cannot doubt that he has received much more court time and attention than most litigants and certainly than those

professionally represented. Mr. Rooney has had not just one but two full opportunities to ventilate claims in relation to the non-

statutory scheme in the High Court, and to have those adjudications appealed to and considered by the Supreme Court. He has also

had separate proceedings heard in the High Court in which he sought to set aside those judgments because they did not deal with

what he now considers to be the true issues in controversy, that is, the claims he now seeks to include in the proposed amended

Statement of Claim. In addition he has made numerous applications to seek to undermine, set aside or qualify the effect of the

judgments in these cases. On this occasion the State respondents, as they are entitled to, advance the argument that the proposed

amendment should be refused on the grounds that it raises arguments, which could plainly have been advanced and determined in the

1987 proceedings when in the High Court and Supreme Court in 1990 and 1991. This argument is in my view well founded, and

accordingly, and in particular given the length of time involved in the litigation of all conceivable claims raised by Mr. Rooney, I would

dismiss the appeal against the order of Mr. Justice Murphy refusing to permit amendment of the Statement of Claim.

Complaints

48 During the oral argument in this appeal Mr, Rooney referred to his complaints made against members of the judiciary including

members of the Supreme Court. In addition he objected to 7 judges hearing his case. He also requested that I “take possession” of a

letter to the Chief Justice of the 28th of July and “act upon the said notification of judicial misconduct/judicial misbehaviour”. The

letter rehearses many of Mr. Rooney’s complaints about the outcome of the various proceedings, that these remaining issues in the

1987 proceedings had not been heard and complaints that his correspondence has not been dealt with. I record these matters here

for the sake of completeness. I have set out the progress of these and related proceedings at some length and identified some of the

difficulty of ascertaining all the details of the various cases and applications. I attach to this judgment a tentative chronology,

identifying the source of the information. Other than doing so, and dealing in this judgment with the two outstanding matters from the

1987 proceedings, I do not consider that I should take any further step in relation to these matters. I wish to make it clear that these

matters have not influenced my consideration of the substantive matters raised by Mr. Rooney.

Costs

49 It follows from the foregoing that both applications brought by Mr. Rooney have failed, and the next issue in this Court is the costs

of these appeals. It is also apparent that the next step in the 1987 proceedings would be a formal application to the High Court to

dismiss the claim in the light of the determination of the special case and perhaps consequential costs orders. I am reluctant to press

these matters to their logical conclusion, (as my predecessors may have been in 1991) but will do so if there is no other possible

resolution. The element of finality and certainty is long overdue in these proceedings. That is the right vindicated in the decision of

the ECtHR. It is apparent however that the proceedings have been tortuous and have imposed a very severe burden on all the parties

concerned. Mr. Rooney while unsuccessful, has, in my view, been motivated by genuine belief that he has been treated unfairly. At

certain points it is apparent that he seemed anxious to resolve matters with State authorities, although his expectations may have

been unrealistic. He also expressed concerns about the pursuit by the State of “massive costs”. On the opening of this appeal he

raised the question of mediation. Counsel for the State parties was not in a position to respond at that point without instructions, and

indeed it seemed preferable that the Court should deal with the matters raised in this appeal so that the legal issues could be brought

to finality. The Court will however adjourn the case for a period more lengthy than normal to allow the parties to consider the entire

position and whether it is possible even at this stage to come to any form of agreed resolution in the light of this decision and its

clear implications. If that is not possible, the Court will proceed to deal with costs on the 5th of April 2016.

Appendix One: Chronology of the Proceedings

Date Proceedings Case Number (if Source of information Additional

applicable) sources

19/11/1987 Special Summons issued by John 1987 No. 1120 Tab 8, Index to Condensed .

Rooney. Sp. Ct.6 Book of Appeal

21/12/1987 High Court Order by Mr. Justice Barr: 1987 No. 1120 John Rooney's Chronology, .

case sent for plenary hearing. Sp. Ct.6 Pg 11. of Plaintiff's

Submissions

15/01/1988 Mr. Rooney's first Statement of Claim 1987 No. 1120 Tab 13, Index to .

filed. Sp. Ct.6 Condensed Book of Appeal

11/03/1988 State Defendants' Defence filed. 1987 No. 1120 Tab 14, Index to .

Sp. Ct.6 Condensed Book of Appeal

18/05/1988 John Rooney's amended Statement of 1987 No. 1120 Tab 15, Index to .

Claim filed. Sp. Ct.6 Condensed Book of Appeal

01/03/1989 John Rooney's amended Statement of 1987 No. 1120 Tab 16, Index to .

Claim filed. Sp. Ct.6 Condensed Book of Appeal

06/11/1989 John Rooney's "November 1989 1987 No. 1120 Tab 19, Index to .

Statement of Claim" filed. Sp. Ct.6 Condensed Book of Appeal

25/01/1990 Notice by John Rooney to the 1987 No. 1120 Tab 20, Index to .

Defendants for a motion for judgment Sp. Ct.6 Condensed Book of Appeal

in default of defence (returnable 19

February 1990).

02/02/1990 Attempted Delivery of Defence by the 1987 No. 1120 Tab 21, Index to .

State Defendants. Sp. Ct.6 Condensed Book of Appeal

19/02/1990 Order by Mr Justice Barron to dismiss 1987 No. 1120 Tab 3, Index to Condensed .

the Ombusdman as a party to the Sp. Ct.6 Book of Appeal

Rooney No.1 proceedings.

19/02/1990 Order by Mr Justice Barron to dismiss 1987 No. 1120 Tab 4, Index to Condensed .

Donal McDaid, Patrick Delaney and Sp. Ct.6 Book of Appeal

the IFA as parties to the Rooney No.1

proceedings

19/02/1990 Order by Mr Justice Barron to dismiss 1987 No. 1120 Tab 5, Index to Condensed .

John Rooney's motion for judgment in Sp. Ct.6 Book of Appeal

default of judgment.

14/03/1990 Notice of Appeal. 1987 No. 1120 Tab 2, Index to Condensed .

Sp. Ct.6 Book of Appeal

30/07/1990 Adjournment of the Special Case by . John Rooney's Chronology, .

Costello J. Pg 12. of Plaintiff's

Submissions

12/10/1990 Supreme Court Hearing of Appeal No. . Book of Appeal 111/1990, John Rooney's

111/1990 before Griffin, Hederman Tab 2, Book of Appeal Chronology, Pg

and O'Flaherty JJ. (Case adjourned Handed up 9 December 13. of Plaintiff's

pending trial of the Special Case). 2015 Submissions

18/01/1991; Hearing of the Special case in the . John Rooney's Chronology, .

22/01/1991; High Court before Lavan J. Pg 13. of Plaintiff's

23/01/1991; Submissions

24/01/1991

16/05/1991 Judgment of Lavan J. in the Special . Book of Appeal 111/1990, John Rooney's

Case dismissing the Plaintiff's case. Tab 1, Book of Appeal Chronology, Pg

Handed up 9 December 13. of Plaintiff's

2015 Submissions

19/12/1991 Supreme Court judgment delivered by SC Nos 111/1990 Book 2- Judgments- Tab 1- .

O'Flaherty J. in the Special Case. and 224/1991 Reported at [1991] 2 I.R.

540.

19/12/1991 Supreme Court dismisses Plaintiff's Appeal No John Rooney's Chronology, .

Appeal No. 111 of 1990 in respect of 111/1990 Pg 14. of Plaintiff's

appeals against the orders to strike Submissions. Also alluded

out the claims against the to in the judgment of Mr

Ombudsman, Donal McDaid, Patrick Justice Finnegan on the 9th

Delaney and the IFA March 2010.

27/05/1992 Plaintiff applies to have Appeals Appeal No John Rooney's Chronology, .

111/1990 and 224/1991 heard before 111/1990 and Pg 14 of Plaintiff's

a five judge constituted Supreme Appeal No Submissions.

Court. 217/2007

27/07/1992 Plaintiff's application to have the . John Rooney's Chronology, .

matter referred to the CJEU for a Pg 14 of Plaintiff's

preliminary ruling is rejected. Submissions.

04/07/1994 Morris P. makes no order on a motion . John Rooney's Chronology, .

brought by Mr. Rooney for directions Pg 14 of Plaintiff's

whether his action had been fully Submissions.

determined.

23/11/1994 Fresh proceedings are dismissed by . Submissions of the .

the High Court in John Rooney v. The Respondents, p.6.

Minister for Agriculture, Record No.:

1993/706P

04/05/2000; Supreme Court hearing of Rooney . John Rooney's Chronology, .

05/05/2000 No.2 to set aside Appeal 111/1990 Pg 14-15 of Plaintiff's

(Procedural issues) and 224/1991 Submissions.

(Special Case)

23/10/2000 Supreme Courts delivers its judgment . John Rooney's Chronology, .

in Rooney No.2 rejecting the Plaintiff's Pg 15 of Plaintiff's

application to set aside Appeals Nos. Submissions.

111/1990 and 224/1991

08/01/2001 Plaintiff brings a Motion to amend the . John Rooney's Chronology, .

Statement of Claim delivered on 6 Pg 15 of Plaintiff's

November 1989. Submissions.

12/03/2001 Plaintiff brings a motion seeking to . John Rooney's Chronology, .

have the decisions of the Supreme Pg 15 of Plaintiff's

Court in Appeals Nos. 111/1991 and Submissions.

224/1991 set aside.

05/10/2001 Supreme Court rejects Plaintiff's . John Rooney's Chronology, .

motion to overturn the decisions of Pg 15 of Plaintiff's

the Supreme Court in Appeals Nos. Submissions.

111/1991 and 224/1991

05/10/2001 Supreme Court makes an Issac . John Rooney's Chronology, .

Wunder order against John Rooney. Pg 15 of Plaintiff's

Submissions.

13/07/2004 Laffoy J. delivers her judgment in the No 1995 No. Book 2-Judgments- Tab 3 .

High Court in respect of the Rooney 8836P

No. 2 proceedings.

19/06/2007 Order by Smyth J. that Issac Wunder . Referred to by Finnegan J. .

Order prevented the Plaintiff from in his judgment at p. 6,

seeking to amend the Statement of Book 2-Judgments, Tab 4.

Claim in the Rooney No. 1 proceedings

09/03/2010 Judgment of Finnegan J. (Hardiman Appeal No Book 2-Judgments- Tab 3 .

and Macken JJ. Concurring) dismissing 111/1990 and

the Plaintiff's appeal in Appeals No. Appeal No

111/1990 and No 217/2007. 217/2007

09/03/2010 Finnegan J. in the Supreme Court Appeal No. Book 2-Judgments- Tab 3 .

rules that the Plaintiff may be allowed 217/2007

to bring a motion to Amend the

Statement of Claim, remitting the

matter to the High Court

18/11/2010 Supreme Court judgment is delivered Appeal No. Book 2-Judgments-Tab 4 .

by Finnegan J. (Hardiman and Macken 387/2004

JJ. Concurring) which rejects the

Plaintiff's appeal against the judgment

of Laffoy J. in the Rooney No. 2

proceedings

18/11/2010 Murphy J. refuses Plaintiff's Motion to Appeal 430/2010 Book of Appeal 430/2010, .

Amend the Statement of Claim Tab 2

delivered on 6 November 1989 in the

Rooney No.1 proceedings.

19/12/2012 Mr Rooney commences further Record No. Tab 2 Book 1 Index of .

proceedings raising complaints inter 2012/12844P Pleadings

alia about the manner in which the

Supreme Court had dealt with his

appeals. Plaintiff seeks 24 different

reliefs.

14/03/2013 Mr Rooney delivers a Statement of Record No. Tab 10 Book 1 Index of .

Claim in fresh proceedings (Record 2012/12844P Pleadings

No. 2012/12844P).

13/06/2013 Plaintiff files Notice of Motion to set Appeal 224/1991 Tab 19, Book 1, Index of .

aside the Supreme Court judgment in Pleadings

Rooney No.1 (delivered on 19

December 1991) .

13/06/2013 Plaintiff files Notice of Motion to set Appeal 387/2004 Tab 21, Book 1, Index of .

aside the Supreme Court judgment in Pleadings

Rooney No. 2 (delivered on 18

November 2010).

04/07/2013 Feeney J. delivers his judgment Record No. Tab 25 Book 1 Index of .

rejecting Mr Rooney's complaints in 2012/12844P Pleadings

the High Court.

31/10/2013 ECtHR rules that the length of the Application no. Application no. 32614/10. .

1987 and 1995 proceedings violated 32614/10 Judgment not included in

Mr Rooney's rights as under Article 6 the Books of Appeal

of the ECHR.

28/03/2014 Supreme orders to strike out Plaintiff's Appeal 224/1991 Tab 23, Book 1, Index of .

motion to set aside the Supreme Pleadings

Court judgment in Rooney

No.1.delivered on 19 December 1991.

28/03/2014 Supreme orders to strike out Plaintiff's Appeal 387/2004 Tab 23, Book 1, Index of .

motion to set aside the Supreme Pleadings

Court judgment in Rooney No.2

delivered on 18 November 2010.

09/12/2015 Supreme Court hearing for Appeals No Appeal No: . .

111/1990 (Motion for Judgment) and 111/1990

Appeal No 430/2010 (Motion to

Amend Statement of Claim)

Appeal No: . . . .

430/2010