Supreme Court allows appeal, refusing surrender despite abuse of process due to severe family harm.

THE SUPREME COURT

Appeal No. 294/2014

Denham C.J.

O’Donnell J.

MacMenamin J.

Laffoy J.

Between/

Minister for Justice and Equality

Applicant/Respondent

and

J.A.T. No. 2

Respondent/Appellant

Judgment delivered on the 28th day of April, 2016 by Denham C.J.

1. This is an appeal by J.A.T., the respondent/appellant, who is referred to as “the appellant”, from the order of the High Court

(Edwards J.) made on the 5th June, 2014 and perfected on the 6th June, 2014 and the written judgment delivered in relation thereto

on the 9th June, 2014, which ordered the surrender of the appellant to the United Kingdom, pursuant to s. 16 of the European Arrest

Warrant Act, 2003. The Minister for Justice and Equality, the applicant/respondent, is referred to as “the Minister”.

2. The High Court held that the appellant had suffered unjust harassment in that the proceedings against him “were de facto abusive

of the Court’s process”.

3. However, the learned High Court judge held that this was not a case in which he

“would be justified in denying the [Minister] relief by refusing surrender, notwithstanding that the manner in which the

[appellant’s] rendition has been pursued has been abusive of the process”.

4. The High Court held that the abuse of process would be addressed appropriately by an admonishment of the parties responsible.

5. The following question was certified by the High Court for an appeal to this Court:-

“Where such an abuse of process has been found to have occurred is it sufficient or appropriate for the Court to

admonish the parties responsible whilst also surrendering the [appellant]?”

Cross appeal

6. The Minister has brought a cross appeal contending that:-

(i) The High Court erred in law and in fact in holding that the appellant had suffered unjust harassment on account

of the manner in which his rendition has been pursued;

(ii) The High Court erred in law and in fact in holding that cumulatively the proceedings reported at [2008] IEHC

118, referred to as “T. No. 1”, and the Supreme Court appeal in Minister for Justice v T. [2010] IESC 61, and the

present proceedings, were oppressive to the appellant and/or to his family, and

(iii) The High Court erred in law and in fact in holding that the proceedings constituted an abuse of the Court’s

process.

European Arrest Warrant for the appellant

7. The appellant is sought by the United Kingdom on foot of a European arrest warrant (referred to as “the EAW”) relating to four

offences:-

(a) Conspiracy to cheat the public revenue, contrary to s. 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act, 1977;

(b) A second offence of conspiracy to cheat the public revenue, contrary to s. 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act, 1977;

(c) Cheating the public revenue, contrary to common law; and

(d) Conspiracy to commit money laundering, contrary to s. 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act, 1977.

8. The section of the European arrest warrant where details of the offences are given is headed “Tax Fraud”.

9. The particulars of the first offence given in the EAW was as follows:-

Between the 1st day of January 1997 and the 31st December, 2005, with intent to defraud and to the prejudice of the

Commissioners of Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise, conspired with others to cheat the public revenue by

dishonestly submitting false 715 CIS 24 and CIS 25 vouchers issued pursuant to Inland Revenue construction industry

taxation schemes.

The description of the said offence was given as:-

Between 1997 and 2005, the appellant was at the centre of a large scale fraud on the UK Public Revenue. He managed

and controlled a large number of companies and individuals in the UK associated with the construction industry, which

were used to systematically defraud the Revenue by dishonestly pretending that payment had been properly made to

third parties which held tax exemption vouchers under the Inland Revenue Construction Industry Scheme (“CIS Scheme”),

thereby resulting in the dishonest submission of such vouchers to the Revenue. Such pretence allowed payments to be

made by a contractor gross of tax and VAT to be passed down the chain accordingly. False invoices were raised to justify

such payments. Tax and VAT were not accounted for to the Revenue. Instead, the funds passed down the chain were

ultimately withdrawn in cash, to pay an off record workforce cash in hand without deduction of tax, and also to benefit

the appellant and others involved in the fraud. The loss to the Revenue is in excess of £10 million.

10. The second offence described that between 1997 and 2005, the fraud operated on the UK Revenue by the appellant and others

extended to companies and businesses independently of the Revenue Construction Scheme (CIS Scheme). It was stated that in

pursuance of the fraud, false invoices were created to give the impression that work had been legitimately carried out by parties, so

as to disguise the dishonest extraction of funds from those companies and businesses, which sums were ultimately converted to cash

and falsely accounted for, thereby necessarily reducing the taxable profits of the companies and businesses. The fraud, it was

stated, was perpetrated against the UK public revenue. And, it was also stated that, the appellant was based in London, in the UK,

throughout the period of the offending.

11. The third offence alleged is that of cheating the Public Revenue, contrary to Common Law. The particulars given are that

between the 1st January, 1997, and the 31st December, 2005, he cheated the public revenue by failing to disclose his income to the

Inland Revenue. In that time, it was stated, in excess of £2 million was received into personal bank accounts held by the appellant,

which income he concealed, and failed to make any or any proper return to the Revenue, or to make any payment of income tax.

12. The fourth offence alleged is described as money laundering, of which particulars and a description are given.

Statement of Opposition on behalf of appellant in the High Court

13. The appellant did not consent to being surrendered on the EAW. It was opposed on the basis that in the particular circumstances

the issue of the warrant and the application to the High Court amounted to an abuse of process on the part of the domestic

prosecuting authority of the issuing State and/or the Minister.

14. It was submitted that the appellant had suffered an abuse of process in light of all the circumstances of the case such that his

surrender is prohibited.

15. The circumstances and the factors referred to, in relation to the abuse alleged, which was stated to be, but not limited to,

included:-

(i) The failure, refusal and/or neglect of the issuing judicial authority to apply Article 2.2 “ticked box” provision for

the four offences in the first proceedings on the first EAW, the subject of the decision of this Court in T. No. 1.

(ii) The contents of the EAW, where it is conceded that the EAW is a “reissued Part 3 warrant”, alongside the

statement that it addresses the observations of this Court in T. No. 1, which statements concede that the issuing

judicial authority and/or the Minister failed or neglected or misused the Article 2.2 provision available to them in the

first EAW.

(iii) The detrimental effect and prejudice to the appellant and his family by reason of the proceedings in T. No. 1,

including the effect on his health and well being, the stress and anxiety caused, the impact of the proceedings upon

family members and the appellant’s family life in general, and the impact of the overall length of time concerned in

these proceedings on the appellant and members of his family.

(iv) The detrimental impact upon the appellant’s health, well being and family life and the impact upon the

appellant’s family members arising from the institution and prosecution of these proceedings against him after the

refusal of surrender in T. No. 1.

(v) The impact of stated time periods and delays in the proceedings, being: (a) the time from the alleged offences,

being between 1997 and 2005; (b) the time between the appellant’s alleged failure to attend at a police station on

the 26th January, 2006 (which was denied), and the issuance of the domestic warrant and the EAW in T. No. 1,

which EAW was issued on the 7th March, 2008; (c) the time period involved in T. No. 1 proceedings which period

was from the date of endorsement of the warrant on the 12th March, 2008, and the appellant’s arrest on the 3rd

April, 2008, and the conclusion of the proceedings in the Supreme Court on the 21st December, 2010; (d) the time

period between the conclusion of the proceedings in T. No. 1 in December 2010 and the issuance of the EAW in

these proceedings on the 13th June,2011; (e) the time period between the issuance of the EAW in these

proceedings and the transmission to the Minister and the endorsement before the High Court on the 16th

September, 2011; (f) the time period between the endorsement of the EAW on the 16th September, 2011, and the

arrest of the appellant in July, 2012; (g) the cumulative effect of the elapse of time on the appellant, and his health

and well being and that of his family.

(vi) The individual and/or cumulative effect and prejudice to the appellant’s constitutional rights and ECHR rights,

the appellant’s health and well being and the detrimental impact upon his family members arising from all of the

above factors.

(vii) The surrender of the appellant would be prohibited by s. 37 of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003, referred

to as “the Act of 2003”, in that to surrender the appellant from such offences would be to breach or violate his

constitutional and ECHR rights in the following aspects: (a) it would breach or violate his constitutional rights to fair

procedures where he is subject to repeated applications for his surrender; (b) the application is oppressive and

unjust whereby the issuing judicial authority had open to it the provisions of Article 2.2 in T. No. 1 but failed,

neglected or refused to apply them to the offences the subject matter of those proceedings where the same

offences are the subject matter of this application; (c) the surrender of the appellant would be lacking in

proportionality in light of the circumstances of the case both as regards his constitutional and ECHR rights, including

failing to vindicate his right to bodily integrity, his right to fair procedures, his right to liberty, and/or would be unfair

in light of his current state of health and well being and/or present a risk to his life such that his surrender should

be prohibited.

(viii) The surrender of the appellant is prohibited by s. 37 of the Act of 2003, in that to surrender the appellant for

such offences would be to breach his constitutional rights to fair procedures and the enjoyment of his family life

(under Article 41 of the Constitution and/or Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights). In the

circumstances the surrender of the appellant would be an unjust and disproportionate interference in his family life

and is contrary to fair procedures in all the circumstances of the case.

(ix) The proceedings herein constitute an abuse of process whereby the appellant is prejudiced in respect of appeal

to the Supreme Court arising from a determination that he should be surrendered to the issuing State. The

restriction on the right of appeal provided by s. 16(12) of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003, with effect from

the 24th August, 2009, thereby has prejudiced the appellant’s position in respect of this matter where no such

restriction could have applied in T. No. 1.

The High Court

16. When this application came before the High Court the relevant points of objection were summarised by the learned High Court

judge as comprising:-

“an objection based upon an alleged abuse of this Court’s process by the domestic prosecuting authority of the issuing

state and/or the [Minister] in seeking to ‘come again’ in circumstances where they failed or neglected or misused the

ticked box procedure available to them pursuant to article 2.2 of the Framework Decision in T. (No. 1).”

Also

“Moreover, delay has been specifically pleaded and is relied upon as an aspect of the case based upon abuse of process;

as an aspect of the case based upon prejudice to the health and wellbeing of the [appellant] and his family; and as an

aspect of the case based upon the right to respect for family life guaranteed by article 8 ECHR and the contention that it

would be a disproportionate measure to surrender the [appellant] in the circumstances of this case.”

17. The High Court set out in great detail the facts of the case, which may be seen at Minister for Justice and Equality v. J.A.T

[2014] IEHC 320.

18. An earlier warrant had been issued for the appellant from the United Kingdom, in relation to the same offences. That warrant was

issued on the 7th March, 2008, by a District Justice at a Magistrates’ Court in London. The appellant was arrested in Ireland pursuant

to that warrant, which he contested. On the 21st December, 2010, this Court discharged the appellant from that warrant.

19. In Minister for Justice v T. [2010] IESC 61, Hardiman J., inter alia, pointed out difficulties in that EAW and the lack of scrutiny,

stating:-

“It appears to me that this very grave difficulty has arisen because the drafters of the warrant, presumably the

prosecuting solicitors to the Inland Revenue, failed to distinguish between the completed offence of cheating the

Revenue, which might or might not be capable of description as ‘fraud’, on the one hand, and the offence of conspiracy to

cheat the Revenue which, as the warrant itself proclaims, is not within the framework list. Notwithstanding this, the

warrant earlier contains a certificate that all of the offences were on the list.”

20. However, the authorities in the United Kingdom have maintained their request for the surrender of the appellant. It was stated by

them that this second EAW takes into account the judgment of this Court: see Minister for Justice v T. [2010] IESC 61, Hardiman J.,

nem diss.

21. On this second EAW the High Court concluded:-

“The Court is satisfied, on balance, that the [appellant] has suffered unjust harassment on account of the manner in

which his rendition has been pursued to date, and that cumulatively the proceedings in T. (No. 1), and the present

proceedings, have subjected the [appellant] in particular, but also his family, to oppression. In those circumstances the

present proceedings must be regarded as being de facto abusive of the Court’s process and I so find.

However, having carefully weighed the various considerations that I identified as relevant, I do not consider that this is a

case in which I would be justified in denying the [Minister] relief by refusing surrender, notwithstanding that the manner in

which the [appellant’s] rendition has been pursued has been abusive of the process.

It is a matter of significance that nobody has set out to deliberately abuse the Court’s process or by underhand and

despicable means to secure an unfair advantage. That said, a duty of care was owed both to the court and to the

[appellant], which has ostensibly been breached. This is not a case, however, where irremediable ongoing prejudice has

been caused to the [appellant] by the unjustifiable prolongation of the rendition efforts. The [appellant’s] medical

conditions were pre-existing and were not caused by the additional oppressive stress to which he has been subjected.

Moreover, his medical conditions, though they remain ongoing, have fortunately not significantly worsened with the

effluxion of time. Indeed, there has been some improvement. The many risk factors for self harm and suicide identified by

Dr. M. in his report existed at the time of the first proceedings. Though Dr. M. has stated that the stress of being

surrendered to the United Kingdom authorities may potentially have a negative impact on both the [appellant’s] mental

health and that of his son, I am satisfied on the evidence that that was always going to be the case given the

vulnerabilities of those parties. Accordingly, while oppression has occurred, and it is very regrettable, it may be regarded

as an historical prejudice at this time in the sense that the case is now at the point that it ought to have been at in

January 2009, when the High Court gave judgment in T. (No 1), had the initial rendition request been addressed with due

diligence. However, any surrender that may happen hereafter, with all its direct and indirect consequences, is something

that the [appellant] and his family would have to have faced in any event even if the first case had been properly

conducted. Moreover, the court is entitled to take account of the fact that the [appellant], and others affected, may

possibly have legal remedies open to them to pursue in respect of any suffering which they have been caused to

experience unnecessarily.

In this Court’s view the abuse of process that has occurred in this case can be appropriately addressed by admonishment

of the parties responsible for it, and particularly of the [Minister] who had carriage of the proceedings in this jurisdiction

at all stages. The Court wishes to deprecate in strong terms the fact that the [appellant] has been unjustly harassed and

oppressed and unnecessarily twice vexed with litigation. That having been recorded, I consider that the abuse that has

occurred has not been so egregious that the mere fact of going forward in the light of it would be offensive. On balance,

taking into account all of the circumstances of the case, I believe that it should still be allowed to proceed in the overall

interests of justice.”

Cross appeal

22. The Minister has brought a cross appeal against the finding by the High Court that there was an abuse of process.

23. The Minister has cross-appealed contending that the High Court erred in finding that the appellant has suffered unjust

harassment, oppression, and abuse of process.

24. I have considered carefully the lengthy and detailed judgment of the learned High Court judge; the affidavit of the appellant

sworn on the 11th January, 2013 (which is detailed in the judgment of the High Court also) and the exhibits thereto; the appellant’s

second affidavit, sworn on the 15th March, 2013, with updated medical information; and the two additional medical reports accepted

by the learned trial judge, being the report of Dr. H., dated the 25th May, 2013, on the appellant’s son and the report of Dr. S.M.

based on his assessment of the appellant on the 27th May, 2013.

25. I am satisfied that there was an evidential basis upon which the learned trial judge could, and did, find that in the circumstances

there was an abuse of process. I would not interfere with the findings by the learned trial judge that the appellant has suffered unjust

harassment, oppression, and that the proceedings may be regarded as being de facto abusive of the Court’s process, an abuse of

process.

26. Consequently, I would dismiss the cross-appeal of the Minister.

The Issue

27. Thus, the issue on this appeal is the question as certified –

“Where such an abuse of process has been found to have occurred is it sufficient or appropriate for the Court to

admonish the parties responsible whilst also surrendering [the appellant]?”

In other words, where the learned trial judge has found such an abuse of process, is it sufficient or appropriate for the Court to

admonish the parties, while surrendering the appellant?

Decision

28. Historically, the issue of extradition has been a matter of treaties between States. Treaties negotiated by the executive branch

of the governments of the States. In Ireland the procedure has been that the individual applications have been processed through

the courts, under a scheme established by legislation, whether it be pursuant to the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act, 1851, the

Extradition Act, 1965, or the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003 There have been many bilateral treaties between Ireland and other

States. A corpus of jurisprudence has grown up around applications for extradition and the decisions of the judiciary.

29. In developing the Irish jurisprudence courts have been referred to, and have referred to, international conventions and the

domestic laws of other states, in analysing the issues raised. For example, in Bourke v. A.G. [1972] I.R. 36, the issue which arose

before the court was as to a “political” offence, and the application of the Extradition Act, 1965, referred to as “the Act of 1965”.

The Court referred to the European Convention on Extradition, to s. 50 of the Act of 1965, and to it being derived from the said

Convention, and to the principle of the non-extradition of political offenders. Reference was made to the Belgian law of 1833, which

marked the historic turning point in the evolution of this principle. There were wide ranging references to the laws on extradition in

many other European states, before the Court concluded, by a majority, in the judgment of O’Dálaigh C.J.:-

“Therefore, my conclusion is that Blake’s offence in escaping was a political offence and that the plaintiff’s offence in

assisting that escape was connected with Blake’s offence in escaping, as has already been shown. Therefore, the plaintiff

may not be extradited”.

30. The underpinning of the relevant legislation is an extradition agreement between states, as referred to in Wyatt v. McLoughlin

[1974] I.R. 378. In the High Court Finlay J. stated:-

“… I am satisfied that I am entitled to have regard to the fact that an extradition Act is necessarily the consequence, as

Mr. Liston contends, of an agreement between two sovereign States reposing confidence in each other, and that I should

not in the first instance, suppose that the court and the other authorities of the country by which extradition is sought

are using a deceit so as to secure the apprehension of the plaintiff.”

31. In the Supreme Court in Wyatt v. McLoughlin Walsh J. held:-

“Extradition is the formal surrender, based upon reciprocating arrangements by one nation with another, of an individual

accused or convicted of an offence who is within the jurisdiction of the requested country when the requesting country,

being competent to try and punish him, demands his surrender. The formal arrangements by which this may be secured

and the principle of reciprocity enshrined are either by way of treaties or by reciprocal legislation.”

32. However, the courts do not simply rubber stamp a warrant from another state with which Ireland has an extradition agreement.

For example, in Gillespie v. Attorney General [1976] I.R. 233, the point in the High Court, and in this Court, was whether the plaintiff

should be allowed to adduce evidence of an expert in English law to show that the English warrant on which he was to be extradited

was invalid because it was issued without jurisdiction. Henchy J. giving the decision of the Court held:-

“Section 55, sub-s.1, allows a court to attribute an authenticity and a lawful origin to a warrant with a duly verified

signature, but the court is debarred from ascribing that, or any other, probative value to the document if and when good

reason to the contrary emerges. This means that when it is sought, in the District Court or in the High Court, to adduce

evidence showing that the authenticity or evidential value of the document put forward as the warrant is not what it

would otherwise be, the court is bound to receive that evidence if it is otherwise admissible.”

The appeal was allowed on this point.

33. The issue of injustice, oppression and invidiousness are part of the Act of 1965, which has been interpreted by the Courts. Thus,

in Fusco v. O’Dea (No. 2) [1998] 3 I.R. 470, this Court considered the issue of injustice, oppression and invidiousness in the context

of that appeal. In that case the plaintiff had been tried for offences before the Crown Court in Northern Ireland. While awaiting

judgment he escaped from prison in Belfast, on the 10th June, 1981. A few days later he was found guilty and sentenced in Belfast.

On the 18th January, 1982, the plaintiff was arrested in the State, tried pursuant to the Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Act, 1976, before

the Special Criminal Court, and convicted of offences relating to the said escape. The plaintiff was due to be released from prison on

the 16th December, 1991. On the 11th December, 1991, he was arrested on five warrants pursuant to the Act of 1965 in respect of

the convictions and sentences which had been imposed on him by the Crown Court in Northern Ireland. The plaintiff sought his release

on a number of grounds, including that the Court should infer that following the plaintiff’s arrest in the State, the Northern Ireland

authorities had made a decision not to seek his extradition and that this decision was communicated to the plaintiff by implication.

Accordingly, it was submitted that the Northern Ireland authorities were then estopped from seeking his extradition. The High Court

ordered the release of the plaintiff. This Court allowed the State’s appeal. The plaintiff had been convicted by the Crown Court in

Northern Ireland of offences of murder, attempted murder, possession of firearms and ammunition, namely a M60 machine gun and a

quantity of ammunition. He had been sentenced to imprisonment for life, with a recommendation of a minimum of 30 years, on the first

offence, and to life and 20 years each on the other offences, all ordered to run concurrently. Hamilton C.J. held at p. 499:-

“As I have already stated, the interests of justice require that persons accused of serious offences should be brought to

trial and if convicted, should be obliged to serve sentences lawfully imposed.

Having regard to all the circumstances of this case, I am of the opinion that there is no basis for holding that it would be

unjust, or oppressive, or invidious to deliver up the plaintiff herein for the purpose of serving the sentences lawfully

imposed on him in respect of the serious offences of which he had been found guilty, other than one.

I am of the opinion that it would be both unjust and oppressive to deliver up the plaintiff to serve the said sentences if

credit were not given for the period of imprisonment which he served in respect of offences committed in Northern Ireland

and which were the subject of the trial before the Special Criminal Court.”

In that case I stated, at p. 523, that:-

“However, the specific terms of s. 50(2)(bbb) – lapse of time, exceptional circumstances, unjust, oppressive, invidious –

require the Court to look at all the circumstances. In determining the circumstances the warrants are relevant. Thus, the

fact that the warrants are for convictions is relevant, it reflects specifically on the issue of prejudice and a trial. The

length of sentence remaining to be served may be important, if it did not exceed the ‘concurrent’ sentence served in

Portlaoise he would be entitled to an order for release. Thus, the Court weights the convictions in determining the

exceptional circumstances.”

In that case I analysed the factors raised and held that individually none of the factors was an “exceptional” circumstance, nor taken

together did they create a pattern of exceptional circumstances, such that he should not be surrendered.

34. Prior to the Act of 1965 the method of processing extradition requests to Ireland from the United Kingdom was a procedure under

s. 29 of the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act, 1851, “the Act of 1851”, a “backing” of warrants process. This continued to be used until in

State (Quinn) v. Ryan [1965] I.R. 70, this Court held the section to be unconstitutional. The applicant had sought habeas corpus in

relation to a warrant backed under s. 29 of the Act of 1851. There was a clear flaw and it was obvious that the applicant would be

released. A second warrant was prepared by the English police, sent to Dublin, and endorsed. Members of An Garda Síochána sat in

court with the new warrant as the applicant’s release was ordered. They then arrested him immediately in the vicinity of the Court,

and drove him over the border into Northern Ireland, where they handed him over to the English police officers. All this was technically

legal within s. 29 of the Act of 1851. The Act of 1851 had been previously held not to be inconsistent with the Constitution. However,

the Supreme Court refused to uphold this extradition procedure, stating that it deprived the plaintiff of access to the Court. O’Dalaigh

C.J. held, at p. 117.

“From the survey of the evidence it becomes clear that a plan was laid by the police, Irish and British, to remove the

prosecutor after his arrest on the new warrant from the area of the jurisdiction of our Courts, with such dispatch that he

would have no opportunity whatever of questioning the validity of the warrant.”

And at p. 118:-

“In plain language the purpose of the police plan was to eliminate the courts and to defeat the rule of law as a factor in

Government.”

And at p. 122:-

“It was not the intention of the Constitution in guaranteeing the fundamental rights of the citizen that these rights should

be set at nought or circumvented. The intention was that rights of substance were being assured to the individual and

that the Courts were the custodians of these rights. As a necessary corollary it follows that no one can with impunity set

these rights at nought or circumvent them, and that the Courts' powers in this regard are as ample as the defence of the

Constitution requires. Anyone who sets himself such a course is guilty of contempt of the Courts and is punishable

accordingly.

The proper order to be made in respect of Detective In¬spector Matthew G. Ryan is that he be served with notice to

show cause why he should not be held to be guilty of contempt of the Courts and dealt with accordingly.”

Subsequently, there were affidavits before the Court and apologies on behalf of the Irish gardaí . Counsel on behalf of the British

police indicating that they would not tender an apology unless and until they had been found in contempt. Four persons were before

the Court to show cause why they should not be held guilty of contempt of the Court and punished accordingly. O’Dalaigh C.J. stated

at p. 133:-

“The Court accepts that the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act purported to authorise instant deportation, but it cannot

accept the view that in a State whose Constitution guarantees personal rights it is enough to look to statute only as the

warrant for one’s actions.”

The Court referred to the regret expressed by the Irish officers, to their knowledge that there cannot be a recurrence of the conduct

in question, and considering this, the Court stated that it would forego the imposition of penalty in their case. The English police

officers tendered apologies after the Court found that they had been in contempt. The Court held that in the absence of an

unqualified apology the Court would have found it necessary to impose an exemplary penalty upon them. However, such apology

having been made to the Court they were discharged without penalty.

Thus, this Court has expressed the view that the courts cannot be eliminated from the equation to defeat the rule of law in the

context of an extradition exercised so as to deprive a person of access to the courts, or to deprive a citizen of his constitutional

rights. While that view was expressed in relation to actions under s. 29 of the Act of 1851, they are general principles appropriate to

any actions taken to eliminate the courts from an extradition process so as to set a citizen’s rights at nought.

New Procedure

35. A new statutory procedure was introduced under the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003, referred to as “the Act of 2003”. It is

under this procedure that the appellant is sought to be surrendered to the United Kingdom.

The Framework Decision

36. On the 13th June, 2002, the Council Framework Decision, referred to as “the Framework Decision”, addressed the issue of the

EAW and the surrender procedures between member states. Reference was made to the conclusions of the Tampere European Council

of the 15th and 16th October, 1999, according to which formal extradition procedures should be abolished among member states.

37. It was recited that the EAW provided for in this Framework Decision was the first concrete measure in the field of criminal law

implementing the principle of mutual recognition, which the European Council referred to as the “cornerstone” of judicial co-operation.

38. The Framework Decision envisaged the new system to be based on decisions of a judicial authority. This Recital (8) stated:-

“Decisions on the execution of the European arrest warrant must be subject to sufficient controls, which means that a

judicial authority of the Member State where the requested person has been arrested will have to take the decision on his

or her surrender.”

39. It was recited that the role of central authorities in the execution of a EAW must be limited to practical and administrative

assistance.

40. Recital (12) stated:-

“This Framework Decision respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised by Article 6 of the Treaty on

European Union and reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in particular Chapter VI thereof.

Nothing in this Framework Decision may be interpreted as prohibiting refusal to surrender a person for whom a European

arrest warrant has been issued when there are reasons to believe, on the basis of objective elements, that the said

arrest warrant has been issued for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on the grounds of his or her sex,

race, religion, ethnic origin, nationality, language, political opinions or sexual orientation, or that the person’s position may

be prejudiced for any of these reasons.

This Framework Decision does not prevent a Member State from applying its constitutional rules relating to due process,

freedom of association, freedom of the press and freedom of expression in other media.”

41. The General Principles of the Framework Decision commence in Article 1 with:-

“Definition of the European arrest warrant and obligation to execute it.

1. The European arrest warrant is a judicial decision issued by a Member State with a view to the arrest and

surrender by another Member State of a requested person, for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or

executing a custodial sentence or detention order.

2. Member States shall execute any European arrest warrant on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and

in accordance with the provisions of this Framework Decision.

3. This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and

fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union.”

42. Article 6 specifies that the issuing judicial authority shall be the judicial authority of the issuing member state which is competent

to issue a EAW by virtue of the law of that state. And the executing judicial authority shall be the judicial authority of the executing

member state which is competent to execute the EAW by virtue of the law of that state.

43. In Ireland the decision making judicial authority is the High Court i.e. a superior court.

44. The time limits and procedures for the decision to execute the EAW are addressed in Article 17 which states:-

“Time limits and procedures for the decision to execute the European arrest warrant

1. A European arrest warrant shall be dealt with and executed as a matter of urgency.

2. In cases where the requested person consents to his surrender, the final decision on the execution of the European

arrest warrant should be taken within a period of 10 days after consent has been given.

3. In other cases, the final decision on the execution of the European arrest warrant should be taken within a period of 60

days after the arrest of the requested person.

4. Where in specific cases the European arrest warrant cannot be executed within the time limits laid down in paragraphs

2 or 3, the executing judicial authority shall immediately inform the issuing judicial authority thereof, giving the reasons for

the delay. In such case, the time limits may be extended by a further 30 days.

5. As long as the executing judicial authority has not taken a final decision on the European arrest warrant, it shall ensure

that the material conditions necessary for effective surrender of the person remain fulfilled.

6. Reasons must be given for any refusal to execute a European arrest warrant.

7. Where in exceptional circumstances a Member State cannot observe the time limits provided for in this Article, it shall

inform Eurojust, giving the reasons for the delay. In addition, a Member State which has experienced repeated delays on

the part of another Member State in the execution of European arrest warrants shall inform the Council with a view to

evaluating the implementation of this Framework Decision at Member State level.”

The Act of 2003

45. The Act of 2003 is described in its long title as an Act to give effect to the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant

and the surrender procedures between member states, to amend the Act of 1965 and certain other enactments, and to provide for

matters connected therewith.

46. In defining the term “judicial authority” the Statute reflects the Framework Decision, stating that the term means “the judge,

magistrate or other person authorised under the law of the Member State concerned to perform functions the same as or similar to

those performed under section 33 by a court in the State.” Thus, the decision of who is a judicial authority is taken by each member

state.

47. In Ireland, under s. 33 of the Act of 2003, a court may, upon an application made by or on behalf of the Director of Public

Prosecutions, issue a EAW, where it is satisfied in accordance with the terms set out in the Act.

48. At the foundation of the EAW Scheme is the concept of mutual trust and co-operation. This is reflected in s. 4A of the Act of

2003, which provides that it shall be presumed that an issuing state shall comply with the requirements of the Framework Decision,

unless the contrary is shown.

49. Section 11 of the Act of 2003, as amended, provides that a EAW shall, insofar as practicable, be in the form set out in the

Framework Decision as amended by the Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA.

50. The Act of 2003, as amended, sets out the requirements for a EAW.

51. Section 16 provides that where a person does not consent to his or her surrender to the issuing state, the High Court may make

an order directing that the person be surrendered to such other person as is duly authorised by the issuing state to receive him,

provided that inter alia:-

(a) the High Court is satisfied that the person before it is the person in respect of whom the EAW was issued,

(b) the EAW has been endorsed in accordance with s. 13 for execution of the warrant,

(c) the EAW states, where appropriate, the matters required by section 45.

(d) the High Court is not required, under s. 21A, 22, 23 or 24 (as inserted by the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act

2005) to refuse to surrender the person under the Act,

(e) the surrender of the person is not prohibited by Part 3.

52. Part 3 covers provisions on the prohibition on surrender. It includes section 37, which provides that:-

“(1) A person shall not be surrendered under this Act if –

(a) his or her surrender would be incompatible with the State’s obligations under

(i) the Convention, or

(ii) the Protocols to the Convention,

(b) his or her surrender would constitute a contravention of any provision of the Constitution (other than for the

reason that the offence specified in the European arrest warrant is an offence to which s. 38(1)(b) applies)

(c) there are reasonable grounds for believing that –

(i) the European arrest warrant was issued in respect of the person for the purposes of facilitating his or her

prosecution or punishment in the issuing state for reasons connected with his or her sex, race, religion, ethnic

origin, nationality, language, political opinion or sexual orientation, or

[…]

53. Section 45C provides that:-

“For the avoidance of doubt, an application for surrender under section 16 shall not be refused if the Court is satisfied

that no injustice would be caused to the person even if –

(a) there was a defect in, or an omission of, a non-substantial detail in the European arrest warrant or any accompanying

document grounding the application,

(b) there is a variance between any such document and the evidence adduced on the part of the applicant at the hearing

of the application, so long as the Court is satisfied that the variance is explained by the evidence, or

(c) there has been a technical failure to comply with the provisions of this Act, so long as the Court is satisfied that the

failure does not impinge on the merits of the application.”

54. Thus, this scheme in relation to EAWs between the member states, is based on the decisions of judicial authorities, mutual

respect and co-operation. As is clear from the Framework Decision and the Act of 2003, as amended, the decision made in a member

state is not administrative. The decision is made by a person designated in the member state as a judicial authority. The scheme of

EAWs is grounded on principles of co-operation and mutual respect between judicial authorities in the member states. However, each

judicial authority has responsibilities and duties. The process is not a rubber stamp. If a surrender is refused that may well be a

reflection on the particular circumstances which have developed in a case, rather than on the system itself.

55. In developing the jurisprudence on extradition the courts have been cognisant, as has been illustrated earlier in this judgment, of

their duty to protect constitutional rights and the rule of law. This has continued while implementing the Act of 2003.

56. At one extreme there may be issues of torture and inhumane or degrading treatment. In Minister for Justice v. Rettinger [2010] 3

I.R. 783, the Minister sought the surrender of the respondent to Poland to serve the balance of a two year sentence imposed for the

offence of burglary. The respondent opposed the application on the grounds that if he was returned to Poland he would be exposed

to a real risk of torture or inhumane or degrading treatment, in breach of art 3. of the ECHR and s. 37 (1)(a) and (i) of the Act of

2003. The respondent filed affidavits as to the prison conditions. On behalf of the Minister there were letters from Poland stating that

the prisons had improved in recent years. The High Court held that the respondent had failed to establish a real risk of torture or

inhumane treatment, as required, and ordered his surrender. However, questions were certified for this Court. This Court allowed the

appeal of the respondent and remitted the matter to the High Court, holding that the burden rested on the respondent to adduce

evidence proving that there were reasonable grounds for believing if he was returned to Poland he would be exposed to a real risk of

torture etc. The burden did not shift to the Minister. Reference was made to s. 37 (1)(i) which required that there be reasonable

grounds for believing that the real risk existed, not proof on balance of probabilities. As to art. 3 of the Convention, the test was

whether there was a real risk of prohibited treatment. Reference was made to a series of cases before the European Court of Human

Rights as to prison conditions in Poland. I addressed relevant principles and the test to be applied, and remitted the matter to the

High Court for the test to be applied.

Fennelly J. pointed out that this Court was being requested to consider for the first time the standard of proof which it must apply in

an EAW case where a person facing surrender complains of the danger of being subjected to inhumane or degrading treatment in the

requesting state. Fennelly J. pointed out also that the Court was invited to prohibit the surrender pursuant to s. 37 of the Act of

2003.

In relation to art. 3 of the Convention, Fennelly J. referred to the absolute protection against treatment prohibited by art. 3. He said

in paras. 71 and 72:-

“[71] The inevitable consequence of the principle of absoluteness is that the objectives of the system of surrender

pursuant to the Council Frame¬work Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Proce¬dures Between

Member States (2002/584/JHA) cannot be invoked to defeat an established real risk of ill-treatment contrary to article 3.

This does not mean that there is any underlying conflict between the Convention and the Framework Decision. As is

stated in recital 10, ‘[t]he mechanism of the European arrest warrant is based on a high level of confidence between

member states’. The normal presumption is, as I said in my judgment in Minister for Justice v. Stapleton [2007] IESC 30,

[2008] 1 I.R. 669, at p. 689, the courts, ‘when deciding whether to make an order for surrender must proceed on the

assumption that the courts of the issuing member state will, as is required by Article 6.1 of the Treaty on European Union

“respect human rights and fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms”’. The amended version of Article 6 now in force

does not affect this principle. Recital 13, however, declares that:¬

‘No person should be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would

be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or pun¬ishment.’

[72] Furthermore, article 1.3 provides:¬

‘This Framework Decision shall not have the, effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and

legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union.’”

In considering the issues of the onus of proof and the burden of proof, Fennelly J. held at para. 74:-

“[74] A partial answer to these questions can be found in the very word¬ing of s. 37(1)(c) of the Act of 2003. According

to the section, it is sufficient to establish that ‘there are reasonable grounds for believing that’ the person would be

‘subjected to ... inhuman or degrading treatment’. The European Court in Soering v. United Kingdom (App No. 14038/88)

(1989) 11 E.H.R.R. 439 spoke of ‘substantial grounds for believing that the person concerned, if extradited, would face a

real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment’. Each test focuses, firstly, on the quality of

the evidence or ‘grounds’ and, secondly, on the level of risk. In practice, the two elements are closely connected and will,

in many cases, merge into a single test. The subject matter of the enquiry is the level of danger to which the person is

exposed. There is no discernible difference between ‘reasonable grounds’ and ‘substantial grounds’. It is equally clear that

it is not necessary to prove that the person will probably suffer inhuman or degrading treatment. It is enough to establish

that there is a ‘real risk’. Recital 13 of the Framework Decision speaks of ‘serious risk’; the term ‘real risk’ is consistently

used by the European Court in its case law, including Soering v. United Kingdom (App No. 14038/88) and Saadi v. Italy

(App No. 37201/06) (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 30. It is appropriate to the seriousness of the subject matter. It would be absurd

to require a person threatened with expulsion to a state where he may be exposed to inhuman or degrading treatment,

not to mention torture, to prove that he would probably suffer such treatment. It must be sufficient to establish ‘real

risk’.”

Fennelly J. also remitted the matter to the High Court to apply the test identified.

57. The issue of an abuse of process has arisen before. For example, in Minister for Justice v. Tobin [2012] IESC 37. In that case

there had been amending legislation after the first EAW was sought and before the second EAW was sought. Fennelly J. held:-

“10. The consequence of the amending legislation was that the appellant has faced a second process of arrest, objection,

High Court hearing and appeal. All this is the result of what appears to have been a legislative error followed by its

correction. None of this was the responsibility of the appellant. For the reasons given by Hardiman J, this is quite different

from cases where an earlier proceeding has failed by reason of defects in a warrant. In those cases it will be apparent

that the surrender (or extradition as the case may be) is the result of a particular defect in the warrant and that, on

established principles, the error can be remedied and a new warrant can be issued without the defects.

11. These are in essence the reasons why I agree with Hardiman J that the appeal should succeed on the ground of

abuse of process. The principle of national procedural autonomy permits the courts of the Member States to apply

national procedural rules so long as they do not infringe either the principle of non-discrimination or of effectiveness.

12. I am not sure that it is relevant to introduce the element of inequality of arms between the appellant and the State

authorities. Inequality in that sense will be present in every case under the Framework Decision or in extradition generally.

I cannot see that it adds anything to the appellant's case. Nor do I believe that delay would constitute a ground for

refusing surrender on the facts of this case. This Court in its decision in Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v.

Stapleton [2008] 1 IR 669 considered how an issue of delay should be treated in the context of the European Arrest

Warrant in the case of surrender for prosecution. The possibilities must be more limited where a conviction has already

recorded.

13. I would confine the decision on abuse of process to the special and unique circumstances of this case. There was an

Arrest Warrant; the appellant was arrested and taken before the Court; he opposed his surrender through the judicial

process in accordance with the law. He succeeded. It was not then suggested that the law was erroneous. The appellant

had no reason to expect that it would be changed, if he successfully invoked its provisions. The law was changed. His

surrender was sought a second time. I would allow the appeal and decline to order the surrender of the appellant.”

A majority of the Court allowed the appeal and refused to surrender the appellant.

58. The Court considers carefully the rights of persons sought to be surrendered. Thus, in The Minister for Justice v. Marek, Supreme

Court, Unreported, 5th February, 2009, it was stated by Murray C.J., that before making an order for surrender, the Court must,

having regard to s. 45 of the Act of 2003, be satisfied that the Judicial Authority has given the appropriate undertaking concerning a

re-trial. He held:-

“The Court is not satisfied that there is, in relation to the request for surrender founded on the European Arrest Warrant,

sufficient documentation or information regarding the nature and form of the re-trial that will take place if the appellant is

returned to it and therefore it does not consider that the Order for surrender made by the High Court was correctly made

in the circumstances outlined. That however is not the end of the matter. The European Arrest Warrant and the scheme

and system of surrender envisaged by it anticipated that there may be circumstances in which there is a lack of clarity or

a gap in the information before a Court dealing with such a request. That this should be anticipated is not surprising

considering the number of countries covered by the system of surrender and the different languages which requires the

translation of relevant documentation which may give rise to ambiguities.

Having come to the conclusion that because of, at the very least, an ambiguity in respect of the undertakings given

having regard to what is contained in page 2 of the European Arrest Warrant the Court, as I have indicated, feels it

should set aside the Order of the High Court, it having been incorrectly made, and considers that the matter should be

remitted to the High Court in order that the High Court can, pursuant to s. 20 of the Act, require the issuing Judicial

Authority to provide it with such additional documentation or information as will enable it to determine the nature and

form of the re-trial which the requesting Judicial Authority says may take place, and will if the appellant so requests, on

his return to the Czech Republic, should that Order eventually be made.”

59. In Bolger v. O’Toole [2008] 4 I.R. 780, the Act of 1965 was applicable to issues of delay, medical negligence, and exceptional

circumstances, which were analysed:-

“[70] 68. In the final analysis, it is necessary to stand back and consider the entire history in accordance with the

correct application of para. (bbb). I accept that the lapse of time of ten years qualifies as sufficiently exceptional to

satisfy the first requirement. I have also indicated that the delays between 1995 and 1998 constitute another exceptional

circumstance, but I have come to the conclusion that it is to be considered against the contribu¬tion of the plaintiff

himself to the total period. The ultimate question is whether, in all the circumstances, it would be unjust, oppressive or

invidious to deliver the plaintiff to the authorities in the United Kingdom. For that purpose, both his illness and the length

of the sentence to be served have to be put in the balance. The decisions of this court in M.B. v. Conroy [2001] 2

I.L.R.M. 311 and Carne v. O'Toole [2005] IESC 22, (Unreported, Supreme Court, 21st April, 2005) strongly suggest that

his illness would not justify making an order for release. In the former case, the decisive element was that the illness

appeared to have supervened after the plain¬tiffs return to Ireland. Keane C.J. there accepted that it would not be

logical to refuse delivery to another country to stand trial on the ground of an illness which would not prevent a trial here.

Similar considerations apply where his delivery is required in order to serve a sentence.

[71] 69. The length of the sentence (which must now be limited to two years) is not an exceptional circumstance. It

could be considered, if it tended to show that delivery would be unjust, invidious or oppressive, but I cannot see how

that is so in this case. However, when appraising all the circumstances, the plaintiffs own behaviour is material. It cannot

be ignored that the plaintiff failed to attend the balance of his trial and that the only evidence he produced for the

English court took the form of two medical certificates. Like Peart J., I cannot escape the impression that he refused

cooperation with an independent medical examination. He has greatly added to the length of the proceedings as a whole

by the pursuit of utterly unmeritorious legal proceedings.

[72] 70. I am satisfied that it would not be unjust, oppressive or invidious to deliver the plaintiff pursuant to the orders of

the District Court. I would allow the appeal from the order of the High Court directing his release.”

Second Warrant

60. This is the second EAW issued by the requesting state for the surrender of the appellant. The appellant has raised this as specific

ground for the refusal of his surrender. However, it has long been settled jurisprudence in relation to applications for extradition or

surrender that the fact that there was an earlier warrant is not a basis of itself upon which to refuse to surrender.

61. It is clear, and remains the law, that simply because a second EAW is issued for the same offences does not, of itself, indicate an

abuse of process, or is a reason of itself to refuse to surrender the person requested.

62. In Bolger v. O’Toole, Unreported, ex tempore, Supreme Court, 2nd December, 2002, Mr. Bolger, the applicant/appellant, appealed

against an order of the High Court (O’Neill J.), delivered on the 8th June, 2000, which dismissed his claim. The proceedings were

brought because it was a second set of warrants seeking the rendition of the applicant to England. I stated:-

“The fact that a previous set of warrants existed and on which the applicant was discharged does not prima facie

exclude the production and endorsement of a second set of warrants. It may well be that for good reason, in the

circumstances of a case, a court may determine that an application for rendition should be refused. Thus, if it were an

abuse of process the application may fail. In this case the applicant has been refused leave to make a specific application

grounded on specific issues of abuse of process. However, that would not be a bar to any subsequent application for

habeas corpus on different issues. Similarly, issues such as delay, which may arise in accordance with the legislation as

well as the Constitution, are separate issues which may be raised. However, these matters are not before this court.

For the reasons stated in this judgment, I am satisfied that the order and judgment of the High Court should be affirmed

and the appeal dismissed.”

63. In Gibson v. Gibson, ex tempore, Supreme Court, 10th June, 2004, an earlier warrant had been issued arising out of the same

facts and had been refused. The question on the appeal was whether a new warrant could proceed. Keane C.J. held:-

“It is necessary to say at the outset that, in my view, it is clear beyond argument that in extradition cases, the mere

fact that a warrant has been issued and an application made arising out of the warrant to the court for an order or

extradition, that a warrant has been issued on an earlier occasion arising out of precisely the same alleged offence, and

has been adjudicated upon by the District Court or any court of competent jurisdiction, that fact does not, of itself and

by itself, preclude a subsequent application to a court of competent jurisdiction. If there were any doubts that that is the

state of the law, they were, in my view, laid to rest by the decision of this court in Bolger –v- O’Toole (unreported

decision of the court, delivered on 2nd December, 2002).”

64. Consequently, the fact that the Court has before it a second EAW seeking surrender of the appellant is not of itself an indication

of an abuse of process. It is a fact to be considered in light of all the circumstances of the case.

Time Passing

65. A great deal of time has passed: it is alleged that the appellant committed the offences between 1997 and 2005; the first warrant

issued on the 7th March, 2008, the judgment of this Court in Minister for Justice v. J.A.T. [2014] IEHC 320, was delivered on the 21st

December, 2010; the arrest on the second EAW on the 24th day of July 2012; and the hearing of this appeal. The scheme under the

Framework Decision, and the Act of 2003, aspires to be a speeded up procedure. This has not been achieved in this case. The time

which has passed since the alleged offences, the first arrest on the first EAW, the second EAW, and the hearing of this appeal, is not

of itself a factor upon which a request for surrender would be refused. However, this time period has to be considered in light of all

the circumstances of the case.

Medical factors

66. Medical factors were put before the courts on the first EAW, and on this EAW, in relation to the appellant and to his son.

Medical factors relating to the appellant

67. An updated medical report in relation to the appellant was before the High Court from the appellant’s General Practitioner’s

practice. It stated:-

“To Whom It May Concern:

The above man is a patient in this practice and has been for the past number of years. He primarily is a patient of Dr.

Moore but attends me also, I know [J.] well. He has had a chequered history with depression, chronic anxiety and also

has an addiction to alcohol which was waxed and waned over the years.

To give a synopsis of his psychiatric history, he attempted suicide in 2008 by way of an overdose and was admitted to [a

hospital] in Mullingar. At that time he was taking anti-depressants in the form of Cymbalta and Lexotan which is an anti

anxiety and sleeping tablets. Further to that he was maintained on other anti-depressants in the form of Mitrazepam and

Zyprexa at night and occasional Xanax. He suffered a great deal of stress and anxiety with recent proceedings between

2007 and 2010 with regards to extradition proceedings.

He is very anxious and stressed again because of the renewal of the extradition proceedings. He is not sleeping, a lot of

anxiety and depression. In particular he is worried about the care of his son who is a young man with chronic

schizophrenia who is attending this practice and also is attending the local psychiatric services and CAD for an alcohol

addition

Over the past 8 months, [J.] has been in to see Dr. Moore on about 7 occasions, generally speaking with abdominal pain

and pain in his right upper quadrant. We have referred him on to the surgical clinic in Mullingar for assessment for this.

Certainly today [J.] presented to me in quite a distressed state and I would fear for his mental health with regards to

going through the full process of hearings and court appearances and extradition proceedings again against him. He feels

very unfortunate and does feel to a degree that he is being unfairly treated. We had a good in-depth discussion about

this and he feels his family has fallen apart since this whole episode has begun.

He also has a daughter in England who has mental health issues which does seem to have started from around the time of

the initial proceedings. She worries quite a lot about her parents and feels strongly that he is being unfairly treated. She

has become stressed and unwell because of this and is under the care of physiatrists here and in England. I have seen

her myself on numerous occasions.

[J.] feels again that his whole family is falling apart. He thought he had put this behind him but now it has reared its head

again and he feels that he will be unable to cope as well as his family. He has asked me to write to you as I do feel that

this is genuine and as I said we know [J.] and both his son and daughter well in the practice, and it is putting quite a lot

of pressure on the family as a whole as you can well imagine.”

Medical factors relating to the appellant’s son

68. An updated medical report dated the 30th November, 2012, in relation to the appellant’s son, D. was also before the High Court

on this second EAW application. It stated:-

“To Whom It May Concern:

The above man is a patient in this practice and has been for the past number of years. He has a diagnosis of chronic

schizophrenia who is attending this practice for seven years. He is also attending the local psychiatric services under the

care of Dr. Corcoran. His medications are Zispin 50mg nocte, Zyprexa 20mg nocte and Xanax on a prn basis. He has a lot

of negative problems associate with the schizophrenia and also has an alcohol addition.

[D.] is very dependant on his Dad [the appellant] at present in all aspects of his care. [D.] doesn't drive, socialise or mix

well and [the appellant] tends to take him everywhere he needs to go and in general keeps him on an even keel and

keeps a good watch on his 24 hours a day. [D.] is very withdrawn, introverted and really his only life it (sic) that of his

family. He has a chronic psychiatric illness which will not get better and in fact will most probably deteriorate as he gets

older, especially if he continues to abuse alcohol.

His Dad [the appellant] looks after him very well and I feel [D.] is very dependant on him at present.”

Conclusion

69. The High Court made a finding of an abuse of process. This is a serious finding which may not be diminished by this Court.

70. However, it is clear that no deliberate actions were taken to intentionally create this abuse of process. Thus, it is not a situation

similar to State (Quinn) v. Ryan [1965] I.R. 70, and no issue of mala fides or contempt of court arises.

71. The High Court indicated that it would order an admonishment. An admonishment of “the parties involved” would appear to relate

to the Minister, the Central Authority, and the prosecuting authorities in the United Kingdom. “To admonish” such parties in the

circumstances would have no effect on the appellant, if he is surrendered to the United Kingdom, despite the finding that the

proceedings against him “were de facto abusive of the Court’s process”. In fact, it would mean that the “parties responsible” achieve

a benefit, despite their abusive behaviour. And the appellant, who has suffered from the abuse of process, is surrendered despite that

abuse of process. This outcome is tainted, as it could be considered to be the fruit of abusive procedures.

72. In general, if there is an abuse of process by authorities they should not benefit. The rule of law, and the right to fair procedures,

requires that such a general principle be applied.

73. Of course, there may be circumstances where a court considers that there has been an abuse of process, but to a limited degree,

and applying the principle of proportionality, a surrender procedure could proceed. However, such a finding would arise only in a

situation where a process was found to be an abuse, but in a limited manner, and with limited effect.

74. In this case there is an accumulation of factors.

75. It is clear, and remains the law, that simply because a second European arrest warrant is issued that does not of itself indicate

any abuse of process. See Bolger v. O’Toole, unreported, Supreme Court, 2nd December, 2002, and Gibson v. Gibson, ex tempore,

Supreme Court, 10th June, 2004, Keane C.J..

76. In analysing a case where there has been a finding of an abuse of process, the circumstances of each case are relevant and

critical to the ultimate decision.

Factors

77. I have reviewed the circumstances of this appeal, which include the following factors:-

(a) this is the second EAW issued in relation to the offences alleged;

(b) failings in the first EAW could have been addressed in the first application;

(c) a considerable time has passed since the alleged offences and a considerable time has passed since the arrest

of the appellant on the first EAW;

(d) the medical condition of the appellant, who is a vulnerable person;

(e) the medical condition of the appellant’s son, for whom the appellant is a significant carer;

(f) the family circumstances;

(g) the oppressive effect which the two sets of EAWs have had on the appellant; on his son; and on his family;

(h) no explanation has been given for delays;

(i) there has been no engagement by the authorities with the issues as to the first EAW or the delays;

(j) the Central Authority has a duty to bring to the attention of the issuing State authorities defects or internal

contradictions in a warrant, and to consider whether all the documentation is complete and clear, before being

relied upon for the purpose of seeking to endorse an EAW;

(k) the duty of the Court to protect fair procedures; and

(l) the principle that a party in litigation should not benefit from proceedings which were de facto abusive of the

Court’s process.

The family factor

79. While there is an obligation to surrender, it is not absolute. Recital 12 of the Framework Decision specifically states that it

respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised by Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and reflected in the

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Further, it is stated that the Framework Decision does not prevent a member

state from applying its constitutional rules relating to due process, amongst others.

80. Reflecting the Framework Decision, s. 37 of the Act of 2003, provides that a person shall not be surrendered under this Act if his

or her surrender would be incompatible with the State’s obligations under the Convention, or the Protocols to the Convention, or

would be a contravention of any provision of the Constitution, with an exception which is not relevant to this case.

81. Article 8 of the Convention provides:-

“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with

the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well

being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection

of the rights and freedoms of others.”

82. I have regard to H(H) v. Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa (Official Solicitor intervening), H(P) v Same (Same

Intervening), F – K v Polish Judicial Authority [2013] 1 AC 338, a decision of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, as a relevant

authority. In the second of these appeals, the appeal was allowed, the Court referring to factors including that the loss of the wife to

her younger children would be exceptionally severe, that her husband’s ill health would render him incapable of becoming the effective

priority carer, as well as the overall delay.

83. In this case the appellant has health issues; his son suffers from schizophrenia; the appellant is his son’s primary carer; the

appellant’s wife is not in a position to be their son’s primary carer; in the running of the family the appellant plays a primary role,

which includes the fact that they live in the country and he is the only driver in the family, and drives his son to medical

appointments etc.

84. Bearing in mind s. 37 of the Act of 2003, and Article 8 of the Convention, the family factors in this case are relevant.

Conclusion

85. While no single factor, as set out above, governs this appeal, in circumstances where the High Court has found, correctly in my

view, that there has been an abuse of process, I am satisfied that the factors, referred to in this judgment, taken cumulatively, are

such that there should not be an order for the surrender of the appellant.

86. To answer the question certified, where such an abuse of process has been found to have occurred, it is not appropriate for the

Court to admonish the parties responsible while also surrendering the appellant.

87. Thus, I would allow the appeal, and refuse to make an order for the surrender of the appellant.