Court of Appeal dismisses appeal against conviction and sentence for assault causing harm where mitigating factors warranted leniency.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal against his conviction for assault causing harm and his consecutive sentence of three years. The appellant argued that insufficient credit was given for his guilty plea and that the sentence failed to respect the totality principle regarding his prior record. The court found the assault was at the very upper end of the gravity scale for the offence and determined that the sentence, which included credit for time served, was within the judge's discretion.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IAs. 3 Non Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997; s. 15A Misuse of Drugs Act 1977: The Court of Appeal held that a sentence at the upper end of the statutory range for a serious assault, reduced by credit for time served and mitigating factors, is within the sentencing judge's discretion and does not warrant appellate interference.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IATesto completo
THE COURT OF APPEAL
Birmingham J.
Mahon J.
Butler J.
Appeal No.: 147/2013
Between
The People at the Suit of the Director of Public Prosecutions
Respondent
- and -
Patrick Irwin
Appellant
Judgment (ex tempore) of the Court delivered on 29th February 2016 by Mr. Justice Mahon
1. On 3rd June, 2013, at Sligo Circuit Criminal Court the appellant pleaded guilty to assault causing harm to Det. Sgt. Brian Lee on
29th May, 2010, at Collooney, Sligo, contrary to s. 3 of the Non Fatal Offences Against the Person Act 1997.
2. On 6th June 2013, the appellant was sentenced to three years imprisonment, consecutive to a concurrent sentence which he was
then serving, namely a seven year prison sentence imposed on 22nd February, 2011, at Dublin Circuit Criminal Court in respect of an
offence contrary to s. 15A of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 (as amended), and which was committed while the appellant was on bail
in respect of the offence with which this appeal is concerned.
3. Det. Sgt. Lee gave evidence to the effect that, on 29th May, 2010, while driving towards Collooney, he noticed a car parked on
the left hand side of the road. As he came close to this vehicle, it drove at speed down the road and turned into a service station.
Det. Sgt. Lee followed and on entering the service station recognised the driver of the car to be the appellant. He also noticed that
there was a young child in the appellant’s vehicle. He approached the appellant and engaged him in conversation. Det. Sgt. Lee then
proceeded to search the appellant and found some cash and a packet concerning an unidentified substance. At this point, a struggle
ensued as between Det. Sgt. Lee and the appellant during which Det. Sgt. Lee was assaulted and suffered personal injury. The
incident lasted for approximately ten minutes, and ended when Det. Sgt. Lee succeeded in detaining the appellant pursuant to s. 23
of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977.
4. The appellant’s grounds of appeal are:-
(i) The plea of guilty. It is contended that insufficient credit was afforded the appellant in relation to his plea of guilty,
and the stage at which he entered that plea.
(ii) The learned sentencing judge failed to adequately respect the totality principle given that he was obliged to impose a
consecutive sentence.
(iii) The appellant was in custody for approximately seven months (from 29th July 2010) prior to sentencing. He contends
that he was not given credit for this period spent in custody before sentencing, although the learned sentencing judge
specifically stated that he was taking it into account when passing sentence.
(iv) The appellant maintains that the learned sentencing judge erred in measuring the sentence start point at five years
(being the maximum sentence for this offence) prior to reducing it for mitigating factors.
(v) It is contended that the learned sentencing judge did not sufficiently provide for rehabilitation.
(vi) It is contended that the learned sentencing judge did not adequately consider the lack of previous convictions for
assault, or the minor nature of such convictions as the appellant had.
5. The assault on Det. Sgt. Lee was a very violent one. It was aptly described by the learned sentencing judge as “an aggressive and
extremely violent attack”. In the assault Det. Sgt. Lee sustained serious injuries including the following:-
• Abrasions to both cheeks and forehead.
• Dental damage and an undisplaced fracture of the left mandible from punches to his face.
• Severe abrasions and punch marks and haematomas to his stomach, his left and right ribs, his left shoulder and his right
renal area and abdomen.
• Multiple abrasions over his right calf muscle extending over the right Achilles tendon.
• Abrasions and cuts to his left and right hands and fingers.
• An injury to his hip joint causing restriction of movement.
6. As a consequence of the assault, Det. Sgt. Lee suffered psychological and developed a severe post traumatic stress disorder.
The previous convictions
7. The appellant had what the learned sentencing judge described as a “bad” record. It included a previous misuse of drugs offence
including the s. 15A offence which resulted in the seven year sentence, being the sentence which had to be served prior to the
commencement of the sentence in this case. While the appellant does not have a previous assault conviction, the offence which is
the subject of this appeal is not entirely unrelated to the previous drugs offences, in that the attempt by Det. Sgt. Lee to search the
appellant arose from his suspicion that the appellant was in possession of illicit substances.
The appellant’s personal circumstances
8. The appellant is thirty three years old, and at the time of the commission of the offence was an unemployed bricklayer, who did
occasional casual work.
The sentencing judgment
9. Having considered the relevant factors as he saw them, the learned sentencing judge proceeded to sentence the appellant as
follows:-
“I must bear in mind the totality principles and the question of proportionality. If this case had come before the Court as
a stand alone offence without the previous history of convictions, it seems to me that the correct sentence would have
been in the region of three to five years. Coming before the Court with the record of serious crime as the accused does,
pitches this offence at the upper end of that range; however, taking into account his plea of guilty, the apology
tendered, however late, the offer of compensation – properly refused in my view – the principles of totality, the
accused own personal circumstances and his efforts in prison at education and upscaling, where I would be more
inclined to sentence him to five years for what can only be described as a savage assault, in the circumstances of this
case, I impose a term of three years consecutive to the current sentence which he is serving. I should point out that I
am also taking into account the fact that there is a time served element included in arriving at the three years as
opposed to five years in this case.”
10. It is quite clear that the learned sentencing judge assessed the gravity of the assault at the very upper end of the gravity scale
for this offence in that he indicated that but for the mitigating factors, and the principle of totality, he would have been inclined to
sentence the appellant to the maximum term of five years.
11. The Court cannot fault this view. Undoubtedly the assault constituted an offence at the very upper end of a s. 3 assault for
which the maximum sentence is five years. Indeed it might be said that the appellant was fortunate that he was not charged with the
more serious offence in the circumstances. The nature and circumstances of the assault certainly brings it the very upper end of the
gravity scale for a s. 3 offence, and one which warranted a headline sentence of close to the maximum of five years, if not the
maximum itself.
12. On that basis, the reduction for the various mitigating factors, including credit for the period of six or seven months spent in
custody prior to sentencing, is in the region of eighteen months to two years, or about 40% below the maximum sentence.
13. Such a sentence might understandably be described by some as being a lenient one. Be that as it may, a net sentence of three
years certainly comes within the discretion which the learned sentencing judge was entitled to exercise in this case.
14. The Court will therefore dismiss the appeal.