Court of Appeal allows partial sentence reduction for dangerous driving by suspending nine months to incentivize rehabilitation.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe Court of Appeal allowed the appellant's appeal regarding the severity of her sentence for dangerous driving causing serious bodily harm. While the court upheld the conviction and the initial three-year term due to significant culpability and harm caused, it found error in the trial judge's failure to consider suspending part of the sentence. Consequently, the court suspended the final nine months of imprisonment for one year post-release to incentivize rehabilitation, based on the appellant's demonstrated remorse and progress in health programs.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IAs. 14 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967; s. 10 of the Criminal Justice (Sentencing) Act 2005: A sentence may be suspended to incentivize rehabilitation when the offender shows remorse and potential for reform, even if the initial culpability warrants a custodial term.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IAGiurisprudenza citata
Generato dall'IATesto completo
THE COURT OF APPEAL
Birmingham J.
Sheehan J.
Edwards J.
1/16
The People at the Suit of the Director of Public Prosecutions
Respondent
V
Jane Kearney
Appellant
JUDGMENT of the Court delivered on the 16th day of December 2016 by Mr. Justice Sheehan
1. Jane Kearney pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing serious bodily harm to Blanaid Molloy at the Citywest Hotel, Saggart on
the 8th March, 2014.
2. On the 1st December, 2015, she was sentenced to three years imprisonment and now appeals against the severity of that
sentence.
3. On the night in question, the appellant had been attending a fund raising function at Citywest Hotel. The injured party and her
husband had been at the same function.
4. The appellant had intended to stay in the hotel that evening but had a falling out with her boyfriend and as a result of this,
decided to go home. As she was driving from the hotel she knocked the injured party down and failed to remain at the scene.
5. The injured party was knocked to the ground and rendered unconscious and taken to hospital. She sustained a serious injury to her
head which has created long term problems for her. She is a mother and, as the trial judge noted, it seems that for a period of time
following the accident life was very difficult for her. She lost her confidence, remained at home and found it very difficult to do
everyday things. The accident has caused a huge trauma to her and her family. In the course of her victim impact evidence the
injured party stated:
“I have been diagnosed with a moderate brain injury. Except for the large scar from my neck, to my shoulder I physically
look fine. I have a hidden disability and people have no idea how to deal with me which makes life very difficult. I avoid all
events and occasions. The only thing that I have to make myself do is school runs, which are very difficult for me. This is
the most I do. I feel safe and happy at home with my husband, sons and dad. I never feel like that anywhere else, so I
am very much confined to the house. This was never me before. I was always socialising and always happy being out and
about. These days I wake up and feel happy that I am still here as I know how close I was to the end. I feel so
connected to victims of road traffic accidents, many of whom pass away and unfortunately I too frequently read of hit
and runs and this really upsets me. Honestly there are many times in the year when I was so unwell that I wish I had
gone too and I felt it would have been easier for my loved ones to deal with that rather than the horrible life I was now
giving them. I am very thankful to the doctors and nurses who looked after me and particularly my medical team who
continue to help deal with my brain injury and learn how to maintain it. I am also very thankful to the gardaí. My life has
changed forever and so have the lives of my loved ones. I will never forgive the person who did this to me as I now have
to live with the consequences of their actions.”
6. In the course of his sentencing remarks, the learned sentencing judge said that the two principal aggravating factors in the case
were that the appellant drove her car when she was intoxicated being almost three times over the limit of permitted alcohol and
furthermore found as a second aggravating factor that the appellant left the scene.
7. Prior to this the learned trial judge had stated the following:-
“Ms. Kearney did not drive carefully on the night in question. She allowed her car to collide and strike Blanaid Molloy.
Dangerous driving is a very elastic crime. I think it can go from mere inattention to horrendously reckless behaviour. Now
in this case it seems that I cannot discern from the evidence where the dangerous driving lies, but it seems Ms. Kearney
did not see her and struck her with her car.”
8. Referring to the personal circumstances of the appellant, the learned trial judge noted:
“Ms. Kearney has her own I suppose life story, and it seems she is a hardworking lady. I think she had modest academic
achievements at school, but nonetheless that did not stop her from working and being a productive member of society. I
note that she has a record of conviction in relation to road traffic offences and to some small degree that must be taken
into account. But what has to be taken into account in sentencing Ms. Kearney is the two aggravating factors, namely
the amount of drink involved and the failure to stay at the scene. These are the two serious factors the Court is taking
into account in dealing with Ms. Kearney.
The effects of the accident have been horrendous for Mrs. Molloy and her family and obviously some degree to that is
taken into account. But principally in sentencing Ms. Kearney I must take into account her level of culpability and I think
her level of culpability is high in the sense that she voluntarily drove the car while she had that amount of alcohol in her
system. Unfortunately for everybody it seems to me a custodial sentence in this type of case is inevitable. The question
is how long should the custodial sentence be. The maximum sentence for this type of offence is ten years I believe and
obviously mitigation has to be allowed for her plea of guilty, her hardworking record, her expression of remorse, her
immediate cooperation when apprehended by the gardaí and by the fact that I think she is a genuinely good person.
Unfortunately this is one fall from grace, a very serious fall from grace nonetheless. I think I am going to impose on her in
relation to count 1 a term of imprisonment of three years.”
9. The appellant is 27 years old and at the time of sentence was a trainee hairdresser. She has a small number of previous
convictions under the Road Traffic Act, including three for exceeding the speed limit and one for driving without insurance. At the
time of the accident she was licensed to drive, insured and working. She has suffered from depression from time to time as a result of
which she spent two periods as an in-patient in a psychiatric hospital. She herself lost a younger brother in 2008 as a result of a road
traffic accident. There was documentary evidence before the Court of her deep remorse and confirmation from the prosecuting garda
of her full cooperation following her arrest. She pleaded guilty at an early stage.
10. Counsel on behalf of the appellant submitted that the learned sentencing judge erred in three respects:-
1. He failed to identify a headline sentence thereby making it difficult to understand what credit had actually been given
for the very considerable mitigation in the case.
2. The sentencing judge erred by imposing a sentence of three years imprisonment with no portion suspended.
3. The sentence imposed was excessive.
11. In support of his submission that the sentence was excessive, counsel for the appellant referred to the remarks of the trial judge
where he had stated:-
“Now in this case it seems to me that I cannot discern from the evidence where the dangerous driving lies, but it seems
Ms. Kearney did not see her and struck her with the car.”
12. Counsel for the respondent, while conceding that there was considerable mitigation in the case, submitted nevertheless that the
sentence was appropriate and “not grossly severe”.
13. In the course of his brief remarks prior to sentencing, the sentencing judge did not identify a headline sentence nor did he give
any consideration to suspending part of the sentence he ultimately imposed. We do not regard a sentence of three years
imprisonment to be an inappropriate sentence in this case having regard to the significant culpability of the appellant and the harm
done to the injured party. However, we hold that the sentencing judge fell into error by failing to at least give consideration to
suspending part of that sentence with a view to incentivising rehabilitation, having regard to the importance of the penal objective of
rehabilitation as emphasised in The People (Attorney General) v. O’Driscoll (1972) 1 Frewen 351. We consider that the evidence
before the sentencing judge provided strong grounds for optimism that such an incentive would be availed of, if provided.
14. In proceeding to a fresh sentence hearing, the Court received further material pertaining to mitigation. This included three
certificates earned by the appellant as a result of the successful completion by her of health and fitness programmes in prison. The
Court also received a personal letter from her in which she again expressed her remorse. Finally and perhaps most importantly the
Court received an excellent reference from the Governor of the Dóchas Centre. In view of this additional material which is consistent
with the mitigating evidence received by the Court below, and which suggests that the appellant is already making progress on the
road to her rehabilitation, this Court will suspend the final nine months of her sentence for a period of one year following her release
from prison in order to further incentivise her ongoing rehabilitation.