Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
IECA 318 ECLI:IE:CA:2016:318 Generato dall'IA

Appeal allowed where inquiry report affected reputation, permitting judicial review under constitutional fair procedures rights.

Numero d'incarto IECA 318
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Irlanda (IE)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Accolto (Allowed)

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding the Minister's inquiry report amenable to judicial review due to its direct impact on the applicant's reputation. The applicant argued the inquiry breached his constitutional right to fair procedures, while the respondent maintained the process was within ministerial powers. The court decided the report was reviewable because it critically assessed the applicant's conduct as Minister, thereby engaging his protected right to good name.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

Constitutional right to fair procedures; constitutional right to good name and reputation: A report by a Minister investigating complaints against him is amenable to judicial review where the inquiry and its outcome directly affect the subject's reputation and fair procedure rights.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
constitutional right to fair procedures judicial review of ministerial inquiries protection of good name and reputation adequacy of investigation powers judicial restraint in review scope

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Testo completo

THE COURT OF APPEAL

Neutral Citation Number: [2016] IECA 318

[2015 321]

The President

Finlay Geoghegan J.

Irvine J.

BETWEEN

ALAN SHATTER

APPLICANT/APPELLANT

AND

SEAN GUERIN

RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Irvine delivered on the 10th day of November 2016

1. I have had the opportunity of reading in draft form the judgments which have been prepared by the President and Finlay

Geoghegan J. in these proceedings and am in full agreement with their conclusions.

2. I nonetheless take this opportunity to fully endorse the views expressed by Finlay Geoghegan J. at para. 31 of her judgment where

she refers to the need for judicial restraint in any expansion of the types of inquiries or other processes that may be amenable to

challenge by way of judicial review. In particular, I favour her conclusion that the respondent’s Report in the present case is only

amenable to judicial review because both the process undertaken by him and the outcome of his inquiry were concerned with and had

the ability to directly affect Mr. Shatter’s constitutionally-protected right to his good name and reputation.

3. It is clear beyond doubt that the terms of reference directly concerned matters relating to Mr. Shatter’s reputation and good

name, namely, the adequacy of any investigation carried out by him as Minister and whether there was reason to be concerned as to

whether he, enjoying as he did a number of relevant statutory powers that he had been asked to deploy, had taken the appropriate

steps to investigate and address certain specified complaints. Likewise, the outcome of the inquiry, leaving aside altogether the

consequences that the Report had for Mr. Shatter as these may well have been influenced by political considerations, was destined

to impact on his constitutionally protected right to his good name.

4. Accordingly, in the relatively unique circumstances which arise in the present case, like my colleagues, I am satisfied that the

Report prepared by the respondent is amenable to judicial review. That being so, for the reasons already fully outlined by my

colleagues, I too am satisfied that the appeal must be allowed.

5. Concerning the relief to be afforded to Mr. Shatter, I agree with the President and Finlay Geoghegan J. that he is clearly entitled to

a declaration that the conclusions and opinions in the Report which were critical of him when Minister for Justice and Equality were

reached in breach of his right to fair procedures. As to his entitlement to any further relief, in the complex circumstances advised by

Finlay Geoghegan J. in the concluding paragraphs of her judgment, any such decision should be postponed to afford the parties the

opportunity to make such submissions to the Court as they deem appropriate.