Court of Appeal allows appeal against sentence for child exploitation offence, remanding appellant for resentencing.

THE COURT OF APPEAL

[2014 No. 108 CCA]

Finlay Geoghegan J.

Irvine J.

Hogan J.

BETWEEN/

THE PEOPLE (AT THE SUIT OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS)

Respondent

AND

MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN

Appellant

JUDGMENT of the Court delivered on the 16th day of February 2015 by Finlay Geoghegan J.

1. On the 28th March, 2014, following a ten day jury trial, the appellant, Muhammad Hussain, was convicted before the Circuit Court

of the offence with which he had been charged on Bill No. CE/24201 namely:

Within the State intentionally meeting, or travelling with the intention of meeting a child, having met or communicated

with that child on two or more previous occasions, and doing so for the purpose of doing anything that would constitute

sexual exploitation of the child contrary to s. 3(2A) of the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998 (as inserted by s. 6

of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) (Amendment) Act 2007).

The offence of which the appellant was convicted took place on the 22nd July, 2011.

2. The sentencing hearing took place on 7th April 2014. Prior to that, the trial judge expressly invited counsel for the prosecution to

provide assistance to the court in relation to the sentencing of the offence.

3. At the sentencing hearing evidence was adduced by the prosecution of the relevant facts from a Detective Sergeant. In addition

the trial judge was given a short note of sentences handed down in cases involving “other types of offence of a similar nature”. The

court will return to the oral submissions accompanying them by counsel for the prosecution. Written testimonials were submitted on

behalf of the appellant and submissions made. This Court has the full transcript of the sentencing hearing on the 7th April, 2014.

4. On the 11th April, 2014. The trial judge imposed a four year custodial sentence taking into account thirteen weeks which had been

served in custody. The Court also has the transcript of the sentencing decision.

5. The appellant appeals against the severity of sentence. The court has had the benefit of written submissions submitted on behalf

of the appellant and respondent and oral submissions made.

6. The court was informed that this was the first prosecution of this kind in the State. Given the novelty and intrinsic importance of

the issues raised by this appeal, this Court reserved judgment on that appeal and this is now the judgment of the Court.

Section 3(2A) of the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998

7. Section 3(2A) of the 1998 Act (as inserted by s. 6 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences)(Amendment) Act 2007) provides:

“(2A) Any person who within the State –

(a) intentionally meets, or travels with the intention of meeting, a child, having met or communicated with that child

on 2 or more previous occasions, and

(b) does so for the purpose of doing anything that would constitute sexual exploitation of the child,

shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14

years.”

Section 3(5) of the 1998 Act (as inserted by s. 3(b) of the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008) provides:

“(5) In this section –

‘child’ means a person under the age of 18 years;

‘sexual exploitation’ means, in relation to a child –

(a) inviting, inducing or coercing the child to engage in prostitution or the production of child pornography,

(b) the prostitution of the child or the use of the child for the production of child pornography,

(c) the commission of an offence specified in the schedule to the Sex Offenders Act 2001 against the child; causing another person

to commit such an offence against the child; or inviting, inducing or coercing the child to commit such an offence against another

person;

(d) inviting, inducing or coercing the child to engage in or participate in any sexual, indecent or obscene act, or

(e) inviting, inducing or coercing the child to observe any sexual, indecent or obscene act for the purpose of corrupting or depraving

the child.”

The evidence before the Circuit Court for Sentence

8. The facts before the Circuit Court of which this Court is aware are confined to those given in evidence by the Detective Sergeant

at the sentencing hearing on the 7th April, 2014. There were minimal further facts referred to (without objection) by counsel in

submission on the same day. With one exception they are the facts referred to by the trial judge in imposing sentence and relevant to

this appeal.

9. The accepted evidence is that the appellant met the intended victim (whom we shall describe as “Ms. F”) in the early hours of the

25th May, 2011, in a provincial city. Ms. F was born on the 3rd August 1997 so that at that point she was some two and half months

short of her fourteenth birthday. At the time Ms. F was residing in institutional care at a location perhaps some 20kms or distant from

the city in question. While she lived in an institutional setting, Ms. F did, however, have frequent contact with her mother.

10. On the evening in question Ms. F and her friend (whom we shall describe as “Ms. H”) had left the residence and got a taxi into the

city. Ms. F and Ms. H had spent the evening together in the company of another person, but by the time they met the appellant they

were walking along a road on their own. The appellant was travelling in a car with another (male) friend and he stopped at some

traffic lights and engaged in conversation with the two girls. It appears that either the appellant or his friend enquired of the two girls

as to whether they were prostitutes. At all events the two girls struck up a conversation and they got into the car. Ms. F

subsequently explained that the only reason that she got into the car was because a Garda patrol car was coming and she did not

want to be caught and taken back to her residence. It was accepted that on that evening both Ms. F and Ms. H told the appellant

and his companion that they were nineteen years.

11. Having got into the car the four of them spent the next part of the evening or the early hours of the morning together. It appears

that Ms. F was in the front of the car with the appellant and Ms. H was in the back seat with the appellant’s male companion. At the

end of the evening the appellant gave his telephone number to Ms. H and Ms. H also gave him a telephone number. Ms. F did not

have her mobile telephone because her mother had confiscated it.

12. On the following evening Ms. F used a computer to send a text message to the appellant’s mobile telephone number in which she

essentially asked him to meet the two girls again in the village just beside the residence. While the appellant may have travelled that

evening, he did not manage to contact Ms. F as she did not have her telephone with her. On the day after that again, the appellant

telephoned Ms. F’s number. On this occasion he spoke to her mother who had possession of her daughter’s telephone. When Ms. F’s

mother answered the telephone, a brief conversation took place in which she explained that Ms. F did not have her telephone

anymore and that the caller could not speak to her.

13. The appellant then subsequently sent a text to Ms. F’s number asking if it was Ms. H. who had just answered the telephone. At

this point Ms. F’s mother became concerned, because Ms. H was a new resident at the institution and she accordingly sent a text to

the calling number asking that person (i.e., the appellant) to call. Added to her concerns was the fact that Ms. F had absconded that

evening and was missing at the time. The appellant then rang again and Ms. F’s mother explained that Ms. F was only thirteen and

that she had just gone missing along with her friend, Ms. H. The appellant said that he had only met her the previous night that he

did not know where she was and, having learnt of her true age, he then asked no further contact be made. He sent a further text

message to the telephone indicating that he did not know where the girls were. It appears shortly afterwards that Ms. F’s older sister,

Ms. O, called the appellant’s number and in that conversation she reiterated that Ms. F was only thirteen years old.

14. There was no further contact until the 17th July, 2011. On that occasion Ms. F was visiting her mother and she had taken back

possession of her mobile telephone, although her mother was not aware of that fact. When in possession of it, she sent a text to the

appellant asking him to make contact. There then followed an exchange of texts and telephone calls. The appellant called Ms. F a

total of five times, but one of these conversations was very brief lasting a matter of seconds. There were, it seems, two separate

conversations that evening and the appellant reproached Ms. F. for not telling him that she was thirteen when they first met. At the

end of the conversation they nevertheless departed on good terms. Ms. F disclosed to her mother that she (Ms. F) had her mobile

telephone. Ms. F’s mother then took possession of her daughter’s telephone. She then discovered that there had been contact

between Ms. F and the caller whom she now knows to be the appellant.

15. On the 20th July 2011, there were two calls from the appellant to Ms. F’s number which her mother answered. During these calls

the mother pretended to be Ms. F and conversed with the appellant as if she were her daughter. In the course of these

conversations there was a discussion about meeting and arrangements were made to meet up together. On the 22nd July, Ms. F was

in company of her mother and a telephone call was received from the appellant which Ms. F’s mother recorded using her own mobile

telephone. This recording was played to the jury and during the course of it, it became clear that the appellant wanted to meet Ms. F

and that he was offering to bring her items including alcohol and credit for her mobile telephone. In that telephone call he admitted he

was aware of her age.

16. While it appears that there was some discussion about sex and sexual matters in that telephone call, the appellant did not commit

himself to anything. The appellant did agree to meet Ms. F that evening and the Gardaí were then contacted by Ms. F and her

mother. By this stage the Gardaí had received Ms. F’s mobile phone and could see the level of contact from the appellant. The Gardaí

then arranged to be in the general vicinity of the village to which the appellant was scheduled to travel.

17. The appellant then made two calls immediately prior to arriving at the village to Ms. F’s number, but both of these were answered

by a female Garda who pretended to be Ms. F. The appellant arrived in his car at the village at about 10.30pm and was then

intercepted by Gardaí. The appellant was arrested and brought to a local Garda station. During the course of the interviews he gave

an account of having met Ms. F and his ongoing communication with her. He agreed that he wished to meet her in the expectation of

some degree of sexual acts being performed. He denied that, by reason of his religious beliefs and the age of Ms. F, he had ever

intended to have full sexual intercourse with Ms. F. He nevertheless stated that he had hoped to engage in some form of oral sex or

some form of masturbation.

18. The appellant was charged with the offence already set out and pleaded not guilty.

19. The appellant was born in March 1982, so that at the time of the events in question he was aged 29. His only prior convictions in

the State arose from one traffic incident in 2010 for which he received a fine and no custodial penalty.

Submissions at Sentence Hearing

20. The submissions made on behalf of the Director at the sentencing hearing are directly relevant to the grounds of appeal. As

already indicated, it appears that the trial judge had invited assistance from the Director in accordance with the decision of the Court

of Criminal Appeal in The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. Z. [2014] IECCA 13 (Clarke J.). The submissions made on behalf of

the Director fell into three parts. Firstly, a submission on the cases in the short note which had been prepared and handed into the

trial judge. In doing this, counsel for the Director indicated clearly that they were cases involving “other types of offences of a similar

nature” and also submitted that “they do not give any direct guidance”. Nevertheless he then took the trial judge through the cases

indicating the nature of the offence, the sentence imposed and in some instances the relevant maximum sentence.

21. The second part of the submissions related to where, in terms of its gravity, the offence created by subs. (2A) of s. 3 of the

Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998 (as inserted by s. 6 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) (Amendment) Act 2007) lay

when considered in the context of the other offences created by s. 3 of the 1998 Act. Counsel for the Director submitted:-

“I regret that there is not anything more direct than that, but what I would point the court to is the legislation itself

because clearly the Oireachtas has considered where on the scale of offences this should fit and has done that by

reference to the maximum sentence. If the court looks as s. 3 of the 1998 Act, as amended, it is clear that the more

serious offences involving children carry life imprisonment and that they are under subs. (1) trafficking a child for the

purposes of sexual exploitation that carries a maximum sentence of life. Under subs. (2) actually sexually exploiting a child

or detaining or restricting the personal liberty of a child for the purpose of sexual exploitation, that again carries a

maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Subsection (3) deals with causing another person to commit either of those two

offences and again that carries life imprisonment as a maximum term. And subs. (4) deals with an attempt to commit any

of those offences and again that carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. So where there is actually sexual

exploitation or any direct damage of a child or direct impact on a child, then the maximum sentence is at the highest end

of the spectrum. Under subs. 3(2A) which we are dealing with where the offence is either meeting or travelling with the

intention of meeting the child, having communicated previously and doing it for the purpose of sexual exploitation, the

maximum sentence in relation to that has been set at fourteen years. So clearly it is viewed as being of less seriousness

than actually impacting on the child or of course actually sexually exploitation of a child, going all the way in relation to

that, but then nevertheless, whilst not being a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, it is still gauged at a very serious

level of having a maximum sentence of fourteen years, and I hope that that is of some guidance to the court in relation

to how to deal with Mr. Hussain. But that is in relation to the offence itself and of course, Mr. Hussain has personal

circumstances of mitigation which I am sure Mr. O’Loughlin will go into and that inevitability will have an impact on the

court’s decision.”

22. Following that submission the trial judge inquired of counsel for the Director:

“. . . under the Z case where does the Director put it on the scale. . . .”

23. Counsel for the Director clarified that the trial judge intended “on the scale of offences of this nature” and then responded with

the following submission:

looks at the alternative offences, or not so much the alternative, but the more serious offences are covered in the same

section, it is difficult to envisage how, if something more serious had happened, a more serious offence would not have

been committed and by way of example I am thinking if for example [ Ms. F] had turned up at the meeting and had

engaged in a sexual act, then of course Mr. Hussain arguably would have then committed a more serious offence of sexual

exploitation. And in those circumstances, at the very least this offence would have to be in the midrange. It perhaps is

not at the highest end because [Ms.F] was thirteen years old and was not an infant or a very young child. And the court

will of course bear in mind that [Ms. F] herself was a willing participant in the communication, albeit that given her age

and vulnerability that derives from her upbringing, that she is the person deserving protection. So it is difficult to know

how far her actions mitigate the sentence or mitigate the culpability of Mr. Hussain because it is this kind of contact that

the Act, in my submissions is designed to protest victims from. But at the very least the Director would say this is in the

midrange of sentencing or midrange of offending, perhaps even towards the upper end of the midrange.”

24. Counsel for Mr. Hussain made submissions on the facts and in relation to a number of written testimonials produced, including a

letter from the appellant. Counsel submitted that the sentencing decisions referred to by counsel for the prosecution were of no

guidance for the court by reason principally of the difference in the offences. He submitted by reference to the facts of the offence

of which the appellant was convicted in the context of what the statute envisaged that it should be considered to be at the lower

end of the spectrum. Counsel submitted that Mr. Hussain accepted the verdict of the jury and was not intending to appeal. He was

now taking full responsibility for his actions. He also referred to the particular hardship for him of a prison sentence by reason of his

not having family in the jurisdiction; the hardship on his family in Pakistan whom he was supporting and the offer of compensation. He

also referred to his good work record, lack of any relevant previous convictions and positive testimonials. In an exchange with the

trial judge he submitted that she was not entitled to take into account the fact that the defence put the prosecution on proof of all

aspects of the case.

Sentence imposed by the Circuit Court

25. The trial judge imposed a four year sentence in a ruling delivered on 11th April, 2014. The trial judge having set out a summary of

the relevant facts stated:

“This is a very serious offence. There is no acceptable justification for a man of 29 years making contact with a 13 year

old girl or responding to contact in the manner he did. His behaviour and scheduled meeting with her on the 22nd July

demonstrate clear meditation and planning and reflects on his culpability. In my view the fact that [Ms. F] was a willing

participant and initiated contact in July given her age, her troubled history and circumstances is worthy of little credit to

the accused. In my view this is an offence, the gravity of which in the circumstances of this case falls within the middle

range that is six to eight years. It is an aggravating factor, in my view, that Mr. Hussain re-established contact with [Ms.

F], albeit at her initial instigation, and arranged the meeting and had been told by her mother and sister in May that [Ms.

F] was only thirteen years of age, was a troubled child, in and out of the care system and that had been asked to stay

away from her because of her vulnerability.

I am not in a position to give any credit to the accused due to the manner in which the matter has proceeded. I am told

that the accused is willing to offer compensation, which, in my opinion, is not appropriate in the circumstances of this

case. He has offered to leave the jurisdiction and return to Pakistan, which, again, I do not think is just in the

circumstances.

His previous conviction which arises out of road traffic incidents bear no relevance to this offence . . . against this I have

to take into account the following mitigating factors: the effect of incarceration would have on the accused as a non-

national, however, he has been living here since 2003, he is an educated man, articulate and he has fluent English. His

co-operation to some extent with the Gardaí and made certain admissions. He is somewhat remorseful. . . . He has not

come to the adverse attention of the Gardai since and he has met his bail conditions. I also take into his account his age,

his previous character, his work history. Also the fact that he was the sole provider for his family in Pakistan. Prior to

being charged with this offence, he was financially supporting them and this sentence will undoubtedly produce certain

hardship in this regard. In all the circumstances I am imposing a four year custodial sentence.”

Issues upon Appeal

26. Multiple grounds of appeal were advanced on behalf of the appellant. However these were helpfully grouped and insofar as

pursued at the hearing may be summarised as follows:

1. The trial judge erred in law and/or in principle in inviting the prosecution to make submissions in accordance with the

judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in DPP v. Z. as to the view of the Director in regard both to the level of

seriousness of the offence and the appropriate sentencing range in the circumstances of this offence and in particular as

it was the first prosecution of such an offence. The further submission was that the trial judge erred in law and principle

in having regard to such submissions in determining the sentence.

2. The sentence imposed was excessive and disproportionate. It was submitted that the trial judge erred in principle in

her approach and in determining that the gravity of the offence fell within the middle range to which a sentence of six to

eight years applied before taking into account mitigating factors.

3. It was also submitted that the trial judge failed to have proper regard to a number of the mitigating factors put

forward. Two in particular were advanced which fall for separate consideration:

a. that the trial judge erred in principle in having regard to the manner in which the defence of the trial was

conducted on the appellant’s behalf; and

b. the trial judge erred in principle in considering that compensation or an offer of compensation was not appropriate

in the circumstances of this case.

Role of Prosecutor

27. The trial judge had sought assistance from counsel for the Director in accordance with the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal

(Clarke, Moriarty and McCarthy JJ) delivered by Clarke J. in (The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. Z. [2014] IECCA 13. The

judgment in the Z. case was one of three judgments of the Court of Criminal Appeal delivered by Clarke J. on the 18th March, 2014.

The other two were The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. Kieran Ryan [2014] ICCA 11 (Clarke, McCarthy and Sheehan JJ)

and The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. Adam Fitzgibbon [2014] IECCA 12 (Clarke, Birmingham and Sheehan JJ). In the

case of Z. the appeal was dismissed and there is no further judgment. However in the case of both Ryan and Fitzgibbon the appeals

were allowed on the 18th March, there was a further sentence hearing in each, during which submissions were made on questions of

principle arising from the Z judgment and further judgments were delivered in Ryan and Fitzgibbon by the Court of Criminal Appeal per

Clarke J. on the 17th July, 2014, [2014] IECCA 24 and [2014] IECCA 25.

28. At the time of sentencing the appellant herein in April 2014, the trial judge and counsel did not have the benefit of the

clarification given by the Court of Criminal Appeal in its judgment of the 17th July, 2014, in Fitzgibbon in relation to what it said in Z in

relation to the guidance or assistance appropriate to be given by the prosecution at a sentence hearing. This Court has had the

benefit of the clarification in the July 2014 judgment in Fitzgibbon to what was said in Z and with which it respectively agrees. It is

necessary to consider in some detail these judgments.

29. In Z the Court of Criminal Appeal firstly expressed approval of an exchange which had taken place at the sentence hearing

between counsel for the Director and the trial judge. The accused had pleaded guilty at a late stage to fourteen sample counts of

rape and child cruelty against four of his daughters. On the day prior to his plea he had pleaded not guilty to 271 counts of rape and

cruelty. The judgment records that counsel for the Director had submitted at the sentence hearing that the case was “on its facts,

at the top end of the range”. The trial judge then sought further assistance from counsel for the Director in relation to the actual

range of sentences which might be considered appropriate for a case of this type being one at the top end of the range. Having

taken instruction, counsel submitted that the top end of the range, even in cases where there had been a plea of guilty permitted a

very lengthy determinative sentence or a life sentence.

30. The Court of Criminal Appeal expressed approval of this exchange. It is important to note that this was a double exchange; firstly

as to where the offence lay on what was referred to as the “range” and is sometimes referred to as “the spectrum of severity” or

“spectrum of seriousness” and secondly as to either the actual sentence or range of sentences which might be appropriate. The

novelty in the Z judgment appears to primarily relate to approval of the latter submission on the sentence.

31. In its judgment, the Court of Criminal Appeal in dealing with the historical position of the prosecution at a sentence hearing at

para. 2.3 stated:-

“For many years it was the practice in criminal courts for the prosecution not to offer any view on sentence as such.

Clearly evidence was led as to any circumstances material to the exercise of the courts sentencing role, including

evidence as to aggregating factors or as to previous convictions. However, it was not the practice for counsel for the

prosecution to offer any view to the trial judge as to how the factors present in an individual case ought to convert into

an actual sentence or range of sentences.”

32. The Court of Criminal Appeal then explained its reasons for its now different approach in paras. 2.4 to 2.7 as follows:

“2.4 Whatever may have been the merits of such a practice in the past, it seems to this Court that such a practice can

no longer be justified, at least since the introduction of a system of appeals, on the basis of undue leniency, which can

be taken by the DPP (s. 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993). It seems to this Court that it is incongruous that the DPP

should be entitled to criticise on appeal, on the basis of undue leniency, a sentence imposed by a sentencing judge

without having first suggested to the sentencing judge the sentence or range of sentences which it was submitted ought

to be considered appropriate.

2.5 In that context it is also important to note that there have been developments which ought assist, at least in many

types of cases, the prosecution in being able to place such guidance before a sentencing judge. First, this Court has

endeavoured, in a number of areas, and in appropriate cases, to conduct an analysis of the case law in relation to

sentences for particular types of offences and give some general guidance as to the type of sentences which might be

appropriate for offences with a particular level of seriousness along the spectrum. An example can be seen in Director of

Public Prosecutions v. Carl Loving [2006] 3 I.R. 355, which sets out a detailed structure in respect of the factors to be

taken into account when sentencing for child pornography offences. These factors were recently summarised in Director

of Public Prosecutions v. Brian O’Byrne (Unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 17th December 2013) (see also Director of

Public Prosecutions v. Derrick Stronge [2011] IECCA 79 in relation to the offence of dangerous driving causing death and

Director of Public Prosecutions v. Brian Wall [2011] IECCA 45 in relation to undue leniency applications in respect of

sentences imposed for offences under s. 15A of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977). There is no reason why the attention of a

sentencing judge should not be drawn to such decisions and submissions made as to where, in the light of the analysis by

this Court, the offence in question is said to lie along a spectrum of severity. In many of the cases this Court had

endeavoured, as it will do in this case, to identify the principal factors which will ordinarily influence a decision as to

where along the spectrum of seriousness of the offence concerned a particular offence might lie. In some cases, this

Court may endeavour to provide further guidance as to how such factors may convert into actual sentences. For

example, in a judgment delivered today in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Ryan, a formation of this Court (differently

constituted in part) sought to give such guidance in relation to sentencing for certain firearms offences. Likewise in a

further judgment delivered today in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Fitzgibbon similar guidance is given in respect of

assault causing serious harm.

2.6 In addition, there is increasingly information available through the ISIS (Irish Sentencing Information System) project,

which provides details as to the range of sentences which are typically imposed by sentencing judges for particular types

of offences.”

33. This Court draws attention to what appears to be two separate forms of potential guidance from an appeal court and assistance

which might be given by the prosecution envisaged by the Court of Criminal Appeal at para 2.5 in the above. Firstly judgments which

analyse factors to be taken into account in sentencing for particular offences upon the basis of which the prosecution may or should

make submissions “as to where, in the light of the analysis by [the appeal court], the offence in question is said to lie along a

spectrum of severity”. Second those judgments such as Ryan (No.1) and Fitzgibbon (No.2) which give guidance as to how such

factors may convert into actual sentences or the range of sentences for such offences.

34. The Court of Criminal Appeal in Z in summarising its approach at the commencement of para. 2.7 stated:

“In this Court’s view, there is now an obligation on the prosecution to draw to the attention of a sentencing judge any

guidance, whether arising from an analysis carried out by this Court or from ISIS or otherwise, which touches on the

ranges or bands of sentences which may be considered appropriate to any offence under consideration [emphasis added]

and the factors which are properly, at least in ordinary cases, to be taken into account. In many cases, this should not

impose any significant burden on the prosecution for the sources ought to be easily recognised.”

35. This Court considers that the Court of Criminal Appeal in Z was confining the assistance or guidance of which it approved to

analysis carried out by the Court of Criminal Appeal, ISIS or otherwise which related to factors to be taken into account and the

ranges or bands of sentence referable to the actual offence under consideration by the sentencing judge. Further as appears below

this approach was not changed in the clarification in Fitzgibbon (No.2).

36. In July 2014, in Fitzgibbon (No.2) the Court of Criminal Appeal again per Clarke J. (with Birmingham and Sheehan JJ.) returned to

consider the obligation of the prosecution in giving assistance at sentencing hearings. It appears from that judgment that counsel for

the Director in the case had raised some practical difficulties in relation to the implementation of certain aspects of what had been

said by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Z. In Fitzgibbon (No.2) the Court of Criminal Appeal at para. 2.2 identified amongst the matters

to be considered by it:-

“(a) Given that no issue was raised concerning the general obligation on the D.P.P. to bring to the attention of a

sentencing judge relevant guidance as to the range of sentences which might properly be imposed in respect of certain

offences, an issue arose concerning the parameters of what might properly come within the ambit of such guidance

properly so called;

(b) the question of the role of counsel for the D.P.P. in sentencing hearings, involving offences in respect of which no

guidance in accordance with (a) is available, was also touched on in the written submission.

(c) . . .”

37. In dealing with the matters identified at paras. (a) and (b) above the Court of Criminal Appeal set out again the traditional

position of the very limited role played by the prosecution at a sentence hearing. It also referred to Deaton v. Attorney General,

Revenue Commissioners [1963] I.R. 170, which makes clear that sentencing is exclusively a judicial task. The Court of Criminal Appeal

expressed agreement with the submission made by counsel that it followed that the sentencing function may not be delegated by a

judge. Its attention was also drawn to recent Australian jurisprudence including the judgment of the High Court of Australia in Barbaro

v. The Queen [2014] HCA 2 (February 12, 2014) in which it considered an earlier decision of R. v. MacNeil-Brown [2008] 20 VR 677.

The Court of Criminal Appeal drew attention in particular to the following extract from the Barbaro judgment of the High Court of

Australia:

“29. The practice countenanced by MacNeil-Brown assumes that the prosecution's proffering a statement of the bounds of the

available range of sentences will assist the sentencing judge to come to a fair and proper result. That assumption depends upon the

prosecution determining the supposed range dispassionately. It depends upon the prosecution acting not only fairly (as it must) but in

the role which Buchanan JA rightly described as that of "a surrogate judge". That is not the role of the prosecution.

…

33. The statement by the prosecution of the bounds of an available range of sentences may lead to erroneous views about its

importance in the process of sentencing with consequential blurring of what should be a sharp distinction between the role of the

judge and the role of the prosecution in that process. If a judge sentences within the range which has been suggested by the

prosecution, the statement of that range may well be seen as suggesting that the sentencing judge has been swayed by the

prosecution's view of what punishment should be imposed. By contrast, if the sentencing judge fixes a sentence outside the

suggested range, appeal against sentence seems well-nigh inevitable.

…

38. If a sentencing judge is properly informed about the parties' submissions about what facts should be found, the relevant

sentencing principles and comparable sentences, the judge will have all the information which is necessary to decide what sentence

should be passed without any need for the prosecution to proffer its view about available range.”

38. The Court of Criminal Appeal then at para. 3.4 sought to explain further what the Court of Criminal Appeal (in part a different

constitution) had said in Z in the following terms:-

“3.4 In the context of those submissions it is, in the Court's view, important that there be clarity about what this Court said in Z. It is

clear that the question of sentencing is purely a judicial matter. It is not for any outside party to give guidance to a sentencing judge

as to what the sentence in a particular case should be. But there is a very real difference between guidance, on the one hand, and

assistance, on the other. What this Court suggested in Z was that counsel for the D.P.P. should be of assistance in drawing to the

attention of the Court, any relevant materials which, it might be suggested, the Court should take into account in imposing sentence.

As noted at para. 38 of the decision of the High Court of Australia in Barbaro, the parties are entitled to make submissions about

facts, ‘the relevant sentencing principles and comparable sentences’. I do not see anything inconsistent between that passage and

what this Court said in Z. It is not for the D.P.P. to suggest that a particular range of sentences is appropriate as such. Rather, it is

for the D.P.P. to bring to the attention of a sentencing judge any guidance on sentence which has been given either by this Court or

from other relevant sources (an issue to which the Court will return) and to make submissions as to where, in the light of that

guidance, the case in question falls.

3.5 It would, indeed, create the very difficulties identified by the High Court of Australia in para. 33 of the judgment in

Barbaro, if the D.P.P. were simply to state that the appropriate sentence, in the D.P.P.'s view, for a particular offence

was between x and y years. It is, on the other hand, a very different thing for counsel for the D.P.P. to draw the Court's

attention to the fact that this Court has given guidance as to the appropriate ranges of sentences for crimes of a

particular type and to submit, on the facts and having regard to appropriate sentencing principles, that the case in

question falls into a particular part of that range. In so doing counsel is doing no more than any counsel on any side of

any case, whether civil or criminal, is required to do; drawing the Court's attention to the law and making submissions on

what the result should be as a result of applying that law to the facts.

3.6 Finally, before going on to deal with the three specific issues identified earlier, it is necessary to touch on a point

made by counsel for the D.P.P. in the course of oral argument. Based on a suggestion that an equal burden should lie on

the prosecution and the defence, counsel made the argument that the obligation on prosecuting counsel should not

extend beyond the obligation which rests on the defence. The Court does not, however, see that there is any reason why

a sentencing judge cannot equally ask defence counsel for submissions as to where the defence submits the offence in

question lies on any spectrum of seriousness identified in the jurisprudence of this Court. In particular if defence counsel

wishes to argue that either the guidance to which the prosecution has drawn attention is not fully relevant or correct or

that the submissions of the prosecution as to where the offence in question lies on any spectrum identified in such

guidance is incorrect, then it is for the defence to make its submissions on those issues as part of the sentencing

process.”

39. The Court then turned to the specific questions it had identified set out above. Firstly, as to what guidance or assistance comes

within the ambit of the prosecutor’s obligation it stated:

“4.1 No point was raised on behalf of the D.P.P. concerning the obligation to bring to the attention of a sentencing judge

guidance such as was given by this Court both in this case and in Ryan. The question which did arise was as to whether

the obligation of prosecuting counsel went beyond that. In the Court's view it does. Where there is reliable information as

to the range of sentences for particular offences typically imposed by sentencing judges it seems to this Court that the

prosecution should draw that information to the attention of the sentencing judge.

4.2 A sentencing judge is not, of course, bound by any such analysis. However, it seems likely that, at least in many

cases, a sentencing judge will obtain assistance from having such information, if it exists, drawn to his or her attention.

Likewise, it is important to note that an important factor behind the views expressed by this Court in Z is a desire, while

recognising the significant range of different factors which may be relevant to the sentencing process in any individual

case, to bring about the maximum level of consistency in sentencing which is compatible with giving proper weight to

such individual factors. Bringing to the attention of the sentencing judge any reputable analysis of the sentences which

are typically imposed in respect of a relevant offence can only be of assistance in bringing about such consistency. For

those reasons it is the Court's view that the obligation on prosecuting counsel extends beyond bringing the sentencing

judge's attention to guidance from this Court, but extends also to any reputable analysis of the sentences typically

imposed by sentencing judges for the offence in question.

4.3 In that context it is appropriate to draw attention to the fact that one of the matters specifically identified by the

High Court of Australia in Barbaro, as being a matter which the prosecution should bring to the Court’s attention, is the

question of ‘comparable sentences’. There is, of course, as has been pointed out in many cases, a real difficulty in

attempting to compare with any degree of precision the sentence imposed in one case with another. The range of

factors, both those which influence an assessment of the seriousness of the offence and the culpability of the accused

and those which derive from the accused’s circumstances, which are properly taken into account, makes it very difficult

to draw any great assistance from a single sentence. It is for that very reason that a sentencing judge must be allowed a

real margin of appreciation in determining the appropriate sentence. Likewise, drawing to a sentencing judge’s attention a

single decision, whether of a sentencing judge in another case or of this Court, is unlikely to be of very great assistance,

at least in many situations. However, where there is sufficient information available as to the range of sentences typically

imposed, different considerations obviously apply. That leads logically to the second issue raised.”

40. The Court then turned to the situation which pertained before the trial judge in sentencing the appellant herein, namely where

there is no guidance of the type referred to from an appeal court or a reputable analysis of the sentences typically imposed by

sentencing judges for the offence in question and stated at para. 5.1:-

“It seems to this Court that where there is no guidance of the type referred to in the previous section available,

prosecuting counsel should not suggest any range of sentence, for to do so, without such guidance being available, would

be to give rise to the very problem identified in Barbaro. It would lead to prosecuting counsel straying into suggesting a

sentence as such rather than making an appropriate submission as to where, in the light of the sentencing jurisprudence

of this Court or in the light of a proper analysis of sentences typically imposed by sentencing judges, the range for the

offence in question lies.”

41. It appears to this Court that the clarification provided by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Fitzgibbon (No.2) to what was stated in

Z limits the circumstances in which assistance or guidance may be given by the prosecution and as to the form of that assistance or

guidance. However, it is important to note that the Fitzgibbon (No.2) judgment appears to be concerned primarily, if not in substance

exclusively with the role of the prosecution in making submissions as to the range of sentence appropriate for the offence in question.

In speaking of the range of sentence it appears that the Court was referring to the range in the sense of number of years which

might be imposed for the sentence. As pointed out earlier in this judgment, in Z the Court approved of assistance by the prosecution

in relation to firstly placing the offence committed at its appropriate point on the spectrum or range of severity and then identifying

the appropriate range of sentence. In Fitzgibbon (No.2) the Court did not expressly address the role of the prosecutor in placing the

offence on the spectrum of severity. It did make reference to this at para 3.6 in the context of the obligation of defence counsel.

42. Prior to considering the role of the prosecutor in the light of Z and Fitzgibbon (No.2) it must be recalled that the judgment in

Fitzgibbon (No.2) was given by a Court of Criminal Appeal two of whose members (Clarke J. and Sheehan J.) were common to the

Court of Criminal Appeal which gave judgment in Ryan (No.1) on the 18th March, 2014 and Ryan (No.2) on the on the 17th July, 2014,

in which they referred with approval to the principles set out in Fitzgibbon (No.2) and which appear relevant to a full understanding of

Z and Fitzgibbon (No.2). In Ryan (No.1), the Court considered the ways of determining an appropriate sentence and stated at paras.

3.1 to 3.3:

“There are, in general terms, two ways in which a determination of the appropriate sentence can be arrived at. First, a

sentencing judge, having assessed the gravity of the offence and the culpability of the accused, may seek to place the

offence itself at an appropriate point on the spectrum of offences of that type. Offences can typically be divided into

lower, middle and upper parts of the range with, perhaps, further refinements such as, for example, “the upper part of the

middle range” or the like. There is, of course, no necessary formula of words which must be used. It should also be

emphasised, as has already been pointed out, that there may always be exceptional or unusual cases which do not readily

fit into any such range or ranges and where the sentencing judge will have to engage in a somewhat novel analysis to

come to an appropriate determination as to sentence. However, in most cases, an offence can, by reason of its gravity

and the culpability of the accused, be placed somewhere along the appropriate range in the manner just identified.

One possible means of converting such an analysis into an actual sentence involves, as a first step, the sentencing judge

determining the appropriate sentence for the offence itself having regard to where the offence lies along that range. The

sentencing judge is then required, in accordance with the established jurisprudence, to take into account the

circumstances of the individual accused and make such adjustment (if any) as may be appropriate to reflect the individual

circumstances of that accused. Where, for example, there are significant mitigating and other personal factors, then a

specified reduction in sentence and/or a suspension of sentence in whole or in part may be appropriate to meet those

factors. In adopting this methodology, the sentencing judge indicates what the appropriate sentence might be, were it

not for the individual circumstances of the accused concerned, and then adjusts the sentence, as appropriate, to reflect

those individual circumstances.

However, a sentencing judge does not necessarily have to indicate what sentence would be appropriate for the offence

itself. Rather the sentencing judge may determine where it is appropriate to place the offence in the spectrum and then

adjust that place to reflect any individual circumstances of the accused so as to determine where the sentence itself

should lie along the range of appropriate sentences having regard both to the offence and the circumstances of the

accused. It seems to this Court that either of such methodologies is an entirely appropriate way for a sentencing judge to

approach the question."

43. As appears each approach involves as a first step a sentencing judge, placing the offence committed at an appropriate point on

the spectrum of severity for offences of that type. In each method a sentencing judge having determined where on the spectrum of

severity the offence lies must turn to the second question of determining what is appropriate for the accused for the offence

committed. The Court envisaged two permissible approaches to the second question. It also recognised that there may be exceptional

cases where judges may need to depart from this approach. It is not necessary to consider the detail of these for the purposes of

this judgment.

44. What then is the permitted role of the prosecution in a sentencing hearing following the single judgment in Z and the two

judgments in Ryan and Fitzgibbon? At a level of general principle it appears to this Court consistent with all the judgments that the

prosecution is entitled to and should give assistance to the sentencing judge in relation both to placing the offence at the appropriate

point on the spectrum of severity and in identifying the sentence or where on the range of sentences it is appropriate to place the

offence.

45. The permitted assistance and limits on same in relation to the second part of the sentencing exercise, namely the determination

of the appropriate sentence or range of sentences for the offence may now be summarised as follows.

a. The prosecution should draw to the attention of the sentencing judge any guidance given by decisions of an appeal

court in relation to the sentence to be imposed for the offence in question and any guidance to be obtained from any

reputable analysis of the sentences typically imposed by sentencing judges for the offence in question.

b. Where there exists guidance of either type described then it is open to the prosecution to make submissions as to

where, in the light of that guidance and the facts admitted or proved the appropriate sentence for the offence in

question falls on the range of sentences.

c. Where no guidance from an appeal court or a reputable analysis of sentences typically imposed by sentencing judges

for the offence in question exists, it is not appropriate for the prosecution to suggest any sentence or a place on the

range of sentence for the offence in question.

46. This Court considers that in identifying the above the Court of Criminal Appeal was not intending, even in cases where no

guidance of the type identified exists, that the prosecution should cease the longstanding practice of drawing the sentencing judge’s

attention to the maximum and any minimum sentence for the offence in question.

47. What, with respect, is less clear from these judgments is the assistance which may or should be given by the prosecution to a

sentencing judge in relation to where on the spectrum of severity for the offence in question the actual offence committed lies. This

Court considers that from the judgment in Z and Fitzgibbon (No.2) it follows that even in the absence of guidance of the type

described on the appropriate range of sentences the prosecution may and should in some instances give assistance to a sentencing

judge in placing the offence committed on the spectrum of severity for the offence in question but not make any further submission

as to the appropriate range of sentence for the offence. Whilst in relation to some offences such as where there is a relatively low

maximum sentence there may be a direct correlation between the place on the spectrum of severity and a corresponding straight line

arithmetic place on range of permissible sentences in others particularly where life is the maximum sentence such a straight line

correlation may not exist.

48. One circumstance where such assistance would be appropriate is where there exist judgments of an appellate court which identify

the factors to be taken into account when sentencing for a particular offence. It would then be appropriate for the prosecution to

draw attention to these judgments and to make submissions as to where in the light of that guidance the offence in question falls on

the spectrum of severity. There may be other circumstances in which such assistance is permissible and appropriate. It is only

intended to consider that pertaining in the sentencing of the appellant.

Application of principles in Z and Fitzgibbon (No 2) to this appeal

49. What of the position which pertained in sentencing the appellant following a first prosecution of a relatively new statutory

offence? Should or may the prosecution do any more than draw the judge’s attention to the maximum sentence and an absence of

any minimum? This Court considers that it may and should and that such a position follows in part from the change of approach

identified in Z consequent on the right of appeal of the DPP in the case of undue leniency, desirability of consistency and the general

principles set out in Z and Fitzgibbon (No.2). Any such additional assistance would depend upon the nature of the offence and must

of course observe the limits of being assistance and not being capable of perceived as guidance by the prosecution, in the sense of

suggesting a sentence, so as to avoid encroaching on the exclusive judicial function and the problems identified in Barbaro and

Fitzgibbon (No.2).

50. The Court recognises that the novelty of this prosecution, the nature of the offence created by s. 3(2A) of the 1998 Act and the

decision in Z without the clarification in Fitzgibbon (No. 2) presented considerable difficulties for the trial judge and prosecution and

defence teams. Nevertheless the Court considers that certain of the submissions by the prosecution which appear to have been

taken into account by the trial judge were impermissible. Firstly, the Court considers that it was not in accordance with the principles

set out to submit for consideration sentence decisions on offences other than the offence in question i.e. the offence of which the

appellant was convicted. Such decisions do not come within the permitted guidance in relation either to the severity of the offence or

the appropriate sentence. Secondly the Court considers that in accordance with the judgments in Z and Fitzgibbon (No. 2) it was not

open to the prosecution to make any submission in relation to the appropriate sentence by reason of the absence of any guidance

either from decisions of an appeal court or any reputable analysis of the sentences typically imposed by sentencing judges for

offences contrary s. 3(2A) of the 1998 Act. Hence it was not permissible to submit as was done that “at the very least the Director

would say this is in the mid range of sentencing or mid range of offending, perhaps even towards the upper end of the mid range”.

The trial judge erred in principle in considering these submissions.

51. For the reasons already set out, the Court considers that it was both permissible and incumbent on the prosecution to assist the

trial judge in the difficult task of placing the offence of which the appellant was convicted at an appropriate point on the spectrum of

gravity of the offences included within s. 3(2A) of the 1998 Act. Counsel for the prosecution sought to assist by considering the

nature of the offence created by s. 3(2A) as compared with other offences created by other subsections of s. 3 of the 1998 Act.

Again the Court does not consider such an exercise appropriate rather what ought to have been considered and analysed was the

spectrum of wrong doing encompassed within the offences created by s. 3(2A) and from an identification of the facts constituting the

offence of which the appellant was convicted, an objective analysis as to where within the spectrum of wrong doing encompassed by

s. 3(2A) of the 1998 Act, the offence of which the appellant was convicted lay.

Severity of Sentence

52. The decision of the trial judge accorded with the view of the Director as communicated that the gravity of the offence fell within

the middle range and determined that it required, prior to considering mitigating factors, a sentence in the range of six to eight years.

There is no doubt, but that the offence of which the appellant was convicted was an intrinsically serious one. By affecting the

changes to the 1998 act which it has in both the 2007 Act and the 2008 Act the Oireachtas clearly recognised that the pre-existing

law in relation to contacts between an adult and a child with a view to the sexual exploitation of the child by the adult was

inadequate. The new offence contained in 3(2A) of the 1998 Act is accordingly designed to protect young persons against the

designs of those who would exploit their youthful innocence and vulnerability.

53. Can, however the offence committed by this particular offender in these particular circumstances be properly characterised as

one meriting a sentence in the range of six to eight years as a starting point prior to any questions of mitigation? It is important to

note that any offence of this nature involving a purpose of sexual exploitation of a child by a significantly older adult is, by definition,

a serious and grave offence. Nothing in this judgment should be taken as detracting from that assessment. It may be helpful to

observe that descriptions or labels of particular criminal conduct as being within a “lower range” or “mid range” whether on the

spectrum of severity or range of sentences may sometimes give a false or misleading impression, not least in cases of this kind.

However, such descriptions are of assistance to sentencing judges and in the interest of achieving consistent sentences. In relation

to this offence such description must be understood in the context of what is at any point on the spectrum a serious and grave

offence.

54. The essential ingredients of the offence committed contrary to s. 3(2A) of the 1998 Act are:-

a. that the appellant was travelling with the intention of meeting Ms. F. (a child); and

b. that he had met or communicated with Ms. F. on two or more previous occasions; and

c. he travelled to meet for the purpose of doing anything that would constitute sexual exploitation of Ms. F.

55. Any assessment of the gravity of the offence of which the appellant was convicted and the appropriate sentence before taking

into account the mitigating factors requires an examination of the admitted facts at the sentencing hearing in relation to the above

ingredients of the offence by reference to the spectrum of offences under s. 3(2A) for which the Oireachtas has prescribed a

maximum penalty of fourteen years and no minimum penalty. Regrettably no such assessment appears to have been made by the trial

judge. Whilst the facts in relation to (a) and (b) above are clear, there appears to be a lack of clarity as to the precise factual

ingredients of the offence of which the appellant was convicted in relation to the purpose for which the appellant was travelling to

meet Ms. F.

56. The sentence hearing and the trial judge’s subsequent sentence ruling appear to have proceeded on the basis that the purpose of

the appellant in travelling to meet Ms. F. was to invite (or perhaps, induce) Ms. F. to engage in a sexual act by either masturbating

him or performing some act of oral sex. There was no suggestion, on the facts adduced of an intention by the appellant to coerce Ms.

F. to commit or perform such acts. The reason for which we refer to a possible inducement is the evidence of the offer made by the

appellant in a phone call with Ms. F. to bring her phone credit and alcohol. However as against that, the trial judge in her sentencing

remarks refers to Ms. F as a “willing participant”. There was no analysis or determination of the basis upon which the actual purpose

of the appellant in meeting Ms. F. if carried out would have constituted sexual exploitation as defined by s. 3(5) of the 1998 Act. The

trial judge referred to the admission made by the appellant in Garda interview of wanting to meet Ms. F. for “a sexual act” and an

indication given by him of masturbation and oral sex, but his denial of any intention of full intercourse. This Court is not aware of the

evidence or submissions at the trial before the jury. It does not appear from the transcript of the sentence hearing and decision of

the trial judge that there was any analysis at that stage of the basis upon which the admissions made or facts proved constituted

sexual exploitation as defined by s. 3(5) of the 1998 Act. As the relevant purpose of the meeting would have to have been proved

beyond reasonable doubt, in the absence of compelling evidence of an intention to induce Ms. F. to perform a sexual act, it appears

that the sentencing of the appellant either did or should have proceeded upon the basis of the relevant purpose being to invite Ms. F.

to engage or participate in a sexual act within the meaning of s. 3(5)(d). The commission of such a sexual act even with the consent

of the child under the age of fifteen years would also constitute the commission of a sexual assault which is a scheduled offence to

the Sex Offenders Act 2001 and hence also come within s. 3(5)(c) of the 1998 Act and thereby sexual exploitation as defined.

57. Notwithstanding that this is as we have already stated an intrinsically serious offence which is gravely wrong, nevertheless its

relative gravity ought to have been considered in the context of the wide range of situation which may constitute offences under s.

3(2A) of the 1998 Act and in particular the wide range of purposes which would constitute sexual exploitation of a child within the

meaning of s. 3(5). The trial judge erred in failing to do this.

58. A consideration of the wide definition and generality of the term “sexual exploitation" in s. 3(5) of the 1998 Act, makes clear that

there are many purposes included therein, which are significantly more morally reprehensible and egregious than the purpose of the

meeting in this case and for all of which the Oireachtas has imposed for an offence contrary to s. 3(2A) a maximum sentence of

fourteen years. These include, for example, meeting a child for the purpose of coercion to perform any sexual act or coercion to

engage in full intercourse, prostitution or coercion into child pornography or for rape or buggery. It is in the context of the wide

definition of sexual exploitation for the purposes of offences coming within the scope of s. 3(2A) that the gravity of the particular

offence of which the appellant was convicted ought to have been considered.

59. The Court also considers it relevant to take into consideration the circumstances in which the appellant came to be travelling to

meet the child in determining the gravity of his offence. This Court considers it relevant to an assessment of the gravity of the

offence that the appellant, in May 2011, upon being told the age of the child, did cease contact and that the contact was renewed

by Ms. F. and that the arrangements to meet were made during a conversation which the appellant thought he was having with Ms.

F. but in fact was having with her mother. These latter circumstances do not excuse the wrongdoing by the appellant and the

commission of the offence, but are relevant to take into account in considering the gravity of the offence committed.

60. The Court considers that the trial judge erred in principle in not considering the relative gravity of the offence committed by

reference to the facts admitted or proved in the context of the full spectrum of potential offences contrary to s. 3(2A) of 1998 Act,

particularly by reference to the wide range of matters defined as constituting sexual exploitation in s. 3(5). Further the Court

considers that this error in principle lead her in error to decide that the gravity of this particular offence in the circumstances in which

it was committed fell within the mid range of offences contrary to s. 3(2A) such that before consideration of mitigating factors a

sentence in the range of six to eight years was appropriate. In this Court’s view this was a disproportionate starting point for the

appropriate sentence for the offence committed by the appellant and lead to an unduly severe sentence of four years.

61. Accordingly the Court will allow the appeal and will hear further submissions prior to determining the appropriate sentence.

Mitigating Factors

62. As the appeal is being allowed, and this Court will have to sentence the appellant, it appears appropriate to set out shortly this

Court’s view on the grounds of appeal which related to the mitigating factors.

63. The first ground related to the trial judge’s view that the offer of compensation was “not appropriate in the circumstances of this

case”. The court considers that the trial judge was correct in her conclusion that this was not an appropriate case in which

compensation could or should have played any role so far as the imposition of sentence is concerned.

64. Apart from any other consideration relating to the nature of the offence, the power of the court to direct the payment of

compensation in cases of this kind is contained in s. 6 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993. This section provides in relevant part as

follows:

“(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, on conviction of any person of an offence, the court, instead of or in

addition to dealing with him in any other way, may, unless it sees reason to the contrary, make (on application or

otherwise) an order (in this Act referred to as a “compensation order”) requiring him to pay compensation in respect of

any personal injury or loss resulting from that offence (or any other offence that is taken into consideration by the court

in determining sentence) to any person (in this Act referred to as the “injured party”) who has suffered such injury or

loss.

(2) The compensation payable under a compensation order . . . shall be of such amount . . . as the court considers

appropriate, having regard to any evidence and to any representations that are made by or on behalf of the convicted

person, the injured party or the prosecutor, and shall not exceed the amount of the damages that, in the opinion of the

court, the injured party would be entitled to recover in a civil action against the convicted person in respect of the injury

or loss concerned.

(5) In determining whether to make a compensation order against a person, and in determining the amount of the

compensation, the court shall have regard -

(a ) to his means . . .

(13) In assessing for the purposes of this section the means of a person, the court shall take into account his financial commitments.”

65. Whilst this was an offence which was tried on indictment and therefore the section prima facie applies the permitted order is one

requiring the convicted person to “pay compensation in respect of any personal injury or loss resulting from that offence . . . to any

person . . . who has suffered such injury or loss”. The offence of which the appellant was convicted was one of travelling to meet for

a particular purpose. The meeting never took place. On the admitted facts upon which the sentencing hearing was based, there was

happily no evidence of any personal injury or loss to Ms. F. resulting from the offence.

66. Accordingly this Court considers, apart from any other reason for which compensation may not have been appropriate, s. 6 did

not apply to the admitted facts.

67. The final ground pursued, was that the trial judge in her sentencing remarks indicated that she was in effect penalising the

appellant for having pleaded not guilty and requiring every aspect of the case against him be proved. This submission arose by reason

of an exchange with counsel at the sentencing hearing as to whether the trial judge could have regard to “the manner in which the

trial was run and the putting on proof of every garda witness in the case” and her statement in her decision on sentence “I am not in

a position to give any credit for the accused due the manner in which the matter has proceeded”.

68. It is of course well settled that a convicted person should not be penalised for exercising his constitutional right to plead not

guilty and to have the case against him proved: see The People (DPP) v Shekale [2008] IECCA 28 per Finnegan J. and The People

(DPP) v Daly [2012] 1 I.R. 476, per McKechnie J. In Shekale, Finnegan J. stated:-

“To penalise someone for exercising his constitutional right, to plead not guilty and have the case against him proved,

would be wrong and if that is what occurred in this case it would indeed be wrong.”

This Court agrees with that statement of principle and also finds itself in the same position as did Finnegan J. in Shekale in the sense

that “if that is what occurred in this case it would indeed be wrong”. Notwithstanding the exchange with counsel, this Court is not

satisfied that that is what occurred. It appears more likely that the trial judge was simply indicating, as she was entitled to do, that

the fact that the appellant did not plead guilty deprived him of credit as a mitigating factor to which he would have been entitled if he

had done so.

Conclusion

69. The Court will accordingly allow the appeal, vacate the sentence imposed on the appellant and remand the appellant in custody

pending a sentencing hearing and decision on sentence by this Court.