High Court dismisses defendants' motion to strike out for want of prosecution due to active discovery disputes.

Neutral Citation Number: [2010] IEHC 185

THE HIGH COURT

1997 2244 P

BETWEEN

MUCHWOOD MANAGEMENT LTD AND DAVID REILLY

PLAINTIFFS

AND

DAVID McGUINNESS, ROBERT MALONE, CRAIG HUTCHINSON,

COLM QUEARNEY, RONAN BYRNE, SAMANTHA B. COKER,

MICHAEL SPAIN

DEFENDANTS

JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Dunne delivered on the 19th day of May, 2010.

The plaintiffs herein issued proceedings for damages for breach of contract, misrepresentation and breach of warranty, breach of

fiduciary duty and other reliefs by way of a plenary summons issued on the 26th February, 1997. All of the defendants (save for the

sixth named defendant Samantha B. Coker) have brought a motion seeking to have the plaintiffs proceedings dismissed for want of

prosecution. For ease of reference, a reference to “the defendants” should be understood as a reference to all the defendants save

the 6th defendant unless it is otherwise clear from the context.

Background

The first named plaintiff is a company beneficially owned and controlled by the second named plaintiff and was a party to a written

agreement dated the 30th January, 1990, made with a number of the defendants herein. That agreement provided that the first

named plaintiff would act as manager of a band called LIR. The agreement expired on the 1st December, 1992 and was extended then

for a further two years. A further agreement was entered into to take effect following the expiry of the second agreement and the

third agreement made some modifications to the terms of the original agreement. In addition the fifth named defendant became a

band member in substitution for one of the original members of the band. It appears from the pleadings herein that the variation of

the terms of the original agreement made orally towards the end of 1994 will be a matter of considerable dispute by the parties to the

agreement. This is a case in which oral evidence and the respective recollections of the various parties will be an important feature of

the case.

The pleadings in this case were closed by the delivery of the plaintiffs reply and defence to counterclaim on the 18th November,

2003. A notice of motion had been issued on the 21st January, 2009, returnable for the 13th February, 2009 and that motion

ultimately came on for hearing before me on Monday the 1st March, 2010. It would be of assistance at this point to set a chronology

in relation to the conduct of these proceedings and I propose therefore to refer to a chronology prepared on behalf of the defendants

herein.

26th February 1997 Plenary summons issued

9th May 1997 Appearance for all defendants

9th March 1998 Plaintiffs first notice of intention to proceed

23rd September 1998 Plaintiffs motion to join sixth and seventh defendants and for other relief

16th February 1999 Statement of claim

14th July 1999 Plaintiffs second notice of intention to proceed

27th September 1999 Plaintiffs motion for judgment in default of defence against first to fifth and

seventh defendants

10th December 1999 Defence and counterclaim of first to fifth and seventh defendants

23rd February 2001 Sixth defendant’s notice of motion to dismiss the plaintiffs claim for want of

prosecution

18th November 2003 Plaintiffs reply and defence to counterclaim of first to fifth and seventh

defendants

15th December 2003 Plaintiffs third notice of intention to proceed

30th September 2007 Plaintiffs fourth notice of intention to proceed

11th May 2009 Order of the Master allowing the plaintiffs three weeks in which to serve a notice of trial

I should add that I was also furnished with a further chronology of the proceedings prepared on behalf of the plaintiffs herein. That

chronology is to be found appended to this judgment.

Delay

It appears that although the Master of the High Court made an order permitting the plaintiffs to serve a notice of trial in May 2009,

the Central Office would not accept the notice of trial because of the fact that the plaintiffs solicitors informed the Central Office

that the defendants were in the process of furnishing a further affidavit of discovery and in those circumstances the central office

regarded the matter as not having reached the stage where it would be possible to set the matter down for trial. These matters are

dealt with in the affidavit of Kevin Brophy sworn herein on the 1st March, 2010.

There is no doubt that there have been some extraordinary periods of delay over the course of years while these proceedings have

been pending. Following the delivery of the statement of claim in May 1999, the plaintiffs had to bring a motion for judgment in default

of defence in October 1999, which led to the delivery of the defence and counterclaim in December 1999. The next event of

significance was a notice of motion brought by the sixth named defendant to dismiss the plaintiffs claim for want of prosecution.

Thereafter, there appears to have been no step in the proceedings until the plaintiffs delivered a reply and defence to the

counterclaim of the defendants. Between December 2003 and October 2007, when the plaintiffs issued their third and fourth notice of

intention to proceed respectively, no steps were taken in the proceedings. Having said that, I note from the chronology prepared on

behalf of the plaintiffs that the process of discovery commenced on the 1st December, 2004, when the defendants sought discovery

from the plaintiffs. On the 2nd June, 2005, there was an indication that counsel on both sides would liaise on the issue of discovery.

By the 24th October, 2005, there was an agreement on the question of discovery. Thereafter the plaintiffs swore an affidavit of

discovery on the 8th December, 2006 and that was sent shortly afterwards to the defendants. An affidavit was provided by the

defendants on the 11th April 2007 and correspondence took place thereafter in relation to the discovery until the 27th November,

2007, when a supplemental affidavit of discovery was sworn by the defendants. Subsequently in 2008 there was further

correspondence over the question of discovery and in October 2008, the plaintiffs issued a motion for discovery. It appears that the

defendants provided further documentation over a period of time and ultimately filed a replying affidavit in relation to the discovery

motion. That affidavit, which is sworn by the seventh named defendant on behalf of all of the defendants with the exception of the

sixth named defendant, makes the point that over the course of the past twelve years all necessary information and documentation

requested by the plaintiffs herein has been provided and that there is no further documentation relevant to the issues in the

possession, power or procurement of the defendants. It is pointed out that had the discovery application been brought ten years

earlier, more third party documentation might have been available.

The affidavit grounding the notice of motion herein was sworn by Michael Spain and in that affidavit he stated that the defendants

had requested the plaintiffs to “call this matter on for hearing without further delay” and reference was made to letters dated the

21st November, 2007, the 17th July, 2008 and the 30th October, 2008. He further stated that the ability to defend the plaintiffs’

claim has been severely prejudiced by the plaintiffs’ failure to call the matter on for hearing. He pointed out that the first named

plaintiff is a non trading company which has not filed annual returns with the company’s records office since 23rd September, 1997.

He stated that none of the delay complained of is attributable to the defendants and that the inordinate delays were caused solely by

the plaintiffs.

A replying affidavit was sworn by Kevin Brophy, the principal in the firm of Brophy, Solicitors, on behalf of the plaintiffs. In that

affidavit, he stated that the defendants have been in a position to set the matter down for trial had they wished to do so. In

particular he emphasised that this could have been done at any time since the 14th December, 2006, after the plaintiffs had sent

their affidavit of discovery to the defendants. Complaint is then made as to an alleged failure on the part of the defendants to comply

with the terms of discovery agreed the parties. There was also complaint made about the extent of information provided by the

seventh named defendant in the affidavit grounding the application. Have set out a number of matters relating to the background of

the proceedings, Mr. Brophy went on to accept that there has been a delay in progressing the case. He came on record in the

proceedings in May 2001. He contended that there has been delay on both sides in progressing the matter and that the most recent

delay has been as a result of the defendants’ failure to make discovery. He set out the background to an agreement reached by

counsel for the parties in relation to the issue of discovery. On the basis of the matters set out in the affidavit, he stated that whilst

there has been substantial delay, having regard to the issue of delay in relation to discovery, the delay is excusable.

The Law

There was little dispute between the parties on the legal principles applicable to a case of this kind. Counsel on behalf of the

defendants referred to the cases of Allergon Pharmaceuticals (Ireland) Ltd. v. Noel Deane Roofing and Cladding Ltd. And Others

(Unreported, High Court, O’Sullivan J., 6th July, 2006) which was an application made by the third named defendant to set aside an

order renewing the plenary summons. O’Sullivan J. made reference in the course of his judgment in that case to the decision of the

Supreme Court in the case of Gilroy v. Flynn [2005] 1 I.L.R.M. 290. Reference was also made to the decision in the case of Anglo Irish

Beef Processors Ltd. and D.J.S. Meats Ltd. v. Montgomery and Others [2002] 3 I.R. 510, in which it had been held that the balance

of justice was in favour of striking out the proceedings. The plaintiffs in that case had not given an adequate explanation for the

delay and the defendants had not acquiesced in their conduct. In that case there was also a difficulty caused by the death of a

witness, causing serious prejudice to the defendants in maintaining their claim against a third party, giving rise to a substantial risk

that a fair trial would not be possible. Keane C.J. commented at p. 515 of the judgment as follows:-

“As against that, there is the remarkable fact that, although Anglo Irish are acknowledged to be a wealthy trading

corporation with access to first class professional advice, no explanation whatever was given for the quite staggering

lethargy with which these proceedings were pursued. Nor can it be said that the defendants in any way acquiesced in the

inaction of the plaintiffs.”

I was also referred to the decision in O’Connor v. John Player and Sons Ltd. (Unreported, High Court, Quirke J., 12th March, 2004) in

which it was accepted by Quirke J. as follows:-

“I accept the contention that, in general, there is no obligation upon a defendant to expedite the prosecution of the claim

made against him or her.”

In that case as in a number of the other cases that were cited to me including the Anglo Irish Beef Processors Ltd. case the courts

dealt with the issue on the basis of the decision in the case of Primor Plc v. Stokes, Kennedy Crowley [1996] 2 I.R. 459.

In the course of the submissions herein I was referred to a judgment of this Court in the case of Dermot Desmond v. Times

Newspapers Ltd. (Unreported, High Court, 12th June, 2009). In the course of that decision I also referred to the legal principles set

out in the Primor decision and to the application of those principles in a number of decisions such as Gilroy v. Flynn [2005] 1 I.L.R.M.

290 and Stephens v. Paul Flynn Ltd [2005] I.E.H.C. 148. In the case of Stephens v. Paul Flynn Ltd., Clarke J. in a decision which was

upheld by the Supreme Court on appeal set out certain principles to be applied in cases such as this:-

“Having considered the matter I am satisfied that the two central tests remain the same. The court should therefore:-

1. Ascertain whether the delay in question is inordinate and inexcusable; and

2. If it is so established the court must decide where the balance of justice lies.”

The principles summarised by Hamilton C.J. in the Primor case are so well known that it is not necessary to set out those principles

here, but it think it is fair to say that those principles are encapsulated in the passage referred to from the judgment of Clarke J.

referred to above. In this case, it has been conceded on behalf of the plaintiffs that the delay has been inordinate. The plaintiffs do

not concede that the delay is inexcusable and have pointed to issues in relation to discovery to support the argument that the delay

has not been inexcusable. Indeed they go further and say that by participating in the process of discovery and by furnishing and

continuing to furnish documentation, the defendants have acquiesced in the delay that has occurred. The defendants have conceded

that there has been some delay on their part in the course of the proceedings, but in essence, their view is that the delay on their

part is minimal when contrasted with that of the plaintiffs herein.

It is necessary therefore to examine the issue in relation to discovery in order to consider whether the delay in this case is not just

inordinate but also inexcusable. On the 1st December, 2004, the solicitors for the defendants wrote to the plaintiffs solicitors seeking

voluntary discovery. There was a response to that letter in June 2005, indicating that counsel for both sides would discuss the

matter. Ultimately there was an agreement on the discovery to be provided by both sides in October 2005, and it was further agreed

that discovery was to be made within eight weeks of the 24th October, 2005. As it transpired, the plaintiffs’ discovery was not

furnished to the defendants until the 14th December, 2006 and the defendants furnished their affidavit of discovery on the 11th April,

2007.

Thereafter, the parties engaged in correspondence about the discovery that had been made on an almost monthly basis until

February 2008. Matters rested there until the 1st July, 2008. In a letter of that date the solicitors for the defendant called on the

plaintiffs to set the matter down for trial. It was pointed out that the defendants were severely prejudiced by the delay. Ultimately, a

motion for discovery was issued on behalf of the plaintiffs on the 14th October, 2008, returnable for the 23rd January, 2009. The

notice of motion at hearing before this Court in relation to the dismissal for want of prosecution issued on the 21st January, 2009,

returnable for the 13th February, 2009. It is worth observing that the process of discovery, having been commenced by and on behalf

of the defendants in December 2004, was engaged in by the parties in a desultory manner over an extraordinary period of time.

Having reached an agreement on the nature of discovery to be made and having agreed that discovery should be furnished within

eight weeks in October 2005, the plaintiffs being dissatisfied with the discovery made available, did not ultimately issue any motion in

relation to discovery until the 14th October, 2008. It has to be remembered that this case relates to a tour by a band in the United

States that took place in 1994.

I do not doubt that there may have been difficulty in accessing some of the materials required by way of discovery given the fact

that some of the events at issue in these proceedings occurred outside the jurisdiction and many years ago, but having said that it is

extraordinary that the process of discovery could have been allowed to drift by the plaintiffs for such a long period of time. It is

necessary to remember that it is the plaintiffs who rely on the discovery process to provide the excuse for the delay in prosecuting

these proceedings. Yet it is the plaintiffs who allowed this matter i.e. the question of discovery to delay the action being set down

without taking any practical steps to advance the matter. One understands that discovery can be a complicated, difficult and labour

intensive aspect of any proceedings. The more complicated the nature of the proceedings, the greater the likelihood is that discovery

in the course of such proceedings may be complicated. Nonetheless, that would not justify the parties in proceedings sitting back and

taking a leisurely approach to the question of discovery. It is obviously desirable that parties should in the first instance try to agree

discovery. That is what happened in this particular case. It is unsurprising that having reached an agreement as to the time scale

within which to provide discovery there may be some delay or slippage in complying with the time scale agreed. There is nothing

unusual in that. One might comment that it is more often the case than not that time scales in relation to discovery are frequently

aspirational. Nonetheless, the Rules of the Superior Courts provide a procedure to deal with difficulties that arise in relation to

discovery. The plaintiffs could and should at a much earlier stage have brought a motion in relation to the issue of discovery. I cannot

see how it was necessary for the plaintiffs to wait until the 14th October, 2008, to issue a motion in respect of discovery.

It is interesting to note in passing that the affidavit in support of that notice of motion sworn by Kevin Brophy on the 1st October,

2008, refers simply to the letter of the 20th September, 2005, in relation to discovery and goes on to say that:-

“No satisfactory response was received to this letter upon a copy of which marked “KB1” I have signed my name prior to

the swearing hereof. I also beg to refer to a copy of all other correspondence passing between our two firms in relation to

discovery, upon copies of which, pinned together and marked “KB2”, I have signed my name prior to the swearing hereof.”

The affidavit does not itself set out details as to how the defendants have failed to comply with the issue of discovery and it is

necessary to consider the correspondence in that regard. In truth, there is nothing unusual about the nature of discovery in this

case.

I do not think that the manner in which discovery has been dealt with in this case to date provides an excuse for the delay in dealing

with the prosecution of the proceedings herein. It may have a bearing on the issue of the balance of justice but it does not provide

an excuse for delay. Far from excusing the delay, one is left with the inescapable conclusion that for long periods of time, little or no

effort at all was made to advance these proceedings. To a certain extent the argument as to the excusability of the delay in this

case is reduced to saying that because the plaintiffs have delayed and the other side has also delayed, there is an excuse for the

plaintiffs’ delay. That is not the case. The delay on the part of the plaintiffs in getting the action to hearing cannot be excused solely

by reason of delay on the part of the defendants in providing discovery. In those circumstances I have come to the conclusion that

the delay in this case is both inordinate and inexcusable.

In those circumstances it becomes necessary to consider the question of the balance of justice. In the Primor principles referred to

above, it was found that in considering that aspect of the case the court should take into consideration and have regard to:-

“(i) the implied constitutional principles of basic fairness of procedures,

(ii) whether the delay and consequent prejudice in the special facts of the case were such that made it unfair to the

defendant to allow the action to proceed and made it just to strike out the plaintiffs action,

(iii) any delay on the part of the defendant, - because litigation was a two party operation, the conduct of both parties

should be looked at,

(iv) whether any delay or conduct of the defendant amounted to acquiescence on the part of the defendant in the

plaintiff’s delay,

(v) the fact that conduct by the defendant which induces the plaintiff to incur further expense in pursuing the action did

not, in law, constitute an absolute bar preventing the defendant from obtaining a striking out order but is a relevant

factor to be taken into account by the judge in exercising his discretion whether or not to strike out the claim, the weight

to be attached to such conduct depending on all the circumstances of the particular case,

(vi) whether the delay had gives rise to a substantial risk that it is not possible to have a fair trial or is likely to cause or

have caused serious prejudice to the defendant,

(vii) the fact that the prejudice to the defendant referred to in (vi) may arise in many ways and be other than that

merely caused by the delay, including damage to a defendant’s reputation and business.”

This is a case in which it has been accepted that there has been some degree of delay on the part of the defendants. It is also the

case that as has been stated in other decisions, for example, O’Connor v. John Player and Sons Ltd. and Others (Unreported, High

Court, Quirke J., 12th March, 2004) that:-

“. . . in general, there is no obligation upon a defendant to expedite the prosecution of the claim made against him or

her.”

It seems to me that in the context of considering the balance of justice, the critical issues to consider are whether the delay or

conduct on the part of the defendants could be said to amount to acquiescence on the part of the defendants in the plaintiffs delay

and whether the delay gives rise to a substantial risk that it is not possible to have a fair trial or is likely to cause or have caused

serious prejudice to the defendants. Dealing with the issue of acquiescence and delay on the part of the defendants, it is relevant to

note that on the 29th September, 2009, an affidavit of discovery described as a supplemental affidavit of discovery was sworn by

Michael Spain on behalf of the defendants. It is noteworthy that that affidavit was sworn some eight months after the issue of the

notice of motion herein seeking to dismiss these proceedings for want of prosecution.

One of the unusual features of this case is that whilst there has been inordinate and inexcusable delay on the part of the plaintiffs in

prosecuting their claim that has been mirrored by the defendants in their response to the issue of discovery, a process which they

themselves initiated in 2004. The approach of the defendants in this case to the question of discovery is not dissimilar to the

approach of the defendant in a decision of this Court in a case entitled Rooney v. Ryan [2009] I.E.H.C. 154, in which I commented at

p. 164 as follows:-

“In those circumstances, it seems to me that the defendant has by its conduct lulled the plaintiff into a false sense of

security such that the plaintiff was not impressed with any sense of urgency in relation to the proceedings.”

I added:-

“I am not entirely sure whether that conduct on the part of the defendant could be classed as acquiescence but it is

certainly the case that the defendant delayed in bringing an application to dismiss for want of prosecution and during that

period of delay, the plaintiff incurred further expense in conducting the litigation, albeit without a sense of urgency.”

I cannot be other than critical of the manner in which the plaintiffs and the defendants have conducted this litigation. There is an

obligation on all sides to litigation to conduct the proceedings expeditiously. In this particular case there has been a lack of expedition

apparent on both sides. Matters are made worse when one considers that the issues go back to a contract first entered into in 1990

and in relation to which the main dispute relates to events that occurred in 1995. The proceedings themselves were issued in 1997

and the last formal step in the proceedings before the issue of the motion for discovery in 2008 was the delivery of the reply to the

defence and counterclaim on the 18th November, 2003.

Apart altogether from the issue of acquiescence or conduct on the part of the defendants, there is also the issue of prejudice. In

that regard the supplemental affidavit of Michael Spain sworn herein on the 25th February, 2010, on behalf of the defendants has to

be considered. He noted in that affidavit that the plaintiffs have served notice of discontinuance against the sixth named defendant,

Samantha Coker, a citizen of the United States and a person residing in that country. She is described as a vital witness for the

defence and Michael Spain indicates that since he discovered that she was no longer a co-defendant in the proceedings he has

attempted to contact her to find out if she would be available to give evidence. Her response was to the effect that she does not

have any documentation from that time period and that her recollection of matters is minimal. Michael Spain also contacted Rob

Gordon, the president of the record company which owns the recording rights of LIR’s music in the United States. His response was

similar. He indicated that:-

“I am sure any paperwork was thrown away after the seven years the IRS makes save records for. Sorry I cannot be

more helpful.”

Michael Spain went on to add that having tried to discuss the case with the co-defendants it is clear that the recollections of the

co-defendants regarding the evidence has been severely diminished by the amount of time that has elapsed.

Mr. Brophy in an Affidavit sworn on the 1st March 2010 went on to add:-

“When these matters, both the motion relating to our request for discovery and the defendants motion to dismiss for

want of prosecution came before the Master of the High Court in May 2009, the defendant was given a further five weeks

to file a further affidavit of discovery. When the matter came before this Honourable Court in May and July 2009, in order

to fix a date for the hearing of the overall action, the matter was adjourned on consent because the defendants indicated

that they were in the process of filing a further affidavit of discovery and because the Central Office would not accept

the notice of trial served by us on the defendants because we had told them that the defendants were in the process of

furnishing a further affidavit of discovery and pleadings had not therefore concluded.”

That affidavit of discovery was as previously mentioned finally furnished in September of last year.

I do not doubt that the defendants herein have suffered a moderate degree of prejudice by the delay in the conduct of these

proceedings. The prejudice includes the lack of documentation from sources in the United States and includes the inevitable effect on

recollection of witnesses and parties that the passage of time inevitably causes. Having regard to the Primor principles to which I

have referred already, I would have to say that this is a case in which it is impossible to ignore the delay on the part of the

defendants. I would go further and say that there has been acquiescence by the defendants in the delay in this case. They initiated,

participated in and delayed the process of discovery to an extent that is difficult to understand even taking into account that the

events at issue go back as far as 1990, relate to a tour in 1995 and deal with events on both sides of the Atlantic. Given that

position, I am reluctant at this point in time to make an order dismissing these proceedings for want of prosecution.

There has been reference as to the circumstances of the various parties to these proceedings in the course of the affidavits sworn

herein. Common sense dictates that these proceedings should be brought to an end sooner rather than later. It does not appear to

me from the affidavits that have been sworn that either the plaintiffs or the defendants could be described as parties with deep

pockets. It seems to me from the affidavits sworn herein that the first named plaintiff is not a company which has any resources. The

second named plaintiff is apparently working as a legal executive. The financial position of the defendants is set out in the affidavit of

Michael Spain sworn on the 21st January, 2009; four of the defendants do not have any form of regular income and indeed appear to

be heavily dependent on social welfare payments or family for their support. To that end, one must question whether there is any

reality for the parties in pursuing this litigation. At one level, one could comment that it would be a kindness to all the parties to

dismiss these proceedings for want of prosecution. I am of the view as I have already made clear that it is not appropriate to do so

at this point in time. At the very least, the parties should consider whether there is a less costly and more practical way of bringing

their protracted dispute to an end. It seems to me that the parties should find an alternative method of resolution of their dispute. I

will hear the parties further on this aspect of the matter.

Date Event Reference

21 Sept 1990 Original Agreement

26 Feb 1997 Plenary Summons 6

9 May 1997 Appearance by Kent Carty for 18

9 March 1998 Notice of Intention to Proceed 19

23 Sept 1998 Motion Issued to Add Two Defendants 26

30 Nov 1998 Order in Motion to Add Defendants 29

16 Feb 1999 Statement of Claim 30

14 July 1999 Notice of Intention to Proceed 51

27 Oct 1999 Motion for Judgment in Default of Defence Grounded on 59

Affidavit of Conor Cahill

10 Dec 1999 Defence and Counter-Claim 70

11 February Appearance by MOP for 6th Defendant 71

2000

17 May 2000 Notion of Motion to Renew Concurrent Summons 72

29 May 2000 Order on renewal motion 78

27 May 2001 Change of Plaintiff’s Solicitor

22 Jan 2002 Notice of Motion for Replies by 6th Defendant 100

2 April 2003 Notice of Motion for Replies by 6th Defendant 136

28 July 2003 Order on Motion for Replies

18 Nov 2003 Reply to Defence and Counterclaim

1 Dec 2004 Defendant’s Seek Discovery Para 13, KB,

217-K3 - 234

2 June 2005 Letter indicating that counsel would liaise on Discovery Para 18, KB,

KB4 - 244

24 October Agreement on Discovery Para 19, KB5,

2005 246

15 Dec 2003 Notice of Intention to Proceed 145

8 Dec 2006 Plaintiff’s Affidavit of Discovery Sworn 148

14 Dec 2006 Plaintiff’s Affidavit of Discovery sent to Defendants Para 20, letter in

KB6

4 Jan 2007 Correspondence from KC indicating that affidavit of Para 20, letter in

Defendants will ready in early course KB6 (253)

12 Jan 2007 Correspondence on discovery 254

26 Feb 2007 Correspondence on discovery

11 April 2007 Defendants Affidavit Provided Para 20, letter in

KB6 (page 260)

12 June 2007 Correspondence on discovery Para 22, KB,

31 July 2007 Correspondence on discovery Para 23, KB,

3 Sept 2007 Correspondence on discovery 272

19 Sept 2007 Correspondence on discovery Para 24, KB

27 Nov 2007 Supplemental Affidavit of Discovery sworn by Defendants Para 25, KB

30 Oct 2007 Notice of Intention to Proceed 162

30 Jan 2008 Inspection Offered C 138

21 February Correspondence over inadequacy of discovery C 131

2008

17 July 2008 Reply to 21 February 2008 correspondence C 122

14 Oct 2008 Plaintiff issues motion for discovery 165

31 Oct 2008 Correspondence in relation to motion C 117

18 Dec 2008 New Documentation is provided 299 KB9

21 Jan 2009 Defendant issues motion to strike out 186

5 Feb 2009 P again queries the discovery C 100

19 June 2009 Continuing Correspondence over Discovery – more

documentation sought referable to discovery made

20 July 2009 KC write referring to social welfare records C 28

19 August 2009 New Documentation is provided C 28

28 August 2009 New Documentation is provided C 21

26 Feb 2009 Defendant files replying affidavit in discovery motion 188

5 May 2009 Plaintiff files replying affidavit in motion to strike out 216