Certificate refused as trial not nullity; defence strategy caused unsworn evidence admission.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe Court of Criminal Appeal refused the applicant's certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court regarding procedural irregularities in the trial. The applicant argued that the admission of unsworn witness statements rendered the trial a nullity, relying on precedent that requires evidence to be given on oath. The court held that the irregularities were caused by the defence's own strategy to facilitate their case, creating an estoppel preventing the applicant from challenging the trial's validity. Consequently, the application was dismissed because the issues did not constitute points of law of exceptional public importance.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IASection 29 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924; Section 22 of the Criminal Justice Act, 2006: Where an appellant relies on the admission of unsworn evidence as a mistrial, they may be prevented by estoppel from an implied waiver or by a finding of fraud on the court, and certificates are refused where issues are specific to the case rather than of exceptional public importance.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IAGiurisprudenza citata
Generato dall'IATesto completo
THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL
Macken J.
Birmingham J.
Edwards J.
[190/06]
RULING ON APPLICATION FOR A CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO SECTION 29 OF THE COURTS OF
JUSTICE ACT, 1924 AS SUBSTITUTED BY SECTION 22 OFTHE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT, 2006
BETWEEN
DANIEL DOHERTY
APPLICANT
AND
THE PEOPLE AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR
OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT of Mrs. Justice Macken delivered the 14th day of December, 2009
1. Arising from the judgment of the Court delivered on 26th February, 2009, the applicant has sought a certificate from the
Court to permit an appeal to the Supreme Court. In its notice of motion five questions are suggested but as was pointed out
by Mr. Alex Owen, senior counsel on behalf of the applicant, as is not unusual in these cases, there was an element of
overlap and reformulation of the same issue.
2. In essence the application now made relates to the view of the court that while the procedure followed in relation to the
statements of evidence of two witnesses who were outside the jurisdiction was inappropriate, this did not have the effect of
rendering the trial a nullity. In moving the application, particular reliance has been placed on the case of Mapp (A minor) v.
Gilhooley, [1991] 2 I.R. 253. There is no doubt that the requirement that evidence be given on oath or affirmation or as
provided for by statute is a matter of real significance. However, Mapp (A minor) v. Gilhooley, makes clear that it is not
every departure from the appropriate procedure that will constitute a mistrial. In that regard the provisions of para. 4 of the
head note are of significance. It provides:-
“That where an appellant sought to rely on the admission of unsworn viva voce evidence as constituting
a mistrial, he might be prevented from doing so by reason of:
an estoppel arising from an express or unambiguously implied representation that he was waiving
his right to challenge; or
by a finding that to allow such a challenge would constitute a virtual fraud or abuse of the process
of the court.”
3. As emerges from this court’s judgment and as was reiterated by Mr. Denis Vaughan Buckley, senior counsel on behalf of
the respondent in the course of this application, the procedure followed at trial was designed to facilitate the defence which
saw the statements of evidence as assisting the strategy that it had decided upon. What happened occurred at the behest of
the defence. It is clear from the sequence of events during trial, that what occurred clearly falls within the first of the above
two categories. The court has already held that the pursuit of the defence strategy which led to the admission of the contents
of the statements not sworn in compliance with the provisions of the relevant statute, has not been shown to be so clearly
erroneous and misguided that it could be said that what happened was not a trial in due course of law.
4. The circumstances in which the jury came to hear the contents of the statement (save for a small portion of one of them
which it was agreed would not be read out), will be recalled. At trial there appears to have been some element of confusion
as to whether the relevant section of the Criminal Justice Act, 1984 was s.22 or s.21. Section 21 was the applicable
provision. Given that the two statements were coming from persons outside the State, it was required by s.21 of the above
statute that the statements contain a declaration to the effect that it was true to the best of the knowledge and belief of the
person making this statement. Neither statement contained any such declaration. It is the absence of these declarations that
forms the basis of the present application.
5. Before a certificate under s.29 can be granted it is not sufficient that the matters sought to be raised are of importance to
the applicant. Rather, it is necessary that the matters identified transcend the specifics of the case before the court and
constitute points of law of exceptional public importance on which it is desirable that the views of the Supreme Court be
obtained. Given the history of the present proceedings the court is not satisfied that the enumerated points amount to points
of law of exceptional public importance but rather are matters which, while of substance, are very much specific to this
case. In these circumstances the application for a certificate is refused.