Supreme Court dismisses appeals against damages award for trademark infringement and passing off where no loss of goodwill was proven.

THE SUPREME COURT

Appeal Nos. 179/2005 and 225/2005

Denham J.

Kearns J.

Finnegan J.

BETWEEN

TOMMY HILFIGER EUROPE INC. AND TOMMY HILFIGER EURO BV

PLAINTIFFS/RESPONDENTS

and

DEREK McGARRY TRADING AS “LIFEJACKET”, GOODSTOCK LIMITED AND LIFEJACKET LIMITED

DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS

Judgment of Mr Justice Finnegan delivered on the 29th day of May 2008

“Tommy Hilfiger” is a well-known brand of casual clothing. The first named respondent is the owner of a number of

registered Trade Marks in the State in respect of a device or mark associated with the brand being in the form of a flag in

the colours red, white and blue and also of the words “Tommy Hilfiger” “Tommy Jeans” and “Tommy Girl”. In addition it

is the holder of a number of Community Trade Marks.

The second named respondent holds the exclusive licence for Europe for the promotion, distribution, sale and supply of

garments, clothing and clothing accessories manufactured by or with the licence of the first named respondent and

promotes, sells and supplies Tommy Hilfiger products in the Irish market. The first named appellant is involved in the

supply by wholesale of clothing and clothing accessories and has been so involved for many years acting either personally or

through the vehicle of limited companies: the second and third named appellants are two of such companies. In the early

part of 1999 the respondents became aware of the sale in the State by the appellants of garments in circumstances where

they believed that their Trade Marks were being infringed and which amounted to passing-off. They issued a plenary

summons on the 3rd March 1999 having on the 1st March 1999 obtained ex parte an order pursuant to the Trade Marks

Act 1996 section 20 and certain injunctive reliefs in relation to passing off. On the 25th March 1999 they obtained

interlocutory injunctive relief restraining the first named appellant his servants or agents until the hearing of the action from

infringing the respondents’ Trade Marks and from selling or supplying garments identified in the second schedule to the

order but granting liberty to the first named appellant to sell and supply garments identified in the first schedule to the order

on terms that an account be kept of such sale and supply. The garments in Schedule 2 clearly infringed the respondents’

Trade Marks. The garments in Schedule 1 less clearly so but bore a label “Tommy Sport” or the word “Tommy”. Shortly

after the institution of the proceedings the first named appellant applied for the registration of a Trade Mark “Tommy

Sport”.

At the hearing in the High Court which took place over five days the appellants conceded infringement of the respondents’

Trade Marks in relation to the goods in schedule 2. In respect of these goods the learned trial judge assessed damages for

infringement and for passing off at €5,000. In relation to the goods in schedule 1 the learned trial judge had regard to the

pending application for registration of the Trade Mark Tommy Sport. She found that the use of the words “Tommy” and

“Tommy Sport” were sufficient to constitute passing off. However as the first named appellant had applied to register the

Trade Mark “Tommy Sport” if such registration should be granted the appellants could not be accused of passing off after

the date of his application: if on the other hand should the respondents objection to registration be upheld there would then

have been passing off. Accordingly the learned trial judge ordered that should the first named appellant not succeed in

having the Trade Mark registered the appellants would be liable in damages and she measured damages post 5th March

1999 at €10,000. On the 13th March 2006 the Controller of Patents refused the first named appellant’s application to

register the Trade Mark Tommy Sports. Accordingly the amount of damages awarded to the respondents was €15,000

being €5,000 in respect of infringement and passing off up the 5th March 1999 and €10,000 in respect of passing off by use

of the name Tommy Sport. The learned trial judge granted to the respondents the injunctive relief which they sought and

other ancillary reliefs together with the costs of the proceedings to include reserved costs.

The appeal and cross-appeal

The appellants appeal so much of the judgment and order of the High Court as awarded the costs of the proceedings and

reserved costs to the respondent. The respondents’ cross-appeal seeking to set aside the award of damages and the

substitution therefor of an award of appropriate damages or in the alternative the taking of an account in respect of the

profits earned by the appellants.

The appeal

The Courts Act 1981 section 17 as substituted by the Courts Act 1991 section 14 imposed a limitation on the costs

recoverable by a plaintiff where the action or application is not brought in the lowest court having jurisdiction to make the

order granting relief. Subsection (3) provides as follows:-

“In any action commenced and determined in the High Court, being an action where the amount of the damages

recovered by the plaintiff exceeds £5,000 but does not exceed £15,000 the plaintiff shall not be entitled to recover more

costs than whichever of the following amounts is the lesser, that is to say, the amount of such damages or the amount of

costs which he would have been entitled to recover if the action had been commenced and determined in the Circuit

Court.”

The damages awarded to the respondent did not exceed £15,000. Accordingly it is submitted by the appellants that

subsection (3) applies and that the consequences provided therein should follow. However subsection (3) must be construed

in the light of section 17 as a whole. Subsection (1) makes the policy of the section clear – proceedings should be

commenced in the lowest court having jurisdiction to grant the relief sought: O’Connor v Bus Átha Cliath [2003] 4 I.R.

459. Subsection (3) only applies where the Circuit Court has jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.

The Circuit Court is a creation of statute and enjoys only that jurisdiction conferred upon it by statute. The court was

established by the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961 and its jurisdiction is set out in the Third and Fourth

Schedules thereto. For present purposes the Fourth Schedule is irrelevant. The Third Schedule at reference no 6 confers

upon the Circuit Court jurisdiction in actions founded on tort subject to a limitation on the amount of damages which may

be awarded. The respondents’ action founded on passing off is an action founded in tort and accordingly the Circuit Court

has jurisdiction.

The respondents claim in relation to infringement of its Trade Mark requires to be considered and in this respect the

historical development of protection of Trade Marks must be considered. While Trade Marks existed from earliest times

they were not as Trade Marks protected by the courts. Thus in 1742 an injunction to restrain a trader from imitating

another’s Mark was refused: Blanchard v Hill [1742] 2 A.T. K. 484. In 1789 it was held that fraudulent misrepresentation

causing loss to a trader gave a cause of action upon the case similar to an action for deceit: Pasley v Freeman [1789] 3

T.E.R.M Rep. 51. Diplock L.J. in General Electric Company v General Electric Company Limited [1972] 2 All E.R. 507

at 518-520 reviewed the history of the development of relief for infringement of Trade Marks and described the interest of a

user of a Trade Mark at common law as a proprietary interest: however the basis of the action at common law had its origin

in the law of deceit similar to misrepresentation or passing off. There was a difference between the common law courts and

the courts of equity with respect to infringement. The common law required an intention to deceive while equity did not. In

Singer Manufacturing Company v Wilson [1876] 2 Ch. D. 434 at 454 Mellish L.J. said:-

“To give a right of action at common law the thing must have been done fraudulently, it must have been intended to

deceive. But the Courts of Equity said, if you purchase goods with another man’s Trade Mark upon them, although you

may have done it perfectly honestly not knowing that it was another man’s Trade Mark, …yet, nevertheless, you cannot be

allowed to put the goods into the market with that Trade Mark upon them because the effect of it will be that the goods

will pass from hand to hand as being goods manufactured by the person whose Trade Mark it is; and therefore you shall

be restrained from doing that.”

The right of a user of a Trade Mark to an injunction at equity was established in Millington v Fox [1838] 3 My. & Cr. 338

where it was decided that it was not necessary at equity to establish any intention to deceive on the part of an infringer.

Prior to Lord Cairn’s Act (Chancery Amendment Act 1858) Courts of Equity did not in general award damages and

accordingly if seeking an injunction to restrain infringement the plaintiff brought his action in the Court of Chancery and if

seeking damages at common law: very often two actions would be brought. After Lord Cairn’s Act the Court of Chancery

could make an award of damages in addition to or in substitution for an injunction. After the Judicature (Ireland) Act 1877

actions in relation to infringement were taken in the Chancery Division. The Judicature Act in section 28(11) provided that

where there was a conflict or variance between the rules of equity and the rules of the common law with reference to the

same matter the rules of equity should prevail. Equity exercised its jurisdiction in cases of infringement upon the basis that

the user of the Trade Mark had a proprietary interest not in the Trade Mark as such but in the goodwill of his business of

which the Trade Mark formed part and that the court would exercise its jurisdiction to prevent by injunction infringement of

that proprietary interest. It follows from this that an action for infringement of a Trade Mark after the Judicature (Ireland)

Act 1877 is not a tort but an action based on interference with a proprietary interest: General Electric Company v General

Electric Company Limited. Since the Judicature Act in order to recover damages it is unnecessary that the infringement

should have occurred fraudulently.

There is a long legislative history in relation to Trade Marks commencing with the Merchandise Marks Act 1862 repealed

and replaced by the Merchandise Marks Act 1887. These Acts, however, did not give a right of action to a trader damaged

by a breach of any of its provisions. The Trade Marks Registration Act 1875 provided for registration of Trade Marks and

provided for the evidential effect of registration and also provided that no proceedings for infringement of a Trade Mark

could be brought unless and until the Mark had been registered. Registration conferred on the registered owner the exclusive

right to the use of a Registered Trade Mark but the remedies remained those provided by the courts. Thus the basis of a

right of action for infringement remained the same as in the Court of Chancery prior to the Judicature Act. The basis of the

right of action now appears from the Trade Marks Act 1996. The Trade Marks Act 1996 is not an amending Act but a code

and under the same a registered Trade Mark is a property right. Section 7 of that Act provides as follows:-

“(i) A registered Trade Mark is a property right obtained by the registration of the Trade Mark under this Act

and a proprietor of a registered Trade Mark shall have the rights and remedies provided by this Act.”

The remedies for infringement are dealt with in section 18 of the Act: the remedies remain those which were available at law

and having regard to the terms of section 7 the action for those remedies is based on a property right. The Courts

(Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961, third schedule, reference 28 has reference to property rights and gives the Circuit

Court jurisdiction in the following terms:-

“Proceedings in relation to property not hereinbefore specified in this schedule and which immediately before

the commencement of Part I of the Courts of Justice Act 1924 (No. 10) of 1924, were assigned to the Chancery

Division of the former High Court of Justice in Southern Ireland, other than proceedings in relation to

companies.”

The third column of the schedule limits that jurisdiction in relation to personalty to personalty having a value of £2,000.

Whether the Circuit Court has jurisdiction in any particular case is a matter of fact to be established in evidence. There is no

evidence that the value of the property here, the registered Trade Mark, does not exceed £2,000 and indeed it is most

unlikely that there could be. On this basis the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction under reference 28 in the third schedule to

entertain the respondents claim and section 17 of the Courts Act 1981 has no application.

The respondent further argued that the scheme of the Trade Marks Act 1996 excludes the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court.

It is unnecessary to consider this submission in order to determine the issues which arise in this case and I would leave this

issue over for consideration in a case where it will be determinative of the issues between the parties. The issue involves

detailed consideration of a number of provisions of the Judicature (Ireland) Act 1877 and the Courts of Justice Act 1924. A

similar issue arose in Bowe v Harte [1905] 1 K.B. 592 in relation to the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act 1883 which

similarly defined “the court” as the High Court and, while the issue was not decided, Vaughan Williams L.J. remarked that

the Act was not conclusive in excluding jurisdiction in the County Court and he decided the matter on another basis. I would

dismiss the appeal on the first ground relied upon.

The second ground of appeal relates to reserved costs awarded to the respondents and arises in the following circumstances.

The respondent applied for an order under section 20 of the Trade Marks Act 1996. The appellants contend that the

respondents’ grounding affidavit for the same conflicts with the oral evidence given at the hearing and accordingly there was

material non-disclosure on the application. Further the respondent was aware of the appellants’ identity and a cease and

desist letter would have been adequate. In these circumstances it is submitted that the costs reserved in respect of this

application ought not to have been awarded to the respondents.

Insofar as differences exist between the grounding affidavit and the oral evidence at the hearing as identified by the appellant

I am satisfied that the same were not material. There was no material non disclosure. The value of an application under

section 20 would be lost if a plaintiff in every case was required to give advance notice of its intention to apply or before

proceeding under section 20 to serve a cease and desist letter. The learned trial judge acted within her discretion in awarding

the reserved costs to the respondents. Accordingly I would dismiss the appeal on this ground also.

The learned trial judge rejected the appellants second ground of appeal on the basis that the correct course to pursue was to

appeal the order of the 1st March 1999 and that it was not appropriate to raise the matter on the hearing of the action. I

would note that a contrary view was taken in Dormeuil Freres v Nicolian International (Textiles) Limited [1988] 3 All

E.R. 197. In that case it was held that the appropriate time for the court to hear and determine an application by the

defendant to discharge an Anton Piller Order on the ground that it was obtained as a result of material non-disclosure by the

plaintiff is at the trial rather than at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings as, the order having been executed, the only

relevance of the non-disclosure is in relation to costs and the undertaking as to damages.

The cross appeal

The respondent in its statement of claim listed sixteen separate reliefs. So far as damages are concerned damages were

sought for the infringement of the respondents Trade Marks, for infringement of copyright, for passing off and for unfair

competition. Copyright and unfair competition were not pursued at the hearing. In the alternative an account was sought in

the following terms:-

“In the alternative and at the option of the plaintiffs an account of the defendants’ profits”.

Having carefully considered the transcript of the five days of the hearing I am satisfied that that option was never exercised.

The learned trial judge was not asked to direct an account and it is clear from the entire tenor of the case that what the

respondents were seeking was an assessment of damages on the basis of the evidence which they presented through their

own witnesses and elicited from the appellants’ witnesses. This being so I am satisfied that on this appeal the respondents

being dissatisfied with the quantum of damages awarded should not be permitted now to seek an account.

It is, however, quite clear that in her judgment the learned trial judge was inaccurate in her recital of the evidence available

to her. In the course of her judgment she found as follows:-

“Before the Futura Fair the defendants sold 2,500 garments which were a mixture of Tommy Hilfiger, Tommy Sports and

others. After the Fair and after an interval of one to one and a half years Mr McGarry commenced manufacturing under

the label Tommy Sports. He sold 1,400/1,500 garments being a mixture of branded goods including Tommy Sports.

The profit in Tommy Sports Clothing Limited was:

To November ’01 gross profit €400,000 and net profit 30%

To November ’02 gross profit €700,000 and net profit 30%.”

The parties are agreed that the correct figures on the evidence are as follows:-

1. Instead of 1,400/1,500 – 20,000.

2. For each of the years ’01 and ’02 the figures for gross profit are in fact the figures for turnover and the figures for net

profit are in fact those for gross profit.

Before considering what effect, if any, the correction of these errors may have I propose considering the basis upon which

damages should be awarded for infringement of a registered Trade Mark and passing off. The position is the same in respect

of each of the causes of action. The object of an award of damages is to give to the plaintiff compensation for the damage

or loss which he has suffered. Damage is divisible into pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss. The former comprises all financial

loss such as loss of business profits or expenses incurred in a case such as the present. The latter in a case such as the

present would include damage to reputation or goodwill and can be described as monetary compensation or reparation and

takes the form of general as opposed to special damages as they do not admit of mathematical calculation. The assessment

of damages for infringement and passing off follow the same lines and both claims are frequently taken together with a

single award being made: Dormeuil Freres S.A. v Feraglow Limited [1990] R.P.C. 449. The plaintiff need not show

damage and the law presumes that any interference with goodwill by infringement or passing off will result in damage.

However unlike other causes of action which are actionable per se the plaintiff is not restricted to purely nominal damages.

In Irvine & Ors v Talksport Limited [2002] E.W.H.C. 539 the racing driver Eddie Irvine was awarded £2,000 damages.

See also Alan Clark v Associated Newspapers [1998] R.P.C. 261. In Antiebolaget Manus v Fullwood [1954] 71 R.P.C.

243 the defendant had a substantial turnover in infringing goods in the period 1947 to 1950 the total exceeding £1.5 million.

The plaintiff sought general damages based on the profits which the defendant had made on the basis of 10% of its

turnover. The award for damages was £10,000 for infringement of Trade Marks and passing off. In this jurisdiction in

Falcon Travel Limited v Owners Abroad Group [1991] I.R. 175, a passing off action based exclusively on presumed

damage, the court refused an injunction and proposed to award damages in lieu and put the matter back for further evidence

on the issue of damages. The court indicated that the award envisaged was a sum which would enable the plaintiff to

advertise and re-establish its identity with the public and the trade.

As on the issue of damages the respondent relies on a number of copyright cases I should say now that I do not consider

these relevant as the basic measure of damages in such cases is the loss of profits caused by the diversion of customers to

the defendant. There was no evidence of diversion given in this case and indeed the evidence was that no damage had been

sustained by the respondents: in the absence of evidence it will not be assumed that the sales achieved by the defendant

would necessarily have been obtained by the plaintiff: Ledger Sons & Co. v J. Munro & Son Limited [1916] 33 R.P.C. 53

and P.C. Products Limited v Dalton [1957] R.P.C. 199.

Bearing the foregoing in mind I turn to the evidence on the issue of damages at the hearing. Mr Shah gave evidence for the

respondents. In his direct evidence no mention was made as to specific damage. On becoming aware of the appellants

conduct he did not apprehend any loss of business. He was unable to say if any one had purchased the appellants garments

under a misapprehension. His main concern was that it might be thought that there had been a change in the respondents’

policy of dealing with a small number of high end retailers only.

Mr Thomas Hanley gave evidence. He is the proprietor of two retail outlets in Galway in one of which he sold Tommy

Hilfiger products: the other outlet dealt at the lower end of the market. The buyer in the latter outlet had purchased some of

the appellants’ products. He had understood that his higher end outlet and Brown Thomas would be the only two outlets

supplied with Tommy Hilfiger products in Galway and he was concerned that this arrangement was being breached. He

thought “Tommy Sport” was a “Tommy Hilfiger” product and the issue he had was with Tommy Hilfiger.

Finally Mr Sean Bagnall gave evidence for the respondent. He is a chartered accountant and prepared a report which was

handed into court. The report was not made available on the appeal. For the purposes of the report he had two sets of

accounts for Lifejacket Limited covering the period March 1996 to January 1999 when it ceased trading. This company did

not trade in the infringing goods. In relation to Goodstock Limited he had three sets of accounts covering the period from

December 1998 to December 2002. It ceased trading in 2002 with an accumulated deficit as of the end of 2002 of

€144,922. Some part of its trading related to the infringing goods. In comparing the accounts of these two companies there

was a very substantial increase in the gross profit margin in Goodstock Limited over Lifejacket Limited and he attributed

this to Goodstock Limited trading in branded products such as those of Tommy Hilfiger. The gross profit margin for

Lifejacket Limited varied throughout its trading from 12.62% to 15.14% whereas in Goodstock Limited the gross profit was

approximately twice this. The turnover for the year ended 31st December 2002 was negligible at just €25,000. Throughout

its trading history overhead always exceeded the gross profit earned. In relation to Tommy Sports Clothing Limited he had

seen only the balance sheet for the year 2002 and it had traded profitably in that year with a small improvement in the

reserves. Mr Bagnall was cross-examined. He used branded product to distinguish products such as the respondents from

generic product. In relation to Goodstock Limited he accepted that there could be another reason for the difference in its

gross profit margin and that in Lifejacket Limited. In a brief re-examination he said that if the entire benefit of the increase in

gross profit margin in Goodstock Limited were attributed to the sale of infringing goods the increase in gross profit

attributable to the appellants wrongful conduct was €83,520.

For the appellants Mr Derek McGarry, the first named appellant, and Mr Kilbride a chartered accountant gave evidence.

The direct evidence of Mr McGarry was as follows. Lifejacket Limited was a wholesaler and sold a number of brands to the

retail trade of which he named five. Following the order of the 25th March 1999 he sold a small number of the items listed

in Schedule 1 of the order and did not trade in the items in Schedule 2 of the order. He had, however, marketed other goods

under the name Tommy Sports. There followed a lengthy and unstructured cross-examination. In doing the best I can I

have abstracted the following as the evidence relevant on the issue of damages. Goodstock Limited started trading in late

January or early February 1999 and not November 1998. He did not agree that a better gross profit margin was available in

respect of branded goods as generic goods could be purchased cheaper and sold at a higher gross profit margin. After the

incorporation of Tommy Sports Clothing Limited he acquired product from an English wholesaler bearing that label. In

November 2001 arranged to have product manufactured bearing that label. He accepted that Goodstock Limited had sold

some 2,500 garments coming within Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 of the order of 28th March 1999 but this figure also

included other garments bearing the Tommy Sport label. At that time Goodstock Limited was selling some eight ranges of

branded goods and it was difficult to distinguish from sales invoices which goods were involved.

While not given in evidence in reply to particulars the appellants admitted that in the period after February 1999 some

10,000 infringing garments were sold. In re-examination Mr McGarry said that none of these garments bore the Tommy

Hilfiger registered Trade Marks.

Mr Kilbride gave evidence that he is a chartered accountant and acted as accountant to Lifejacket Limited, Woodstock

Limited and Tommy Sports Clothing Limited. Following the institution of these proceedings 1,045 infringing garments were

handed over to the respondents solicitors. Goodstock Limited started to trade around January 1999 in a whole range of

products. A very small amount of goods was sold in Goodstock Limited subsequent to March 1999. The company ceased

trading with substantial losses and substantial debts the latter being taken over by Mr McGarry in a personal capacity. The

witness was cross-examined. Tommy Sports Clothing Limited commenced trading in November 2001. The accounts for

2002 had not yet been prepared and were not due until September 2003 for submission to the Company’s Registration

Office. The company was trading quite well. In round figures the turnover of the company for the year 2002 was between

€300,000 and €400,000, for the year 2003 €700,000 and its gross margin was between 25% and 30% which would be

normal for that type of business. His understanding was that Lifejacket Limited traded in different types of branded

products from Goodstock Limited its products being aimed at the lower end of the market.

From the foregoing it will appear that the information available to the learned trial judge was as follows:-

1. Prior to March 1999 Goodstock Limited sold approximately 2,500 infringing garments. The gross profit of Goodstock

Limited on its overall trade was 30%. Its overall net results were a loss.

2. After March 1999 the appellants sold 10,000 garments which by reason of their get-up, in the event which happened that

the first named appellant was unsuccessful in registering the Trade Mark Tommy Sport, constituted passing off.

3. For the year 1992 the turnover of Tommy Sport Clothing Limited was between €300,000 and €400,000 and for the year

1993 €700,000. The gross profit margin achieved was between 25% and 30%. A small net profit was achieved.

The errors were to a large extent compensating errors. The number of garments was understated by the learned trial judge.

The gross profit was treated as net profit and on the evidence in the case of Goodstock Limited the gross profit was entirely

consumed by overheads. In the case of Tommy Sports Clothing Company Limited the only evidence was that a small but

unquantified profit was made for one year and that this was reflected in a transfer to reserves. There was no evidence which

could form the basis of an award of damages based on profits made by the respondent on the sale of infringing goods. With

regard to the quantum of damages awarded in respect of the period prior to March 1999 I am satisfied that the same is not

out of line with awards of damages in similar cases nor does the award depart in principle from the authorities, some of

which I mention above, including cases where infringement of a registered Trade Mark and passing off are combined. As to

the claim for passing off following March 1999 I note that factors present in many other cases are absent here. Thus here

there is no question of permanent and continuing damage to goodwill as in Unik Time Company v Unik Time Limited

[1983] F.S.R. 121. The respondents do not allege any diminution in their trade. They do not allege that they had to offer its

products at a lower price to compete with the appellants. There was no evidence that their reputation in terms of their

products was affected. They did not have to engage in a remedial advertising campaign nor indeed would one be

appropriate. There is not in this case any basis upon which it could be inferred that the products sold by the appellants

would otherwise have been sold by the respondents.

The award of damages in these cases is intended to be compensatory, that is to give the plaintiff compensation for the

damage, loss or injury which he has suffered. Thus in General Tire and Rubber Company v Firestone Tyre and Rubber

Company [1975] 1 W.L.R. 819, a patent case, Lord Wilberforce stated that as in any other tort the general rule in relation

to economic torts is that the measure of damages is to be, so far as possible, that sum of money which will put the injured

party in the same position as he would have been if he had not sustained the wrong. In that case the plaintiff had the option

of an account of profits under the Patents Act 1949 section 60 but claimed damages only. That being the case he

continued:-

“There are two essential principles in valuing that claim: first, that the plaintiffs had the burden of proving their loss;

second, that, the defendants being wrongdoers damages should be liberally assessed but that the object is to compensate

the plaintiffs and not to punish the defendants (Pneumatic Tyre Company Limited v Puncture Proof Pneumatic Tyre

Company Limited [1899] 16 R.P.C. 209 at 215).”

Adopting that as a correct statement of law it is difficult to see how it can be said that the award of €10,000 in respect of

post March 1999 trading is inadequate on the facts of this case. In these circumstances I would dismiss the cross appeal.

I would dismiss both appeal and cross appeal.

Hilfiger v McGarry1