Extradition to Jersey for rape dismissed due to failure to strictly comply with diplomatic communication requirements under the Act.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe High Court dismissed the application for the respondent's extradition to Jersey for rape, ordering his release from bail. The court found that the request for extradition was not 'duly requested' because the Minister had not strictly complied with the requirement that the request be communicated by a diplomatic agent as mandated by the Extradition Act, 1965. Although the delay in providing additional information was acknowledged, the court ruled that the procedural defect regarding diplomatic communication was fatal to the extradition process, distinguishing this case from previous decisions where exceptional circumstances were present.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IAs. 23 of the Extradition Act, 1965; s. 29(1)(a) of the Extradition Act, 1965: A request for extradition is not 'duly requested' if the Minister fails to strictly comply with the requirement that the request be communicated by a diplomatic agent, regardless of the absence of exceptional circumstances or actual prejudice.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IAGiurisprudenza citata
Generato dall'IATesto completo
This judgment is circulated in redacted form to avoid identification of the parties
Neutral Citation Number: [2006] IEHC 414
THE HIGH COURT
Record Number: 2006 No. 64 Ext
BETWEEN
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
APPLICANT
AND
M. P. Q.
RESPONDENT
Judgment of Mr Justice Michael Peart delivered on the 13th day of December 2006
1. This is an application for the extradition of the respondent to Jersey, Channel Islands under Part II of the Extradition Act, 1965, as
amended (“the Act”). He is wanted by that jurisdiction to face a charge of rape alleged to have been committed in 2004. The alleged
victim is a lady with whom the respondent had a consensual relationship for some time, and which is alleged to have been ended by
her some thirty six hours prior to the alleged offence.
2. The applicant has in May 2006 received a Request for extradition dated May 2005 from the British Embassy.
3. As required by s. 26 of the Act the Minister, following receipt of the said Request, has certified that such a Request had been
made. That Certificate is dated June 2006.
4. Thereafter, as provided for in s. 26(1)(b) of the Act, an application was made for a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent who
was known to be living and working in this State under an assumed name. That Warrant duly issued, and on the 3rd July 2006 the
respondent was arrested in Co. Cork by Sgt. A. L. of Crime Branch, Garda Headquarters, Dublin, following which the respondent was
brought before the High Court. He was remanded on bail from time to time pending the hearing of the present application under s. 29
of the Act.
5. No issue arises as to the designation of Jersey for the purpose of Part II of the Act. Neither is there any issue or controversy about
the respondent being the person in respect of which the Request for extradition has been received.
6. Giollaíosa Ó Lideadha SC raises four issues by way of objection. Briefly stated these are as follows:
1. That the Request for extradition which the Minister has certified that he has received from Jersey is not a Request
which has been “communicated by a diplomatic agent” to the Minister in accordance with the provisions of s. 23 of the
Act set out below, and that the extradition has not been “duly requested” for the purposes of s. 29(1) of the Act.
2. That the affidavits supporting the Request for extradition have not been properly sworn, there being no evidence that
the Notary Public before whom they have been sworn is a person authorised to administer oaths in Jersey.
3. That the domestic warrant is dated 22nd December 2004 and that there is no evidence that same is still within the
meaning of a warrant of arrest “immediately enforceable” and therefore fails to satisfy the requirement of s. 25(1)(a) of
the Act.
4. That the respondent is prejudiced by the delay of the prosecution in Jersey in seeking his extradition.
7. I shall deal with these issues in the above order:
1. That the Request for extradition which the Minister has certified that he has received from Jersey is not a Request which has been
“communicated by a diplomatic agent” to the Minister in accordance with the provisions of s. 23 of the Act set out below, and that
the extradition has not been “duly requested” for the purposes of s. 29(1) of the Act.
Section 29 of the Act provides for the circumstances in which the High Court may make an order for the committal of the
requested person to a prison “there to await the order of the Minister for his extradition.” That section provides:
“29. (1) Where a person is before the High Court under section 26 or 27 and the Court is satisfied that –
(a) the extradition of that person has been duly requested, and
(b) this Part applies in relation to the requesting country, and
(c) extradition of the person claimed is not prohibited by this part or by the relevant extradition
provisions, and
(d) the documents required to support a request for extradition under section 25 have been produced,
the Court shall make an order committing that person to a prison (or, if he is not more than twenty-one years of
age, to a remand institution) there to await the order of the Minister for his extradition.”(my emphasis)
Section 23 of the Act provides:
“23.—A request for the extradition of any person shall be made in writing and shall be communicated by –
(a) a diplomatic agent of the requesting country, accredited to the State, or
(b) by any other means provided in the relevant extradition provisions.”
(my emphasis)
“The term “diplomatic agent” is defined in s. 3 as meaning “an ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, envoy extraordinary and
minister plenipotentiary or chargé d’affaires”. (my emphasis)
Mr Ó Lideadha on behalf of the respondent submits that in this case the “request” for extradition was not communicated by the British
“ambassador” but from “The British Embassy”. There is a seal of the embassy on the request, but nowhere is there any reference to
or signature by the ambassador or any other person who might come within the definition of “diplomatic agent” in s. 23 aforesaid. In
the respondent’s submission, the consequence of this error is that, contrary to the requirement in s. 29(1)(a) of the Act, the Court
cannot be satisfied that the Request for extradition “has been duly requested”, and that the Minister’s Certificate dated 21st June
2006 is not correct when it states that he has “received a request duly made by Jersey in accordance with Part II of the Extradition
Act, 1965”.
It is of course important to refer to the rebuttable presumption contained in s. 26 (5) of the Act (as inserted by s. 7 of the
Extradition (Amendment) Act, 1994, which provides as follows:
26. -- (5) A person arrested under a warrant issued under this section shall be brought as soon as may be before a
judge of the High Court.
(6) Where a person has been arrested under a warrant issued under this section, then, in any proceedings it shall be
presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that a request for the extradition of the person has been duly made and has
been duly received by the Minister." (my emphasis)
The Minister’s Certificate states that he has received a request “duly made by Jersey…” which has been “duly communicated by the
Embassy of the United Kingdom …”.
Mr Ó Lideadha submits that the statute being a penal statute must be strictly construed, and interpreted by means of the plain and
ordinary meaning of the words used by the legislature in order to give expression to its intention. That meaning in his submission is
perfectly clear, and that it is required by Part II of the Act that a request be communicated to the Minister not by “the Embassy” but
by the ambassador himself/herself or some other person who comes within the definition of a “diplomatic agent” as defined by s. 3 of
the Act, and that “The Embassy” is not a person and cannot possibly come within the definition.
Patrick McGrath BL for the applicant submits that the wording of the presumption is clear, and that no evidence has been adduced by
the respondent to rebut the presumption that the request has been duly received, and therefore the contrary has not “been proved”.
In O’Rourke v. Governor of Cloverhill Prison, unreported, Supreme Court, 13th May 2004, Denham J. considered the meaning to be
given to the word “produced” as appearing in s. 50 of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003, being a transitional provision in respect
of warrants issued prior to the coming into force of that Act. The section required that such a warrant must have been “produced” to
the Commissioner of An Garda Siochana” for endorsement before the 1st January 2004. The evidence in the case was that the
warrant was received in the office of the Commissioner before that date but that same had not been actually endorsed by him until
the 3rd January 2004. The decision hinged on the meaning to be given to the word “produced”, that word not being specifically
defined in the Act.
In her judgment, Denham J. relied upon the dictionary definition of the word and that this meaning meant that the warrant must have
been brought forward to the Commissioner for his consideration, and that it would be going too far to say that it had been produced
to the Commissioner by it having been received by somebody in his office. She stated:
“Thus the plain words of the section require that the production be to the person designated. This is consistent with the
importance of the duty of considering the warrant for endorsement as to whether a person be delivered out of the
jurisdiction.”
She continued:
“There was no evidence that the warrants were produced to the Commissioner, or any of the persons who, under the
Act of 1965, are designated persons, to carry out the function described in s. 43, prior to 1st January, 2004. The
evidence was that the warrants had been received in the Extradition Unit in Garda Headquarters. Essentially, the court
was requested to infer that there had been “production” of the warrants. However, only the designated persons are
enabled to carry out the functions set out in s. 43 and there was no evidence of even receipt by those persons in 2003.
Whatever about considering inferring receipt by designated persons in such circumstances, the court must address the
issue of “production” for the purposes of s. 43 of the Act of 1965. Receipt of the warrants by non-designated persons is
so far removed from the concept of production of the warrants to a designated person that I am satisfied it may not be
inferred. It would be a step too far from the clear words of the statute.”
By analogy, it can be said that the communication of the request by “the embassy” is so far removed from the concept of
communication by the person designated by the section, that it may not be inferred and would be a step too far.
It seems clear that where the letter from “The Embassy” makes no reference to it being from the ambassador, or any of the other
potential appropriate persons in the embassy, it is necessary to conclude by a strict interpretation and by reference to the plain and
ordinary meaning to be given to the words used in the section, that there has not been compliance with the requirement regarding
the communication of the request to the Minister. Section 23(a) specifies clearly by whom the request is to be communicated, and
this has not been done. Regarding the presumption, it is a rebuttable presumption. If the respondent can prove the contrary to the
presumption, he may do so. Mr McGrath has submitted that no evidence has been adduced and that therefore the presumption has
not been rebutted. In my view the documents produced by the applicant, not the respondent, make the position so clear that no
further proof is required. The presumption is rebutted by the document itself on its face. I suggest that the only evidence possible
would be for the respondent to ask the British ambassador to swear an affidavit to the effect that he/she did not sign the note dated
May 2005 and the note dated May 2006. In my view that is an unreasonable burden to impose upon the respondent in order to rebut
the presumption, where the face of the document makes the position clear. It is not to reverse the presumption and turn it into a
presumption the other way.
2. That affidavits supporting the Request for extradition have not been properly sworn, there being no evidence that the Notary
Public before whom they have been sworn is a person authorised to administer oaths in Jersey.
Section 7B. – (1) In proceedings under this Act, evidence as to any matter to which such proceedings relate may be
given by affidavit or by a statement in writing that purports to have been sworn –
(a) by the deponent in a place other than the State, and
(b) in the presence of a person duly authorised under the law of the place concerned to attest to the swearing of
such a statement by a deponent, howsoever such a statement is described under the law of that place.
(2) ………”
The affidavits referred to contain a jurat at the end thereof which states that the affidavit has been “sworn” in Jersey before a
“Steven Charles Kilvington Pallot” and there is a red seal attached which bears his name and the words “Notary Public”. The point
made by the respondent is that nowhere is it stated that Mr Pallot is authorised to “attest to the swearing of such a statement by a
deponent, howsoever such a statement is described under the law of that place.” The powers of a Notary Public are not set forth.
However, it is important to note that these two affidavits are part of a bound bundle of documents making up the request from the
Attorney General of Jersey. That bundle of documents is bound together with pink ribbon and bears on the front page thereof the
Seal of the Attorney general of Jersey.
Of relevance to that submission are the provisions of section 37 of the Act (inserted by s. 17 of the Extradition (European Union
Conventions) Act, 2001) as follows:
"37.—(1) In proceedings to which this Part applies, a document supporting a request for extradition from a requesting
country (other than a Convention country) shall be received in evidence without further proof if it purports—
(a) to be signed by a judge, magistrate or officer of the requesting country, and
(b) to be certified by being sealed with the seal of a minister of state, ministry, department of state or such other
person as performs in that country functions the same as or similar to those performed by the Minister under this
Act, as may be appropriate, and judicial notice shall be taken of such seal.
(2) …
(3) …” (my emphasis)
In my view, the bundle of documents bound together with ribbon and bearing the seal of the Attorney General in Jersey contains the
documentation in support of the request. That bundle conforms with the requirements of section 37. It is signed by “an officer”
namely the Attorney General, and bears his seal. No further proof is required.
Even if I am wrong about that matter, I would not be prepared to hold that the Court requires proof that an affidavit can be sworn in
Jersey before a Notary Public. A notary public is a position so widely known and recognised, certainly in legal circles, that this Court is
entitled to take judicial notice of the fact that the person before whom these two affidavits have been sworn in Jersey is a person
empowered to administer oaths.
3. That the domestic warrant is dated December 2004 and that there is no evidence that same is still within the meaning of a warrant
of arrest “immediately enforceable” and therefore fails to satisfy the requirement of s. 25(1)(a) of the Act.
The respondent submits also that there is nothing amongst the documentation supplied to support this request that the warrant
issued in Jersey for the arrest of the respondent is “immediately enforceable” and issued in accordance with the laws of the
requesting country as required by s. 25(1) of the Act. Mr O Lideadha submits that when the Minister certified that the request had
been made in accordance with the statute, he would need to have had before him some evidence that the warrant issued in Jersey in
December 2004 was still enforceable after so long, so that it was a warrant “immediately enforceable” as required by the terms of s.
25 of the Act.
Section 25 (1 ) provides:
(1) (a) the original or an authenticated copy of the conviction and sentence or detention order immediately enforceable
or, as the case may be, of the warrant of arrest or other order having the same effect and issued in accordance with
the procedure laid down in the law of the requesting country;
(b) a statement of each offence for which extradition is requested specifying, as accurately as possible, the time and
place of commission, its legal description and a reference to the relevant provisions of the law of the requesting
country;
(c) a copy of the relevant enactments of the requesting country or, where this is not possible, a statement of the
relevant law;
(d) as accurate a description as possible of the person claimed, together with any other information which will help to
establish his identity and nationality, and
(e) any other document required under the relevant extradition provisions.”
(my emphasis)
McGrath on the other hand submits that in extradition matters the Court should operate on the basis that Jersey acts in good faith,
and that the Court is entitled to presume that the warrant on foot of which the extradition of the respondent is requested is lawful
and therefore still extant as far as being immediately enforceable is concerned. He points to the fact that the respondent has
produced no evidence to the contrary and until that is done this Court should proceed on the basis suggested. I agree. This ground of
objection must fail.
4. That the respondent is prejudiced by the delay of the prosecution in Jersey in seeking his extradition.
respondent’s affidavit states that he moved to Jersey in March 2003 and that in March 2004 (mistakenly stated in para. 4 of his
affidavit as 2003) he was arrested and interviewed by the police and detained for questioning about a suspected rape of the named
victim. He says that he made a formal statement in which he admitted having consensual sexual intercourse with the complainant and
was released without charge. He says that he was not told by the police that he was going to be charged with any offence, and that
he was not told that he could not leave Jersey. He returned to Ireland some days later and resided in Co. Cork, and he says that he
immediately told Sergeant G. that he had returned to Ireland and where he was residing.
states that from March 2004 until the July 2006 when he was arrested his whereabouts were known or easily ascertainable by the
police in Jersey and the Gardai here.
He says that he was “seriously affected by the allegations of rape” and that it was continually on his mind when he returned to this
country. It goes on to state that after “a period of time” he felt that it was “reasonable to conclude that a decision had been made
not to proceed with the matter”. He submits that by being extradited at this stage he will be denied a right to a speedy trial, and that
he has been prejudiced by the delay in that his capacity to defend himself has been irreparably diminished.
A chronology of events is as follows. The offence is alleged to have been committed in March 2004, and the respondent was
interviewed shortly thereafter. He left almost immediately thereafter and came back to Ireland where he is from. The Jersey police
commenced their investigation, including by obtaining DNA analysis of samples and a copy of the respondent’s DNA profile. The DNA
analysis is dated November 2004. The Opinion of lawyers was obtained by the prosecution in September 2004 and it was concluded
that there was sufficient evidence to warrant charging the respondent with rape. A warrant was obtained in December 2004. Mr C.E.
W. of the Attorney General’s office in Jersey, and Det. C. H. both swore affidavits to support the request for extradition in January
2005, and May 2005 the first Diplomatic Note was delivered by the British Embassy in Dublin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The
Request itself by the Attorney General of Jersey is dated May 2005. This is about thirteen months after the date of the alleged
offence. It appears that further information was sought by that Minister following the receipt of the note, and that information was
furnished some twelve months later by further diplomatic note dated 23rd May 2006 in the form of a further affidavit of Mr W. sworn
on the 5th May 2006.
Thereafter the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform certified receipt of the request in June 2006, followed by the issue of the
warrant for the arrest here of the respondent and his arrest on foot of same in July 2006.
The only delay of any significance is the delay between the request for further information by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and its
receipt on the 23rd May 2006. The total of that period is twelve months. It is reasonable to allow some time in any event for the
provision of the information sought. Perhaps this could have been attended to more speedily. The Court does not know what, if any,
particular difficulty arise. But in any event the delay cannot be regarded as lengthy, and even if the trial of the respondent were to
take place even twelve months from today, the time since the date of the alleged offence would not be that unusual, and in the
absence of any evidence as to real prejudice to the respondent, this Court cannot conclude that there is a real risk that any trial of
the respondent would be unfair.
The anxiety which the respondent states that he suffered, and his discovery that his expectation that the matter was not being
proceeded with was unfounded, cannot be regarded as a sufficient prejudice in the circumstances of this case. There is nothing
exceptional about these factors. The authorities in Jersey are entitled to prosecute offences, and this Court would refuse to extradite
the respondent only in exceptional circumstances on the basis of un explained delay, and where actual prejudice is demonstrated.
There are no exceptional circumstances such as were found by me to exist in Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v. SR,
unreported, 15th November 2005, and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform v. Stapleton, unreported, High Court, 21st
February 2006.
I order the release of the respondent for the reason that I am not satisfied that the provisions of s. 23 of the Act have been strictly
complied with, and the extradition of the respondent has not therefore been “duly requested” for the purposes of s. 29(1)(a) of the
Act.