Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
IEHC 406 ECLI:IE:HC:2006:406 Generato dall'IA

High Court dismisses application to renew summons as no good reason exists to override Statute of Limitations.

Numero d'incarto IEHC 406
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Irlanda (IE)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Respinto (Dismissed)

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The High Court dismissed the defendants' application to set aside a plenary summons order and renew the proceedings for three months. Plaintiffs argued that their previous solicitors' conduct and the Statute of Limitations issues warranted an extension, but the court found no valid reason to override the time bar. The decision emphasized that preventing a defendant from relying on the Statute of Limitations is not a sufficient ground for renewal.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

O. 8, r. 2 of the Rules of the Superior Courts; The Statute of Limitations must be available on a reciprocal basis, and no good reason exists to renew a summons merely to prevent a defendant from relying on it.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
Statute of Limitations renewal of summons plenary summons O. 8 r. 2 Rules good reason requirement

Disposizioni normative citate

Generato dall'IA
O. 8, r. 2 of the Rules of the Superior Courts
This is an application by the defendants herein for an order pursuant to O. 8, r. 2 of the Rules of the Superior Courts setting aside

Giurisprudenza citata

Generato dall'IA
Roche v. Clayton & Ors. [1998] I.R. 596
See for example the decision in the case of Roche v. Clayton & Ors. [1998] I.R. 596 in which
O'Brien v. Fahey

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Testo completo

Neutral Citation Number: [2006] IEHC 406

THE HIGH COURT

2003 No. 10788 P

BETWEEN

GERALD KELLEGHER AND ANNE KELLEHER

PLAINTIFFS

AND

RAYMOND BRADLEY AND FRANK LANIGAN

TRADING UNDER THE STYLE AND TITLE OF

MALCOLMSON AND LAW SOLICITORS

DEFENDANTS

Judgment of Ms. Justice Dunne delivered on 18th December, 2006

1. This is an application by the defendants herein for an order pursuant to O. 8, r. 2 of the Rules of the Superior Courts setting aside

the order of this Honourable Court dated the 14th day of February, 2005, renewing the plenary summons herein for a period of three

months from the making of that order.

2. The background to this matter is somewhat complicated. Originally the plaintiffs in these proceedings brought proceedings in

respect of the construction of their home at Paulstown, County Kilkenny. They moved into that home in October, 1997. Subsequently

it was alleged that there were defects in the house in relation to its construction and as a result of that proceedings were issued on

behalf of the plaintiffs against John Hayes, Tallis Engineering Company Limited and others. Those proceedings did not include any

claim for damages in respect of personal injuries by reason of the stress caused to the plaintiffs in relation to the difficulties they

found themselves in. Those proceedings have been issued in March of 2000.

3. Subsequently, having become dissatisfied with their original solicitors, the plaintiffs retained Malcolmson Law Solicitors in August,

2000. It is clear from correspondence that by October of 2000, Malcolmson Law were aware of an issue in relation to the Statute of

Limitations. They wrote a letter to the solicitors who previously acted for the plaintiffs and who were still on record, Messrs. Hughes,

Murphy & Company, Solicitors, pointing out that there was a deadline due to expire in October relating to the Statute of Limitations

and calling on them to deal with the matter. I should say that it is clear from that letter that, whilst the defendants had at that stage

agreed to act for the plaintiffs, they were undoubtedly not on record because the letter went on to request the plaintiffs’ file “subject

to the usual undertakings to protect your own interests and in addition that notice of change of solicitor should be filed”.

Subsequently, the following year, Malcolmson Law formally came on record on behalf of the plaintiffs in relation to the matter.

4. It appears that following this no steps were taken by Hughes, Murphy & Company, Solicitors to amend the pleadings or to deliver a

statement of claim including a claim for damages for personal injuries prior to the end of October, 2000.

5. Ultimately Malcolmson Law Solicitors came on record in relation to this matter in August, 2001.

6. Dillon Mullins came on record on behalf of the plaintiffs in March of 2003. At that time it appeared that no statement of claim had

been served against the defendants in the proceedings. In September of 2003 a plenary summons was issued by Dillon Mullins

Solicitors on behalf of the plaintiffs against the defendants herein. In that plenary summons the plaintiffs claimed damages for severe

personal injuries, loss and damage suffered and sustained by the plaintiffs by reason of the negligence and breach of contract and

breach of duty by the defendants, their servants and agents. That summons is the one which is the subject of these proceedings.

7. An ex parte application was made to renew the summons on foot of an affidavit of Andrew Dillon sworn herein on 4th February,

2005. In that affidavit Andrew Dillon swore as follows:

“6. I say and believe that at the time after issue of the said plenary summons in September, 2003, I honestly believed

that the associated High Court proceedings would progress sufficiently and therefore effectively render the current

proceedings against the defendants herein irrelevant.

7. I say that in the circumstances I did not serve or attempt to serve the defendants herein with the plenary summons

herein, on that basis.

8. I now say that due to unforeseen circumstances, it appears that the current proceedings issued against the

defendants herein shall have to proceed and we therefore require an extension of time for service of the said plenary

summons as the time limit for service of same has expired.”

8. On foot of the ex parte application an order was made by the High Court renewing the summons for a period of three months from

the date of the making of that order on 14th February, 2005. The defendants were ultimately served with that summons on 6th May,

2005. Thereafter the solicitors for the defendants herein sought a copy of the affidavit grounding the application for the renewal of

the summons and also subsequently, on receipt of same, sought information as to the “unforeseen circumstances” referred to in the

affidavit. Dillon Mullins & Company, Solicitors, responded by indicating that they no longer act for the plaintiffs and accordingly the

information was not made known to the solicitors for the defendants herein. Accordingly, this application was brought on behalf of the

defendants herein on the basis that no good reason was disclosed by or on behalf of the plaintiff for the renewal of the plenary

summons. A replying affidavit has been sworn by the plaintiffs herein. In that affidavit they set out a number of matters in relation to

the background to the original proceedings in respect of the alleged defects in the construction of their home. They outlined a number

of matters in relation to the subsequent history of proceedings and the circumstances in which they changed solicitors on a number

of occasions. They outlined their involvement with the Law Society and the circumstances in which they became involved with Dillon,

Mullins & Company. Perhaps most surprisingly of all, they say that the application to renew the plenary summons was made without

their knowledge and they did not see the grounding affidavit. A number of allegations are made in the course of that affidavit to the

effect that Mr. Dillon had been involved in an effort to “protect his legal colleagues”. At this point the plaintiffs have now discharged

the firm of Dillon Mullins & Company.

9. It is, to say the least, unfortunate that it would appear that a statement of claim was only delivered in the original negligence

proceedings against the builders this year. For whatever reason, and I am not in a position to comment on this, it is clear that those

proceedings have been beset with difficulties. At this stage the plaintiffs are left in a situation where they are representing

themselves in the original proceedings and in these proceedings. They make the point that if the renewal of the plenary summons was

set aside, any subsequent proceedings brought by them against Malcolmson Law would be statute barred. In those circumstances

they asked the court not to grant the relief sought.

10. The essence of the argument put forward on behalf of the defendants in seeking to have the renewal of the plenary summons set

aside is that the plaintiffs in an action alleging negligence are not allowed to issue what is in effect a protective writ. It was

submitted that there is authority to the effect that in an action for professional negligence a plaintiff should not be allowed to issue a

protective writ.

11. In support of the submissions made on behalf of the defendants reference was made to a number of decisions. Reliance was

placed in particular on the decision in the case of Allergan Pharmaceuticals (Ireland) Ltd. and Noel Deane Roofing and Cladding

Limited & Ors. (Unreported, High Court, O’Sullivan J., 6th July, 2006) in which the court noted at p. 4 of the judgment dealing with

the issue of whether there is “other good reason”. O’Sullivan noted that “Walsh J. expressed the view [in Baulk v. Irish National

Insurance Co. Ltd. [1969] I.R. 66] that the fact that the Statute of Limitations would defeat any new proceedings could itself be a

good reason to move the court to grant renewal”. This view was subject to the criticism that it undermined the policy of the Statute

of Limitations and Barron J. in the Supreme Court in Prior v. Independent Television News [1993] I.R. 339 emphasised that prejudice

to the defendant is equally important as prejudice to the plaintiff and that their respective hardships have to be balanced by the

court among other issues (which in that case included the fact that the plaintiff secured damages from other defendants).

Subsequently, in Sullivan v. Church of Ireland (Unreported, 7th May, 1996) Laffoy J. said:

“It seems to me that the essential principle is that where proceedings have not been heard on the merits it may be unjust

that they should be barred by procedural difficulties … the question of prejudice to the defendant is equally as important

as prejudice to the plaintiff. I must balance the hardship which the plaintiff will suffer … against that which the defendant

may suffer …”

12. Laffoy J. went on to say:

“The court considered what it termed actual as distinct from theoretical prejudice which the defendant would suffer if the

proceedings continued.”

13. In Roche v. Clayton [1998] 1 I.R. 596, the Supreme Court (per O’Flaherty J.) stressed that it is not a good reason for renewing a

summons simply to prevent the defendant availing of the Statute of Limitations.

14. Counsel for the defendants also relied on the decision in the case of Moynihan v. Dairygold (The High Court, Unreported, 13th

October, 2006). In that case it was emphasised that it was not sufficient that any reason be shown but that what was required was

that any good reason had to be shown for the renewal of the summons. Reference was also made to a number of judgments which

deal with the importance in cases alleging professional negligence to ensure that there is credible evidence to support the case before

action is commenced. See Cook v. Cronin & Neary (14th July, 1999, Supreme Court, Unreported, Lynch J.) and Connolly v. Casey &

Ors. (Unreported, 12th June, 1998.)

15. On the basis of the authorities opened to the court it was submitted that the averment in the affidavit of Mr. Dillon to the effect

that “due to unforeseen circumstances the current proceedings issued against the defendants herein shall have to proceed” is not a

sufficiently good reason for the renewal of the summons and that accordingly the application to set aside the renewal should be

granted. In their submissions the plaintiffs noted that on previous occasions when this motion was listed various comments were made

by the court and further that it was directed that the matter be put back to enable the Law Society to attend and to allow other

parties to attend. Whilst the Law Society did appear previously, they indicated that they would be taking no part in the application.

The plaintiffs then set out the history of the proceedings and went through the replying affidavit that they had sworn and the

correspondence exhibited in the proceedings. One of the main arguments they made was that there was indeed a good reason for the

renewal of the summons. It was alleged by the plaintiff that there had been a deliberate attempt by Dillon Mullins & Company

Solicitors to protect their legal colleagues from the consequences of any proceedings that might be brought against them by their

conduct in relation to delay. They also submitted that it would be a travesty of justice to grant the relief sought in this motion and

that justice would only be served by an extension of time.

16. I do not think it would be unfair to say that it appears to me that to date the plaintiffs have had some unfortunate experiences

with their solicitors. Whatever may be the merits of the original action in respect of the alleged defects in the construction of their

home, it is a fact that proceedings in that case were not issued until 16th March, 200 and it was not until 2006 that a statement of

claim was delivered in those proceedings. Incidentally it is worth pointing out that the delivery of the statement of claim was effected

by Dillon Mullins & Company. Undoubtedly that is a cause for concern. However, the real issue in this case is whether it was

appropriate to issue as a “protective writ” the plenary summons herein against the previous solicitors for the plaintiff. It has been

stated by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions that it is not a good reason to renew a summons to prevent a defendant from

relying on the Statute of Limitations. See for example the decision in the case of Roche v. Clayton & Ors. [1998] I.R. 596 in which

O’Flaherty J. noted at p. 600 of the judgment:

“But there must be some good reason. Here we really have got no good reason at all. The only reason advanced by the

plaintiff is that he was let down by Mr. Murphy. That has nothing to do with the defendant. We must make an order that

renders justice between the two immediate parties to the litigation. It seems to me that no good reason has been

advanced at all. He did know that he had to serve the summons. In a sense (if he is correct), he had been let down by

Mr. Murphy before he ever issued the summons because he says he gave money to Mr. Murphy to issue the summons and

he did not issue it.

I cannot detect that there is any good reason. It is not a good reason in light of O’Brien v. Fahey to renew a summons

simply to prevent the defendant availing of the Statute of Limitations. The Statute of Limitations must be available on a

reciprocal basis to both sides of any litigation.”

17. Having considered all of the authorities opened to me and the arguments presented by counsel on behalf of the defendant and by

the Kelleghers I can only come to the conclusion that so far as the renewal of the summons is concerned, no good reason was

proffered to the court for the renewal of the summons. I know from their submissions that the plaintiffs feel very hard done by in

relation to their legal representation. However, the Supreme Court has made it plain that that is not sufficient reason for the renewal

of a summons.

18. In the circumstances I feel I have no option but to make the order sought herein.