High Court dismisses judicial review claim where Tribunal properly considered country of origin reports without selective quotation.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe High Court dismissed the applicant's judicial review application against the Refugee Appeals Tribunal's refusal of refugee status. The applicant argued the Tribunal relied on selective quotations from Human Rights Watch reports to claim effective state protection in Croatia. The court found the Tribunal had properly considered the full context of the reports, which indicated cooperation with international organizations and joint programs for returnees, rather than relying on isolated examples.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IARefugee Act 1996; Refugee Appeals Tribunal Act 2004: A decision-maker must consider country of origin information as a whole and cannot rely on selective quotations or isolated examples to justify a finding of adequate state protection.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IAGiurisprudenza citata
Generato dall'IATesto completo
Neutral Citation Number: [2006] IEHC 365
THE HIGH COURT
[2004 No. 942 JR]
BETWEEN
DRAGICA VERCEVIC
APPLICANT
AND
THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM
AND
AIDAN EAMES SITTING AS
THE REFUGEE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
RESPONDENTS
Judgment of Mr. Justice Feeney delivered on the 14th day of November 2006.
1.1 The Applicant is from Croatia and was born on the 6th May, 1961. She arrived in Ireland in February, 2001. She immediately
applied on the 12th of that month for refugee status and duly completed the standard application. Her application was initially
considered by the Refugee Applications Commissioner who recommended on the 20th February, 2002, that the Applicant should not be
granted a declaration of refugee status. That was appealed by a notice of appeal dated the 9th April, 2002.
1.2 On the 23rd June, 2004, the second named Respondent, sitting as a member of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal, proceeded upon an
oral hearing of the Applicant’s appeal. There is a transcript of that oral hearing conducted on the 23rd June, 2004. At that oral
hearing the Applicant was represented by both solicitor and counsel. The Applicant was questioned by her own counsel and also by
the presenting officer and at the conclusion of that questioning the Applicant’s counsel was provided with and availed of an
opportunity to make submissions. The submissions made by counsel on behalf of the Applicant highlighted that it was the Applicant’s
claim that there was no effective State protection particularly in the enclave or area which was home to the Applicant. In the course
of those oral submissions it was requested that the Applicant’s lawyers might provide the Tribunal with an overall submission framed
on the issue of State protection and the approach which the Tribunal should adopt in assessing country of origin information and it
was expressly stated (at p. 26 of the transcript) that the member of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal conducting the hearing “would go
through all the materials that have been submitted”. The presenting officer was then given an opportunity to make a submission and
the hearing concluded.
1.3 By letter dated the 14th July, the Applicant’s solicitors forwarded written submissions together with four country of origin
documents namely a UNHCR field survey dated January, 2001, a Human Rights Watch report, on the Balkans of 2004, a Human Rights
Watch briefing paper of 13th May, 2004 and a US Department of State report on Croatia dated the 25th February, 2004. Also
forwarded with that letter were two positive recommendations in respect of two refugee Applicants namely a Mr. Ruzic and a Ms.
Ognjenovic who both came from the same area as the Applicant and whom it was contended had succeeded based upon similar facts
to the facts in the Applicant’s claim.
1.4 A decision was duly made by the member of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal in relation to the application which was dated the 29th
September, 2004. The member determined that the appeal should be dismissed and affirmed the original recommendation of the
Refugee Applications Commissioner. The decision to refuse the appeal was notified to the Applicant by letter dated the 5th October,
2004 and the Applicant duly applied for relief by way of judicial review in respect of the decision of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal
dated the 29th September, 2004. The Applicant was granted leave to seek an order of certiorari quashing the decision of the 29th
September, 2004, together with a declaration that such a decision was arrived at in breach of the principles of natural and
constitutional justice and for a consequential order remitting the Applicant’s asylum claim for rehearing together with any directions
that might be made in relation to the correct test to be applied in considering applications for refugee status as the court may seem
just or appropriate.
1.5 The Applicant was granted relief to seek judicial review on two specified grounds namely;
1. The second Respondent in the course of the Applicant’s oral hearing of her appeal against the recommendation of the
Refugee Applications Commissioner refused and/or failed to allow the Applicant to call a witness, namely Svetlana Pavlovic
whom she wished to give relevant evidence on her behalf. Accordingly, the second Respondent failed to adhere to the
principles of audi alteram partem and thereby breached the Applicant’s right to have her appeal dealt with according to
the tenets of natural and constitutional justice.
2. The second Respondent in his decision of the 29th of September, 2004, failed to consider all relevant material, more
specifically the positive recommendations of the Refugee Applications Commissioner in the cases of Zoran Ruzic, RAC
Reference 69/24558/01A and Dobrila Ognjenovic RAC Reference 69/32272/01B which were tendered by the Applicant to
the second named Respondent in the course of the said oral hearing in support of her application for asylum. The second
Respondent also failed to consider the written submissions submitted by the Applicant subsequent to the said oral hearing
and which the Applicant was given leave to submit subsequent to the said oral hearing. Accordingly, the second
Respondent failed to adhere to the principles of audi alteram partem and thereby breached the Applicant’s right to have
her appeal dealt with according to the tenets of natural and constitutional justice.
2.1 It is in respect of those two grounds that this court must consider whether or not the Applicant is entitled to judicial review.
2.2 The first ground relied upon is that it is claimed that during the course of the Applicant’s oral hearing before the second member
Respondent that the second named Respondent refused and/or failed to allow the Applicant to call a witness, namely, Svetlana
Pavlovic whom it was claimed wished to give relevant evidence on the Applicant’s behalf and that as a result of such refusal and/or
failure there was a failure on the part of the second named Respondent, to adhere to the principles of audi alteram partem.
2.3 It is clear that a body such as the Refugee Appeals Tribunal must apply procedures that ensure constitutional justice. The audi
alteram partem principle encompasses two concepts, firstly, that a person affected by a decision must have due notice and
secondly, that such person must be allowed appropriate facilities to make the best possible case in reply. It is the alleged failure to
allow the Applicant to make the best possible case in reply by failing to allow Svetlana Pavlovic be called as a witness which is
claimed amounts to a breach of the principles of audi alteram partem.
2.4 The factual position in relation to this issue can be gleaned from the transcript of the hearing before the second named
Respondent on the 23rd June, 2004. At the commencement of the hearing counsel for the Applicant identified to the second named
Respondent that there was one witness namely Svetlana Pavlovic. The second named Respondent questioned as to how such witness
might assist the Tribunal and counsel for the Applicant informed him that she was from the same area as the Applicant and the
second named Respondent indicated as follows:
“All right. Well, we will take a view as we go through the evidence, as to whether it will be necessary to call Ms.
Pavlovic.”
At the end of the questioning of the Applicant no application was made to call the witness nor was the issue raised. In fact what
occurred was that the second named Respondent identified that the real issue in the case which was going to have to be determined
was the issue of effective State protection. It was in respect of that issue that the hearing continued and the Applicant’s counsel
made further submissions thereon and requested to be allowed to put in further written submissions and documentation. At that stage
no request was made for the witness to be called nor was it suggested that such witness was required. There was no reference to
the witness in the letter of the 14th July, 2004, or the written submissions attached thereto. Those submissions together with the
attachments dealt with country of origin information, the forward looking aspect of the claim and a submission in relation to what at
law amounts to persecution.
2.5 The decision of the second named Respondent did not call into question any facts identified by the Applicant nor was any adverse
determination made in relation to the credibility of the Applicant. It was also the case that the proposed witness had left Croatia a
number of years prior to 2004. In the above circumstances it appears to this court that there were clear and compelling reasons as to
why the hearing before the second named Respondent proceeded on the basis that the proposed witness’s evidence was not
necessary and this is confirmed and clearly demonstrated by the fact that counsel for the Applicant did not suggest otherwise, even
though there was a clear statement that if it was deemed necessary to call the witness Ms. Pavlovic that the same would be
considered. The Applicant’s counsel did not raise the matter other than at the start and made no attempt to suggest that such
evidence was necessary.
2.6 In the light of the above facts this court is satisfied that the correct position is that there was not a refusal to call a proposed
witness but merely an indication that the decision as to whether or not to call such witness would be delayed until the stage of the
hearing when it could be determined whether or not such evidence was necessary. This court is satisfied that there was never a
refusal or failure to allow the Applicant to call a witness and that the true position is that such evidence was deemed to be
unnecessary. This court is therefore satisfied that in relation to the first of the grounds identified at paragraph E1 of the amended
statement required to ground an application for judicial review that there was no refusal or failure on the part of the second named
Respondent to allow or permit the calling of a witness and that the principles of audi alteram partem have not been breached.
3.1 The second ground upon which leave was granted is that the second named Respondent in his decision of 29th September, 2004,
failed to consider all relevant material, more specifically the positive recommendations of the Refugee Applications Commissioner in the
cases of Zoran Ruzic, RAC reference number 69/24558/01A and Dobrila Ognjenovic RAC reference number 69/32272/01B which were
tendered by the Applicant to the second named Respondent in the course of the said oral hearing in support of her application for
asylum. The ground for relief went on to state:
“The second named Respondent also failed to consider the written submissions submitted by the Applicant subsequent to
the said oral hearing.”
It was claimed in the said ground that as result of the failure to consider the above identified two positive recommendations and the
written submissions that there was a failure to adhere to the principle of audi alteram partem and therefore a breach of the
Applicant’s right to have her appeal dealt with according to the tenets of natural and constitutional justice.
3.2 The Applicant had applied at leave stage for leave on wider grounds and had claimed leave at paragraph 5 of the application on
the ground that:
“the decision of the second named Respondent displays an error of law on its face and is wholly at odds with the decision
of the High Court in Rostas v. Refugee Applications Tribunal and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform
(Unreported, High Court Gilligan J. 31st July, 2003) which is authority for the principle that when the Tribunal is presented
with conflicting sets of country of origin information, those sources which are more favourable to the Applicant are to be
preferred over those which are not, and in that the Applicant presented independent country of origin information which
was supportive or operative of her claim for asylum to the second named Respondent. Yet the second named Respondent
in his said decision preferred alternative country of origin information which was not supportive of the Applicant’s claim for
asylum.”
Leave was not granted to seek judicial review on that ground. It followed that during the hearing before this court that the issue
which required to be considered is not the favouring of one piece of country of origin information as opposed to an other but rather
the issue as to whether or not the second named Respondent considered the two cases in which positive recommendations were
made and also considered the written submissions submitted with the letter of 14th July, 2004.
3.3 It is appropriate to identify a number of facts relevant to this ground of appeal. Firstly, as is clear from the grounding affidavit of
the Applicant (at para. 6), it is apparent that during the oral hearing on 23rd June, 2004, before the second named Respondent that
the documentation relating to the two positive recommendations relied upon by the Applicant was tendered to the second named
Respondent. That documentation was again included and attached to the written submissions forwarded by letter of 14th July, 2004,
subsequent to the oral hearing. It therefore follows that the documentation dealing with the two positive recommendations was
placed before the second named Respondent on two occasions. Whilst it was submitted during the oral hearing no reference was
made to it by the Applicant’s counsel in his submissions to the second named Respondent. Again when further written submissions
were forwarded by the letter of 14th July, 2004, including copy documentation dealing with the two positive recommendations once
more no express reference was made to such positive recommendations. Those two positive recommendations were made in 2002,
almost two years prior to the oral hearing. In the light of the information contained in the country of origin information as to the
changing circumstances within Croatia such lack of reference is not surprising. Those positive recommendations would have been
based upon the factual position existing as of 2002, and due to the passage of time it is no surprise that there was no express
reference to those recommendations in either the oral submissions or the two written submissions.
3.4 It is against that background that the absence of an express reference to either of the two positive recommendations in the
written decision must be considered. This court is satisfied that no inference can be drawn from the absence of such express
reference. That is all the more so where it is clear, beyond doubt, that the second named Respondent had the documentation relating
to such positive recommendations and in circumstances where the second named Respondent had (at p. 30) of the transcript of the
oral hearing of 23rd June, 2004, expressly stated that he would go through all the country of origin reports and would take into
account all of the submissions made by the barrister acting on behalf of the Applicant and where the second named Respondent had
also on the same occasion invited lawyers acting for the Applicant to make further written submissions and allowed and permitted
such submissions to be made. Also as is apparent from the finding hereinafter made it is also clear from the ultimate written decision
of the second named Respondent that express reference was made to part of the documentation included with the letter of the 14th
July, 2004.
3.5 The written decision also stated at paragraph 4 on p. 11 that the second named Respondent had carefully considered all the
papers submitted to him for the purpose of the appeal and all the matters required to be considered under s. 16(16) of the 1996 Act.
The second named Respondent reiterated that he had considered all the evidence at the bottom of p. 14 of his written decision.
3.6 Against the above factual background this court is satisfied that it cannot be said that the express reference to careful
consideration of all the papers and all matters required to be considered under s. 16(16) of the 1996 Act and reference to
consideration of all the evidence could be categorised as a formula of words or a statement of a mere administrative formula. (See
G.K. v. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2002] 2 I.R. 418 at pp. 425 and 426.) The manner in which the second
named Respondent dealt with this matter is indicative of a willingness to consider and have regard to documentation provided by and
submissions made on behalf of the Applicant. This court is satisfied that there should be due regard to the express statements made
by the second named Respondent.
3.7 Counsel on behalf of the Applicant urged that the approach identified by Clarke J. in Muia v. O’Gorman and Others (Clarke J., 11th
November, 2005), as stated at paragraph 4.6 of that judgment should be followed. In that paragraph Clarke J. stated:
“Where, however, as here, there is no evidence to be found in the decision that the country of origin information
favourable to the Applicant’s case was considered and, equally, as a consequence, no rational explanation as to why it
was rejected, it seems to me there are at least arguable grounds for the Applicant’s contention that the decision maker
did not take into account relevant considerations.”
This court is satisfied that that approach, albeit that it was at leave stage, is of no benefit to the correct approach to be followed on
the facts of this case. The information concerning two positive recommendations was of little or any relevance to the matters under
consideration by the second named Respondent. Due to the lack of real relevance this court cannot draw any inference from the lack
of express reference in the written decision. The quality of the information to be gleaned from those two positive references was such
that it could not be said that a stated rational explanation was required to reject same. This court is satisfied that the Applicant has
not made out the claim that the second named Respondent failed to consider relevant material or failed to consider the said two
positive recommendations or that any inference can be drawn from a lack of an express reference to such recommendations in the
written decision of the second named Respondent.
4.1 The final ground which the court must consider is the ground relied upon in the second part of paragraph 2 in section E of the
amended statement required to ground an application for judicial review. That ground relates to a claim that the second named
Respondent failed to consider the written submissions submitted by the Applicant subsequent to the said oral hearing. Those written
submissions together with documentation were forwarded with the letter of the 14th July, 2004. Such submissions were invited by the
second named Respondent and he expressly refers in his written decision to the fact that he had considered all the evidence and had
carefully considered all the papers submitted to him for the purposes of the appeal. This court, as outlined above, is satisfied that
those references, on the facts of this case, were not a mere formula of words but were a true statement of what had occurred.
4.2 This court is confirmed in its conclusion that the second named Respondent considered the written submissions from the text of
the actual decision. The written submissions contained extensive quotes from a number of country of origin documents and copies of
those documents were attached. One of those documents was a Human Rights Watch report on minority returns in the Balkans 2004,
which was not only attached to the submissions but was also referred to by quotation in a number of places in the written
submission. In the second paragraph on the third page of that report it was stated:
“By 2003, physical attacks against returnees in Croatia, already rare in comparison to Kosovo and Bosnia had all but
disappeared.”
On p. 15 of the written decision of the second named Respondent he stated:
“The EU Accession Report on Croatia and the Human Rights Watch report on Croatia for 2003, make similar points even
though both recognise that there are ongoing hostilities and difficulties in this post conflict situation. The Human Rights
Watch report on Croatia for 2003, state:
‘In 2003, physical attacks on returning Serbs are… rare and… almost disappeared.’”
I am satisfied that a proper reading of that written decision makes it clear that the Human Rights Watch report on Croatia for 2003, is
in fact the report dated January, 2004, as it is that report which covers the situation in Croatia for 2003. It would appear highly
probable that the reference on p. 15 of the written decision to that report amounts to what could almost be described as a quotation
and confirms, beyond doubt, that such a report was considered. This court is satisfied that the written decision itself makes it clear
that at least some of the documentation submitted with the letter of the 14th July, 2004 and referred to in the written submissions
attached thereto was considered and that the lack of express reference to other documents is not material on the facts of this case.
4.3 A complete and proper reading of the decision and the country of origin information submitted with the letter of the 14th July,
2004, makes it clear that this is not a case of selective quotation or the use of an isolated example of State protection. The decision
of Clarke J. in Idiakheua v. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the Refugee Appeals Tribunal judgment May, 2005,
had indicated that there were arguable grounds for judicial review if the decision of the Refugee Appeals Tribunal relied on selective
quotations from the report contrary to the overall conclusions or relied on an isolated example of State protection to justify a finding
of adequate State protection (see p. 6).
4.4 A reading of the country of origin information submitted with the letter of the 14th July, 2004, leads this court to the conclusion
that the findings contained in the written decision of the second named Respondent could not be described as reliance upon selective
quotations or at variance with the overall conclusions of those reports. It was apparent from those reports that the government was
cooperating with the UNHCR and other humanitarian and international organisations in assisting refugees and returnees and that there
were joint programmes as of December, 2003, being organised by the UNHCR and the government.
4.5 In the light of the above findings I therefore refuse the reliefs sought.