High Court quashes Minister's refusal to consider late immigration application due to breach of child's constitutional rights.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe High Court granted certiorari to quash the Minister's decision refusing to consider a late immigration application. The applicants argued that the rigid time limit violated the constitutional rights of their Irish citizen child, while the Minister contended the deadline was necessary for the common good. The court held that the refusal breached Article 40.3 of the Constitution and Article 8 of the ECHR by failing to account for the child's protected private life.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IAArticles 40.3.1° and 40.3.2° of the Constitution; Article 8 of the ECHR: A statutory time limit excluding late applications is invalid where it fails to consider the constitutionally protected personal rights of a citizen child, thereby breaching the right to respect for private life.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IAGiurisprudenza citata
Generato dall'IATesto completo
Neutral Citation Number: [2006] IEHC 346
THE HIGH COURT
Record No. 2006 No. 43 J.R.
BETWEEN
FOLASHADE OLUBUNMI ADIO, FUAD ADIO
(A MINOR SUING BY HIS MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND
FOLASHADE OLUNMUNMI ADIO)
FAROUQ ADIO (A MINOR SUING BY HIS MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND
FOLASHADE OLUNMUNMI ADIO
APPLICANTS
AND
THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM
RESPONDENT
Supplementary Judgment of Ms. Justice Finlay Geoghegan of 14th November, 2006.
1. The third named applicant is a citizen of Ireland and was born in the State on 27th March, 2003. He is the son of the first named
applicant who is a national of Nigeria and arrived in the State in March, 2003. The second named applicant is also a son of the first
named applicant who was born in Nigeria in 2001.
2. The first named applicant is stated to have submitted an application on form IBC/05 on 26th April, 2005 which was received by the
respondent on 5th May, 2005, seeking permission to remain in the State based on the parentage of her Irish citizen child.
3. By letter dated 29th November, 2005 she was informed:
“I am directed by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform to refer to the IBC/05 application form submitted by
you in connection with the revised arrangements announced by the Minister on 15th January 2005 for the processing of
applications for permission to remain in the State from the non-national parents of Irish born children born before 1st
January 2005.
As stated on the application form, and in the Minister’s announcement, the closing date for the submission of applications
for consideration under the revised arrangements was 31st March 2005. Your application, which was received by this
Department on 5th May 2005, was too late for consideration. Accordingly I am to inform you that an application from you
cannot be considered under the revised arrangements.
The IBC/05 application form and your original supporting documents are returned herewith.”
4. As appears from the above, the decision of the respondent was to refuse to consider the application under the revised
arrangements.
5. Subsequent to that refusal, it appears that the applicant consulted with Sean Mulvihill & Co., Solicitors, and they then wrote on
her behalf a letter dated 15th December, 2005 which was headed “Application for permission to remain on the basis of parentage of
an Irish born child born before 1 January, 2005” and then the applicant’s name and reference. The solicitors then stated, “Please find
enclosed application for the above applicant with the following” and then enclosed twelve documents the first of which was the
IBC/05 application completed on 26th April, 2005. The remaining documents were documents in support of the application for leave to
remain, including certain documents which purported to confirm the residency of the first named applicant in Ireland in the period
since the birth of her citizen child. The solicitors then stated:
“As you can see there is compelling evidence that the applicant was residing in Ireland with her Irish born child, and I
would ask you therefore to grant her leave to remain at your earliest.”
6. In response to this application, the letter already set out above of 29th November, 2005 was re-issued on 19th December, 2005.
Leave and grounds
7. By order of the High Court of 13th February, 2006 the applicants were granted leave to apply by way of an application for judicial
review for:
1. An order of certiorari by way of an application for judicial review quashing the decision of the respondent, dated 29th
November, 2005 and re-issued by letter dated 19th December, 2005 refusing to consider the first named applicant’s
application for permission to reside in the State;
2. An order of Mandamus by way of an application for judicial review directing the respondent to consider the application
of the first named applicant to reside in the State with the second and third named applicants.upon the grounds set out
in the statement of grounds.
Related proceedings and judgment
8. These proceedings were heard immediately after the first set of five proceedings listed in the judgment delivered by me herein
today in Deborah Olarantimi Bode & Ors. v. the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2006 No. 102 J.R.). In the submissions
the applicants relied upon the submissions made in those proceedings insofar as relevant to the reliefs and grounds in respect of
which leave was granted in these proceedings.
Challenge to validity of decisions
9. As in many of the other applications in the related proceedings, the primary submission made was that each of the decisions of
19th November, 2005 and 19th December, 2005 was unlawful or invalid in that they were taken without any consideration of the
personal rights of the Irish citizen child guaranteed by Article 40.3 of the Constitution and in breach of the citizen child’s right to
respect for his private life under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights as implemented in the State.
10. The essence of the submission made in response on behalf of the respondent was that having regard to the time limit specified in
IBC/05 the respondent was not under any obligation to consider the rights of the Irish citizen child either by reason of Article 40.3 of
the Constitution or article 8 of the Convention. It was further submitted that the second application made by Ms. Adio’s solicitors on
her behalf on 15th December, 2005 should properly be construed as simply a repeat of her application under the revised arrangements
on IBC/05 and should not be considered as a separate or a “free-standing” application for permission to remain in the State or
residency.
Effect of time limit in IBC/05
11. For the reasons fully set out in the Bode judgment delivered today, I have concluded that having regard to the announcement
made on 15th January, 2005 by the respondent and other documents referred to therein that the revised arrangements announced
were essentially a revised procedure for the making and consideration of applications to remain in the State from parents of Irish born
children born before 1st January, 2005. Further, the Minister in making that announcement committed himself to consider and
determine an application for permission to remain in the State made by the parent of an Irish born child born before 1st January, 2005
on IBC/05.
12. Also, for the reasons set out in the same judgment, I have concluded that the Minister in establishing the revised arrangements
which became known as the IBC/05 Scheme and in receiving, processing or considering and determining applications made on IBC/05
is exercising the inherent executive power of the State to control aliens which is now derived from Article 6 of the Constitution. Also,
that subject to the obligations arising under the Constitution and s. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003
applicable to the exercise of such discretionary power, that the Minister retained a discretion as to the matters to be considered and
the criteria according to which such applications should be determined.
13. In the announcement of 15th January, 2005 it was stated expressly “completed applications must be submitted before the end of
March, 2005”. The effect of this provision appears to be the following. The Minister cannot be considered to have committed himself
to consider and determine an application made on IBC/05 which was submitted after the end of March, 2005. The express
commitment made having regard to the terms of the announcement on 15th January, 2005 must be considered to be limited to those
applications which were submitted prior to the end of March, 2005.
14. However, there is nothing in the express terms of the revised arrangement which precludes the Minister from considering an
application made on IBC/05 after the end of March, 2005.
15. As stated in the Bode judgment, it is common case that the inherent power of the Minister in relation to aliens includes the power
in his discretion to receive, consider and determine an application for residency or leave to remain in the State from a non-national
independently of any express statutory scheme such as the procedure envisaged by s. 3 of the Act of 1999. Accordingly, on receipt
of an application from Ms. Adio on IBC/05 the Minister had a power in his discretion to receive, consider and determine that
application. Where, as in this instance, that application was an application for permission to remain in the State by the parent of an
Irish citizen child also in the State, for the reasons fully set out in the Bode judgment it appears to me that such discretion as to
whether or not he will consider and determine the application must be exercised in accordance with the rights of the citizen child
protected by the Constitution which includes having regard to the State guarantee of the personal rights of the citizen child under
Article 40.3.1.
16. As I concluded in the Bode judgment, in relation to Mr. Bode’s separate application for residency, it appears to me that such
principles require, at minimum, that where the Minister receives an application for permission to remain in the State from the parent of
an Irish citizen child must by a fair an proper inquiry into the circumstances of the citizen child and his or her family consider and
determine whether or not the respect for and defence and vindication of the child’s personal rights and in particular the right to live in
the State require that he should then consider the application for permission to remain in the State. It does not appear to me, having
regard to the guarantee of the personal rights of the Irish citizen child in Article 40.3, including the right to live in Ireland and the
welfare rights set out in G. v. An Bord Uchtála [1980] I.R. 32, that it is open to the respondent, without consideration of the relevant
facts and rights of the citizen child to refuse to consider the parent’s application for permission to remain in the State.
17. Accordingly, I have concluded that in relation to the application submitted on 26th April, 2005 by the first named applicant, whilst
the Minister was not obliged by the terms of the revised arrangements known as IBC/05 to consider that application, neither was he
precluded from doing so by the terms of the IBC/05. He retained a discretion to consider and determine the IBC/05 application and
having regard to the existence of that discretion he was bound in determining whether or not to consider the application to consider
the personal rights of the citizen child protected by Article 40.3 and to exercise the discretion so as to respect and as far as
practicable vindicate and defend the qualified right of the citizen child to live in Ireland.
18. No submission was made that any interest of the common good required the respondent to refuse to consider an application on
IBC/05 submitted after the 31st March, 2005, without considering the constitutionally protected rights of the citizen child.
Submissions were made as to the necessity for a time limit but not for a time limit which automatically excluded consideration of a
late application where the vindication of the citizen child’s constitutional right to live in Ireland so required.
19. Accordingly, I have concluded that the decisions made herein to refuse to consider the applications of the first named applicant
for permission to remain in the State were invalid as they did not consider the personal rights of the citizen child and were taken in
breach of the third named applicant’s rights under Article 40.3 of the Constitution.
20. For the reasons set out in the Bode judgment the third named applicant also has a private life in the State within the meaning of
article 8 of the Convention which demands respect from the respondent. Further, it appears to me that the principles set out in the
Bode judgment in relation to article 8 apply equally to the decision taken herein to refuse to consider the application on IBC/05 as
they apply to the decisions to refuse the applications on IBC/05.
21. Accordingly applying those principles to the decision taken herein I have concluded that the decision to refuse to consider the
first named applicant’s IBC/05 application without considering the right to private life in the sense of the constitutionally protected
personal rights of the citizen child was an interference with the citizen child’s right to respect for his/her private life within the
meaning of article 8.1 of the Convention.
22. Counsel for the respondent made some submissions in justification of the refusal to consider the late application. However detailed
submissions based on article 8(2) were not made. I am not satisfied that the respondent has established that the decision is justified
under article 8.2. One reason is that such a decision must be taken inter alia “in accordance with law”. Blake and Husain Immigration,
Asylum & Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2003) state: Domestic law is not law for the purposes of the ECHR if it is not
adequately accessible and precise so that its consequences are foreseeable and a law conferring a discretion must indicate the width
of that discretion (Sliver v. United Kingdom [1983] 5 EHRR 347). The executive discretion being exercised by the respondent herein
does not prima facie appear come within such a definition.
23. Accordingly it appears to me that the decision to refuse to consider the first named applicant’s IBC/05 application must also be
considered to have been in breach of article 8 of the Convention and hence contrary to s. 3(1) of the Act of 2003.
Relief
24. For the reasons set out above the applicants are entitled to an order of certiorari quashing the decision of the respondent dated
the 29th November, 2005 and reissued by letter dated the 19th December, 2005, refusing to consider the first named applicant’s
application for permission to reside in the State and an order remitting that application for consideration and determination in
accordance with law.