High Court grants leave to appeal on whether courts can refuse judicial review if no benefit accrues to the applicant.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe High Court granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court regarding the exercise of judicial review discretion under the Planning and Development Act, 2000. The appellants, James and Margaret Talbot, challenged a planning decision, while the respondents included An Bord Pleanála and the Attorney General. The court certified that points of exceptional public importance arose concerning whether a court can refuse leave based on the lack of benefit to the applicant and whether inferences can be drawn about future planning outcomes.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IAs. 50 of the Planning and Development Act, 2000; The High Court is entitled to exercise its discretion to refuse leave to seek judicial review on the ground that no benefit would accrue to the applicant, and it is permissible to infer that future planning applications would be refused on grounds not currently impugned.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IATesto completo
Neutral Citation Number: [2006] IEHC 202
THE HIGH COURT
Record Number: 2004 No. 350 JR
IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 50 OF THE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT ACT, 2000 (AS AMENDED)
BETWEEN
JAMES TALBOT AND MARGARET TALBOT
APPELLANTS
AND
AN BORD PLEANÁLA,
KILDARE COUNTY COUNCIL,
IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
RESPONDENTS
Judgment of Mr Justice Michael Peart delivered on the 16th day of November 2005
1. I have decided that in the unusual circumstances of this case I should grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court pursuant to the
provisions of s. 50(4)(f)(i) of the Planning and Development Act, 2000, as I believe, having heard the submissions of Counsel for the
parties, that a point of exceptional public importance arises, given the basis in my judgment delivered on the 21st June, 2005 for the
exercise of the Court’s discretion to refuse leave to seek judicial review herein.
2. I am of the view that an important point of exceptional importance arises because of the potential in future applications for the
court’s discretion to be exercised in a similar way, and it is important that some clarification be given on the issue by the Supreme
Court.
3. I am of the view that the following are points of exceptional public importance and that it is desirable in the public interest that an
appeal should be taken to the Supreme Court in relation thereto, and I so certify.
4. Is the Court, when hearing the application for leave on notice pursuant to the provisions of s. 50 of the Planning and Development
Act, 2000 as amended, entitled to exercise its discretion to refuse leave to seek judicial review on the ground that no benefit would in
any event accrue to the applicant?
5. If the court is so entitled to refuse leave on that basis, is it permissible to reach a conclusion that leave should be so refused by
drawing an inference from the material put before the Court on the application for leave that any future application for planning
permission would be refused in any event on a ground or grounds which was/were not sought to be impugned in the proceedings for
judicial review?