Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
IEHC 152 ECLI:IE:HC:2006:152 Generato dall'IA

High Court allows partial discovery of existing Tribunal records but rejects requests to compile new statistics.

Numero d'incarto IEHC 152
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Irlanda (IE)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Parzialmente accolto (Partially Allowed)

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The High Court granted an application for judicial review discovery regarding the Refugee Appeals Tribunal's procedures. Applicants alleged bias and sought specific records, including case assignment lists and audio transcripts, while respondents opposed the vague nature of the request. The court permitted the production of existing documents but refused orders requiring the Tribunal to create new statistics or lists solely for the applicants' benefit.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

Order 31 of the Rules of the Superior Courts; Discovery is limited to the disclosure of documents already in existence and does not permit the deponent to compile new statistics or create lists for the benefit of the applicant.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
judicial review discovery Refugee Appeals Tribunal existing documents only fishing expedition Order 31 Superior Courts

Disposizioni normative citate

Generato dall'IA
Order 31 of the Rules of the Superior Courts
Order 31 of the Rules of the Superior Courts relates to discovery and discovery means, initially at any rate, the disclosure of the

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Testo completo

Neutral Citation Number [2006 IEHC 152]

THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

2004 No. 483 J.R.

IN THE MATTER OF THE REFUGEE ACT 1996 (AS AMENDED) AND IN THE MATTER OF THE IMMIGRATION ACT 1999 AND IN THE

MATTER OF THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS (TRAFFICKING ACT 2000)

BETWEEN

LEONID POPOVICI AND ANNA ANDREEVA

APPLICANTS

AND

JAMES NICHOLSON, THE REFUGEE APPEALS TRIBUNAL, IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RESPONDENTS

Judgment of Mr. Justice de Valera delivered on the 26th day of April 2006.

1. This is an application for the production of certain documents set out in detail at paragraphs (i)-(v) of the notice of motion herein

relating to the decisions and procedures of the first and second named respondents in the course of conducting appeal hearings

concerning the applicants pursuant to the provisions of the above mentioned Acts of the Oireachtas. The description “discovery”

does not appear in the notice of motion but is used in the affidavit of Mr. Durkan, the applicants’ solicitor, supporting the application.

2. It should be noted that in the case of paragraph (ii) and paragraph (iii) of the notice of motion paragraphs are further subdivided

into (viii) and (ii) divisions respectively.

3. This application is made subsequent to an order for leave to proceed by way of judicial review which was made on the 9th day of

February 2005.

4. The application for leave was accompanied by a statement of grounds, supported by an affidavit from Leonid Popovici and

subsequently a statement of opposition was filed supported by an affidavit sworn by John English.

5. The applicants’ case can be summarised as claiming a general bias on behalf of the first and second named respondents evidenced

by the alleged pattern of findings by the first named respondent and the procedures in assigning cases adopted by the second named

respondent and a specific complaint concerning the manner in which the first named respondent conducted the appeal hearing in

question.

6. The application for leave was not contested by the respondents and the hearing of the substantive judicial review is pending. This

application is made in the course of these proceedings.

7. It should be noted that the affidavit of John English, sworn on the 21st April, 2005, pre-dates the letter seeking voluntary

discovery dated the 5th May, 2005, and the notice of motion herein which is dated the 18th July, 2005, and anticipates the

application for discovery (at paragraph (xv) of John English’s affidavit).

8. There is a fourth affidavit sworn on behalf of the respondents on the 18th July, 2005, resisting the application for discovery.

9. In conceding the application for leave to seek judicial review the respondents must be taken to have conceded that there were

“substantial grounds” on which to base the applicants’ claim. This being so the dictum of Finlay C.J. in AIB Bank Plc. v. Ernst and

Whinney [1993] 1 I.R. 375 is relevant:

“The basis purpose and reason for the procedure of discovery… is to ensure as far as possible that the full facts

concerning any matter in dispute before the court are capable of being presented to the court by the parties concerned,

so that justice on full information, rather than a partial or limited revelation of the facts arising in a particular action, may

be done.”

10. At paragraph 10-03 of Civil Procedures in the Superior Courts, 2nd ed., (Delany and McGrath) the learned authors state:

“…the discovery process is designed to narrow the issues which must be resolved between the parties and to facilitate

the resolution of the case in as speedy and cost efficient manner as possible.”

11. And I adopt this as being an apt and appropriate statement of the law.

12. In this respect it must be borne in mind, as already stated, that the respondents have accepted there is a case to be tried, that

is the application for judicial review, between the parties.

13. I am satisfied, therefore, that there should be discovery of documents by the respondents to ensure that the full facts of this

matter come before the court hearing the judicial review application but the scope of the documentation sought by the applicant is

too extensive and it should be restricted to such documents as are necessary for the purpose of ensuring a proper and

comprehensive hearing of the facts and arguments.

14. In her affidavit, which has not been contradicted by any subsequent affidavit, Ms. NicCanna on behalf of the respondents points

out, at paragraph (iv), that the information sought at (ii)(ii) of the applicants notice of motion has not been compiled by the Tribunal

and is, therefore, not discoverable.

15. Ms. NicCanna at paragraph (v) of her affidavit and the numbers in relation to Ms. NicCanna’s affidavit and to continue at

paragraph (v) of her affidavit states that the information sought at (ii)(ii), (iv) and (v) of the notice of motion is already available to

the applicant and, therefore, need not be discovered.

16. At paragraph (vi) of her affidavit Ms. NicCanna states that, as already stated in respect of paragraphs (ii)(ii) of the notice of

motion paragraph (ii) (viii) seeks information not compiled by the respondents and therefore not available for discovery.

17. I accept that the information sought at paragraph (iv) and paragraph (ii)(v), (ii)(vi) and (ii)(vii) is in the public domain and

therefore need not be discovered.

18. This leaves the information sought at:

Paragraph (i)

Paragraph (ii)(i)

Paragraph (ii)(iii)

Paragraph (iii)(i)

Paragraph (iii)(ii)

Paragraph (v)

to be considered.

19. I have been referred to Finlay Geoghegan J.’s decision in K.A. v. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2003] 2 I.R.

93 in which she states, inter alia:

“The limitation on discovery… it is that it must not be considered to be a fishing exercise… it is not sufficient for an

applicant simply to make an assertion not based on any substantial fact and then seek discovery in the hope that there

will exist documents which support the contention.”

20. In respect of paragraph (i) I cannot see the relevance of this information to the application for judicial review and it must be

considered, in the circumstances, to be a “fishing expedition” as envisaged by Finlay Geoghegan J. as set out above.

21. The information sought at paragraph (ii)(i) appears to me to be relevant to the judicial review proceedings and discoverable, if

available. It seems appropriate to point out at this point that only statistics already compiled and available are discoverable – the

discovery procedure is not appropriate to seek to force the respondents to compile statistics from information in their possession for

the benefit of the applicant.

22. At paragraph (ii)(iii) if such records have been complied then it appears that they are relevant and discoverable but it is not the

responsibility of the respondents to create such lists solely for the purpose of the applicants’ discovery.

23. At paragraph (iii) the applicants seek documents relating to the assignment of cases to Tribunal members both generally and,

specifically, in relation to the applicants and I am satisfied this is an appropriate heading pursuant to which discovery should be

allowed under sub headings (i) and (ii).

24. Finally it is not clear that any audio visual recording or transcript in respect of the applicants hearing with the first named

respondent exists but it seems to me that it is an appropriate matter for discovery but my comments in relation to discovery generally

which follow are to be taken into consideration.

25. This matter came before me as a motion seeking discovery. As already pointed out, the notice of motion did not, in fact, specify

this but merely sought, rather vaguely in places, documents and records and other general information. Matters which, for example in

plenary proceedings, should more properly be sought by way of particulars are apparently included and this is not appropriate.

26. Order 31 of the Rules of the Superior Courts relates to discovery and discovery means, initially at any rate, the disclosure of the

existence of documents (which as in this matter may include items such as video recordings). Discovery is made on affidavit and the

standard form affidavit, in summary, provides for the disclosure of documents.

Firstly: in the possession of the deponent which it is agreed to produce.

Secondly: in the possession of the deponent, the production of which is objected to.

Thirdly: previously but not now in the deponent’s possession and

Finally: an averment that there are no other relevant documents.

27. It is appropriate that the respondents make discovery, as set out above, in the manner provided for in the rules using the

specimen form of affidavit as a template. I reiterate that the respondents need only disclose documents already in existence for the

purpose of this discovery and do not need to create, or extrapolate, statistics or tables not already in existence as is apparently

envisaged in the notice of motion particularly in paragraph (ii) thereof.

28. For the avoidance of doubt this means that it is still open to the respondents to object to the production of certain documents as

envisaged in the specimen “Affidavit as to documents” (No. 10 appendix C Rules of the Superior Courts).