Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
IECCA 72 ECLI:IE:CCA:2006:72 Generato dall'IA

Court of Criminal Appeal dismisses appeal on identification evidence admissibility and refusal to amend late grounds.

Numero d'incarto IECCA 72
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Irlanda (IE)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Respinto (Dismissed)

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal regarding the admissibility of witness identification evidence from a still photograph. The trial judge correctly admitted evidence from one Garda who knew the applicant socially while excluding another whose knowledge was solely professional, balancing probative value against prejudice. The court further refused leave to amend the grounds of appeal because the new issues were not raised via requisition or included in the original notice, deeming the delay unjustified.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001, s. 12(3); Identification evidence is admissible if probative value outweighs prejudicial value, and late amendments to grounds of appeal are refused absent miscarriage of justice.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
identification evidence admissibility probative value versus prejudice witness identification from photograph late amendment of appeal grounds requisition for jury warning

Disposizioni normative citate

Generato dall'IA

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Testo completo

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

Record No. 219/05

McCracken J.

O’Donovan J.

de Valera J.

BETWEEN

THE PEOPLE (AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS)

RESPONDENT

.v.

JOHN FOLEY

APPLICANT

Judgment of the Court delivered by McCracken J. on the 1st day of June 2006

The applicant was convicted before the Cork Circuit Criminal Court of one charge of burglary contrary to section 12(3) of

the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001. The charge related to a burglary at Coleman’s shop and garage in

Millstreet in Co. Cork on 4th September 2003, and the evidence against the applicant depended on his identification from a

CCTV system which was fitted to the shop. It was agreed between the prosecution and the defence that, while there was a

video recording, a still photograph taken from it would suffice as evidence.

As soon as the case was open to the jury issue was taken as to the admissibility of evidence of identification from the still

picture. It was proposed by the prosecution to call two members of the Gardra Siochana who would identify the applicant

from this still picture. A voir dire was held in the course of which Garda Russell acknowledged that he first came to know

the applicant through his work and Garda O’Sullivan also said that he got to know the applicant through his work but he

would have met him outside of that as well when he was off duty around the town, that he was not a friend but that they

would say hallo if they met on the street. After some considerable legal argument the learned trial judge ruled as follows:

“On the basis of what has been argued before me and the evidence I have heard, I will be prepared, on the basis that

there may be additional prejudice or there may be prejudice to the accused, to exclude the evidence of Garda Liam

Russell on the basis that he is not now stationed in the area, he met him apparently entirely through his work and his

evidence may be more prejudicial than probative. However, in relation to the evidence of Garda O’Sullivan, it appears

to me that he is stationed in a close area to where the accused had his address, he gave evidence of knowing him in a

more social rather than Garda work situation and I think that in reality, his evidence of recognition is probative if it

stands up before the jury and that, together with any photograph, accompanied by the due and relevant warnings are

sufficient to protect the accused from prejudice, so I propose to allow the State to adduce O’Sullivan’s evidence but not

Russell’s.”

Subsequently Garda O’Sullivan gave evidence identifying the applicant from the photograph and when asked how he was

able to recognise the applicant he said:-

“I know Mr Foley since 1997, My Lord, I have met him on a number of occasions My Lord, spoke to him on a number of

occasions.”

He was then asked where he would have met the applicant and replied:-

“I would have met him, My Lord, if he came into the station, I would have met him on the street, My Lord, I would have

met him socially, My Lord, in town when I was off duty. I would have acknowledged him in passing, My Lord, and he

would have acknowledged me back.”

The question of identification of an accused from a photograph taken at the scene, where the identification is by a member

of the Garda Siochana who was not present at the time of the crime, has been considered in a number of cases. The leading

authority undoubtedly is The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v Maguire [1995] 2 I.R. 286, which was a

decision of this court. In that case Barron J. giving the judgment of the court said at page 289:-

“Where stills can be taken from which the persons can be identified by persons who are not at the scene, these may be

used to support evidence of identification. Such persons must indicate the opportunity which they have had to make such

identification, for example whether as a friend, workmate, acquaintance etc. They should also be permitted to indicate

any feature which in their mind identifies the person with the still taken from the video film.

Where a witness who was not at the scene gives evidence of identity based upon the video film is a police officer or some

other person in authority, the accused must be protected from obvious prejudice arising from the position of the person

giving evidence. In general such person would have gained his knowledge in the course of the execution of his duty as a

police officer or person in authority. Such evidence is admissible but clearly it should not be admitted where its

prejudicial effect would outweigh its probative value. In any given case the need to determine whether or nor such

evidence should be admitted will depend upon all the circumstances of the case. It is not appropriate that this Court seek

to lay down guidelines where the question does not come before us directly.”

In the present case the applicant also relies strongly on a decision of this court in The People (Director of Public

Prosecutions) v Allen [2003] 4 I.R. 295. In that case a still photograph was taken from a video showing the raider leaving

premises where an armed robbery had taken place and in the course of the judgment of this court I said at page 297:-

“There was also a security video running in the premises which apparently filmed the events of the raid, but,

as all the raiders were wearing balaclavas, the video itself was of little use in identifying them. However, a

still photograph was taken from the video which showed one of the raiders leaving the premises having taken

off the balaclava and the prosecution alleged that this identified the accused. This still photograph was shown

to the jury, but when the prosecution sought to call evidence from garda officers who could identify the

accused as been the person in the photograph, such evidence was objected to on behalf of the accused on the

basis that it could be extremely prejudicial, as influencing the jury to believe that the accused was, in the well

known phrase, known to the gardai and therefore, by inference, that he had a criminal record. Quite rightly in

the view of this court, such evidence was excluded by the trial judge…”

In the view of this court the law is quite clear based on the two cases cited, and also on the several English cases which

were considered by the court in D.P.P. v Maguire. Evidence from a video or a still photograph taken from a video is clearly

admissible evidence against an accused when used to prove his presence at the scene of a crime. However, as in other types

of admissible evidence, it may not be used against an accused if it would unfairly prejudice his right to a fair trial. This

involves in every case the balancing of the probative value of the evidence against the possible prejudice to the accused, an

exercise which can only be undertaken by examining the particular facts of each case. In D.P.P. v Allen, quite apart from

the fact that the passage relied on is obiter, the learned trial judge took the view that it would be unfairly prejudicial to the

accused to allow the Garda Officer concerned to give evidence. This he was perfectly entitled to do on consideration of the

evidence before him, and this court on the appeal considered that he had been correct in doing so. That does not mean that

such evidence should be excluded in every case.

In the present case, the learned trial judge was very careful in weighing up the conflicting elements of probative value and

prejudice. He made every effort to avoid unnecessary prejudice against the applicant. He quite rightly held that for two

members of the Gardai to give such evidence would be unnecessary prejudicial and he only allowed the evidence from the

member who actually lived in the town, and therefore, could present the least prejudicial basis for his identification and his

knowledge of the applicant. Furthermore, the prosecution, and indeed Garda O’Sullivan himself, were obviously conscious

of possible prejudice and were extremely circumspect in putting before the jury evidence of how Garda O’Sullivan knew the

applicant.

Despite this, there was, of course, a danger of prejudice to the applicant in that the jury might still consider that, as he was

known to a local Detective Garda, he may well have a criminal record. However, that prejudice must be weighed against the

probative value of Garda O’Sullivan’s evidence. Without such evidence it would probably have been impossible to launch a

prosecution against the applicant at all. In the view of the court the probative value clearly outweighed the prejudicial value,

taking into account the care that was taken by both the learned trial judge and the prosecution to minimise any prejudice

which there might have been. The court is quite satisfied that the evidence of Garda O’Sullivan was properly admitted.

The applicant has also brought a motion to adduce additional grounds of appeal relating to the learned trial judge’s charge to

the jury in relation to the problems with identification evidence. No requisition was raised at the end of the charge in relation

to these matters, nor were they referred to in the original notice of appeal. The notice of motion seeking to add these

grounds is dated 25th April 2006, less than two weeks before the hearing of this appeal. The court fully accepts that failure

to raise a requisition does not automatically prevent the court from considering a ground of appeal, but when this failure is

combined with a failure to include the point in the original notice of appeal, the court must look with disfavour on the

application to amend the grounds of appeal. If the court considers that the refusal of an amendment would result in a

miscarriage of justice, then, of course, the amendment must be allowed. In the present case if the learned trial judge had

given no warning whatever to the jury in relation to identification evidence, then clearly this court would have to consider

the matter. However, the learned trial judge told the jury he was making an issue of identification and in the view of the

court gave the jury a perfectly adequate general warning as to the dangers of relying on identification evidence.

The court feels that no injustice will be done to the applicant if leave to amend the grounds of appeal is refused, and, in the

light of the failure to requisition and the lateness of the application to amend the court refuses leave to amend the grounds of

appeal.

Accordingly the court refuses leave to appeal.