Supreme Court allows appeal where arrest under s.30 requires more than a superior's order.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe Supreme Court allowed the appeal for Anselm Walshe while dismissing the appeal for Kay Bedford. The court held that an arrest under s.30 of the Offences against the State Act, 1939, requires reasonable suspicion founded on something more than a mere order from a superior officer. The arresting Garda must possess an understanding of the underlying rationale or basis for the arrest to satisfy the statutory requirement.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IAs.30 of the Offences against the State Act, 1939; An arrest under this section must be founded on reasonable suspicion which requires an element beyond a bare order from a superior officer.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IATesto completo
THE SUPREME COURT
Murray C.J.
Geoghegan J.
Kearns J.
221 & 222/04
BETWEEN
ANSELM JOSEPH WALSHE AND KAY BEDFORD
PLAINTIFFS / RESPONDENTS
-v-
ANTHONY FENNESSY
FIRST NAMED DEFENDANT / APPELLANT
AND THOMAS A. SLOYAN, THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
SECOND, THIRD, FOURTH AND FIFTH NAMED
DEFENDANTS / APPELLANTS
The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice John L. Murray on the 28th day of July, 2005
1. I agree that the appeal against the order of the High Court in the case of Ms. Kay Bedford should be dismissed for the reasons set
out in the judgment of Kearns J. I also agree with Kearns J. and Geoghegan J. that the appeal in the case of Mr. Anselm Walshe
should be allowed.
2. With regard to the latter case I simply wish to add that I agree with Geoghegan J. that in the exercise of a power of arrest
pursuant to s. 30 of the Offences against the State Act, 1939, the suspicion which the arresting Garda member is required to have in
order to effect such an arrest must be founded on something more than a mere order of a superior to carry out that arrest. The fact
that such an order is given to a garda member by a superior officer is a fact that may be taken into account in determining whether
the arresting officer had grounds for a reasonable suspicion but there must be some other element than a bare order to carry out the
arrest. Such an element was present in this particular case as pointed out in the judgments of my colleagues. In order to form the
requisite suspicion required by s. 30 the arresting officer must have some understanding of the underlying rationale or basis for the
arrest. This is not an unduly onerous requirement, for example, the fact that a Garda member was informed by a superior officer that
there were reliable intelligence reports indicating that the person to be arrested may be involved in the commission of an offence to
which s. 30 relates could ground a reasonable suspicion for an arrest. Mr. Justice Geoghegan has given other examples of what such a
further element could comprise and I agree with him in that regard.