Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
IEHC 156 ECLI:IE:HC:2005:156 Generato dall'IA

Judicial review dismissed for failure to comply with statutory time limits and procedural requirements.

Numero d'incarto IEHC 156
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Irlanda (IE)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Respinto (Dismissed)

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The High Court refused leave to issue judicial review proceedings challenging two planning permission decisions made by the County Council of Donegal. The applicant argued the council breached natural justice by ignoring submissions and failing to notify him of decisions within the statutory period, while also claiming procedural errors regarding fee allocation. The court dismissed the application because it was not filed within the required time limits and no sufficient reasons were provided to extend the deadline, rendering the claims procedurally inadmissible.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

s. 50 of the Planning and Development Act 2000; s. 50(1) of the Planning and Development Act 2000; The court must refuse leave to issue judicial review proceedings if the application is not made within the statutory period and no good and sufficient reasons are shown to extend the time.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
judicial review leave planning permission statutory time limits procedural fairness extension of time opposizione tardiva termine di revisione opposizione

Disposizioni normative citate

Generato dall'IA
s. 50 of the Planning and Development Act 2000 (as amended)
provisions of s. 50 of the Planning and Development Act, 2000 (as amended).
Planning and Development Regulations, 2001
and of the statutory requirements of the Planning and Development Regulations, 2001.
Development Act, 2000
50 of the Planning and Development Act, 2000 (as amended).
Generato dall'IA

Ti chiedi come si applica questa sentenza alla tua fattispecie?

Analizza questa decisione insieme alla legislazione federale e cantonale, ai commentari e alla giurisprudenza successiva in Legislator AI.

Apri in Legislator →

Testo completo

Neutral Citation Number: [2005] IEHC 156

THE HIGH COURT

[Record No. 2004 1154 JR]

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 50 OF THE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT ACT 2000 (AS AMENDED)

BETWEEN

MAARTEN OPENNEER

APPLICANT

AND

THE COUNTY COUNCIL OF THE COUNTY OF DONEGAL

RESPONDENT

AND

JOHN SWEENEY AND SIOBHAN SWEENEY

NOTICE PARTIES

Judgment delivered by Mrs. Justice Macken on the 13th day of April, 2005

1. This is an application for judicial review in a planning matter and so it falls to be considered predominantly pursuant to the

provisions of s. 50 of the Planning and Development Act, 2000 (as amended).

2. The application concerns two separate developments, of two individual dwelling houses, in County Donegal, which were the subject

of planning application reference numbers 04/2511 and 04/2512, in respect of which decisions to grant permissions were made on 7th

May, 2004 and 11th May, 2004 respectively. From the material disclosed on affidavit, it seems clear that the notifications of the grant

of planning permission were issued on 25th and 29th June, 2004 respectively.

3. The applicant seeks, in essence, leave to issue judicial review proceedings in respect of these two decisions, seeking (a) certiorari

to quash them both, (b) declarations that the above numbered applications which led to the decisions were null and void, (c) an order

extending the time within which the proceedings can be brought, (d) a stay on the implementation of the purported planning

permission, or in the alternative, an injunction restraining the implementation of the permissions.

4. The grounds upon which the leave to issue the proceedings are firstly, the respondent failed to have regard to submissions lawfully

made by the applicant within the statutory period for so doing, and thereby breached the rules of natural and constitutional justice

and of the statutory requirements of the Planning and Development Regulations, 2001. Secondly, the respondent failed to accept the

submissions of the applicant, with the same consequences in law. Thirdly, the respondent failed, in the circumstances of the case, to

accept the submissions of the applicant for both or for one or other of the planning applications and failed to notify the applicant of

that decision until after the period for the lodging of submissions had expired. Fourthly, the respondent failed to advise the applicant

as to the fee applicable in relating to the lodging of the submissions, and accepted a lesser fee, without notification to him of the

error in so doing. Finally, on this aspect of the claim, the applicant pleads that the respondent failed to notify the applicant of its

decision to refuse to accept the applicant’s submission as soon as may be and in any event not until after the date of the decision,

and contrary to the provisions of Article 31 of the regulations of 2001, so that, in consequence, this frustrated the applicant’s in

exercising his statutory right of appeal.

5. In a second series of grounds, the applicant claims that the respondent accepted an application for planning permission which did

not comply with the statutory or regulatory requirements in that it granted permission for rural housing to persons not indigenous to

the rural community in question, and in breach of s. 25 and in material breach of the Donegal County Development Plan, 2000.

Further, it failed to inspect the sites for the appropriate site notices within the required period from the date of the applications for

planning permission. Further, the provisions of the Article 17 of the Regulations of 2001 were not complied with.

6. As I have mentioned, the applicant also sought an extension of time within which to commence the within proceedings on grounds

which I will consider in greater detail, as the Respondent pleads that the applicant should not be permitted to bring these

proceedings, in light of the delay which has occurred. The notice parties concur with the arguments of the respondent in that regard.

7. To understand the factual matrix in which the application for leave is sought, and also the issue of delay, I must set out in some

detail the chronology of events in respect of the applications and the decisions made.

8. Applications were made by each of the first and second named notice parties for permission to construct two separate houses with

appropriate ancillary works in County Donegal. The two applications bear the numbers already referred to. The applications were

lodged on 18th March, 2004 and received the date of 19th March, 2004 for the purposes of time running under the statute. With the

applications it would appear that there were furnished (a) the required newspaper notices, and (b) what purported to be the “site

notices”, both required to be provided pursuant to the statutory scheme on planning applications.

9. It appears to be the case, and this is not disputed, or at least not clearly disputed in the affidavit evidence filed, that neither of

the site notices was in fact in place on the site of the proposed dwelling houses prior to or at the time when the applications were

filed, although this is what is required. The applicant avers that the site notices were not affixed to the site until a date in the first

week in April. The first named notice party swore an affidavit in which he denied that the notice parties had not complied with the

statutory requirements. However, he did not say that the site notices were actually affixed to each of the sites, nor when they were

so affixed nor by whom, either on his own behalf nor on behalf of his sister the second named notice party. I am prepared to deal with

this case on the basis that the applicant’s evidence should, at least at this point in time, stand as evidence that the site notices

were not erected until sometime in or around the 4th April, and were not in place on the 18th or 19th March, 2004.

10. There were two previous applications lodged in respect of two houses at the same location, also in what might be called duplicate

applications, but these had been withdrawn. The applicant, together with several other named persons, wished to oppose the two

applications the subject matter of this application. The applicant and those others therefore decided to oppose them, and on 20th

April, 2004 lodged an objection in writing, which according to the affidavit evidence was delivered by hand at the respondent’s office

in Letterkenny. The subject matter of the objection was described in the title to the objection as: “planning applications no. 04/0511

and 04/0512 as lodged on 19th March, 2004 by John and Siobhan Sweeney respectively to erect dwellings in the National Heritage

Area Aghalattive-Ards”. This heading appeared in the covering letter to the objection and in the objection itself.

11. According to the affidavit of the applicant, and this is not disputed, the applicant tendered the sum of €20.00 which was

requested of him by the respondent’s administrative officer in its offices in Letterkenny, Co. Donegal in respect of which a receipt was

issued. The receipt, which was in court, does not refer to any particular planning application number.

12. Also, according to the affidavit evidence filed, this objection was transmitted forthwith to the Dungloe offices of the respondent,

which is where the applications were being dealt with. On that occasion it became immediately clear that the appropriate statutory or

regulatory fee in respect of submissions to planning applications had not been paid, in that only €20.00 had been paid. There were

however two distinct applications although the submissions to both were joined in one written submission. The affidavit evidence of

Mr. Eunan Quinn on behalf of the respondent is that, on receipt of this material and on his discovering that the payment made was

not in accordance with the regulatory fee, he endeavoured to contact the applicant at the telephone number indicated in the papers

filed by him, but was unsuccessful in so doing.

13. The fee was not thereafter applied by the respondent either to one or other application, but shortly thereafter was returned

together with the submissions filed, to the applicant, the respondent indicating that the submissions could not be considered as they

did not comply with the requirements of the statutory scheme, not being accompanied by the appropriate fee.

14. The correspondence between the applicant and the respondent commenced in or around 20th April, 2004 and continued back and

forth until late November, 2004. The proceedings were then commenced on 13th December and were served on 20th December, 2004.

15. I have set out in some detail the foregoing chronology of events, because the first argument of the respondent is that the

proceedings were not commenced promptly as is required by law, nor within the time limits imposed by the statutory scheme which

the respondent submitted is to be very strictly complied with, that being the intention of the Oireachtas as found in the Local

Government (Planning and Development) Act, 2000. This ground was raised, in effect, as a preliminary ground, and before considering

the merits of the applicant’s case, which the respondent also contests. The notice parties supported the respondent’s claim that the

proceedings were not commenced promptly and therefore on the grounds of delay and failure to comply with the statutory time limits,

should not be entertained. As against that, the applicant seeks an extension of time within which to bring these proceedings, and

pleads that in the particular and peculiar circumstances of this case, especially having regard to the manner in which the respondent

dealt with the issues, such an extension of time ought to be granted, because there are good and sufficient grounds for doing so.

16. It seems to me that it is essential to deal with this aspect of the matter first. The case made on behalf of the applicant is that he

lawfully filed submissions to the applications for planning permission, and that he paid the amount of the fee which was sought by the

respondent’s administrative officer, who is well aware of such matters and received the appropriate receipt in respect of the same. It

was argued by Mr. Kilty, S.C. on his behalf that, having made submissions, the failure to accept them was due to the respondent’s

failure to state the correct fee, the respondent’s failure to apply the fee actually paid at least in respect of one of the planning

applications, and to its failure to notify the applicant when it was discovered by the respondent that it had made an error in charging

only €20.00 instead of double that figure, when time still existed for the error to be rectified. In support of this last aspect of the

matter, the applicant claimed that the submissions were delivered on 20th April, 2004 and since the closing date for receipt of those

would have been 23rd April, 2004 there were three days in which to notify him of the incorrect fee charged, and for him to remedy

the matter.

17. The respondent raises several legal issues in respect of questions of delay and on the claim by the applicant to be entitled to an

extension of time. Firstly, Mr. Flanagan, S.C., submitted that it is necessary to distinguish between what is being sought in these

proceedings and what might have been sought by the applicant on discovering that an incorrect fee had been paid.

18. First he submitted that the applicant in fact paid the incorrect fee. He submitted that it is not for the respondent to suggest or to

indicate the correct fee, as this is clearly established as part of the statutory scheme in question, and this is made especially clear in

the site notices which the applicant accepts were erected, even if he alleges they were not erected in good time. Each of the

notices, he submitted, stated specifically the precise charge which must be made in respect of each of the applications for planning

permission in the event of a person wishing to file submissions, namely €20 in respect of each such application.

19. Moreover, on the facts of the case, Mr. Eunan Quinn Area Manager in the Planning and Economic Development department of the

respondent, averred, in his affidavit sworn on 9th February, 2005, to having sought to contact the applicant when the error came to

his attention, but was unable to do so when he tried by the telephone number given. This attempt by the respondent’s Mr. Quinn was

not obligatory, but was a genuine attempt to notify the applicant that he had failed to comply with the appropriate regulations.

Moreover, counsel argued that the respondent could not and had no power to allocate the fee actually paid to one planning

application or another.

20. But further, if the applicant had considered that the respondent was not entitled to reject the submissions filed, because of the

alleged underpayment of the appropriate fee, he was notified of this step by letter dated 30th April, 2004, less than ten days after

the date of lodgement and well prior to any decision being taken by the respondent on the applications for planning permission, and

therefore would have been entitled to seek leave to issue judicial review proceedings in respect of that complaint in good time to

resolve the matter. Not having done so, he cannot now base his judicial review proceedings, in which he seeks relief against the

decisions actually made, on those planning application matters, in view of the inordinate delay.

21. Secondly, counsel argued, the applicant averred in his affidavit that he understood at all time from the correspondence

exchanged between him and the respondent, that the planning applications remained open and under active consideration and that it

was not until late in November, 2004 when a lengthy letter was written to him by the respondent replying to a range of queries raised

by him that it became clear final decisions had actually been made on the two applications.

22. The Respondent counters these averments by pointing to exchanges in the correspondence between the parties from which the

respondent says it is clear that the applicant well knew, even at an early stage in the process, that decisions had been made and

that the decision had become final, but that notwithstanding this, no steps were taken by the applicant to bring these proceedings

until the month of December 2004. In particular counsel for the respondent relied on a letter to it from the applicant dated 31 May,

2004 in which the applicant stated: “According to information from the Service Centre in Dungloe planning permissions on the

mentioned applications were granted on 7th May, we even feel more embarrassed by the fact that the area manager, while

interpreting the law to the point of injustice on our submission, had no problems to grant planning permission.” The respondent also

submitted that the applicant well knew that permissions had been granted when he wrote on 5th July, 2004 in a letter from him to the

respondent in which he stated, inter alia, “… the misleading information and lies … should be enough reason to reject the applications

… and to retract the granted permissions on the applications 04/2511 and 04/2512. The reference to the “applications” was to two

other number applications not the subject of these proceedings.

23. Finally, on this aspect of the matter, the respondent submitted it was clear from the correspondence and/or from the submissions

filed that the applicant had access to legal advice throughout the process, and had on several occasions threatened to bring legal

proceedings or to invoke legal measures to compel the respondent to comply with its alleged obligations.

24. In the foregoing circumstances, the respondent has argued that the applicant had no good grounds for delaying in bringing

proceedings until the month of December, 2004. Since the decisions granting planning permission pursuant to the applications were

made on 7th May and on 11th May respectively, the statutory time limit for challenging these expired eight weeks later on 1st and

5th July, 2004. The respondent further argued that the eight week time limit imposed is to be strictly construed, in particular since a

late challenge may have significant adverse effects on third parties. Quite apart from the statutory time limit, the respondent also

argued that the applicant has presented no material facts upon which the court ought to permit an extension of time pursuant to s.

50(4)(a)(iii) of the Act of 2000. Finally, on the general obligation imposed on an applicant in judicial review proceedings, Mr. Flanagan

invoked the decisions of the Supreme Court in State (Cussen) v. Brennan [1981] I.R. 181 and De Roiste v. Minister for Defence &

Others [2001] 1 I.R. 190, as well Slatterys Ltd v. Commissioner of Valuation and Others [2001] 4 I.R. 91, in support of his contention

that an applicant must, in any event, move promptly for the type of relief sought here.

25. The notice party joined with the respondent in its argument on the question of delay, both as to the absence of any proceedings

by the applicant for the alleged failure of the respondent to accept the submissions filed or to apply the fee paid to one or other

application and also as to the alleged lengthy delay in bringing the within proceedings and the lack of entitlement to any extension of

time. Miss Collard, B.L., on behalf of the Notice Parties argued further that in the present case there was good reason for not

permitting any extension, because she submitted, the notice parties had entered into contracts for the purchase of the lands the

subject matter of the planning applications on condition that such planning permission would be forthcoming, and had closed the

contracts for the sale of the lands in question on that basis. In the circumstances the notice parties would suffer substantial losses

if, at this remove, an extension of time were granted to the applicant to commence judicial review proceedings.

26. In response the applicant submitted that there was nothing in any of the special conditions attaching to the contracts for sale

invoked by the notice parties, concerning planning permission in their favour. Further, he argued that in the present case the

applicant was entitled to have the benefit of the statutory entitlement to make submissions and that it was incumbent on the

respondent, where an error had been caused by their administrative officer, to ensure that that statutory right was protected.

Conclusions

27. It is clear that when the above referred to submissions filed by the applicant objecting to the planning applications the subject of

the motion, were not accepted but rather were returned by the respondent, the applicant was entitled to seek to issue judicial review

proceedings in respect of the same, and might have been in a position to do so possibly even prior to the dates in May, 2004 when

the decisions were made. So also would the applicant have been in a position to challenge the decisions themselves prior to the

statutory expiry date in July, but did not do so. The question which now arises therefore is whether, in light of the events occurring in

the present case, the applicant should have an order extending the time for bringing these proceedings which commenced by notice

of motion filed on the 10th December, 2004, some five months after the expiry of the statutory eight week period.

28. The applicant can undoubtedly seek and secure an extension of time if he can persuade the Court that there are “good and

sufficient reasons for doing so”. This will always depend on the particular circumstances of each case. In the present case, it is

understandable that the applicant was very concerned that his submissions, as filed, and in respect of which he paid a fee, were not

accepted. As I have mentioned, when these were returned, the applicant was entitled to seek leave to issue judicial review

proceedings challenging this, as well as the failure of the respondent to allocate the fee actually paid to one or other planning

application, although I refer to the merits of such a claim, in so far as they may be relevant to my decision in this particular case,

below.

29. And, as I have indicated, even if he did not actually commence such proceedings for relief in respect of that discrete issue of the

fee payment, he could have sought leave to issue judicial review proceedings within the statutory eight week period provided for

under the Planning and Development Act, 2000, and included in such application a ground based on the payment of the fee and the

alleged failure of the respondent to allocate the fee to one or other application.

30. To the extent therefore that the respondent argued that the applicant if he had a complaint about the fee, should have

commenced legal proceedings in respect of that issue, the fact that he did not do so would not preclude him, for that reason alone,

from seeking leave to issue such proceedings in which that too was a ground within the statutory period provided for under the Act of

2000, so long as he could be considered, in respect of that issue, to have moved promptly in any event.

31. However, in so far as the present application is concerned the applicant did not in fact, file his application for leave within the

statutory period. Mr. Flanagan argued that this is a very strict time limit, which, save for exceptional circumstances, operates as a

type of guillotine. While I accept that it does so operate, the wording of s. 50 requires only that there be “good and sufficient”

reasons, not necessarily exceptional circumstances, to permit an extension of time.

32. As to the reasons put forward by the applicant in this application, I do not find that any good or sufficient reasons have been

adduced. It is a well established principle of law that any application for judicial review must be sought promptly. That has been

interpreted in the jurisprudence as imposing a high obligation to move, not merely within the time scale provided for by Order 84 of

the Rules of the Superior Courts, but to move at all events promptly, as is clear from the decision of Fennelly J. in the judgment of

the Supreme Court in Dekra Eireann Teo v. Minister for the Environment, unreported, 4th April, 2004, and of the High Court in the

judgment of Finlay Geoghegan, J. in Connolly v. The Director of Public Prosecutions, unreported, 15th May, 2003. The situation is

even more certain in the case of planning, which is the subject of a statutory scheme intended to impose and actually imposing strict

time limits, including those more strict than in judicial review in general, and also more strict than previously existed under earlier

versions of the Act of 2000. It is very understandable why such time limits are imposed by the legislation. Planning matters are of

their very nature, when they include a right in third parties to make submissions, such as in the planning regime, such that those

securing permission may wish to rely on the rights granted, as soon as possible after the expiry of a statutory period within which a

challenge might have been made but was not, in the certain belief that the right “final”. It is one of the very reason why the

challenge must be made within the time limit provided for, as otherwise the party with the right vesting in him arising from the

permission granted might be in limbo for an inordinate period of time, and the permission would lack legal certainty.

33. On the facts in the present case, I find that the applicant knew at a very early stage in the planning process that his submissions

had been treated as invalid, due to the fee issue, and could have moved promptly to challenge the same but did not do so. Further, I

am satisfied from the applicant’s own correspondence that he also knew at a very early stage in the same process that a decision

had been made on 7th May, 2004 even though he may not have known at that time that a decision on the second of the planning

applications had been made on 11th May. It would seem clear from the availability of information, as evidenced in the exchanges

between the parties, however, that that too could have been ascertained without any great difficulty.

34. Moreover, on the correspondence from the applicant himself, and as correctly contended for by the respondent, the applicant

also knew in the month of July, 2004 that the planning permissions decisions had become final, and had requested that they be

retracted by the respondent.

35. It is therefore clear, on the facts, that the applicant was well aware, and for many months, that decisions had been made and

that permissions had been granted, yet did not commence proceedings until December, 2004. Even taking the month of July as the

cut off point in terms of knowledge of the decision, the applicant did not move for another five months.

36. The applicant argues however that this failure to move sooner should not be held against him, because although he had some

knowledge about the events, he did not know definitively until the receipt by him of a letter from the respondent in late November,

2004 that the position on the permissions was final.

37. I am not satisfied that this is a correct reflection of the true position, and I find as a matter of fact that the applicant was

sufficiently aware both of the true facts and also of the legal consequences arising from those facts at a date well in advance of the

date upon which he commenced the proceedings. It is true that there was a significant volume of correspondence exchanged

between the applicant and the respondent, but much of this was directed towards the applicant’s view of the manner in which the

respondent was dealing with or had dealt with his complaints, including of course the complaints the subject of these proceedings.

38. Although I find that the applicant did not, in the above circumstances, move promptly as required, I must also consider whether,

despite this, there are good and sufficient grounds so as to permit the application to proceed. I am satisfied that there are not. It is

true that on the applicant’s case, if I take it at its highest, a statutory site notice was not in place from the date on which it should

have been. That statutory notice is intended to permit members of the public to exercise their rights within the permitted time limits

to make submissions in respect of a planning application. In the present case, while not in any way condoning the fact, on the

assumption it could have been established, that the site notice was not in place as required, nevertheless on the applicant’s own

evidence it was in place from in or round the 4th April, 2004, he knew this, and it was erected well within the time during which he

would be entitled to and had ample time to lodge submissions. To that extent therefore the applicant was not deprived, by the

absence of a notice, of his right to make submissions.

39. Further, the applicant argued that because the €20 fee was not allocated to one or other application, but rather was returned, he

was wrongly deprived of his right to make submissions. Leaving aside altogether the fact that he would have been entitled to seek

leave to issue judicial review proceedings in respect of this complaint, and assuming this could still form part of the within judicial

review proceedings, if commenced within the appropriate statutory period and promptly, nevertheless on the merits of such a claim,

the applicant is not entitled to lay the blame on the respondent for the error made. The regulatory scheme in relation to planning

provides for the payment of a fee in respect of any submissions to a planning application. It is perfectly obvious, even from the

applicant’s own submissions and from his affidavits, that two such applications were involved. The site notices, both of them, gave a

clear indication of the charge to be paid in respect of any objection being lodged to either of them. The distinguishing feature of this

case is that the applicant himself chose to combine the submissions in respect of both planning applications in one document. But

that was his choice and it does not take from the fact that there were two submissions to two different applications. In the

circumstances, it was for the applicant to ensure that the statutory or regulatory requirements, duly notified to him by means of the

site notices, were complied with. While the respondent made an attempt to bring the deficiency in fees to the attention of the

applicant, this did not exonerate the applicant from the obligation to ensure that the appropriate fee was made.

40. Nor do I accept that it would have been possible for the respondent, even if it attempted to bring the matter to the applicant’s

notice, could have done so within a period of time which would have permitted the applicant to remedy matters, since in the absence

of successful telephone contact, as here, the only other appropriate means would have been by post, and that might not have led,

on any reasonable assessment of the time scale involved, to the applicant being in a position to pay the appropriate sums in respect

of two applications in time. In acknowledging that the respondent did attempt to contact the applicant by telephone, I am not to be

taken to accept the applicant’s contention that there was any legal obligation on it to do so.

41. It is not necessary for me to deal with the merits of the other elements of the applicant’s claim. The application for leave to

challenge the decisions of the respondent was not made within the statutory period provided for. Nor was it made promptly. And

there are no factors which fall within the ambit of “good and sufficient” reasons upon which the court should exercise its entitlement

to extend the time for the making of the application. In the circumstances, I refuse the leave sought.