Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
IECCA 70 ECLI:IE:CCA:2005:70 Generato dall'IA

Court quashes unsafe conviction where prosecution improperly delisted a listed witness without good reason.

Numero d'incarto IECCA 70
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Irlanda (IE)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Accolto (Allowed)

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The Court of Criminal Appeal granted leave to appeal and quashed the applicant's conviction, holding the trial judge erred in law by allowing the prosecution to remove a listed witness from evidence without valid justification. The applicant argued the procedure was unfair because the witness was previously listed as a prosecution witness, yet the court noted the witness was later vigorously cross-examined as a defence witness. Although the conviction was unsafe, the court declined to order a retrial due to the applicant's time already served and the blurred nature of the proceedings.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

s. 3 of the Non Fatal Offences Against the Person Act, 1997; The trial judge erred in law by permitting the prosecution to refrain from calling or tendering a witness included in the book of evidence without good reasons, rendering the conviction unsafe and unsound.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
unsafe conviction book of evidence prosecution witness delisting witness non fatal offences quashing conviction no retrial ordered esclusione del testimone

Disposizioni normative citate

Generato dall'IA
s. 3 of the Non Fatal Offences Against the Person Act, 1997
The applicant was charged with the offence of assault causing harm, contrary to s.3 of the Non Fatal Offences
Person Act, 1997
Against the Person Act, 1997.
Generato dall'IA

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Testo completo

THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL

APPEAL NO. 13 /2005

DENHAM J.

HERBERT J.

GILLIGAN J.

THE PEOPLE AT THE SUIT OF

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

PROSECUTOR

And

MARK LACY

APPLICANT

Judgment of the Court delivered on 12th day of May, 2005 by Denham J.

1. Mark Lacy, the applicant, has brought an application seeking leave to appeal against conviction and sentence. The

applicant was convicted on the 28th January, 2005, by the Dublin Circuit (Criminal) Court, and sentenced on 4th

February, 2005, to three years imprisonment, with the last twelve months suspended.

2. The applicant was charged with the offence of assault causing harm, contrary to s.3 of the Non Fatal Offences

Against the Person Act, 1997. The particulars were that the applicant on the 5th January, 2003, at Maynooth Road,

Leixlip, in the County of Kildare, assaulted John Tansey, causing him harm.

3. The applicant filed grounds of appeal as follows:

(a) The learned trial judge erred in law in allowing the prosecution to remove a witness from the book of evidence

without either calling or tendering him, thereby forcing that witness to be called as a defence witness.

(b) The learned trial judge erred in law in not withdrawing the case from the jury on the grounds that the prosecution

had failed to satisfy the standard of proof.

(c) The verdict of the jury went against the weight of the evidence.

(d) In all the circumstances the conviction is unsafe and unsound.

However, before the court the grounds were confined to a single issue. The applicant submitted that the learned trial

judge erred in law in all the circumstances in permitting the prosecution to remove a witness from the book of evidence

without either calling or tendering him, thereby forcing the witness to be called as a defence witness, and that as a

consequence the conviction was unsafe.

4. The background to this case is that the applicant was originally tried in the Dublin Circuit (Criminal) Court, and the

jury was unable to agree. The Director of Public Prosecutions directed that he be retried. New counsel for the Director

and new counsel for the applicant were appointed, and the matter came on for trial before a different judge. The

applicant was found guilty and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three years, with the last 12 months

suspended.

5. The trial court refused leave to appeal but legal aid was granted in the event of an appeal.

6. The applicant sought bail from this Court which was refused, but he was given priority in the list. In light of the

circumstances this judgment is also being delivered with urgency.

7. The factual background to the case was set out in the submissions for the applicant and I draw on that information.

The facts were not in dispute. The case against the applicant was set out in the book of evidence. He was alleged to

have assaulted John Tansey on the 5th January, 2003, by giving him a head-butt from which John Tansey received an

injury requiring five sutures. The book of evidence contained:

(i) A statement of John Tansey

(ii) Statements from a number of alleged eye witnesses who supported the account of the incident given by the alleged

injured party and, who were friends of his.

(iii) Statements of members of an Garda Síochána who investigated but who did not actually witness the assault.

(iv) A statement of Darragh O’Regan which directly contradicted the account offered by the alleged injured party, but

which was consistent with the statement of the applicant.

(v) A statement from a doctor setting out details of the medical treatment given to John Tansey.

(vi) A voluntary statement made by the applicant.

8. In the applicant’s statement to the Garda Síochána he admitted being in a fight with John Tansey but he maintained

that John Tansy head-butted him and was the aggressor. This version of events was supported by the statement of

Darragh O’Regan.

9. In essence this was a prosecution arising out of somewhat confused events. There was an altercation outside a night

club in the early hours of the 5th January, 2003. The State alleged in the prosecution that some time after 2.00 a.m.

John Tansey left the night club with a number of friends, went out and crossed the road. He later came back with

another friend to look for or to wait for more friends. He was approached by a person named Jenny Taaffe and some

words were exchanged. At that stage a man approached him and head-butted him for no reason. There was no

provocation and there was no threat. He ran away but slipped and fell to the ground. This man continued to attack him

on the ground.

The applicant, on the other hand, had a different version of the events. He gave evidence of an altercation outside the

night club, “a bit of mouthing back and forward”, between John Tansey and himself, and the two of them going head

to head. He said that John Tansey head-butted him.

This event occurred in the early morning, outside a night club, where young people were gathered, after consuming

alcohol, and an altercation occurred. This is a difficult type of situation both to investigate and to assess. The evidence

presented by the prosecution was in effect that of John Tansey and his friends.

10. The issue on this appeal revolves around the evidence of Darragh O’Regan. At the initial trial the jury were unable

to agree. At that trial Darragh O’Regan was called as a prosecution witness.

11. On the retrial the prosecution called witnesses and John Tansey. They told the same story as in their statements.

Each maintained that John Tansy had not been the aggressor and those who claimed they saw the incident said that

John Tansey had received the head-butt not given it. A medical consultant was called by the State who reviewed the

medical notes relating to John Tansey. On cross examination he agreed that the injury could have been caused by

someone giving a head-butt as well as someone receiving a head-butt, and that there was no way to tell from the injury

how exactly it had been caused.

12. Counsel for the prosecution, in the absence of the jury, asked the learned trial judge to grant him liberty from

having to call or tender one of the witnesses in the book of evidence, Darragh O’Regan.

13. Counsel for the Director of Public Prosecution noted that Darragh O’Regan’s statement was “on all fours with the

statement of the” applicant. While accepting that it was standard procedure to call all the witnesses in the book of

evidence it was maintained that Darragh O’Regan’s evidence was unreliable, as his name had been provided to an

Garda Síochána by the applicant as a potential witness. He also claimed that the prosecution would be subject to

criticism by calling inconsistent evidence within its own case. This application was opposed by counsel for the

applicant.

14. The learned trial judge acceded to the prosecution request that they should not call Darragh O’Regan to give

evidence, but that he should be available to the defence as a witness if the defence wished to use him.

15. At the core of the issue is whether the discretion of the Director of Public Prosecutions / counsel for the

prosecution is fettered once a statement of a witness appears in a book of evidence. Or, to put it another way, if once

a statement of a witness is put in the book of evidence must the Director and the prosecuting counsel call that witness?

16. The Court is satisfied that a discretion whether or not to call a witness does remain after a book of evidence is

compiled. Firstly, the Director of Public Prosecutions retains his discretion as to the prosecution of the offence,

including the calling of the witnesses. Secondly, prosecuting counsel retain a discretion as to how a prosecution will

proceed, including as to the calling of witnesses. This discretion must be exercised fairly and in the interests of justice.

These principles have been stated in Joseph Francis Oliva (1965) 49 Crim. App. R. 298 at p. 309 where Parker LCJ

stated:

“Accordingly, as it seems to this court, the principles are plain. The prosecution must

of course have in court the witnesses whose names are on the back of the indictment,

but there is a wide discretion in the prosecution whether they should call them either

calling and examining them, or calling and tendering them for cross-examination. The

prosecution do not, of course, put forward every witness as a witness of truth, but

where the witness’s evidence is capable of belief, then it is their duty, well

recognised, that he should be called, even through the evidence that he is going to

give is inconsistent with the case sought to be proved. Their discretion must be

exercised in a manner which is calculated to further the interest of justice, and at the

same time be fair to the defence. If the prosecution appear to be exercising that

discretion improperly, it is open to the judge of trial to interfere and in his discretion

in turn to invite the prosecution to call a particular witness, and, if they refuse, there

is the ultimate sanction in the judge himself calling the witness.”

The placing of names of the witnesses on the back of an indictment in that jurisdiction is similar to entering the names

of witnesses in the book of evidence in this jurisdiction. The Court adopts and applies the principles enunciated by

Parker LCJ, with the added consideration of the constitutional concept of due process. At the root of every criminal

trial in this jurisdiction is the constitutional guarantee of justice and fair procedures.

The trial judge has a discretion to intervene in the exercise of this discretion by the Director and prosecuting counsel as

to the calling of witnesses where the requirements of a fair and just trial require such an intervention. An illustration of

an occasion where a court would intervene and refuse to agree to a decision not to call a witness would be where the

discretion was being exercised for an “oblique motive” as referred to in Adel Muhammad el Dabbah v. Attorney

General for Palestine [1994] 2 ALL ER 139 and R. v. Russell Jones [1995] 3 ALL ER 239. It is this ground that the

applicant has raised for consideration by the court.

This court accepts that there is a general practice that all witnesses in a book of evidence will be called, but that there

remains a discretion with the Director of Public Prosecution and prosecuting counsel. This discretion is subject to

review by the trial judge.

Mr. Comyn, S.C., counsel for the Director of Public Prosecutions, on the hearing of this application, very fairly

outlined to the court that there were two reasons for the application not to call or tender Darragh O’Regan in evidence.

These two reasons appear on the transcript and this Court must decide the appeal by reference to the facts on the

transcript. The application by counsel for the Director of Public Prosecution was grounded on the basis that the

witness Darragh O’Regan was unreliable. This was based on (a) the fact that his name had been provided to the

members of the Garda Síochána by the applicant some days after the event, and, (b) that his evidence was different

from, and gave an account of the events contrary to, that of the other prosecution witnesses, although it was consistent

with that of the applicant. It was submitted that counsel would be subject to criticism for having called inconsistent

evidence within its own case.

On the issue of consistency it is important to note that the evidence of Darragh O’Regan in the first trial, and at all

times, was consistent with his statement, and indeed that of the applicant. The only inconsistency in the case was

between the evidence of John Tansey and other prosecution witnesses and that of the applicant, Darragh O’Regan,

and some other witnesses called on behalf of the defence.

This Court would distinguish the instant case from The People (D.P.P.) v Casey and Anor (Unreported C.C.A. 14th

day of December, 2004) where the facts were entirely different. In that case there had been extraordinary

inconsistency in the statements and actions of a witness. In Casey there were circumstances enabling the exercise of a

discretion not to call a witness. In Casey the witness was arrested and questioned and made a number of statements

indicating his involvement in the events of the night. He subsequently swore an affidavit exculpating one applicant.

Then he made a statement informing the Garda Síochána that he had sworn the affidavit under intimidation. After

reviewing the facts the Court held that the witness’s account of the events was self-contradictory. The prosecution

stated that they regarded him as wholly unreliable witness. The Court held:

“On the material which is before the Court this is a tenable assessment of the position”.

The position in this case is entirely different. Darragh O’Regan swore a statement. He has not sought to vary or

deviate in any way from that statement. He gave evidence in accordance with that statement in the first trial. He has

never resiled or attempted to resiled from his statement. There was no reason to believe that he would not give the

same evidence at a later trial. Further, he was not a participant in the events in issue. He was a witness, one of many,

who claimed to have seen what happened.

The witness’s statement is internally consistent. It is also consistent with the evidence of the applicant. There does not

appear to be any manifest fact pointing to its unreliability.

The Court is satisfied that the fact that Darragh O’Regan came to the notice of the investigating Garda Síochána

through the applicant is not a valid ground from which to state that he is unreliable as a witness. Neither is the fact, in

all the circumstances, that his evidence is inconsistent with that of other State witnesses. Thus the two bases submitted

on behalf of the prosecution for stating that the witness was unreliable are not good grounds.

This case must be decided on its own circumstances. The circumstances relate to an offence arising in a situation

which raises significant difficulties for members of an Garda Síochána, prosecuting authorities and courts. The

circumstances include young people, outside a night club, in the early hours of the morning, when an altercation arises.

A different version of the events is given by different groups of friends. That is not to say that anyone is lying or

committing perjury, but simply that given the circumstances events may be somewhat blurred.

In such circumstances, in the judgment of this Court, the decision to delist the witness was unfair. While the defence

undoubtedly had the opportunity to call the witness, and did infact do so, the proceedings had shifted. The witness was

not presented as a prosecution witness, and may have been perceived differently by the jury as a defence witness,

particularly when he was subjected to a vigorous cross examination by counsel for the State, whereas in the first trial

he had been a prosecution witness and had been cross examined on behalf of the applicant.

The fact that there had been an earlier trial when Darragh O’Regan was called as a prosecution witness is a factor to

be considered, as is the fact that the jury in the earlier trial disagreed. A further relevant factor is that the same solicitor

acted in the first trial and the second trial for the State. While counsel were different it was the same State solicitor in

the case when the witness was delisted and vigorously cross-examined. It is the view of the court that this procedure

was unfair to the applicant. Also of relevance is the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the offence. All of

these factors are relevant to the exercise of the discretion by the Director of Public Prosecution, prosecuting counsel,

and the trial judge.

In this case the witness Darragh O’Regan was listed in the book of evidence. Consequently, in the view of this Court,

his position is different to that of a person not so listed and where statements have been furnished to the defence.

While all of this information was then available to the defence, by naming him in the book of evidence a situation is

created where it is expected that he will to be called by the prosecution. Good reasons may arise in the course of a trial

which result in witnesses being tendered rather than called in evidence. However, if a witness included in the book of

evidence is not called or tendered then there should be good reasons why such a course is adopted.

It is not necessary to review at length the well established principles governing the position, obligations, and level of

discretion afforded to the counsel for the prosecution, referred to by counsel for the Director of Public Prosecutions.

Each case falls to be decided on its own facts. This Court is satisfied that the two reasons give to delist the witness

Darragh O’Regan are not good reasons to support a just and proper order in the particular circumstances of this case.

The learned trial judge therefore erred in law in allowing the prosecution to refrain from calling him or tendering him in

evidence.

Consequently the Court will grant the applicant leave to appeal, deem the hearing of the application to be the hearing

of the appeal, allow the appeal, and hold that the conviction is unsafe and unsound, and quash the conviction.

The Court has considered the issue of a retrial. In all the circumstances of this case, and having regard in particular to

the fact that the applicant has been serving a sentence since 4th February, 2005, and that he was remanded in custody

for a week prior to that sentencing date, the Court is not disposed to order a retrial.