Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
1 StR 334/24 ECLI:DE:BGH:2024:300924B1STR334.24.0 Generato dall'IA

Admissibility of procedural objection regarding two-week sentencing deadline when last word defense not yet granted

Numero d'incarto 1 StR 334/24
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Germania (DE)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Respinto (Dismissed)
Spese processuali a carico del ricorrente / reclamante

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The Federal Court of Justice dismissed the defendant's appeal as unfounded, upholding the lower court's conviction and ordering the defendant to bear the costs of the legal remedy and the necessary expenses of the civil claimant. The case concerned a procedural objection where the defendant challenged the trial court's observance of statutory time limits for sentencing deliberations, specifically arguing that the closing of the hearing had occurred prematurely. The Court ruled the procedural objection inadmissible because the defendant failed to fully disclose the content of the penultimate hearing day, which would have demonstrated that the last word of defense had not yet been granted; consequently, the proceedings were not legally closed under Section 268(3) sentence 1 StPO, rendering the two-week deadline inapplicable and the three-week deadline under Section 229(1) StPO applicable.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

§ 349 Abs. 2 StPO; Admissibility of procedural objection regarding two-week sentencing deadline when last word defense not yet granted: The case concerned a procedural objection where the defendant challenged the trial court's observance of statutory time limits for sentencing deliberations, specifically arguing that the closing of the hearing had occurred prematurely. The Court ruled the procedural objection inadmissible because the defendant failed to fully disclose the content of the penultimate hearing day, which would have demonstrated that the last word of defense had not yet been granted; consequently, the proceedings were not legally closed under Section 268(3) sentence 1 StPO, rendering the two-week deadline inapplicable and the three-week deadline under Section 229(1) StPO applicable.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
termine processuale perentorio censure procedurali commisurazione della pena limiti legali impugnabilità della decisione di rinvio preclusione per tardività

Disposizioni normative citate

Generato dall'IA
Generato dall'IA

Questioni giuridiche chiave estratte da Legislator

Generato dall'IA
§ 349 Abs. 2 StPO

Basis for dismissing the appeal as unfounded.

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Testo completo

Gewährung des letzten Wortes für Angeklagten vor Schließung der Verhandlung

[TENOR]

Die Revision des Angeklagten gegen das Urteil des Landgerichts Heilbronn vom 8. Dezember 2023 wird als unbegründet verworfen (§ 349 Abs. 2 StPO).

Der Angeklagte hat die Kosten seines Rechtsmittels und die hierdurch der Adhäsionsklägerin entstandenen notwendigen Auslagen sowie die besonderen Kosten des Adhäsionsverfahrens zu tragen.

Zur Verfahrensrüge des Angeklagten, mit welcher er das Überschreiten der Zweiwochenfrist des § 268 Abs. 3 Satz 2 StPO beanstandet, ist ergänzend auszuführen:

Die Verfahrensrüge ist bereits deswegen unzulässig (§ 344 Abs. 2 Satz 2 StPO), weil der Angeklagte den Inhalt des vorletzten Verhandlungstages (17. November 2023) nicht vollständig mitteilt. Daraus hätte sich ergeben, dass der Vorsitzende dem Angeklagten am 17. November 2023 noch nicht das letzte Wort (§ 258 Abs. 2 zweiter Halbsatz, Abs. 3 StPO) gewährt hatte. Solange war die Verhandlung aber noch nicht im Sinne des § 268 Abs. 3 Satz 1 StPO geschlossen (vgl. BGH, Beschlüsse vom 14. Mai 2014 – 3 StR 130/14 Rn. 2 f.; vom 12. März 2014 – 1 StR 605/13 Rn. 6 und vom 20. Juni 2007 – 1 StR 58/07 Rn. 2 f.; Urteile vom 30. Mai 2007 – 2 StR 22/07, BGHR StPO § 268 Abs. 3 Verkündung 5 Rn. 3 und vom 12. November 1986 – 3 StR 260/86 Rn. 13); damit galt die Dreiwochenfrist des § 229 Abs. 1 StPO.

Jäger Bär Leplow

Allgayer Munk