Court annuls dismissal of unestablished public officer for failing to follow disciplinary procedure and deny hearing.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe Supreme Constitutional Court annulled the dismissal of a female clerical assistant employed on an unestablished month-to-month basis. Although the Public Service Commission terminated her services citing inefficiency and misconduct, the court found the procedure flawed because the applicant was denied an opportunity to be heard. The court ruled that despite her unestablished status, the termination involved disciplinary elements requiring proper procedural safeguards, which were not afforded to the applicant.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IAArt. 122; Art. 29: Employment in public service on an unestablished month-to-month basis falls within the definition of public law, and disciplinary termination requires adherence to appropriate procedures including the right to be heard.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IAGiurisprudenza citata
Generato dall'IADecisioni correlate
Generato dall'IATesto completo
[*100] 1963 February
(FORSTHOFF, P., TRIANTAFYLLIDES and MUNIR, JJ.)
(April 7, May 22, October 22, 1962, February 1, 1963)
MARO N. PANTELIDOU,
AND
THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, THROUGH THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, AN INDEPENDENT ORGAN OF THE REPUBLIC.
(Case No. 49/62)
Public officers — Unestablished, on a month-to-month basis — Dismissal of, within the domain of public law — Within the definition of “public service” in Art. 122.
Dismissal — Unestablished officers, of— For inefficiency — For misconduct — Appropriate procedure.
Art. 122 — “Public service” includes unestablished officers.
The Applicant having originally been appointed to the public service on the 1st March, 1959, on an unestablished month-to-month basis as a Female Clerical Assistant, had her services terminated by the P.S.C with effect from the expiration of vacation leave to be taken as from the 8th January, 1962, without any reason for such termination having been assigned to her. At the material time when her services were terminated she was posted to the District Court of Famagusta.
It appears from the minutes of the P.S.C. that the
decision for the termination of her services by the P.S.C. was based on a report submitted by the Registrar of the District Court of Famagusta to the effect that her work was unsatisfactory and that she was lacking in zeal and, further, that she was using the telephone of the court for private affairs and pretending illness at any time. The said decision was taken on the 3rd October, 1961, but it was not communicated to the Applicant until the 5th December, 1961, and after a further report by the Registrar that she was seen by him and others on the night of the 25th November, 1961, dancing in a place of public entertainment whilst she was being on sick leave from the 22nd to the 27th November, 1961.
To a letter from the Applicant's counsel asking the reasons, under Art. 29, for the termination of her services and requesting a review of the case, the P.S.C. replied that the said termination had been made in accordance with para. 2 (f) of the “letter of appointment”, no other reason having been given therefor.
Subsequently, the Applicant wrote to the P.S.C. requesting reconsideration of the decision and that she should be afforded an opportunity to be heard in answer to any grounds for such termination but she was informed, without having been given an opportunity to be heard thereof, that it was not possible to change the decision already taken in the matter.
The Applicant contented that the termination of her services was null and void and of no legal effect whatsoever. [*101]
Held : (a) the status of a person employed in the public service on an unestablished month-to-month basis fell within the definition of “public service” in Art. 122, and, consequently, the termination of such services was a matter in the domain of public law within the jurisdiction of this Court (Andreas A. Marcoullides, and The Republic (Public Service Commission) , 3 R.S.C.C. p. 30 at p. 35, and John Stamatiou, and The Electricity Authority of Cyprus, 3 R.S.C.C. p. 44 at p. 46, affirmed) ;
(b) inefficiency, as such, should not, in the absence of any express provision to the contrary, be treated as a disciplinary matter necessitating the giving of an opportunity to the officer concerned to be heard before his services were terminated, provided the decision by the P.S.C. to terminate such services was taken after full examination of all relevant facts in the matter ;
(c) where the termination of the services of an officer in the public service was made both for reasons of inefficiency and for misconduct and there was a doubt as to the essential nature and the predominant reason for such termination, as in the instant case, such doubt should be resolved by treating such termination of services as if it was for disciplinary reasons thus affording the officer concerned the safeguards ensured to him by the procedure applicable to disciplinary matters, even though the reason for dismissing a public officer might, prima facie, be so overwhelming as to render it improbable that anything would be forthcoming from him which would render his dismissal unnecessary (Nicos Kalisperas, and The Republic (Public Service Commission) and another, 3 R.S.C.C. p. 146 at p. 151, applied) ;
PER CURIAM : The fact that an officer was employed on an unestablished month-to-month basis though not a sufficient ground for departing from the appropriate procedure in the exercise of disciplinary control over him, would be a very material consideration in deciding on a claim under Art. 146.6 as to what ought to be “just and equitable damages” or “just and equitable remedy”, expressions which did not appear to be free from ambiguity.
Decision of the P.S.C. declared null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
Cases referred to :
Andreas A. Marcoullides, and The Republic (Public Service Commission) 3 R.S.C.C.
John Stamatiou, and The Electricity Authority of Cyprus, 3 R.S.C.C.
Nicos Kalisperas, and The Republic (Public Service Commission) and another 3 R.S.C.C.
N. L. Zomenis for the Applicant.
A. E. Munir, Counsel of the Republic, for the Republic. [*102]
Cur. adv. vult.
February, 1. The Judgment of the Court was read by:
FORSTHOFF, P. : The Court declares—
†The decision of Respondent to terminate Applicant's services, taken on the 3rd October and confirmed on the 27th December, 1961, is null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
‡At the material time, when her services were terminated, Applicant was employed in the public service as a clerical assistant on an unestablished from month to month basis.. She was posted to the Registry of the Famagusta District Court.
The terms of Applicant's employment are to be found in an offer of employment dated the 4th March, 1959. By virtue of such offer of employment the Applicant took up employment in the public service as from the 1st March, 1959, with the Public Works Department, Famagusta.
Paragraph 2(f) of the said offer of employment provided that the employment of Applicant might be terminated at any time by the Head of the Department “without assigning any reason upon giving” Applicant “one month's notice therefor in writing or paying” her “one month's salary in lieu of notice”.
As a matter of fact, the Applicant had previously, on the 19th June, 1958, been offered employment as a clerical assistant on an unestablished from month to month basis, on exactly identical terms as the offer made later on the 4th March, 1959, except that she was to be posted to a different Department, but this said offer of the 19th June, 1958, was withdrawn on the 26th July, 1958, before Applicant had taken up such employment.
On the 3rd October, 1961, the Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as “the Commission”) decided to terminate the Applicant's services. The relevant minutes of the Commission read as follows:
“Miss Mary N. Pantelides, Clerical Assistant:
In view of the complaints recorded at Rs 37-36 in
P. 7580 against Miss Pantelides, the Commission decided that her appointment should be terminated by giving her one month's notice”.
The aforesaid “Rs 37-36” is a report of the Registrar of the Famagusta District Court dated the 8th September, 1961. In such report the Applicant is described as being most unsatisfactory in her work and lacking in zeal. It is [*103] further stated that “she has remained in the habit of malingering in all ways, especially by using the telephone for private affairs too often and sometimes for too long periods” and is charged with “pretending illness at any time”. There follows then a detailed list of dates, between the 18th January and 8th September, 1961, which indicates that on eleven occasions the Applicant was absent from duty for one day or more on the ground of alleged illhealth.
The above decision of the Commission was not, however, communicated to Applicant until the 5th December, 1961, when a letter was written to her informing her that in accordance with paragraph 2 (f) of the “letter of appointment” dated the 19th June, 1958, (i.e. the one which in fact had been withdrawn) , the Commission had decided to terminate her appointment as from the expiration of vacation leave to be taken after the 8th January, 1962. In the meantime and prior to such communication, which was a sine qua non to the effectiveness of the
decision in question of the Commission, the Registrar of the District Court Famagusta had once again reported that Applicant had been granted six days' sick leave, from the 22nd November to the 27th November, 1961, and yet on the night of the 25th November, 1961, she had “attended the cabaret 'Arlekin' at Famagusta and danced there many times” and she had been seen doing so by the Registrar himself and others present.
On the 14th December, 1961, Applicant's counsel wrote to the Commission protesting against the termination of her services, requesting, under Article 29 of the Constitution, the reasons for such a course, and asking also for a review of the relevant decision of the Commission.
The Commission replied by letter dated the 19th December, 1961, informing counsel that the termination of the services of Applicant had been made under paragraph 2(f) of the “letter of appointment”, dated the 19th June, 1958 (again the one that had been withdrawn) . No other reasons were given.
On the 21st December, 1961, Applicant wrote to the Commission and requested a reconsideration of the decision to terminate her services and she also requested to be afforded an opportunity to be heard in answer to any grounds for such termination, after such grounds would have been made known to her by the Commission.
The Commission on the 27th December, 1961, decided without hearing the Applicant, as follows:-
“Application by Miss Mary N. Pantelidou, Clerical Assistant, for reconsideration of the
decision of the termination of her appointment. [*104]
The Commission considered the above-mentioned application and decided that Miss Pantelidou be informed that it was not possible to change the decision already taken in the matter”.
†The Application in this Case was filed on the 12th February, 1962. By the motion for relief, as amended at the hearing for Directions, on the 7th April, 1962, a declaration is applied for that “the termination by the Respondents of the services of the Applicant as clerical assistant (unestablish-ed) is null and void and of no legal effect whatsoever”.
A Presentation of the Case before a Judge of this Court took place, under the Court's Rules, on the 22nd May, 1962, and the Court heard the Case on the 22nd October, 1962.
The main issues arising in this Case are as follows :-
1.Whether the termination of the services of Applicant is a matter in the domain of public law, and, therefore, a proper subject for a recourse to this Court under Article 146, or merely a contractual matter, in the domain of private law, and not within the competence of this Court.
2.Whether or not such termination amounts to the exercise of disciplinary control over Applicant, so as to necessitate applying the appropriate procedure for such control.
3.Whether or not such termination is valid from the point of view of the necessary formalities having been complied with, having regard to the facts :-
(a) that it was made with reference to the appointment dated the 19th June, 1958, which had been withdrawn, and not with reference to the appointment dated the 4th March, 1959, under which Applicant had taken up employment ; and
(b) that Applicant was not given a month's notice expiring at the end of any calendar month of her employment, though she was being employed from month to month and her employment had actually commenced on the 1st March, 1959.
Issue No. (1)
Though under the terms of her employment the Applicant has been employed on an unestablished from month to month basis, nevertheless, an officer, such as Applicant, comes within the definition of “public service” in Article 122 of the Constitution in view of the fact that such definition comprises, with certain exceptions which are not relevant in this Case, “any service under the Republic” ; moreover the [*105] said terms of Applicant's employment have to be read subject to the Constitution. (Vide also Andreas
A. Markoullides and the Republic, (Public Service Commission) , 3 R.S.C.C. p. 30 at p. 35) .
In the light of the above, the Court has reached the
conclusion that the termination of the services of Applicant, like other decisions of the Public Service Commission in the exercise of its competence under Article 125, is a matter in the domain of public law, (vide John Stamatiou and the Electricity Authority of Cyprus,
3 R.S.C.C. p. 44 at p. 46) , and, therefore, a recourse against such termination lies before this Court under Article 146.
Issue No. (2)
It is common ground that the appropriate procedure applicable in the case of disciplinary matters including, in particular, giving to Applicant an opportunity to be heard, in writing or orally as it might be deemed proper, in answer to the complaints made against her has not been followed in this Case.
What has, however, to be determined is whether or not the termination of the services of Applicant amounts, in all the circumstances of the present Case, to the exercise by the Commission of disciplinary control over the Applicant.
In view of the fact that the decision of the Commission was based on the report of the Registrar of the District Court of Famagusta dated 8th September, 1961, there can be no doubt that one of the main reasons for the termination of the services of Applicant was the unsatisfactory quality of her work. Such a reason might have property been a ground for putting an end to the services of a public officer, such as the Applicant, but it might equally well have been a ground which would have only necessitated, depending on the discretion of the Commission, the transfer of Applicant to some other post, where the work involved would be better fitted to her abilities. It is significant in this connection that in the said report of the Registrar it is expressly stated, concerning Applicant, that “as regards the work assigned to her, she has been unequal to the situation”, and, actually, the course of transferring Applicant from one post to another, in view of unsuitability had already been taken once in the past, when she was transferred by the Commission from the Income Tax Office, Famagusta, to the Registry of the District Court Famagusta, in January, 1961.
It should, at this stage, be made abundantly clear that, in the absence of express provision to the contrary, inefficiency, as such, should not be treated as a disciplinary matter and, therefore, no opportunity to be heard need be afforded to the officer concerned before his services are terminated or [*106] other action is taken against him for inefficiency ; though this, of course, does not absolve the Commission of the duty to make a full examination of all relevant facts before coming to a
decision in the matter, as in all other instances of discretionary competence.
Had, therefore, the matter been that the Applicant's services had been terminated for inefficiency only, this issue No. (2) would have to be decided against her, in the absence of anything to show that the
decision of the Commission had otherwise been taken in abuse or in excess of powers. As shown, however, from the aforesaid report of the Registrar another main reason for the course taken by the Commission has been the Applicant's malingering attitude, her use of the telephone for long periods for private affairs and her pretending often to be sick and absenting herself on such ground from her work. These are clearly matters of a disciplinary nature.
It has already been held by this Court in Nicos Kalispe-ras and the Republic (Public Service Commission) and another, 3 R.S.C.C, p. 146 at p. 151 that -
“It is, of course, possible for transfers to be made, in varying degrees, both for reasons of misconduct and other reasons at the same time. In such cases it may not always be easy to draw the line between disciplinary and other transfers. The test to be applied in such cases is to ascertain the essential nature and predominant purpose of the particular transfer. In case of doubt whether a transfer is disciplinary or not then such doubt ought to be resolved by treating the transfer in question as being disciplinary in order to afford the public officer concerned the safeguards ensured to him through the appropriate procedure applicable to disciplinary matters”.
What has been stated in the above Case concerning a transfer applied with equal, if not greater, force to the case of the termination of the services of a public officer, because then the consequences for such public officer are much more serious, irrespective of whether such officer is established or unestablished.
In the opinion of the Court, strict adherence to the principle concerned is most essential, in spite of the fact that such a course may occasionally result in causing some delay and that the reasons for dismissing a public officer may sometimes be, prima facie, so overwhelming as to render it improbable that anything will be forthcoming from him which would render his dismissal unnecessary, and the moreso because in Cyprus disciplinary control is vested, not in the appropriate Ministers or other Heads of Departments who are expected to have considerable direct and personal knowledge of their subordinates, but in an extra-departmental organ like the [*107] Commission, which usually acts upon papers placed before it and contained in the personal file of the officer concerned.
As, in accordance with the relevant decision of the Commission, Applicant's services were terminated “in view of the complaints recorded” against her in the aforesaid report of the Registrar, and which complaints comprise both inefficiency and disciplinary matters, the Court has reached the conclusion that there exists in this Case such a considerable element of doubt, regarding the essential nature and predominant purpose of the termination of the services of Applicant, as to lead to the result that such termination ought to have been treated by the Commission as a disciplinary matter (vide Nicos Kalisperas and the Republic (Public Service Commission) and another,
3 R.S.C.C. p. 146 at pp. 151-152) .
In this view the Court has been considerably strengthened by the fact that, though the decision of the Commission of the 3rd October, 1961, did not specify any particular date on which it was to have taken effect but it necessitated the giving of one month's notice to Applicant before it would become operative, and though it would have been expected, in the ordinary course of administration, that such decision would have been implemented by the giving of such notice as from the 1st November, or at the latest as from the 1st December, 1961, no such notice was given until after a further report of the said Registrar, dated the 27th November, 1961, containing a fresh disciplinary complaint against Applicant; it was then apparently deemed fit to implement the decision of the Commission which already had been taken, and a notice to that effect was given on the 5th December, 1961.
In the light of all the above, the Court is of the opinion that the proper course is to annul the relevant decision of the Commission, in view of the fact that the appropriate procedure for disciplinary matters has not been followed, in that, inter alia, an opportunity to be heard in answer to the complaints made against her has not been afforded to Applicant by the Commission, though she expressly requested this by her letter of the 21st December, 1961. It is now up to the Commission to take appropriate action in the matter.
Issue No. (3)
This issue, which goes to the validity of the relevant action of the Commission from a formalities' point of view, does not now have to be determined, because of the determination, as above, of issue No. (2) .
Lastly the Court would observe, for future guidance, that though the fact that Applicant has been employed on an un-established from month to month basis is not a sufficient ground for departing from the appropriate procedure in [*108] exercising disciplinary control over Applicant, nevertheless such fact would be a very material consideration in deciding, on a claim under paragraph 6 of Article 146, what ought to be “just and equitable damages” or “just and equitable remedy”. Such expressions, which do not appear to be free from ambiguity, do not have, however, to be interpreted by this Court in this Judgment.
For The Reasons set out above the Court declares as is stated in The Order.