Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
1. STELIOS EVRYPIDOU EVLOGIMENOS, 2. YIANNOULLA FLORIDOU, 3. SOFIA GEORGHIOU FLOURI v. THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS THROUGH THE DISTRICT LANDS OFFICER, LIMASSOL (1961) 2 RSCC 139 Generato dall'IA

Constitutional Court upholds property pre-emption law as civil regulation, not unconstitutional deprivation.

Numero d'incarto 1. STELIOS EVRYPIDOU EVLOGIMENOS, 2. YIANNOULLA FLORIDOU, 3. SOFIA GEORGHIOU FLOURI v. THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS THROUGH THE DISTRICT LANDS OFFICER, LIMASSOL (1961) 2 RSCC 139
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Cipro (CY)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Respinto (Dismissed)

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The Supreme Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants' challenge to Sections 24 and 33 of the Immovable Property Law, which granted a third party a right of pre-emption over a field. The applicants argued these sections violated their constitutional right to property and freedom of contract. The Court ruled that such regulations are valid civil law measures defining property rights rather than unconstitutional deprivations protected by the Constitution.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

Immovable Property (Tenure, Registration and Valuation) Law, Cap. 224, Sections 24 and 33; The right to property under Art. 23 is not an abstract right but one regulated by civil law, meaning restrictions under such laws do not constitute unconstitutional deprivation.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
right of pre-emption constitutional property rights civil law regulation freedom of contract unconstitutional challenge land registration tree ownership diritto agrario

Disposizioni normative citate

Generato dall'IA
Immovable Property (Tenure, Registration and Valuation) Law, Cap. 224, Sections 24 and 33
As a result of an advertisement which was published in accordance with the provisions of section 24 of Cap.
Constitution, Article 23
224 — Sections 24 and 33, not unconstitutional in relation to Arts. 23 and 26 — Right of property — Regulation by civil law of rights to property.
Constitution, Article 26
Contract — Right of. Art. 26.
Art. 23 was
(b) the right of property safeguarded by Art. 23 was not an abstract right, but a right as defined and regulated by the law relating to civil law rights in property ;
Art. 23 has
224 — Sections 24 and 33, not unconstitutional in relation to Arts. 23 and 26 — Right of property — Regulation by civil law of rights to property.
Art. 23 for
224 — Sections 24 and 33, not unconstitutional in relation to Arts. 23 and 26 — Right of property — Regulation by civil law of rights to property.
Art. 23 does
224 — Sections 24 and 33, not unconstitutional in relation to Arts. 23 and 26 — Right of property — Regulation by civil law of rights to property.
Generato dall'IA

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Testo completo

[*139] 1961 December 12

(FORSTHOFF, P., TRIANTAFYLLIDES and MUNIR, JJ.)

(June 27, September 12, November 14, December 12, 1961)

1. STELIOS EVRYPIDOU EVLOGIMENOS,

2. YIANNOULLA FLORIDOU,

3. SOFIA GEORGHIOU FLOURI,

AND

THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS THROUGH THE DISTRICT LANDS OFFICER, LIMASSOL.

(Case No. 57/61)

Immovable Property (Tenure, Registration and Valuation) Law, Cap. 224 — Sections 24 and 33, not unconstitutional in relation to Arts. 23 and 26 — Right of property — Regulation by civil law of rights to property.

Article 23 — Right of property — Meaning of “property’” in para. 1 — Para. 2 does not protect against deprivation, restriction or limitation effected under a law regulating civil law rights in property.

Words and phrases — “Property” in Art. 23.1.

Contract — Right of. Art. 26.

A Declaration of Sale was, on the 18th January, 1961, executed at the District Lands Office, Limassol, by which a certain Hasip I. Moustafa sold to the Appicants a field with 9 carob-trees standing thereon, of which he was the registered owner, for the sum of £2,100.000 mils which was paid together with the transfer and registration fees by the Applicants.

As a result of an advertisement which was published in accordance with the provisions of section 24 of Cap. 224, a certain Djihan Bayram Kori, who was the registered owner of 82/480 shares in 5 carob-trees standing in the said field, exercising her right of “pre-emption” under section 24 of Cap. 224, and having paid to the District Lands Office the amount of the purchase price and the transfer and registration fees, had the property in question registered in her name.

The present Application was filed on the 27th June, 1961, the Applicants alleging that section 24 of Cap.

224 was unconstitutional in relation to Arts. 23 and 26.

Held : (a) the object of sections 22-25 and 30-33 of the Immovable Property (Tenure, Registration and Valuation) Law, Cap. 224, was to ensure that ownership of land would, eventually, include ownership of trees and anything erected thereon ;

(b) the right of property safeguarded by Art. 23 was not an abstract right, but a right as defined and regulated by the law relating to civil law rights in property ;

(c) deprivations or restrictions or limitations imposed under a law regulating civil law rights in property, such as sections 24 and 33 of Cap. 224, were not contrary to, or inconsistent with, Art. 23, because Art. 23.2 was inapplicable to provisions of law regulating such rights ; [*140]

(d) section 24 of Cap.

224 was not contrary to, or inconsistent with, Art. 26, because the right to enter freely into any contract was not taken away from an owner, but was limited under civil law regarding the extent to which it could be disposed of by sale to particular persons.

PER CURIAM : It is for the legislative authorities of the Republic to regulate by law civil law rights in property, contained in the notion of “property” in Art. 23.1, including the right of pre-emption.

G. P. Cacoyiannis for the Applicants.

P. N. Paschalis, Counsel of the Republic, for the Republic.

A. Hikmet, for Dj. B. Kori an interested party.

Cur. adv. vult.

December, 12. The Decision of the Court was read by:

FORSTHOFF, P. : The Court declares—

Section 24 of the Immovable Property (Tenure, Registration and Valuation) Law, CAP 224, is not unconstitutional as being contrary to, or inconsistent with, Articles 23 and 26.

One Hasip Izet Moustafa of Kato Polemidia was the registered owner of a field at Kato Polemidia, by virtue of registration No. 19232. He was also the registered owner of six carob trees standing in the said field, by virtue of registration No. 19233, and of another three carob trees standing therein, by virtue of registration No. 19235

On the 18th January, 1961, the aforesaid Moustafa and the Applicants executed at the District Lands Office, Limassol, a Declaration of Sale, No. 232/61, in pursuance of an agreement by the said Moustafa to sell to Applicants the whole of the field in question, together with his aforesaid nine carob trees standing therein, at the price of £2, 100, which was actually paid to him by Applicants.

The Applicants also paid to the District Lands Office, Limassol, the necessary transfer and registration fees amounting to £84.300 mils.

By virtue of section 24 of the Immovable Property (Tenure, Registration and Valuation) Law, CAP 224, the Applicants were required to advertise the sale in question and such advertisement appeared in the Turkish press of the 2nd February, 1961.

As a result of such advertisement one Djihan Bayram Kori, of Kato Polemidia (hereinafter referred to as “the pre-emptor”), who appears registered by virtue of registration No. 19221 as the owner of the 82/480 share in five carob [*141] trees standing in the aforesaid field, exercised her rights of “pre-emption” under section 24 of CAP 224 and lodged with the District Lands Office, Limassol, the aforesaid sums of the purchase price and the transfer and registration fees and as a result the properties in question (i.e. the land and trees), were registered in her name by Respondent.

On the 10th May, 1961, Respondent informed Applicants in writing of the position and requested them to proceed to collect the sums deposited by the pre-emptor.

This Application was filed on the 27th June, 1961, and the motion for relief, as amended at the hearing for Directions, seeks a declaration “that the act or decision of the Limassol District Lands Officer to accept the lodgment by” “the preemptor “of the purchase price amounting to £2,100.000 mils paid by the Applicants by virtue of Declaration of Sale No. 232/61 in respect of the purchase by the Applicants from one Hasip Izet Moustafa of Kato Polemidia of one field with nine carob trees at Kato Polemidia, the said District Lands Officer purporting to do so under section 24 of the Immovable Property (Tenure, Registration and Valuation) Law CAP 224, and then to proceed instead to transfer and register the said property in the name of the” pre-emptor “is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and in particular to Articles 23 and 26 thereof and/or to the Immovable Property (Tenure, Registration and Valuation) Law, CAP 224, as amended or modified as provided by Article 188 of the Constitution and a declaration that such act or

decision is null and void and of no effect whatsoever”.

It should be pointed out at this stage that the pre-emptor, who was described by Applicants in the title of this Case as Respondent No. 2, cannot be treated as a Respondent because she is only an interested party and the title of the Case has been amended by the Court accordingly.

It is alleged by Applicants that section 24 of CAP 224 is unconstitutional as being contrary to the provisions of Articles 23 and 26 of the Constitution and furthermore that the five carob trees in which the pre-emptor appears to own a share do not and did not, at the material time, exist in fact and, therefore, Respondent was wrong in accepting, under the provisions of section 24 of CAP 224, the lodgments made by the pre-emptor and in proceeding to register the properties in question in her name.

On the 27th June, 1961, the Applicants applied for a Provisional Order restraining the pre-emptor from disposing of the immovable properties, the subject-matter of this Application, pending the determination of these proceedings and such Order was granted on the 7th July, 1961, on certain conditions regarding security for damages and costs.[*142]

The Opposition of Respondent was filed on the 20th July, 1961, and an Opposition by the pre-emptor was filed on the 30th September, 1961.

The Case came up for Directions on

the 12th September, 1961, when it was directed, inter alia, that the first hearing of this Case on the 14th November, 1961,

would be devoted to the hearing of preliminary legal issues.

The Case was duly heard as above and the Decision of the Court was reserved until today.

The issue to be decided is the constitutionality of section 24 of CAP 224 in view of the provisions of Articles 23 and 26 of the Constitution, safeguarding respectively the right to property and the freedom to contract.

The Court in examining the said issue has not approached this matter as if the said section 24 of CAP 224 was an enactment standing by itself but has examined it as part of the whole Law, CAP 224, to which it belongs and, in particular, in relation to sections 22, 23, 25, 30, 31, 32 and 33 thereof.

It appears to be the clear object of these provisions to ensure that with the passage of time ownership of land will eventually include ownership of trees and anything erected thereon and that separate ownership of land and anything standing thereon should eventually cease to exist.

Further, the Court in examining the provisions of Article 23 of the Constitution has proceeded on the well-settled principle that the right to property safeguarded by an Article such as this is not a right in abstracto but a right as defined and regulated by the law relating to civil law rights in property and the word “property” in paragraph 1 of Article 23 has to be understood and interpreted in this sense.

Paragraph 2 of Article 23, in the opinion of the Court, protects the aforesaid right to property from deprivation or restriction or limitation effected in the interests of the State or public bodies and not merely under a law regulating civil law rights in property.

The object of the above-mentioned sections of CAP 224, and of section 24 in particular, which relates strictly to the regulation of civil law rights in property does not and cannot conflict with the provisions of Article 23 and, therefore, section 24 cannot be unconstitutional on that ground.

It is for the legislative authorities of the Republic to regulate by law the civil law rights in property which are contained in the notion of “property” in paragraph 1 of Article 23 and if there is any absurdity, as alleged by Applicants, [*143] resulting from the fact that under section 24 of CAP 224 an owner of a minor share in trees should be entitled to a right of pre-emption over the land in which they stand, it is for such authorities to consider this matter.

As section 24 of CAP 224 is particularly closely related to section 33 of CAP 224 and as the deprivation of an owner of property of the benefit of the procedure provided for under section

33 would in effect amount to changing the nature of the rights of owners of land or trees, under section 24, the Court has also had to examine the constitutionality of the said section 33.

The Court is of the opinion that such section 33 is not unconstitutional as being contrary to Article 23 for the same reasons for which section 24 is not unconstitutional i. e. because paragraph 2 of Article 23 does not apply to provisions of law regulating civil law rights in property as among different property owners and the effect of which provisions is already inherent in the notion of “property” in paragraph 1 of Article 23.

The Court is further of the opinion that section 24 is not unconstitutional as being contrary to Article 26 of the Constitution, because, by means of section 24, an owner is not in effect prevented from contracting as such but is merely prevented from disposing at random of a right of ownership which by its very nature is limited under civil law regarding the extent to which it can be disposed of by sale to particular persons.

The Court will now proceed to hear the Case on the remaining issues.*

*Editorial note : This case was eventually settled out of Court, and by leave of the Court it was withdrawn and dismissed on the 13th January, 1962.