Supreme Constitutional Court upheld tax law sections 37 and 42 but struck down section 43 as unconstitutional.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe Supreme Constitutional Court held that the Income Tax Law's assessment and review procedures were valid exercises of executive authority and did not constitute an appeal. While the court found Section 19 reasonable regarding marital status, it ruled Section 43 unconstitutional because it barred appeals to civil courts, violating Article 146. Consequently, the court declared Section 43 repealed and clarified that the review process does not estop future constitutional challenges.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IAIncome Tax Law Cap. 323, s. 37; s. 42; s. 43: Assessments are executive acts; review procedures are not appeals; Section 43 barring civil court appeals is unconstitutional and repealed.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IADecisioni correlate
Generato dall'IATesto completo
[*125] 1961 December 11
(FORSTHOFF, P., TRIANTAFYLLIDES and MUNIR, JJ.)
(June 3, October, 3, 16, November 17, December 4, 11, 1961)
Argiris Mikrommatis of Astromeritis,
And
The Republic of Cyprus, through
(a) The Minister of Finance,
(b) The Auditor-general.
(Case No. 28/61)
Income Tax Law, Cap. 323—Section 19 not discriminatory against married persons as such — Assessments under s. 37, an exercise of administrative or executive authority, Art. 146 — Procedure on objections under s. 42 not an “appeal” — Not unconstitutional — Not an estoppel to proceedings in Supreme Constitutional Court — Review or revision not inconsistent with Art. 29 — Section 43 unconstitutional.
Discrimination — Art. 6 inapplicable — Art. 28.2.
Equality — Art. 28. 1 — Arithmetical equality — Arbitrary discrimination — Reasonable distinctions.
Contribution towards public burdens, Art. 24.1.
Time — Computation of.
Words & Phrases — “Income from her own labour” and “income from property” defined— “Equal before the law” and “discrimination” in Art. 28.1 & 2.
The Applicant is a farmer residing at Astromeritis, who, on the 2nd March, 1961, after some correspondence with, and meetings at, the Income Tax Office, was informed that the income tax payable by him in respect of the years 1954 to 1960, both inclusive, amounted to £74 odd.
It is the allegation of the Applicant that the assessment of his income and the resulting tax were made arbitrarily as, during those years, he did not earn any taxable income.
The Applicant subsequently alleged, by leave of the Court, that section 19 of the Income Tax Law, Cap. 323, was unconstitutional as contravening Arts. 6, 24 & 28 of the Constitution.
Held : (a) the making of an assessment by the Commissioner of Income Tax, under section 37 of Cap. 323, was an act of an authority “exercising an executive or administrative authority”, within the ambit of Art.
146 ;
(b) the review and revision procedure on objections against assessments, under section 42 of Cap. 323, was not an “appeal”, nor could it be regarded as judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and, therefore, it was not contrary to, or inconsistent with, the Constitution ;
(c) an appeal could no longer lie to a civil court under section 43 of Cap. 323, against an assessment made under section 37 of Cap. 323 ;[*126]
(d) section 43 of Cap.
323 was contrary to Art. 146, and should be regarded as having been repealed as from the 16th August, 1960 ;
(e) the review and revision procedure in section 42 of Cap. 323, was not incompatible, or inconsistent with the general rights given to the citizen by Art. 29, to which resort could be had independently of any specific procedure in Cap. 323 ;
(g) any person’s resort to the review and revision procedure under section 42 against an assessment under section 37 of Cap. 323, would not operate as an estoppel to a recourse to this Court ;
(h) in cases of this nature the period of 75 days prescribed by Art. 146.3 should operate from the date on which the result of the review or revision came to the knowledge of the person concerned ;
(i) Article 6 was not applicable to the provisions of section 19 of Cap. 323, as the latter was not a Law enacted after the coming into force of the Constitution ;
(j) the principle of equality provided in Art. 28, in the expressions “equal before the law” in Art. 28.1, and “discrimination” in Art. 28.2, did not convey the notion of exact arithmetical equality, but it safeguarded only against arbitrary discrimination, without excluding reasonable distinctions. This applied with equal force to the interpretation of Art. 24.1, which is an aspect of the general principle of equality ;
(k) although the application of section 19 of Cap. 323 might result in the making of a reasonable distinction between married and unmarried persons, it did not discriminate against married persons and was not, therefore, unconstitutional on this ground alone ;
(I) the addition of the income from property of a married woman, resulting from the application of section 19 of Cap. 323, to that of her husband was a reasonable restriction based on the intrinsic nature of the community of life existing between spouses, and did not amount to a discrimination on the ground of sex, whilst the addition of the income of the wife’s labour to that of her husband had no relation to the intrinsic nature of the bond of marriage, nor was it justified, and, therefore, it was discriminatory on the ground of sex, contrary to Art. 28 ;
(m) the expression “income from her own labour” meant income derived from the exercise of the right “to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business” as safeguarded by Art. 28, whilst the expression “income from property” meant income from all other sources ;
A. Triantafyllides for the Applicant.
P. N. Paschalis, Counsel of the Republic, for the Republic.
Cur. adv. vu/l.
October, 16. The Decision of the Court on the preliminary legal issues was read by :[*127]
FORSTHOFF,
P. : †The Court declares—
The Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of this Case.
‡At the hearing for directions on the 3rd June, 1961, the Court, with the consent of the parties, directed under rule
9 of the Supreme Constitutional Court Rules, 1961, that the issue raised by paragraph 2 of the points of law of the Opposition of Respondent as to the jurisdiction of the Court to hear this recourse should be heard as a preliminary legal issue on the 3rd October, 1961.
The Court accordingly heard the submissions made by counsel for both parties on the above issue on the said date and reserved its Decision thereon until today.
The Court has examined the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Law, CAP 323 (hereinafter in this Decision referred to as “CAP 323”), in the light of the provisions of the Constitution and has considered the manner in which the relevant provisions of that Law should be construed and applied under Article 188.
The relevant provisions of CAP 323 are section 37, which empowers the Commissioner of Income Tax (hereinafter in this Decision referred to as “the Commissioner”), to make assessments, section 42, which enables any person who disputes such an assessment to apply to the Commissioner to review and revise the assessment in question and section 43, which gives any person aggrieved by an assessment made upon him the right to appeal against such assessment to the District Court of his district.
The making of an assessment by the Commissioner under CAP 323, is, in the opinion of the Court, an act of an authority exercising executive or administrative authority for the purposes of Article 146 of the Constitution.
The Court must now consider the relationship between an assessment made under section 37 of CAP 323 and the procedure of review and revision under section 42.
The Court is of the opinion that the procedure provided in section 42 of CAP 323, which enables a person who disputes an assessment made under section 37 to apply to the Commissioner to review and revise such assessment, cannot either to regarded as an “appeal” in any sense of the term, nor can such a review and revision be regarded as judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.
It is true that the review and revision procedure provided in section 42 may have some features which may also be found [*128] in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, such as the hearing of objections, the hearing of evidence and the examination of persons on oath or otherwise. The one important respect in which the procedure under section 42 differs from judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, however, is that the review and revision under section 42 is made by the same authority as the one who made the original assessment which is the subjectmatter of the dispute. It is significant also that section 42 does not refer to the making of a new assessment as such but sub-section (4) thereof envisages the person assessed “agreeing with the Commissioner as to the amount at which he is liable to be assessed” and the sub-section then provides that in such an event “the assessment” (i.e. the original assessment) “shall be amended accordingly”.
The Court is of the opinion that the review and revision procedure under section 42 is not contrary to, or inconsistent with, any provision of the Constitution. Such procedure merely enables the person assessed to seek a reconsideration of the original assessment by the Commissioner and, if resorted to, such procedure amounts to nothing more than a continuation or completion of the process of assessment in the particular case.
As Article 146 of the Constitution gives this Court “exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate finally on a recourse made to it on a complaint that a decision, an act or omission of any organ, authority or person, exercising any executive or administrative authority” is contrary to any of the provisions of the Constitution or of any law or is made in excess or in abuse of powers, and as the Court is of the opinion that the assessment made by the Commissioner under section 37 of CAP 323, read in conjunction with section 42, is an act of an authority exercising executive or administrative function, it must necessarily follow that, under the Constitution, there can no longer be an appeal to a civil court against such assessment as provided in section 43 of CAP 323. The said section 43 is thus contrary to Article 146 of the Constitution and, in accordance with the provisions of Article 188, it must be regarded as having been repealed as from the date of the coming into operation of the Constitution.
As the Court has held that the review and revision procedure under section 42 of CAP 323 is a continuation or completion of the process of assessment made under section 37, the Court does not regard such review and revision procedure as being incompatible or inconsistent in any way with the general right given to every person under Article 29 of the Constitution to address written requests or complaints to any competent public authority of the Republic and to have them attended to and decided expeditiously. It is open to every person to have independent resort to Article 29, if he [*129] so wishes, apart from any specific procedure provided for in CAP 323.
Having regard to the opinion expressed in this Decision as to the nature of the review and revision procedure under section 42, and its relationship to an assessment made under section 37, the Court is of the opinion that there can be no question of the Applicant’s resort to such review and revision procedure operating so as to stop him from making this recourse, as submitted by counsel for the Respondent.
It was also contended in this Case by counsel for the Respondent that this recourse could not be entertained by this Court because it had not been made within the period prescribed by paragraph 3 of Article 146. As the Court has held, for the reasons given above, that the review and revision under section 42 of CAP 323 of the original assessment under section 37 of that Law must be regarded as a continuation or completion of the process of assessment, it follows that the relevant date in this Case from which the period prescribed by paragraph 3 of Article 146 of the Constitution must be reckoned. is the date on which the result of the review and revision under section 42 came to the knowledge of the Applicant. In this case the Applicant was informed by the Respondent of such result by letter dated the 22nd March, 1961. The Court is, therefore, of the opinion that this recourse, the Application in respect of which was filed on the 15th April, 1961, has been made within the time prescribed by paragraph 3 of Article 146.
The Court, therefore, has jurisdiction to take cognizance of this recourse.
December, 11. The Interim Decision of the Court was read by :
FORSTHOFF, P. : The Court declares—
(a) Section 19 of the Income Tax Law, CAP 323, is unconstitutional in so far as it applies to the income of a wife derived from her own labour.
(b) Section 19 of the Income Tax Law, CAP 323, shall be applied modified in accordance with (a) above.
This Case is a recourse under Article
146 of the Contitution against income tax assessments. On the 6th November, 1961, counsel for Applicant filed notice of his intention that he would raise at the resumed hearing of this Case a supplementary legal point, namely, that section 19 of the Income Tax Law, CAP 323, is unconstitutional.
As the Court considered that the legal point raised as [*130] above was material for the determination of this Case, it has accordingly heard the submissions made by counsel for both parties on the said legal point on the 4th December, 1961, and reserved its Decision thereon until today.
Counsel for Applicant submitted that the section in question was contrary to Articles 6 and 28 of the Constitution as being discriminatory between the sexes and between married and unmarried persons and contrary to Article 24 of the Constitution inasmuch as the application of section 19 resulted in the wife and husband concerned being taxed not “according to his (or her) means” but according to the combined means of both.
Counsel for Respondent submitted that the section in question was constitutional because when a married couple were living together their respective incomes constituted one financial unit and it was, therefore, proper to tax such incomes as one unit and such a course was not discriminatory as alleged.
Section 19 of the Income Tax Law, CAP 323, which is the subject-matter of this decision, reads as follows:-
“Wife’s income
19. (1) The income of a married woman living with her husband shall, for the purposes of this Law, be deemed to be the income of the husband and shall be charged in the name of the husband :
Provided that the wife may be required to pay that part of the total tax charged upon the husband which bears the same proportion to that total tax as the income of the wife bears to the total income of the husband and wife notwithstanding that assessment has not been made upon her.
(2) If either a husband or a wife makes written application to that intent to the Commissioner before the 31st January in the year of assessment, returns of income shall be required to be rendered by the husband and wife separately in the year of assessment and in subsequent years until the application is revoked and the amount of the tax chargeable on the husband pursuant to sub-section (1) shall be apportioned between the spouses in such manner as to the Commissioner appears reasonable and the amounts so apportioned shall be assessed and charged on each spouse separately.
(3) Nothing in this section contained shall [*131] prevent a woman living with her husband from being assessed in her own name in respect of income received in her own right where the husband is absent from the Colony”.
In the opinion of the Court the relevant Articles of the Constitution are Articles 24 and 28. As section 19 of CAP 323 is a provision which was enacted before the coming into operation of the Constitution, Article 6 of the Constitution is clearly not applicable.
Paragraph 1 of Article 24 reads as follows :-
“1. Every person is bound to contribute according to his means towards the public burdens”.
In the opinion of the Court this provision is an aspect of the general principle of equality safeguarded by Article 28.
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 28 of the Constitution read as follows :-
“1. All persons are equal before the law, the administration and justice and are entitled to equal protection thereof and treatment thereby.
2. Every person shall enjoy all the rights and liberties provided for in this Constitution without any direct or indirect discrimination against any person on the ground of his community, race, religion, language, sex, political or other convictions, national or social descent, birth, colour, wealth, social class, or on any ground whatsoever, unless there is express provision to the contrary in this Constitution”.
In the opinion of the Court the term “equal before the law” in paragraph 1 of Article 28 does not convey the notion of exact arithmetical equality but it safeguards only against arbitrary differentiations and does not exclude reasonable distinctions which have to be made in view of the intrinsic nature of things. Likewise, the term “discrimination” in paragraph 2 of Article 28 does not exclude reasonable distinctions as aforesaid.
The above view regarding the application of the principle of equality applies also to the interpretation of paragraph 1 of Article 24.
It follows, therefore, bearing in mind the intrinsic nature of the status of marriage and the relationship it creates between spouses, that reasonable distinctions in taxation legislation between married and unmarried persons do not in principle offend against paragraph 1 or 2 of Article 28 and against [*132] paragraph 1 of Article 24.
The Court has examined section 19 of CAP 323 in the whole context of CAP 323 (including provisions such as allowances in respect of children and increased taxation on the income of unmarried persons) as well as against the background of the status of marriage as existing in Cyprus at present and it has come to the conclusion that, although the application of section 19 of CAP 323 may result in the making of a reasonable distinction between married and unmarried persons, it does not discriminate against married persons, as such, and it is not, therefore, unconstitutional on such ground.
Coming now to the question whether the application of section 19 of CAP 323 involves any discrimination on the ground of sex.
There is no doubt that a married woman whose income is added to that of her husband and is thereby taxed to a greater extent than if it were to be taxed separately, enjoys the income from her property or from her own labour to a lesser degree than any married man taxed separately in respect of similar income.
In the opinion of the Court the reason for such a differentiation between a married woman and any married man regarding income from property, as results from the application of section 19 of CAP 323, is to be found in the community of life existing between spouses. The said community of life justifies treating the spouses, when living together, as one financial unit in this connection. Such differentiation, therefore, is nothing more than the making by taxation legislation of a reasonable distinction based on the intrinsic nature of the marriage and does not amount to a discrimination on the ground of sex.
In the case, however, of a married woman not being able, through the application of section 19 of CAP 323, to enjoy, to the same extent as any married man, the income from her own labour, the position is quite different. In such a case a married woman is placed in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis any married man in the same profession, occupation, trade or business. Such a differentiation is not a reasonable distinction based on the intrinsic nature of the marriage nor is it otherwise justified. It, therefore, amounts to a discrimination on the ground of sex contrary to Article 28.
In this Judgment the Court has used the expression “income from her own labour” as meaning income derived from the exercise of the right safeguarded by Article 25 of the Constitution and “income from property” as meaning income from all other sources*.