Supreme Constitutional Court dismisses claim for automatic retirement reinstatement as it lacks jurisdiction under Article 146.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe Supreme Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's claim for reinstatement, ruling that automatic retirement by operation of law does not require a decision by the Public Service Commission. The court held that such administrative actions fall outside the court's jurisdiction under Article 146, which requires an existing legitimate interest and a decision by a competent body. Although the applicant argued his birth date was incorrect, the court determined the retirement had already taken effect, rendering the rejection of his birth certificate irrelevant to the constitutional challenge.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IAPensions Law, Cap. 311; Article 146: Automatic retirement by operation of law does not require a decision by the Public Service Commission, and claims for reinstatement in such cases are not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Constitutional Court.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IADecisioni correlate
Generato dall'IATesto completo
[*84] 1961 November 6
(forsthoff, p., triantafyllides and munir, jj.)
(June 6, October 16, November 6, 1961)
Mehmed Ali Rouhi of Famagusta,
And
The Republic of Cyprus, Through the Public Service Commission, an Independent Organ of the Republic.
(Case No. 34/61)
Public officers — Retirement automatic by operation of law — No decision necessary — Claim for reinstatement not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Constitutional Court, Art. 146.
Pensions Law, Cap. 311 — Retirement automatic — No decision necessary — Continuance in force without modification, Arts. 125.1 and 188 — Chief Establishment Officer’s action within the jurisdiction o f the Supreme Constitutional Court.
Public Service Commission — Decision a necessary ingredient of the notion of competence, Art. 125.1 —
Decision in matters of no competence, an excess of power.
Existing legitimate interest.
Estoppel.
The Applicant, a member of the public service employed as Tugmaster at the Famagusta Harbour, was placed on retirement with effect from the 1st January, 1961, on attaining the retiring age of 60, allegedly having been born on the 6th January, 1900.
He was first appointed on the 1st December, 1921, and applied for the grant to him of a certificate of British nationality, supporting his application with a Mukhtar’s certificate, showing as his date of birth the year “1900”, as no record of his birth had been traced in the Registers of Births kept in the Commissioner’s office, Famagusta.
An unsuccessful effort to trace his birth in the Registers was made in 1951, whereupon, on advice received he obtained an official birth certificate, on the strength of a sworn affidavit, showing as his date of birth the 6th January, 1902, which he submitted to the Chief Establishment Officer who ruled that his accepted date of birth should continue to be the year “1900”. In 1960 another search was made in the Registers of Births, and this time a certain “Hassan Ali Rouhi” was found to have been born on the 6th January, 1902.
It is the Applicant’s contention that he was born on that date, when he was given, according to an old Moslem custom, the name of his deceased brother “Hassan Ali Rouhi” who died in 1898. When the Applicant was later on taken ill his original name was changed to “Mehmed” as the deceased brother’s name was considered to be an unlucky name. This change of name was never notified to the Commissioner for the alteration of the records.[*85]
It is the Applicant’s allegation that his retirement by the Public Service Commission was effected prior to his attaining the retiring age of 60.
Held : (a) the retirement of a public officer from the public service on attaining retiring age was, by operation of law, automatic not necessitating the taking of a decision ;
(b) the taking of a
decision was an essential ingredient of the notion of competence of the Public Service Commission as defined in Art. 125.1; a provision of law not requiring the taking of a decision did not involve the exercise of competence ;
(c) the provisions of the Pensions Law, Cap. 311, were not inconsistent with the competence of the Public Service Commission under Art. 125.1, and, coming within the expression “subject to the provisions of any law” in Art. 125, continued in force without any modification under Art. 188;
(d) the validity of the administrative action taken by the Chief Establishment Officer, in relation to Applicant’s retirement, was within the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 146.1;
(e) the Supreme Constitutional Court had no jurisdiction under Art. 146 to entertain the Applicant’s claim for reinstatement ;
(f) the decision of the Public Service Commission not to alter the date of birth and to reject the new birth certificate of the Applicant, was taken in a matter in which it did not have competence, and amounted to excess of power ;
(g) the Applicant was not estopped from attacking the validity of his retirement, having objected to his retirement before it took effect, and any sums received by him were received without prejudice to such objection.
A. M. Berberoglu for the Applicant.
P. N. Paschalis, Counsel of the Republic, for the Republic.
Cur. adv. vult.
November, 6. The Decision of the Court was read by:
FORSTHOFF, P. : The Court declares—
(a) The Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of claims (a) and (b) of Applicant and of claim (c) of Applicant in so far as it relates to a declaration that he may be reinstated as from the 1st January, 1961.
(b) The Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of claim (c) of Applicant in so far as it relates to a complaint against his retirement before attaining the specified age of retirement.
On the 6th of June, 1961, when this Case came up for Directions the Court by consent of both sides directed, under rule 9 of the Supreme Constitutional Court Rules, 1961, that [*86] the first hearing should be devoted to the Preliminary Legal Issues raised by Respondent. The Court has heard arguments on such Issues on the 16th October, 1961, and its
Decision thereon has been reserved until to-day.
The said Preliminary Legal Issues raised by Respondent are as follows:
“1. That the Supreme Constitutional Court has no power or jurisdiction to entertain the prayers in the Application under Article 146 of the Constitution and/or has no such power or jurisdiction on the facts alleged in the Applicant’s Statement of Facts.
2. That the prayer (a) in the Application cannot form the subject-matter of a prayer, and/or cannot be put forward, in an Application before the Supreme Constitutional Court.
3. That, in any event, the Applicant by his acts and conduct set out herebelow is estopped from putting forward his prayers in the Application”.
The motion for relief of the Application reads as follows:
“(a) A declaration by this Court that the Public Service Commission has exceeded and/or abused its powers in rejecting the Certificate of Birth issued by the Competent Authority.
(b) A declaration by the Court that the applicant had not attained on 31.12.1960, or has not yet attained the age of retirement, i.e. 60 years.
(c) A declaration by this Court that the applicant should be reinstated as from 1st January, 1961, and that he should be retired when he shall have attained the age of retirement in accordance with the Certificate of Birth issued by the Competent Authority”.
The Court before proceeding to deal with specific issues in this Case will first make a general assessment of the Case as a whole so that the said issues may be placed in proper perspective.
The Applicant was retired as from 1st January, 1961, and his retirement was published in the Official Gazette on the 11th January, 1961. Such retirement took place by way of administrative action by the Chief Establishment Officer pursuant to the provisions of the Pensions Law, CAP 311, because of the fact that Applicant had allegedly reached, in[*87]
In the opinion of the Court when a public officer reaches the age of retirement the appropriate administrative action is taken by operation of law without the taking of a decision in the particular case.
Paragraph 1 of Article 125 of the Constitution is a provision defining the competence of the Public Service Commission. The taking of a decision is an essential ingredient of the notion of competence. A provision of a law not requiring the taking of a decision does not involve the exercise of competence. It follows, therefore, that provisions such as those contained in the Pensions Law, CAP 311, making retirement automatic by operation of law on reaching a specified age limit are not inconsistent with the competence of the Public Service Commission to deal with matters relating to retirement and requiring the taking of a specific decision. In the circumstances the said provisions of CA P 311 continue in force, without any modification in this respect under Article 188 of the Constitution, and they, therefore, come within the expression “subject to the provisions of any law” in paragraph 1 of Article 125.
What is really in issue in this Case is the validity of the administrative action taken by the Chief Establishment Officer on the assumption that Applicant had reached the age of retirement, if it is established that such assumption which is the factual basis required for the relevant provisions of CAP 311 to take effect, was wrongly made.
In view of this the Court is of the opinion that it has jurisdiction to take cognizance of claim (c) in so far as it relates in substance to the aforesaid issue because the said administrative action taken by the Chief Establishment Officer comes within the ambit of paragraph I of Article 146.
Counsel for Respondent has contended that the Applicant cannot in any case succeed in this respect under claim (c), because this recourse was filed on the 15th April, 1961, i.e. more than seventy-five days, as provided for by paragraph 3 of Article 146, after the retirement of Applicant was published in the Official Gazette of the 11th January, 1961. As the Court, however, has not as yet, before it all the material necessary to decide whether the said period of seventy-five days should be reckoned from the 11th January, 1961, or from a later date it has decided to defer decision on this point until the conclusion of the Case.
Regarding that part of claim (c) which relates to a declaration for reinstatement, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain it under Article 146 and such relief as is prayed for therein can be claimed by Applicant under paragraph 6 of accordance with the records in his Personal File, the age of retirement.[*88]
Article 146 if he is successful in this Court on the main issue regarding the validity of his retirement.
Coming now to claim (b) of the Applicant. The Court accepts the submission of counsel for Respondent that this is not a claim properly made under Article 146 or any other Article of the Constitution granting the Court jurisdiction. It really raises an issue of fact which is directly involved in claim (c) in so far as it relates to the validity of the retirement but it cannot by itself form a separate basis for direct relief.
There now remains to be dealt with claim (a).
It is to be noted that by such claim the Applicant is not claiming the annulment of the decision itself of the Public Service Commission dated the 14th March, 1961, but only complains against the rejection of the birth certificate issued by the competent authority i.e. the District Officer.
In the opinion of the Court, when the Public Service Commission decided not to alter the date of birth of Applicant, the retirement, on the basis of the disputed assumption of fact regarding age, had already taken effect. The Public Service Commission on the said date did not have competence concerning the aforesaid administrative action taken in relation to retirement by operation of Law. The decision in question, therefore, of the Public Service Commission was arrived at in excess of their powers and is of no effect whatsoever. It follows, that the rejection by the Public Service Commission of the birth certificate, the basis of claim (a), did not and could not have affected any existing legitimate interest of the Applicant and, therefore, such claim cannot be entertained under Article 146, as the prerequisites for making a recourse under such Article do not exist.
Finally, Applicant is not estopped from attacking the validity of his retirement because he had, by his letter of the 21st December, 1960 (Exhibit 3), objected to his retirement even before it took effect and consequently he should be regarded as having received any sums which were paid to him on account of such retirement without prejudice to his said objection.
Editorial note : The Applicant having received an ex gratia monetary compensation this case was, by leave of the Court, withdrawn and dismissed on the 26th February, 1962.