Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
JASON KANIKLIDES OF FAMAGUSTA v. 1. THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, THROUGH THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL,2. THE MAYOR, DEPUTY MAYOR, COUNCILLORS AND TOWNS MEN OF FAMAGUSTA (1961) 2 RSCC 49 Generato dall'IA

Constitutional Court dismisses landowner's claim that road strip acquisition violates property rights.

Numero d'incarto JASON KANIKLIDES OF FAMAGUSTA v. 1. THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, THROUGH THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL,2. THE MAYOR, DEPUTY MAYOR, COUNCILLORS AND TOWNS MEN OF FAMAGUSTA (1961) 2 RSCC 49
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Cipro (CY)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Respinto (Dismissed)

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The Supreme Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's recourse against the refusal of a building permit for his land in Famagusta. The applicant argued that the continued use of his plot as a road protecting strip constituted an unconstitutional restriction under Article 23 of the Constitution. The Court held that the construction of the port access road and its protecting strips was absolutely necessary for public safety and town planning, thereby justifying the refusal to grant the permit.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

Land Acquisition Law Cap. 226; Streets and Buildings Regulation Law Cap. 96; Article 23.5 Constitution: The Court held that the construction of a port access road with protecting strips is absolutely necessary for public safety and town planning, and such restrictions do not violate constitutional property rights.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
Land Acquisition Law Road Protecting Strips Building Permits Constitutional Property Rights Public Safety Necessity Town and Country Planning Refusal of Permit accesso al fondo

Disposizioni normative citate

Generato dall'IA
Land Acquisition Law, Cap. 226
Land Acquisition Law, Cap. 226 — Notification sanctioning the acquisition of kind under section 7, an executive act — Executive acts of a final nature — Section 13 — Abandonment of undertaking — Sale of surplus land.
Streets and Buildings Regulation Law, Cap. 96
Streets and Buildings Regulation Law, Cap. 96 — Section 3 — Building permits —Appropriate authority — Section 4 — Restrictions on the grant of building permits — Permits issued not to contravene provisions of other laws.
Article 23.5 of the Constitution
Streets and Buildings Regulations, 1946 to 1957 — Regulations 3 and 5 (1)(c) —Access of plots to roads — Port access road and road protecting strips “absolutely necessary in the interest of public safety” and the “town and country planning” in accordance with Art. 23.3.
Art. 146 are
3 did not amount to a claim under Article 146 ; [*53]
Art. 146 or
3 did not amount to a claim under Article 146 ; [*53]
Art. 146 cannot
3 did not amount to a claim under Article 146 ; [*53]
Art. 146 claims
3 did not amount to a claim under Article 146 ; [*53]
Art. 23 take
Streets and Buildings Regulations, 1946 to 1957 — Regulations 3 and 5 (1)(c) —Access of plots to roads — Port access road and road protecting strips “absolutely necessary in the interest of public safety” and the “town and country planning” in accordance with Art. 23.3.
Art. 23 so
Streets and Buildings Regulations, 1946 to 1957 — Regulations 3 and 5 (1)(c) —Access of plots to roads — Port access road and road protecting strips “absolutely necessary in the interest of public safety” and the “town and country planning” in accordance with Art. 23.3.

Giurisprudenza citata

Generato dall'IA
Hassan Mustafa and the Republic (Chief Revenue Officer)
*Hassan Mustafa and the Republic (Chief Revenue Officer), 1 R.S.C.C., letter G p.
The Holy See of Kitium and The Municipal Council of Limassol
*The Holy See of Kitium and The Municipal Council of Limassol, 1 R.S.C.C., letter E et seq p.
Generato dall'IA

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Testo completo

[*49] 1961 October 27

(FORSTHOFF, P., TRIANTAFYLLIDES and MUNIR, JJ.)

(March 28, April 24, May 30, October 2, 9, 27, 1961)

Jason Kaniklides of Famagusta,

And

1. The Republic of Cyprus, through the Attorney-General,

2. The Mayor, Deputy Mayor, Councillors and Towns men of Famagusta.

(Application No. 12/61)

Land Acquisition Law, Cap. 226 — Notification sanctioning the acquisition of kind under section 7, an executive act — Executive acts of a final nature — Section 13 — Abandonment of undertaking — Sale of surplus land.

Streets and Buildings Regulation Law, Cap. 96 — Section 3 — Building permits —Appropriate authority — Section 4 — Restrictions on the grant of building permits — Permits issued not to contravene provisions of other laws.

Article 23.5—Meaning of “attained”, “###” and “###” in the English, Greek and Turkish texts of the Constitution.

Streets and Buildings Regulations, 1946 to 1957 — Regulations 3 and 5 (1)(c) —Access of plots to roads — Port access road and road protecting strips “absolutely necessary in the interest of public safety” and the “town and country planning” in accordance with Art. 23.3.

Words & phrases — “attained”, “###” and “###” in Art. 23.5.

The Applicant owns a plot of land situated at Famagusta in respect of which, in January, 1961, he applied, in accordance with section 3 of Cap. 96, to the Municipal Council of Famagusta for a permit to lay it out or divide it into separate building sites.

The plot of land in question was part of an area which was, on the [*50] strength of a notice issued by the Governor of the former Colony of Cyprus under section 7 of the Land Acquisition Law, Cap. 226, and published in the official Gazette under Not. 1119, sanctioned to be acquisitioned for the purpose of forming “road protecting strips” to the Port access road which was to be constructed as part of a plan for extending, improving and developing the Famagusta Port, which was in November, 1954, declared by the former Governor, under sections 2, 3 and 5 of the Land Acquisition Law, Cap. 226, to be “an undertaking of public utility”.

The plans in support of the application of the Applicant contemplated the construction of a road joining the plot in question with the port access road and running across one of the road protecting strips.

The Mayor of Famagusta informed the Applicant in writing that the permit for which he had applied could only be granted if the Applicant could submit revised plans which would comply with the Government plan for the port access road and the road protecting strips.

As a result of the Mayor’s letter the Applicant filed a recourse to this Court on the 3rd March, 1961.

Held : (a) a claim framed in so wide and ambiguous terms as “further or other relief” was clearly not a claim for relief which could be made to this Court ;

(b) Notification No. 1119 in Supplement No. 3 to the Gazette of the 22nd November, 1956, was not a legislative act, but an executive act of a final nature which could not become the subject of a recourse under Article 146, as it took place before the coming into force of the Constitution (Hassan Mustafa and The Republic of Cyprus (Chief Revenue Officer), 1 R.S.C.C., letter G p. 44, applied) ;

(c) a claim under paras.

5 and 11 of Article 23, was within the jurisdiction of this Court under Article

146 (The Holy See of Kitium arid The Municipal Council of Limassol,

1 R.S.C.C., letter E, p. 25 et seq. applied):

(d) the two sets of circumstances, in section 11 of Cap. 226, and Art. 23.5 which had they come about would have amounted either to the abandonment of the scheme under section

13 of Cap. 226, or to the non-attainability of the scheme under Article 23.5, respectively, had not come about, so as to bring into operation the provisions of either section 13 of Cap. 226, or of Article 23.5 ;

(e) the words “attained”, “###” and “###”, in Art. 23.5, should be read as meaning “has become attainable”, or “it is attainable”;

(f) the provisions of section 4 of Cap. 96, could not be interpreted as authorising an appropriate authority to issue building permits which would result in the contravention of some other Law;

(g) the refusal by the Respondent Municipality to grant to the Applicant a permit to lay out or divide his plot of land was lawful. On the other hand, the grant of a permit for laying out and dividing the said plot of land into 4 building sites, which would have had no access to a road, would be contrary to the provisions of regulations 3 and 5 of the Streets and Buildings Regulations, 1946 to 1957, and of section 4 of Cap. 96, in addition to [*51] being contrary to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Law, Cap. 226;

(h) the said refusal was not unconstitutional, though amounting to imposition of restrictions and limitations under Art. 23, because the construction of a port access road with road protecting strips was “absolutely necessary in the interest of the public safety” and the “town and country planning” in terms of Art. 23.3;

(i) the question whether such refusal resulted in the constructive imposition of restrictions or limitations after the coming into operation of the Constitution, in the sense of Art. 23.3, so as to entitle the Applicant to claim compensation, was

governed by the principles propounded by this Court in the case of Hussein Ramadan and The Electricity Authority of Cyprus and another, 1 R.S.C.C., letter E, p. 58.

The Application was dismissed.

Cases referred to :-

Hassan Mustafa and The Republic through the Chief Revenue Officer, 1 R.S.C.C.

Holy See of Kitium and The Municipal Council of Limassol, 1 R.S.C.C.

Hussein Ramadan and The Electricity Authority of Cyprus and another, 1 R.S.C.C.

The Applicant in person.

P. N. Paschalis, Counsel of the Republic, for Respondent No. 1.

K. Marathovouniotis & A. Pouyouros for Respondent No. 2.

Cur. adv. vult.

May, 30. The Decision of the Court was read by:

FORSTHOFF, P. : The Court declares that it has jurisdiction to take cognizance of Claims Nos. 1, 2 and 6 of Applicant and that it has no jurisdiction to take cognizance or Claims Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 7.

In this case Applicant by his motion for relief claims as follows:-

“1. A declaration that the refusal of def. No. 2, to grant the applicant’s application of the 5th January 1961, to lay out or divide his land, plot 711, plan/sheet XXXiii/4.i.ii, block C, in Famagusta into separate building sites is unconstitutional, ultra vires and illegal. [*52]

2. An order of the Court directing def. No. 2, to examine the applicant’s application of 5th January 1961 or any other subsequent application free from the condition set by the said defendant No. 2, that the applicant’s plans must fit in with the plans prepared by def. No. 2 his servant or agent pursuant to a Government Order respecting the Port Access Road, Notification No. 1119, in Supplement No. 3 to the Cyprus Gazette of the 22nd November, 1956.

3. A declaration that on the true construction of the order (notification No. 1119, Supplement No. 3 to the Gazette of the 22/11/1956) the property described in par. 1 above, was not cut off of its access to the Port Access Road or any other road.

4. A declaration that the said order, published by the Command of the then Governor of Cyprus, whereby Protecting strips were created depriving the applicant as owner of his right to access to Port Access Road or any other road, or curtailing the owner’s said right and/or the exercise of any other right pertaining to the concept of ownership of immovable property is unconstitutional, null and void and illegal.

5. Or a declaration that the creation by the said order of road protecting strips, serve no purpose of public utility and therefore are unconstitutional, null and void.

6. Or a declaration that the object of the said “Road Protecting strips” has lapsed, and therefore must either :-

(a) be ceded to the Port Access Road or any other road

or (b) be offered for sale to the applicant at the price at which the land of which they form part was acquired by the Government of Cyprus from the applicant in 1956.

7. Further or other relief”.

When this case came up for hearing on the 24th April, 1961, the following preliminary objections were taken as regards the several claims of Applicant set out above :-

(1) By counsel for Respondent No. 1:

(a) that Claim No. 3 did not amount to a claim under Article 146 ; [*53]

(b) that Claims No.4 and No.5 are not within the jurisdiction of this Court as they refer to an executive act, i.e. the Notification under section 7 of the Land Acquisition Law, CAP 233 (now CAP 226) dated the 19th November, 1956, and published in the Gazette on the 22nd November, 1956, (hereinafter in this Decision to be referred to as the Notification), to which the provisions of Article 146 are not applicable, in as much as such Notification was made and published before the coming into force of the Constitution.

(c) that Claim No. 6 is not properly made under Article 146.

(2) By counsel for Respondent No. 2:

That Claims No. 1 and No. 2 are out of time.

The Court will now deal with the aforesaid objections in their above order, but before doing so it should be stated that Claim No. 7, as it stands, is clearly not a claim for relief which can be made before this Court.

Objection (1) (a) : Claim No. 3 clearly cannot be taken, as framed, as amounting to a recourse under Article 146 or any other Article of the Constitution conferring jurisdiction on this Court. It only involves a point of interpretation of the Notification which may or may not become relevant in the ensuing hearing of this case on its merits. It is merely an argument in support of Applicant’s case and the Court will treat it as such from now onwards.

Objection (1) (b) : The Notification in this case is, in the opinion of the Court, an executive act and not a legislative one. It is not a piece of subsidiary legislation but the notification, by publication in the Gazette, of a step (i.e. sanction under section 7 of CAP 226) taken by executive authority pursuant to the provisions of the Law.

It has already been decided by this Court in its Judgment in Application No. 5/60* that Article 146 cannot be applied to, inter alia, executive acts of a final nature which took place before the coming into force of the Constitution. As Claims No. 4 and No. 5 involve directly the application to such Notification of the provisions of Article 146 and as the said Notification is an executive act of a final nature which pre-existed as such before the 16th August, 1960, when the Constitution came into force, it follows that this Court cannot entertain under Article 146 claims which are directly aimed at the constitutionality, legality or otherwise the validity of such Notification itself.

Objection (1) (c) : It is correct that Claim No. 6 is not framed, as it stands, in precise terms. The Court, however, having taken into consideration the explanations put forward in respect of such Claim by Applicant in addressing the Court has come to the conclusion that it appears to involve a claim under paragraphs 5 and 11 of Article 23 and, for the reasons given in the Judgment of this Court in Application No. 1/60*, such Claim is within its jurisdiction under Article 146.

Objection (2) : Claims No. 1 and No. 2, in so far as they affect the action taken by Respondent No. 2 with regard to the application of Applicant to such Respondent dated the 5th January, 1961, are not out of time because this Application has been filed in this Court on the 3rd March, 1961, well within the time limit laid down by paragraph 3 of Article 146.

October, 27. The Judgment of the Court was read by:

FORSTHOFF, P. : The Court declares—

This Application cannot succeed and is dismissed accordingly.

The Applicant is the owner of immovable property registered as plot No. 711, plan/sheet XXXiii/4.i.ii, block C, situated in Famagusta (hereinafter in this Judgment referred to as “plot No. 711”).

On the 24th November, 1954, the Governor of the former Colony of Cyprus issued a notice under sections 2, 3 and

5 of the Land Acquisition Law, CAP 226 (formerly CAP 233 of the 1949 Revised Edition of the Laws of Cyprus hereinafter in this Judgment referred to as “CAP 226”), inter alia, declaring the carrying out of “extensions and improvements of the Famagusta Port and to provide for the development thereof” to be “an undertaking of public utility” (hereinafter in this Judgment referred to as “the undertaking”) for the purposes of CAP 226. This notice was published as Notification No. 665 in Supplement No. 3 to the Official Gazette of the 25th November, 1954, and is in this Judgment hereinafter referred to as “Notification No. 665”. The Commissioner (now District Officer) of Famagusta, in accordance with the provisions of section 6 of CAP 226, published the relevant “notice to treat” under Notification No. 675 in Supplement No. 3 to the Official Gazette of the 25th November, 1954, giving particulars of the lands required in connection with the undertaking.

The Governor of the former Colony of Cyprus, by [*55] notice published under Notification No. 1119 in Supplement No.

3 to the Official Gazette of the 22nd November, 1956, (hereinafter in this Judgment referred to as “Notification No. 1119”) sanctioned under section 7 of CAP 226 the acquisition of the lands described in the Schedule to the said Notification No. 1119. The second paragraph of the said Schedule reads as follows :-

“The areas coloured green on the said plan shall form ‘road protecting strips’ and shall not be ceded to the public road”.

Throughout the proceedings in this case and in this Judgment the aforesaid areas coloured green on the said plan mentioned in the Schedule to Notification No. 1119 have been referred to as “the road protecting strips”.

The road protecting strips, which are five feet in width, run along each side of a wide road which has been constructed to serve as an access road for the proposed to be developed port of Famagusta and which road is a part of the undertaking. This road is referred to in this Judgment as the “port access road”. One of the road protecting strips cuts off plot No. 711 from the port access road along its entire frontage.

On the 5th January, 1961, the Applicant applied by Exhibit 19 to Respondent No. 2 under section 3 of the Streets and Buildings Regulation Law, CAP 96, (hereinafter in this Judgment referred to as “CAP 96”) for a permit to lay out or divide plot No. 711 into separate building sites. The plans in support of the Applicant’s application for such a permit contemplated the construction of a road joining plot No. 711 with the port access road and running across one of the road protecting strips.

The Mayor of Famagusta informed the Applicant, by a letter written on behalf of Respondent No.2 and dated the 10th February, 1961, (Exhibit 3), that the permit for which the Applicant applied could only be granted if the Applicant submitted revised plans which would comply with Notification No. 1119 regarding the port access road and the road protecting strips.

This Application was filed on the 3rd March, 1961, and originally contained seven motions for relief*.

By a Decision of this Court dated the 30th May, 1961, on preliminary objections which were taken on the first day of the hearing of this Case on the 24th April, 1961, only Claims Nos. 1, 2 and 6 of the Applicant’s motion for relief [*56] remained. These three Claims are set out in full in the abovementioned Decision of this Court and need not be repeated here.

The Opposition of Respondent No. 1 was filed on the 29th March, 1961, and of Respondent No. 2 on the 30th March, 1961. Respondent No. 1 contends that the object for which the land comprising the road protecting strips had been acquired had not been abandoned or lapsed and Respondent No. 2 contends that its refusal to grant the Applicant the permit applied for was because in the plans submitted by the Applicant in support of his application for such a permit it is shown that the construction of a road across one of the road protecting strips and joining the Applicant’s proposed building sites with the port access road is envisaged.

On the 11th April, 1961, the Applicant filed an affidavit in reply to the said Oppositions.

The Case came up for mention on the 28th March, 1961. On the first day of the public hearing on the 24th April, 1961, certain preliminary legal issues were dealth with as stated above. The hearing of the Case was resumed on the 2nd October, 1961, and was completed on the 9th October, 1961, when Judgment was reserved until today.

The Court will first deal with Claim No. 6 of the Applicant’s motion for relief in which the Applicant asks for a declaration that the object of the road protecting strips has lapsed and that consequently the land which they comprise must either be ceded to the port access road or to any other road or be offered back for sale to the Applicant at the price at which the land of which they form part was acquired by the Government of the former Colony of Cyprus from the Applicant in 1956.

The purpose for which the land in question had been acquired is clearly and expressly specified in Notification No. 665*, namely, “to carry out extensions and improvements of the Famagusta Port and to provide for the development thereof”. There can be no doubt, in the opinion of the Court, that the construction of a port access road such as the port access road in question is within the object of carrying out “extensions and improvements of the Famagusta Port” as declared in Notification No. 665* and that the road protecting strips on either side of the port access road, which are essential for a road of this nature, are, therefore, also connected with the proposed “extensions and improvements” of the Port.

The question of fact which is raised by Claim No. 6 and [*57] which this Court must ascertain is whether the aforesaid object of carrying out “extensions and improvements of the Famagusta Port and to provide for the development thereof”, as specified in Notification No. 665*, has been abandoned before the date of the coming into operation of the Constitution or whether such purpose has not been attained since the coming into operation of the Constitution.

Section 13 of CAP 226 provides, inter cilia, that the acquiring authority “shall, within one year from the completion of the works or……from the abandonment of the undertaking in connection with which the land had been acquired, sell and dispose of any land which is found to be in excess of the extent actually required or to be no longer required for the purpose for which it has been acquired”.

The relevant provision of paragraph 5 of Article 23 of the Constitution provides that if within three years of the acquisition the purpose for which immovable property has been acquired has not been attained the acquiring authority shall, immediately after the expiration of the said period of three years, offer the property at the price it has been acquired to the person from whom it has been acquired.

As far as the question of any alleged abandonment of the undertaking having taken place before the date of the coming into operation of the Constitution is concerned and regarding any right which might consequently have been vested in the Applicant immediately prior to the date of the coming into operation of the Constitution, the provisions of section 13 of CAP 226, which would have applied, must be considered.

As to any question concerning the alleged non-attainment of the purposes for which the land in question had been acquired since the date of the coming into operation of the Constitution, the matter is governed by paragraph 5 of Article 23, and the corresponding provisions of CAP 226 must, in accordance with Article 188 of the Constitution, be read subject to the said paragraph 5.

The Court is satisfied on the evidence which has been adduced before it, and particularly from the evidence given by Mr. P. Kazamias, the Administrative Officer of the Ministry of Communications and Works, that the undertaking was never abandoned by the then acquiring authority, i.e. the Government of the former Colony of Cyprus, prior to the coming into operation of the Constitution. This finding is supported, inter alia, by the uncontested fact that provision was made in the annual Government Estimates for the expenditure [*58] of money in connection with the undertaking during the years between 1956 and I960.

The words corresponding to the word ““attained”, which appears in the second sentence of paragraph 5 of Article 23, in the original Greek text is “###” “###” and in the original Turkish text is “gerçekleşmediği (‘takdirde’)”. The Court is of the opinion that the respective Greek and Turkish expressions in the respective authentic original texts convey the same notion i.e. that of “attainability”; in any case the notion which is intended to be conveyed by the English word “attained” in the context in which it is used in the English text of paragraph 5 of Article

23 of the Constitution is also the notion of “attainability”, and the word “attained” should be read as meaning “has become attainable”.

The Court is, therefore, of the opinion that the provisions of paragraph 5 of Article 23 take effect if within three years of the acquisition the purpose for which the land in question had been acquired has not become “attainable”. Any other interpretation would lead to absurdity in that there are bound to be many purposes for which land has been acquired in the sense of paragraph 5 of Article 23, which, by their very nature, cannot be fulfilled within the said period of three years.

It is quite clear in this Case, on the evidence adduced before the Court and particularly having regard to

Decision No. 890 of the Council of Ministers dated the 22nd June, 1961, (Exhibit 21), that the purpose for which the land in question had originally been acquired is at the present time capable of being attained, that is to say, it is attainable.

The Court is, therefore, of the opinion that neither of the two above-mentioned sets of circumstances, which are respectively referred to in section 13 of CAP 226 and in paragraph 5 of Article 23 of the Constitution, have come about in this Case during the material periods so as to bring into operation the two provisions in question.

For the reasons given above Claim No.

6 of the Applicant’s motion for relief cannot succeed and is accordingly dismissed.

Coming now to Claims Nos. 1 and 2 of the Applicant’s motion for relief.

The first question which has to be considered is whether the decision of Respondent No. 2 not to grant the application made by the Applicant on the 5th January, 1961, for a permit under section 3 of CAP 226 to lay out or divide the land in question into separate building sites is unconstitutional [*59] illegal or made in excess or abuse of powers.

Section 3 of CAP 96, provides, inter alia, that no person shall erect any building or lay out or divide any land into separate sites without a permit in that behalf first obtained from the appropriate authority. Sub-section (2) of that section provides that the appropriate authority within the area of a municipal corporation shall be the municipal council of such corporation, i.e. in this Case Respondent No. 2.

Sub-section (1) of section 4 of CAP

96 provides that “no permit shall be granted under section 3” of CAP 96 “unless the appropriate authority is satisfied that the contemplated work or other matter in respect of which the permit is sought is in accordance with the provisions of” CAP 96 and the Regulations made thereunder in force for the time being.

Although section 4 of CAP 96 only lays down that the contemplated work or other matter in respect of which a permit is sought under section 3 of that Law has to be in accordance with the provisions of CAP 96 and the Regulations made thereunder, the provisions of CAP

96 cannot, in the opinion of the Court, be interpreted as authorising an appropriate authority to issue permits thereunder which would result in the contravention of some other Law.

In this Case it is clear that the granting of the permit applied for would be contrary to the provisions of CAP

226 in the sense that it would prevent the object for which an undertaking of public utility had been declared, and in respect of which the land in question had been acquired under CAP 226 (which object includes the construction of a port access road with road protecting strips), from being achieved, thus defeating the objects and operation of that Law.

The granting by Respondent No. 2 of the permit for which the Applicant had applied would also have the effect of Respondent No. 2 allowing or condoning the construction of a road by the Applicant on property (i.e. road protecting strips) which does not belong to the Applicant without first obtaining the consent of the owner of such land, (i.e. the Republic) to construct such road on the property of the Republic. Particularly so when it is obvious to Respondent No. 2 from the very wording of Notification No. 1119 itself that it is the decision of the owner of such protecting strips, i. e. the Republic, that they should not form part of a public road.

Furthermore, it is provided by sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph (1) of regulation 5 of the Streets and Buildings Regulations made under CAP 96 (hereinafter referred to as “the Regulations”) that an application for a building permit under CAP 96 shall be accompanied by a site plan showing, [*60] inter alia, “the access to the plot from some existing street”.

The appropriate authority in this Case, i.e. Respondent No. 2, in considering applications for a permit to divide land into plots for building purposes under regulation 3 of the Regulations (being the same appropriate authority for the granting of applications for building permits under regulation 5) must have due regard to the requirements under regulation 5 concerning building permits.

As stated before, an appropriate authority must be satisfied, as required by sub-section (1) of section 4 of CAP 96, that the contemplated work or other matter in respect of which a permit is sought under section 3 of that Law is in accordance with the provisions of CAP

96 and the Regulations made thereunder in force for the time being before it can lawfully grant such a permit. The granting of a permit under regulation 3 clearly envisages the division of land “into plots for building purposes” and, therefore, no such permit can lawfully be granted thereunder unless, in respect of each resulting plot, it is possible under the Regulations to grant a building permit. It is clear that no such building permit could be granted under regulation 5 if a plot did not have access to an existing road.

If, therefore, Respondent No. 2 were to grant the permit for which the Applicant had applied and if it were to approve the plans submitted with such application, which contemplated the creation of at least four sites without any access from each one of them to a road, and merely having a frontage on a road protecting strip not forming part of a public road, would clearly contravene regulation 3 read in conjunction with regulation 5 and the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 4 of CAP 96 would thus also be contravened.

This being so the Court is of the opinion, for all the reasons given above, that the decision of Respondent No. 2 not to grant the permit for which the Applicant had applied was the only

decision which could lawfully have been made.

The Applicant has submitted that the refusal by Respondent No. 2 of the permit for which he applied on account of the continued use of the land, which had been compulsorily acquired from him prior to the date of the coming into operation of the Constitution, as road protecting strips, amounts to the imposition of restrictions and limitations on his land plot No. 711 contrary to Article 23 of the Constitution. In the opinion of the Court the construction of a modern port access road with road protecting strips of a standard comparable with those prevailing in other countries comes under paragraph 3 of Article 2.3 as being “absolutely necessary in the interest of the public safety” and “town and country planning” and, therefore, the refusal to grant such a permit is not unconstitutional.

The question whether the aforesaid refusal of Respondent No. 2 has resulted in the constructive imposition of restrictions or limitations in the sense of paragraph 3 of Article 23 so as to entitle the Applicant to compensation thereunder is governed by the principles propounded by this Court in its Judgment in Case No. 1/61*.

*Hassan Mustafa and the Republic (Chief Revenue Officer), 1 R.S.C.C., letter G p. 44. [*54]

*The Holy See of Kitium and The Municipal Council of Limassol, 1 R.S.C.C., letter E et seq p. 25.

*See letter H p. 51 & letter A et seq p. 52.

*Supplnt. No. 3 of Official Gazette No. 3792 of 25/11/54, p. 581.

*Supplnt. No. 3 of Official Gazette No. 3792 of 25/11/54, p. 581.