Cyprus Supreme Court dismisses District Court jurisdiction for speed-boat engine repair claims under Admiralty Act.

[*496] 1984 March 7

(ELIADES, D.J.)

IN THE DISTRICT CGJRT OE LARNACA

Nicos Chambi

Applicant,

v.

Desilu Company Limited,

Respondent.

(Action No.1607/83).

Jurisdiction - Admiralty Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court - Sections 19(a) and 29(2) of the Courts of Justice Law 14/60 - The English Administration of Justice Act, 1956, sub-sections l(l)(m) and (l)(l)(n) - Ship - Definition of - Claim by a speed-boat mechanic for services rendered in connection with the repairs of two “Selva” engines, which are out-of-boat engines installed in speed boats - As motor-boats fall within the ambit of the definition of the word “ship” and in the light of the plain provisions of the said subsections of the English Act, the District Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the Claim - Counterclaim based on plaintiff’s negligence in installing the electrical parts of the said engines and in failing to install non-deficient sparks - Counterclaim, also, within the ambit of said sub-sections of the English Act and, therefore, the District Court has no jurisdiction.

Costs - Award of - Principles applicable.

S. Liasides, for Applicant.

G. Athanasiades, for Respondent.

RULING

The following ruling was delivered by:

ELIADES, D.J.: By the present application the applicant-defendant disputes the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the present action which, it is submitted [*497] falls within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court.

The respondent-plaintiff opposed the

application, alleging that there is no impediment for the Court to consider the action, as the nature of the claim does not fail

within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court “but within the substantive jurisdiction.of a District Court entertaining civil actions.

It has been submitted on behalf of the applicant that the claim (as this can be described from the pleadings) concerns the repair of installation of various accessories on a “Selva” machine belonging to the applicants, by the respondent which is referred to in the specially indorsed statement of claim as a mechanic of speed-boats.

By virtue of s.19 (a) of the Courts of Justice Law No. 14/60, the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction as a Court of Admiralty, exercising the same powers of jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice in England in its Admiralty jurisdiction before Independence Day. The Law which governs the Admiralty jurisdiction of the Court in England is the Administration of Justice Act 1956. In view of the provisions of a.19 (a) and 29(2) of the Courts of

Justice Law 14/60, the administration of Justice Act 1956 has been extended to apply in Cyprus concerning the Admiralty jurisidiction of the

Supreme Court of Cyprus.(See Anagnostou v Ship Holcor (1981 ) 1 C.L.R.p.461). [*498]

S.l(l)(m) of the administration of Justice Act 1936 provides that the High Court in England in its Admiralty .jurisdiction, has power to hear and determine questions or claims “in respect of goods or materials supplied to a ship or her operation or maintenance” and sub-section (n) questions or claims “in respect of the construction, repair, or equipment of a ship or dock charges or dues” .

The word “ship” has received several

interpretations by several statutes (See The National Prize Acts, (1864)s.2, The-Foreign and Enlistment Act (1870) s. 30, The Explosives Act (1875)

S.108, The Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act (1678) s.7, The Marine Insurance.Act (1906) sch.(1 ), The Employment of Women, Young Persons and Children Act (1920) s 4, The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (1924) sch., The Merchant Shipping (international Labour Conventions) Act (1925),s.5, Harbours Act (1964) s.57, The Ship Building Industry Act (1967) s.12, The Trade .Descriptions Act.(1968).39(1), and the Hovercraft Act

(1968) Immigration Appeals Act (1969) s.24(2).

The most widely accept ad definition of the word “ship” in Admiralty can be found in s.742 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 where it is provided that the word “ship” includes every description of vessel used in navigation not propelled by oars. Concerning the interpretation of the word “ship” Blackburn J. had this to say: [*499]

“Whether a ship is propelled with oars or not it is still a ship. Most small vessels use something of the kind to propel them. The vessels which came over in the Armada, with perhaps a thousand men on board were rowed by hundreds of slaves. Yet no one could say that 5 they were not ships. I can only suggest that every vessel that substantially goes to sea is a ship. I do not mean that every little boat that goes a mile or two outside a harbour is a ship, but that where it is really and. substantially the

business of a vessel to go to sea it is a ship. If the absence of oars were the test of a ship, this would take in the case of river steamers which never go to sea.

Whenever the vessel is substantially a sea-going vessel, whether it be decked or not, it would be a ship (In. Re Ferguson L.R.6 Q.B. 291)”.

However the vessel in order to qualify as a ship within he definition, need not necessarily have been to sea. A launched unfinished vessel intended for navigation is a “ship” (The Andalusian 2 P.D. 231), A mudhopper used for dredging purposes, not fitted with oars or other means of propulsion and generally moved by towing has been held to “be a “ship”. (The Mac 7 P.D 126) as well as lighters used, for navigation in the transport that goes on the Thames in tow ox tugs hut a small electric steam launch, drawing three feet and used for pleasure on the

artificial fore-shore sea-water lake at 25 Southport, is not a ship because “it is not used in navigation” (Southport

v. Morris (1893) 1 Q.B. 359)as [*500] well as a

stationary beacon (gas float) (See Gas Float Whitton (1896) P.42). However the mooring and unmorring of a ship and the conveyance of her crew to the ship and the shore qualified the motor-boars used

within the meaning of the word “ship’ (See Queen of the South (1968) 1 All E R 1163).

As it appears from the pleadings the respondent is a speed-boat mechanic and was rendering services in connection with the repairs of two “Selva” engines belonging to the applicants. Although no particular reference 10 is made in the specially indorsed statement of claim as to the purpose for which these engines are used, it appears from the statement of defence and counterclaim that these are out-of-boat engines which

are installed in speed-boats. Considering the plain provisions of s.1 (l) (m) and (n) of the Administration of Justice Act 1956 and the fact that

motor-boats fall within the ambit of the definition of the word “ship” as being used in connection with navigation the District Court has no competency to assume jurisdiction in respect of the claim. Accordingly the Court rules that it has no jurisdiction to take up the claim and the present proceedings are stayed in accordance with the provisions of 0.33,r. 10.

There remains to be examined whether the jurisdiction of the Court may be invoiced in connection with [*501] the applicant’s counterclaim. It appears from the contents of the Counterclaim that this is based on the respondent’s negligence in failing to

install properly the electrical parts of the engines as well as in his failure to install non-deficient sparks. No doubt the character of these

services refer exclusively to the repair of the speed-boat engines and the fact that some of the parts installed came

from another speed-boat engine, cannot take the counter claim outside the ambit of s.1 (l)(m) and (n) of the Administration of Justice Act 1955. In my view the counterclaim refers exclusively to materials supplied for the operation or maintenance or repair of a ship and it does not empower the District Court to assume jurisdiction and try the counterclaim. Accordinglythe counterclaim is also stayed in accordance with 0.33, r.10.

Considering the award of costs it is well settled that it is within the discretion of the Court and such discretion must he exercised judicially. Costs normally follow the event. The final outcome of the case is the most important consideration which must he taken into account by the Court in exercising its discretion to award costs (See Evangelou v. .Ambizas (1982) 1 C.L.R. p.41), but it is net the sole consideration, The conduct of the parties in relation to the litigation is also relevant. [*502]

Considering the outcome of the present application there will he no order as to costs.

Proceedings stayed.

No order as to costs.