Court acquits accused for using building as car repair shop, ruling 'garage' includes panel beating.

[*306] 1984 Jan. 23

(KALLIS, AG. D.J.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF NICOSIA

Municipality of Nicosia,

v.

Andreas Eleftheriou and Another,

Accused.

(Case No. 19273/83).

Buildings - Building permit - Conditions - Building to be used as "garage" - Meaning - Whether "garage" a place for repairs of engines of cars only.

L. Kythreotis, for the Prosecution

E. Polydorou, for accused No. 1.

A. Danos, for accused No, 2.

RULING

The following ruling was delivered by:-

KALLIS. AG. D.J.:- The accused in this, case [*307] were charged on a count of the offence of altering the approved use of a building contrary to sections 3 and 20 of the Streets and Buildings Regulation Law, Cap. 96, without a permit in that behalf first obtained by the appropriate Authority.

At the stage of the close of the case for the prosecution learned counsel for accused submitted that the prosecution has not made out against the accused a prima facie case sufficiently to require them to make their defence.

It was the case for the prosecution, emanating from the evidence of Denetrios Ashiotis, a Technical Assistant at the Nicosia Municipal Corporation that accused No. 1 was on the 28th May, 1954, granted a permit - Exhibit 1 - for the construction of the buildings subject-matter of the charge; and one of the conditions attached thereto stayed that "after completion the licensee will use th.6 buildings as a garage” ("γκαράζ").

Upon paying a visit to the buildings on 11.10.1983 the witness ascertained that they were used as a place for panel beating of cars ("isiotirion") ; and there were cars for repairing both within and outside the buildings and on the road opposite. These buildings consist of a single room the dimension of which are 25' x 42'.

In cross-examination he said that from the file in his possession he could say that the buildings in [*308] question have since 1954 been used ae space for the repair of cars with the permit and approval of the Municipality.

Learned counsel for the prosecution submitted that the word "garage"

should be interpreted an meaning a place for the repair of the engines of cars only and not for the use to which accused put the buildings.

In view of the fact that the approved

use of the buildings is for a "garage” the case of the prosecution stands or falls on the meaning which will be given to this word.

In Craies on Statuts Law 7th Ed.,. p. 64, the following are stated:

"The expression 'construation' as applied to. A document ... includes two things - first, the meaning, of the words: and secondly, the effect which is to be given to them. The meaning of words I take to be a question of fact in all cases, whether we are dealing with a poem or a legal document. The effect of the words is a question of law. Strictly speaking, there is no place for interpretation or construction except where the words of the statute admit of two meanings",

And further at p. 65 the following are stated:- [*309]

"If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the lawgiver."

Regarding the use of dictionaries in

ascertaining the necessity of. a word in R. v. Peters (1886) Q.B.D. 636, the following were said at p. 641 by Lord Coleridge:

"I am quite aware that dictionaries are not to be taken as authoritative exponents of the meanings of words used in Acts of. Parliament, but it is a well-known rule of courts of law that words should be taken to be used in their ordinary sense, and we are therefore sent for instruction to these books."

And in Camden (larquis) v. I.R.C.

(1914) 1 K.B. 641, Cozens-Hardy M.R. stated the following at p. 647:

"It is for the court to interpret the statute as best it may. In so doing the courts may no doubt assist themselves in the discharge of their duty by any literary help they can find, including of course the consultation of standard authors and reference to well-known and authoritative dictionaries." [*310]

In Barnett and Block v. national Parcels Insurance Co. Ltd. (1942) 1 All E.R. 221 the following were stated at p. 223;

"Now what is a garage? No evidence was given to suggest or prove that the word garage in the trade had got any special meaning, and it. was agreed to take the four dictionary definitions set out in the agreed statement of facts. The four definitions were these. From the Shorter Oxford Dictionary; ’ A building for the storage or refitting of motor vehicles. From the Hew Century Dictionary: ' A building for sheltering, cleaning or repairing motor vehicles. To put or keep in a garage'. From the Hew Standard Dictionary; ' A building for stabling or storing of motor vehicles of all kings'. From Nuttal's Standard Dictionary; Ά storehouse for motor vehicles'. Those are four definitions from leading dictionaries all containing at any rate one word in common, and that is ’building’. As there is no evidence as to how the general public understand the word 'garage', I suppose one is entitled to use one’s own knowledge, I am inclined to think that the ordinary man in the street does regard a garage as connoting some sort of a building; how far he would go f do not know." [*311]

In Black's Law Dictionary, p. 809, it is stated "Garage. A place in which motor vehicles are stored and "cared for". In the Oxford Universal Dictionary illustrated p. 775 it is stated; “Garage. A building for the storage or refitting of motor vehicles”; and in the Universal English Dictionary p. 471; "Garage... Commercial "establishment where motor cars are stored, repaired, "leaned, etc. and at which fittings and petrol for cars can be obtained".

It should not be forgotten that the outcome of this case will involve penal sanctions against the accused and it is well settled that penal statutes and laws should be construed narrowly and strictly (see Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes.12 Ed,, pp. 239-240 and HadjiDemetriou v, "Telegraphos" & Another

(1983) 2 C.L.R. 268 at p. 278). It is also well settled that in case of doubt in the construction of laws and regulations affecting fundamental , rights and liberties of the subject they should be interpreted strictly and not given wider effect than that warranted by their context and cases of doubt should be interpreted in favour of citizen’s rights; in this case the right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business safeguarded by Article 25 of the Constitution (see Marangos v. Municipality Famagusta (1970) 3 C.L.R. 7; Fina v. Republic 4 R.S.C.C. 26; Chilimindri v. Municipality Famagusta (1969) 3 C.L.R. 159)· [*312]

Having regard to the evidence adduced, the meaning of the word "garage" as given above, particularly the reference "that it is a building for ... cleaning "or repairing motor vehicles", and the absence of any reference to the repairing of engines of motor vehicles only and to the above principles of interpretation, I cannot give to this word the narrow construction suggested by learned counsel for the prosecution. I therefore hold that panel beating of cars ("isioma”) amounts to repairing of cars and is in line with the above meanings; and thus the buildings in question which are used for "isioma" of cars are used as a garage as provided by the building permit. In view of this conclusion the accused have not altered the approved use of the building. I, therefore, rule that the prosecution has not proved an essential element in the alleged offence, and as are result it has not made out a prima facie case against the accused sufficiently to require them to make their defence. The accused are, therefore, not called upon to make their defence and they are acquitted and discharged.

Accused acquitted and discharged.