Cypriot court allows partial damages for breach of marriage contract within reasonable time period.

[*436] 1982 March 15

(ARTEMIDES,AG.P.D.C. IOANNIDES D.J.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF NICOSIA

Anastassia G.Savvidou,

Plaintiff,

v.

The Estate of the deceased Makis

Christou, late of Nicosia, through

the administrators of the Estate.,

Defendants,

(Action No. 852/1978)

Limitation

of Actions - Action under marriage contract -Limitation period six years - Section 5 of the Limitation of Actions Law, Cap. 15.

Damages - Contract - Breach of obligation resembling those created by contract — Quantum of damages — No time of performance specified in the contract - Engagement to be performed within "reasonable time”- What is "reasonable time” - Sections 46 and 73(2) of the Contract Law, Cap. 149.

Plaintiff in person.

E.Odysseos, for the defendants.

JUDGMENT

The following judgment was delivered by:

ARTEMIDES, Ag.P.D.C. The plaintiff in the[*437]

present action is suing the administrators of the late Makis Christou of Nicosia for damages amounting to hundreds of thousands of pounds for the alleged breach of two agreements dated 22.6.54 and 20.4.70.

The undisputed facts of the case are that the late Makis Christou, who was a brother of the plaintiff's grandmother signed as one of the parties in a marriage agreement in which he undertook to give to the plaintiff, who was to get married to a certain Takis Dokides, a building site situate at Santa Roza Street, in Nicosia, The marriage agreement was signed on 22,6,54 and the marriage took place in September 1954. The building site was not transferred to the plaintiff. The marriage of the plaintiff was dissolved in July, 1956, and in 1963 the late Makis Christou sold the land at Santa Roza Street, whichin fact was never divided into building plots and was the property by undivided share of his wife as well.

On 20.4.70 the late Makis Christou signed a statement by virtue of which he undertook to transfer to the plaintiff a building plot at Aglandjia, Plot No. 209, Block B No. 12 and which was at that time under division in the plans which were before the appropriate authorities, as a gesture of love and affection and further as a discharge of his old obligation to give the building site which he had undertaken in the marriage agreement.

The late Makis Christou did not transfer to the plaintiff the building plot at Aglandjia till the time of [*438]his death, which occurred in a traffic accident on 19.9.75, and the plaintiff is now suing the administrators of the late Makis Christou.

The defence of the administrators is based on legal grounds on which they consequently dispute the validity of the two documents.

At the hearing of the action the plaintiff Was not represented by counsel as her advocate had ceased to represent her for some time before the hearing. As the plaintiff was not represented at the hearing we gave her all the assistance that could possibly be given in presenting her case and during the hearing, when we were informed that a proposal for settlement was made by the administrators which was for the benefit of the plaintiff, we suggested to her to accept it but she declined to do so.

The administrators did not call any witnesses for their defence which, as we have already stated is based solely on legal argument concerning the validity of the two documents which were signed by the deceased.

With regard to the first document, that is, the marriage agreement which was produced in Court as Exhibit I, the legal points raised are that the document is without consideration and that the prerequisites of section 77 of Cap. 149 were not observed at its signing and further that even if the agreement is valid the right of action has prescribed as it was not instituted within six years from the time -ithas arisen (see section 5 of Cap. 15). [*439]With regard to the issue of consideration it is clear from the relevant agreement that it emanates from the agreement of marriage between the plaintiff and Takis Dokides which in fact took place in September, 195. Therefore consideration exists for that agreement.

Regarding the prerequisites of section 77 of Cap. 149 at the signing of the agreement, it is clear from the document itself that these prerequisites exist . The agreement is made in writing and it is signed by the deceased; there are also the signatures of two witnesses on the document who., as the plaintiff had stated in her evidence in Court, were present t the signing of the marriage agreement when the deceased had added his signature in it. The agreement is therefore, valid.

Section 5 of Gap. 15 of the Limitation of Actions Law provides as follows;

"No action shall be brought upon for or in respect of any cause of action not expressly provided for in this law or expressly exempted from the operation of this Law, after the expiration of six years from the date when such cause of action accrued."

Cap.

15 makes no express provision with regard to marriage contracts and therefore the six-year period applies.

The marriage agreement was signed on 22.6.54, the [*440] marriage took place in September 1954 and the action on such agreement ought to have been brought within the period of six years. The right to bring an action on this agreement has therefore been prescribed. Whilst on this point we may add that the marriage agreement was prescribed before Law 57/64 came into operation by virtue of which the period for the purposes of the limitation of actions has ceased to be reckoned as from 21.12.63.

We now turn to examine the second document, that is, the written statement of 20.4.70 which was produced in Court as Exhibit 2. The main legal point raised in the defence is that the undertaking contained in that document was made without consideration and it is therefore invalid. Mr.Odysseos, the advocate for the administrators, in his final address advanced elaborate and interesting arguments regarding the legal implications pertaining to this document but he. has abandoned them all and accepted its validity submitting to judgment for.£2,500.- being damages accruing from its breach, measured at the value of the building plot in accordance with the evidence of Mr.Patrikios, a lands' valuer expert, called by the plaintiff.

In view of this we shall proceed and examine what are the damages to which the plaintiff is entitled for the breach of the undertakin given in Exhibit 2.

Section 73(i) Cap. 149 provides that:- [*441] “When a contract has been broken, the party who

"suffers by such breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which, naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties knew when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the "breach of it. Such compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach.

"2. When an obligation resembling those created by contract has been incurred and has not been dischar ged, any person injured by the failure to discharge it is entitled to receive the same compensation from the party in default, as if such person had contracted to discharge it and had broken his contract."

It is clear in the present case that the amount of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled is the value of the building plot at the time of the breach.

When was the time of the breach?

The document, Exhibit 2, does not state when the building plot was to be given.

As it is provided in section 46 of Cap.149:-

"Where, by the contract a promisor is to perform his promise without application by the promisee, and [*442]"no time for performance is specified, the engagement must be performed within a reasonable time".

The question "what is a reasonable time" is in each particular case a question of fact.

In the present case we are of the opinion that the transfer of the building plot ought to have taken place within the years 1970 or 1971 the latest, since the undertaking given in Exhibit 2 was as it is stated therein, as payment of the old obligation given in 1954 and it was something outstanding for a long time.. Therefore the time to be considered as the time for the breach of the undertaking given in Exhibit. 2 is the year 1971.

Christos Patrikios, as we have already said estimates the value of the building plot at Aglandjia in 1971 at at around £2,500.- and this seems to be the highest figure.

The result therefore of this action is that judgment is given for the plaintiff for the sum of £2,-500.-With regard to costs, although Mr. Odysseos has in his favour an order for more than £1-70.-, he -claims no costs. In view of this we make no order as to costs.

Judgment for plaintiff for

£2,500.- with no order as

to costs.