Court allows landlord recovery of statutory tenancy premises via notice to former landlord under Rent Control Law.

[*253] 1981 February 10

(G. NICOLAOU, D.J.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF NICOSIA

Kyprianos S.Kouppa of Nicosia, through his attorney Stelios Galazis,

Applicant,

v.

1.Nina Tsiattalou,

2.Christos Tsiattalos,

Respondents.

(Appl. No. 232/80).

Landlord and tenant - Statutory tenancy - Recovery of possession - Notice of quit by tenants; to landlord’s predecessor - Effect - Section I6(I)(e) of the Rent Control Law, 1975 (Law 36/75) - Once provisions thereof satisfied no question of the exercise of a discretion arises.

Landlord and tenant - Statutory tenancy - Relates to the premises rather than to the landlord.

N. Andreou, for the applicant.

A. Skordis, for the respondents.

JUDGEMENT

The following judgment was delivered by:

G. NICOLAOU , D.J.: The applicant is[*254] the owner and the respondents are the statutory tenants of a dwelling house situated at 21, Korai Street, Nicosia. By the present application the applicant seeks recovery of possession of these premises on the ground that the tenancy has been determined by a notice to quit given by the tenants under s.I6 (I)(e) of the Rent Control Law of 1975•

The respondents had been tenants of the said premises for many years when on or about the 24th April, 1979 they were purchased by the applicant who in December, 1979 became the registered owner thereof. The facts sought to be established by the applicant in support of the present application are that by a notice to quit dated 31st July, 1979 given by the tenants to the. former landlord who was the applicant’s predecessor in title, the respondents who were then statutory tenants, expressed the intention to quit the said dwelling house on 31st March, 1980, the said tenancy being terminated as at that date. This date expired and the tenants failed to vacate the premises evincing an intention to continue as tenants thereof.

The respondents contested the application for an order of recovery of possession on two main grounds. Put shortly, these are, first, that it has not been proved that a valid notice to quit had ever been given by the respondents and, second, that even if the court should find that such notice had actually been given to the former landlord - predecessor in title of the applicant, this was of no avail to the applicant because on a proper interpretation[*255]of the relationship of landlord and tenant under the law such notice was personal to the particular landlord to whom it was given and did not, as it were attach to the premises so as to be transferable with them to confer rights on a new landlord.

On the question whether a valid notice to quit was in fact given by the respondents to the former landlord the manner in which the applicant has presented his case does, indeed, leave must to be desired. The applicant testified that at the time when he acquired the premises he was furnished by his predecessor in title with a document which purported to be a notice to quit in the terms already mentioned given by the respondents as tenants. This document is exhibit I in the case. It is stated in this document that it constitutes a notice to quit given in pursuance of the law; it is addressed to the predecessor in title of the applicant and signed at the end thereof by both respondents. Following an intervention of the court, the predecessor in title of the applicant who was the former landlord was called as a witness and though she could not recollect the number of the said premises being under the impression that it was No.8 in the said road, yet she recognised exhibit I as the document which her husband had said had been handed to him by respondent 2 as a notice to quit the premises. This notice to quit she gave to the applicant when he acquired the house. The respondents have chosen not to give any explanation at all regarding the existence of this document. On the evidence before me I find that the[*256]respondents as tenants of the said premises had in fact given to the applicant's predecessor in title who was land-lord at the time the notice to quit the premises embodied in exhibit I.

On the issue concerning the effect, if any, of a notice to quit given by a tenant to a previous landlord of the leased premises this being the predecessor in title of the present landlord, it is necessary before this can be resolved to examine briefly the nature of the relationship of landlord and tenant with particular reference to the premises leased.

Dicta in Cyprus Cinema & Theatre Co. Ltd. v. Karmiotis, (1967) I C.L.R. 42, per Josephides J. at p.56 and in Aspasia Millington Ward v. Roubina (1970) I C.L.R.88 per Josephides J. in delivering the judgment of the court at pp. I02-I03, indicate that in Cyprus a lease does not create an estate in land vested in the lessee but only a contractual right. This is, of course, now subject to the provisions of the Immovable Property (Tenure, Registration and Valuation) Law Cap. 224 as amended by Law 2/78. Whether the corollary of this is that a tenancy agreement between landlord and tenant in respect of uncontrolled premises binds the tenant vis-a-vis the landlord with whom such tenancy agreement was made but that such agreement does not operate as between that tenant and a new landlord is a matter which I would leave open as it does not arise for decision here though on this interesting point I would refer for guidance to the decisions in London County[*257]Council v. Allen, (1914) 3 K.B.642; Clore v. Theatrical Properties Ltd., (1936)/

(1936) 3 All E.R.483; Greenhalgh v. Mallard & Others(1963)

2 All E.R. 234; Fort Line Ltd. v. Ben Line Steamers Ltd. , (1958) 2 Q.B. 146 . Re Mattors v. Gibson

(1858) 4 De G & J. 276, Lord Stratcona s/s Co. Ltd. v. Dominion Coal Co. Ltd,(1925) All E.R. Rep. 86.

A statutory tenancy, however, is on a different footing for it extends beyond the bounds of contractual rights and liabilities having an existence which relates directly to the controlled premises occupied rather than to a specific landlord. As has been aptly said, a statutory tenancy is merely "a compendious expression used to describe the right of a tenant of protected premises to a remain in possession notwithstanding the determination of the contractual interest". (See Dudley & District Benefit Building Society v. Emerson (1949) Ch.707 at p. 717 and Marcroft Wagons v. Smith (1951) 2 All E.R. 271).

An indication of the effect of this lack of personal character in a. statutory tenancy as between landlord and tenant is to be found in s.21 of the Rent Control Law of 1975 under which the tenant, is bound with observance of terms of the initial tenancy agreement and this must in the very nature of things be quite independent of who the landlord at any particular time might be. The meaning attributed to the term landlord (ιδιοκτήτης) in s.2 of the. Rent Control Law points in the same direction. s.I6 of the same law which restricts the making of an[*258]order for the recovery of possession to certain specified classes of case set out therein, again reflects the same approach. Could it be seriously argued, for example, that when rent is lawfully due after the lapse of the time specified in a statutory notice in pursuance of s 16(I)(a) given by a landlord no action for recovery of possession will lie at the instance of a new landlord on the basis of that failure to pay the rent due after the said notice had been given? Where, of course, the person of the landlord seeking possession is of importance, as where, for example, his needs, circumstances or intention are relevant , this has been embodied in the terms on which recovery of possession may be ordered as under 16(I)(g) and 16(I)(h) but this is a completely different proposition from that made by learned counsel for the respondents.

In my judgment the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the respondents are devoid of merit. The applicant has established his right to the recovery of possession of the said premises under s. 16(1)(e). I would only add that in my view, it transpires on a perusal of this provision in the context and in the light of s.I6 read as a whole that once the terms of s.I6(I)(e) have been satisfied there does not arise any question of the exercise of a discretion in the matter. But even if such question did arise, on the material before me I would be bound to exercise such discretion in favour of the applicant, the respondents not having put anything into the scales that would bear on this matter.[*259]

In the results, the respondents are ordered to vacate the premises.

The respondents have not seen fit to adduce any evidence directed at assisting the court on the question whether to suspend the execution of such order, in case such an order was made. This, I understand, they, have failed to do because they considered it was safer for them on the issue/recovery of possession if they refrained from adducing any evidence at all and let the applicant prove his case if he could. Whatever the case may be, I propose without more to proceed to deal with this matter in a manner that appears to me be just.

In the circumstances I suspend the execution of the said order for a period of four months.

As to the question of costs, in all the circumstances I make no order as to costs.

Order that respondents vacate premises. No order as to costs.