Court holds Displaced Tenants Law applies to controlled area residences built after 1974 regardless of construction date.

[*359] 1979 December 12

(PIKIS, P.D.C.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF LARNACA

Stelios Pattichis and Another,

Plaintiffs,

v.

Kikis Sotiri HadjiKyriacou,

Defendant.

(Action No. 1137/79).

Landlord and tenant - Displaced tenants - Whether section 7(1) of the Displaced Tenants Lease of Residence Law, 1978 (Law 56/78) applies to residences situate within controlled areas built and let after 31st December, 1974.

Statutes - Construction - Purposive approach - Construction of section 7(1) of the Displaced Tenants Lease of Residence Law, 1978 (Law 56/78).

A. Koukounis, for the Plaintiffs.

A. Poetis, for the Defendant.

JUDGMENT

The following judgment was delivered by:-

PIKIS, P.D.C.:- Only one succinct point arises for consideration, that is whether the provisions of section 7 of the Displaced Tenants Lease of Residence Law 56/78 apply to residences situate within controlled areas built and let after 31st December 1974. The

broader issue may be defined thus: Is the application of s.7 of Law 56/78 that purports to confer security of tenure to displaced tenants

limited to properties built before 31st December 1974? If the Court upholds the submission of the owner [*360] and finds that the house let to the defendant is not covered by the provisions of s.7 of the law then it is conceded that plaintiff is entitled to an eviction order. On the other hand, if the submission of the tenant is upheld and he is entitled to the protection of the law, the action collapses and it will have to be dismissed for in that eventuality he is lawfully in occupation as a statutory tenant. It is primarily a matter of construction.

The Construction of section 7(1), Law 56/78

It is appropriate that the provisions of s.7(l) should be reproduced:-

"Παρά τας διατάξεις των περί Ενοικιοστασίων

Νόμων του 1975 και 1977 διαρκούσης της περιόδου αναστολής ουδέν διάταγμα

εκδίδεται δυνάμει του ρηθέντος Νόμου δι ανάκτησιν κατοχής ακινητού διά

κατοικίαν ενοικιασθέντος υπό πρόσφυγος ενοικιαστού εφ' όσον ούτος εξακολουθεί

να καταβάλλη παν νομίμως υπ' αυτού οφειλόμενον ενοίκιον:

Νοείται ότι ο ιδιοκτήτης δύναται να

υποστήριξη επί Δικαστηρίω ότι εις δεδομένην υπόθεσιν υφίστανται τοιαύται

ειδικαί περιπτώσεις αίτινες θα εδικαιολόγουν την έκδοσιν διατάγματος εξώσεως

και το Δικαστήριον δύναται, λαμβανομένων υπ' όψιν όλων των περιστατικών της

υποθέσεως και της εκτάσεως της ταλαιπωρίας ήτις θα προεκαλείτο εις εκάτερον των διαδίκων συνεπεία της

εκδόσεως[*361] ή μη διατάγματος εξώσεως, να εκδώση τοιούτο διάταγμα και υπό τοιούτους

όρους οίους το Δικαστήριον θα έκρινε πρέπον."

In the proviso following discretion is conferred on the Court to make an eviction order in the face of special circumstances. The submission for the landlord/plaintiff is that inasmuch as s.7(1) confers relief from the application of the provisions of the Rent Control Law 36/75 as subsequently amended and considering that this legislation applies only to premises erected prior to 31st December 1974, the protection of the law does not extend to lettings of property built subsequent to the aforementioned date. In aid of his submission learned counsel for the landlord referred the Court to a decision of the District Court of Larnaca, delivered by myself on 26th January 1979 in Rent Application 142/1978†. There I decided, on a consideration of the wording of s.7(1), viewed in combination with the provisions of s.3(1) of the Rent Control Law 36/75, that some residences of displaced tenants were left out of the ambit of s. 7(1) because the Rent Control Law is inapplicable in the case of properties situate outside controlled areas. I arrived at that conclusion notwithstanding the fact that the rental payable by displaced tenants for the lease of residence anywhere in Cyprus is subject to control and review by the rent authority set up by s.3 of Law 56/78.

For the tenant it was argued that the decision in Rent Application 142/78 is distinguishable from the present case because the property let to the tenant is [*362] within a controlled area. And inasmuch as a specific definition is given for "akiniton dhia katikian" it is manifest that the relieving provisions of s.7(1) apply to every residence of a displaced person situate within controlled areas.

Section 7(1) is a reproduction of s. 3(1) of the Suspension of Eviction Orders Law 31/77 that supplemented the Residence for Displaced Tenants Law 4/76, making specific provision regulating the rental payable by displaced tenants. Reference to the history of the enactment is made simply in order to indicate the historical perspective and not as an aid to the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the law for not even in the case of consolidating enactments is it permissible to have regard to antecedent legislation unless there is a real and substantial difficulty that classical methods of construction cannot resolve. (See Farrell v. Alexander (1976) 2 All E.R. 721). The same principles apply with still greater force in the case of non consolidating enactments and Law 56/78 is not a consolidating enactment though it incorporates some of the provisions of the laws it repeals, namely Law 4/76 and 31/77. So we must concentrate on the wording of s.7(1) of Law 56/78 in order to discern the meaning of its provisions read in the context of this enactment. Law 56/78 aims at making special provision regulating the tenure to be enjoyed and the rent to be paid by displaced tenants for the lease of a residence. It sets up a statutory body with responsibility, inter alia, to determine the rent to be paid by displaced tenants and kindred matters. [*363]

The modern method of statutory interpretation favours what has come to be known as the purposive approach, that is an interpretation is favoured that is compatible with the general objects of the statute. (See Kammins Ballrooms v. Zenith Investments (1970) 2 All E.R. 871, 893 (H.L.) and Nothman v. London Borough v. Barnet (1978)

1 All E.R. 1203). The same tendency is noticeable in Cyprus. (See Krasismenos v. Hjichanni (1963) 2 C.L.R. 448). And in the case of

legislation with a marked social content, which is the case with Law 56/78, there are additional reasons for following the purposive

approach. Any other course might leave a gap between the aims of the legislature and the results produced, leaving unremedied the mischief against which the law is directed, in this case the exposure of displaced tenants to insecurity of tenure regarding their residence. But it must be emphasized that the purposive approach is no warrant from departing from the plain provisions of the law nor can it be invoked as a justification for removing anomalies created by the plain language of a statute. (See Stock v. Prank Jones (Tipton Ltd.) , (1978) 1 All E.R. 941).

In Rent Application 142/1978, I decided that residences of displaced tenants situate outside controlled areas are left out of the ambit of the provisions of s. 7(1) of Law 56/78. My reasons were that inasmuch as the application of Law 36/75 is limited to properties situate within controlled areas and the relief conferred by s.7(1) extends only to cases where Law 36/75 is applicable, there is no room for extending its relieving provisions to properties [*364] in uncontrolled areas, something altogether outside the domain of Law 36/75. Having reflected once more on that decision I still hold that the above interpretation is unavoidable notwithstanding the anomaly created thereby. Section 3(1), Law 36/75, expressly limits the application of the law to properties situate within controlled areas. By virtue of s.16(1), Law 36/75, eviction orders can only be made in respect of residences situate within controlled areas that were built and let for the first time before 31st December 1974. And on the basis of that premise learned counsel for the landlord argued that the relief conferred by the provisions of s.7(1) is limited to properties in respect of which an order might be made under the provisions of s.16. But this argument is defeated on a reading of the plain provisions of the law that confer relief in respect of any residence occupied by a tenant. The definition supplied by s.2 of Law 56/78 for the residence of a tenant covers every residence of a displaced tenant independently of when it was built or first let. Unlike properties situate outside controlled areas which are altogether left out of the ambit of Law 36/75 specific provision is made for relief from ejectment in the case of residence occupied by tenants independently of the day on which they are constructed or first let. If I was in any doubt as to the interpretation that should be accorded to s.7(1) I would arrive at the same

conclusion guided by the wise, if I may say so with respect, counsel of Lord Wilberforce in Vandyk v. Oliver (1976) 1 All E.R. 466 (H.L.), when he said at p. 471 – [*365]

” . . I rest on the principle that if one possible interpretation of a statute leads to a result contrary to the evident general purpose one should prefer to it an interpretation also reasonably possible which does not lead to such a result”.

And the interpretation to which I have arrived is to say the least, possible and certainly does justice to the intention of the legislature.

In my judgment s.7(1) confers security of tenure to all displaced tenants when their residence is situate within controlled areas, independently of when it was built. The distinction made between the two, that is residences within and outside controlled areas, anomalous though it may be, it is not altogether unjustified for, as it is well known, there is far greater scarcity of accommodation within controlled areas than outside.

In the result, the case is dismissed with costs in favour of defendant.

Action dismissed with costs

in favour of defendant.

† (1980) 1 J.S.C. 136.