Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
Adamos Costa Constantinides v. Vassos Yianni Pitsillou and Another (1980) JSC 279 Generato dall'IA

Court allows breach of contract claim and exemplary damages for malicious land sale interference.

Numero d'incarto Adamos Costa Constantinides v. Vassos Yianni Pitsillou and Another (1980) JSC 279
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Cipro (CY)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Parzialmente accolto (Partially Allowed)

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff against the vendor for breach of contract and awarded exemplary damages to the second defendant for procuring that breach. The vendor failed to pay the final installment, and the second defendant subsequently purchased the land at an undervalued price to generate profit. The court held that the second defendant's conduct undermined decent commercial behavior and thus imposed additional punitive damages alongside compensatory relief.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

Civil Wrongs Law Cap 148 s. 34(1); Civil Wrongs Law Cap 149 s. 73(1): Procuring a breach of contract constitutes a tort where exemplary damages may be awarded if the defendant's conduct is calculated to yield profit and undermines the foundations of decent behavior in ordinary dealings.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
procuring breach of contract exemplary damages award land sale interference vendor repudiation joint tortfeasors rule unjust enrichment principles commercial confidence modalità di vendita

Disposizioni normative citate

Generato dall'IA
Civil Wrongs Law Cap 148 s. 34(1)
Civil Wrongs - Procuring breach of contract - Ingredients of the tort - Section 34(1) of the Civil Wrongs Law, Cap.
Civil Wrongs Law Cap 149 s. 73(1)
The measure of damages for breach of contract is regulated by the provisions of s.73(1) of the Contract Law, Cap.
Debtors Relief Law 1975 (Law 9/75)

Giurisprudenza citata

Generato dall'IA
Cassell's case
Lord Diplock in his judgment in Cassell's case (supra) hints at the relationship between unjust enrichment on the one hand and the amount of exemplary damages.
Cassell & Co. Limited v. Broome (1972)
(See Cassell & Co. Limited v. Broome (1972) 1 All E.R.
Egger v. Viscount Chelmsford (1964)
Rookes v. Barnard (1964)
The scope of exemplary damages was seriously limited by the decision of the House of Lords in Rookes v. Barnard (1964) 1 All E.R.
Generato dall'IA

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Testo completo

[*279] 1979 June 30

(PIKIS, P.D.C. AND CONSTANTINIDES,D.J.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF FAMAGUSTA SITTING AT LARNACA

Adamos Costa Constantinides,

Plaintiff,

v.

Vassos Yianni Pitsillou and Another,

Defendants.

(Action No. 455/78).

Contract - Sale of land - Time - Not of the essence of the contract - And not made of the essence by an appropriate notice - Vendor not entitled to repudiate contract - Moreover purchase protected by the Debtors Relief Law, 1975 (Law 9/75).

Damages - Breach of contract for sale of land - Measure of damages - Section 73(1) of the Civil Wrongs Law, Cap 149.

Civil Wrongs - Procuring breach of contract - Ingredients of the tort - Section 34(1) of the Civil Wrongs Law, Cap. 148.

Contract - Procuring breach of contract - Section 34(1) of the Civil Wrongs Law, Cap, 148.

Damages - Exemplary damages - Quantum - Award - Whether on the principles of Rookes v. Barnard

(1964) 1 All E.R. 367 or on wider approach - Procuring breach of contract for sale of land - Award of exemplary damages.

A. Poetis, for the Plaintiff.

E. Samoutas, for Defendant 1.

A. Arghyrides, for Defendant 2.

JUDGMENT

The judgment of the Court was delivered by:-

PIKIS, P.D.C.:- This is a twofold action: [*280] Firstly, a claim is raised against defendant 1 for breach of a written agreement dated 7th May 1973 (exhibit 6) by virtue of which defendant 1 agreed to sell to plaintiff his share in a plot of land at Ayia Napa of which he was coowner to the extent of one third hereafter referred to as the subject property. Secondly, a claim is made against defendant 2 for compensatory and exemplary damages for alleged procurement of the breach of the aforementioned agreement between plaintiff and defendant 1 contrary to the provisions of section 34(1) of the Civil Wrongs Law, Cap.148.

The agreement provided for the sale of the subject property for a sum of £10,000 payable in three instalments as follows: (a) £3,000 upon the execution of the agreement; (b) £2,000 on 31st December 1973; and (c) £3,000 on 30th August 1974. The first two instalments were paid on the dates stipulated for in the agreement but not so the third instalment.

The intervening tragic events of the summer of 1974 caused the displacement of the family of the plaintiff and removal from Famagusta, the backbone of their financial strength. Defendant 1 kept, it seems, pressing for payment of the balance and as admitted a sum of £700 was paid in two instalments towards plaintiff's debt of £3,000. Be it noted that the agreement provided that money in arrears would carry interest at the rate of 5 per cent per annum.

On 14th September 1978 defendant 1 transferred the subject property to defendant 2 for the sum of £14,000 as [*281] they declared before the Lands Department. The transfer had been preceded by a written agreement of sale reached, as we were told, a few days earlier. The Lands Department refused to accept the declared price on the ground that it was far below a fair estimate of the market value of the land, estimated at £19,000. In the course of the hearing agreement was reached that at the time of the sale of the subject property by defendant 1 to defendant 2 its market value was £18,500. To complete the history surrounding the ownership of this land it may be mentioned that prior to acquiring the share of defendant 1 defendant 2 had purchased one third of the property from the Paralimni coowners and shortly after acquiring the share of defendant 1 he purchased the third share from the brother of defendant 1 for a sum of £18,500. It is interesting to note the great increase of the value of land in the area where the subject property is situate between the end of 1977 or early 1978 when the first share was acquired, valued by the L.R.O. at £9,5OO and the valuation made of the subject property in less than a year at £19,000. It seems the land doubled in value in less than a year.

It is the case for the plaintiff that defendant 1 sold the land to defendant 2 in breach of his contractual obligations to the plaintiff and that he is in consequence, liable to damages for breach of contract. Further it is his case that defendant 2 had, notwithstanding full knowledge of the existence of a contract between plaintiff

and defendant 1, procured a breach of this contract after [*282] failure on his part to persuade the plaintiff to. sell to him the

land securing thereby considerable advantage to himself made up of (a) the difference between the market value of the land and the value at which it had been purchased and (b) the advantage of acquiring thereby the whole strip of land which is apparently favourably situated for development at Ayia Napa, a rapidly developing tourist resort.

In his defence defendant 1 denies being guilty of any breach of contract and put forward a dual defence contending that plaintiff was solely to blame for the cessation of their contractual relationship because of his continued failure to pay the balance due. In the alternative the defence is raised that the land was sold with the consent of the plaintiff. Defendant 2 made a brief defence denying any knowledge of the existence of any agreement between plaintiff and defendant 1 or, as it is put in the defence, any liability under the provisions of Cap.

149. In fact he is sued for damages for the commission of a tort defined by the Civil Wrongs Law, Cap. 148. At the trial defendant 2 maintained on oath that he knew not of any contract between plaintiff and defendant 1 and suggested that he laboured under the belief, as if this was a consequential factor, that the contract that defenant 1 had for the sale of the land was with the father of the plaintiff and not the plaintiff himself. In actual fact the father of the plaintiff, Costas Constantinides [*283] (P.W.7) was at all times the attorney of the plaintiff who managed his affairs during his son's absence abroad and acted on his behalf. So it is his case that at the time of purchasing the property from defendant 1 he did so notwithstanding his knowledge that defendant 1 had sold the property to a third party, namely the agent of the plaintiff. In his evidence defendant 2 was shaken in his assertion that he knew not of the actual parties to the written agreement in question in view of the evidence of defendant 1 who stated that he told defendant 2 that his agreement was with plaintiff acting through his father. He did not exclude the possibility that the true facts, as to the identity of the parties to the original sale agreement were imparted to him.

At the time of the sale of the subject property by defendant 1 to the plaintiff and for a long time thereafter the plaintiff was studying in the United Kingdom and was represented by his father in Cyprus, Mr. Costas Constantinides, to whom he had given a power of attorney.

The Evidence

Conflicting evidence was received as to what preceded the sale of the property by defendant 1 to defendant 2. It is common ground that defendant 1 was pressing the plaintiff through his attorney to pay the balance due under the agreement of 1973. The father of plaintiff was putting off payment of the balance maintaining he was out of funds and promising to make payment either [*284] on the return of the Greek population to Famagusta or upon receipt of pension moneys after his retirement. At some stage defendant 1 introduced defendant 2 to Mr. Constantinides as a prospective purchaser of his share in the land.

The two sides disagree as to the date of this visit but there is consensus that the object of the visit was to enable defendant 2 to make a bid for the purchase of the land. The visit took place after defendant 2 had agreed to purchase or had purchased one third share of the land in question. Defendant 2 made an offer of £12,000 that Mr. Constantinides rejected after a moment's reflection. His evidence on this point is supported by that of defendant 1. The recollection of defendant 2 on this subject, like many other subjects, is apparently poor and he had no clear recollection whether Mr.

Constantinides said a blunt "no" or merely promised to study the matter and let them know. In the evidence of Mr. Constantinides the two of them left very disappointed, mattering, as they were leaving, threats that were allegedly given effect to months later when the property was sold without plaintiff's knowledge by defendant 1 to defendant.

2. In his evidence they were murmering they would fix him "tha se kanonisoumen". The defendants on the other hand maintained that notwithstanding the negative reaction of Mr. Constantinides to the offer of defendant 2 and his refusal to sell, acting under the pressure of defendant 1 for the payment of the balance, he told them as they were leaving that if he did not pay the balance within 10 to 15 [*285] days defendant 2 would be free to sell it. And acting on that authority defendant 1, without having any further consultation with Mr. Constantinides and without in any way referring the matter to him sold the property months later to defendant 2 at a price agreed between them in the absence of plaintiff or his attorney. This aspect of the defence of defendant 2, that is that he laboured under the belief that defendant 1 had been authorized to sell the property was in no way adumbrated in the defence nor touched upon during the cross-examination of Mr. Costas Constantinides, the person who had allegedly made such an unequivocal statement.

Defendant 1, like defendant 2, laid stress in his evidence on alleged authority given to him by Mr. Constantinides to sell if the balance was not paid within 15 days. This was not his case while cross-examining Costas Constantinides to whom the suggestion had been made that it was defendant 1 himself who threatened as he was leaving the house of Constantinides that he would be selling the property within a fortnight unless the balance was paid. This change of stand has not escaped our attention.

Defendant 1 maintained that their visit to Mr. Constantinides took place in June 1978 or thereabouts after a meeting he had with Mr. Constantinides at the office of Mr. Karas, an advocate then acting for Mr. Constantinides who had summoned defendant 1 to his office to go through accounts. It is the evidence of Mr. Karas, a [*286] witness called by defendant 1, that at that meeting he intimated to defendant 1 that the plaintiff was entitled to the protection of the Debtors Relief Law 9/75. Notwithstanding this intimation defendant 1 kept threatening to sell the property unless paid the balance. In their final addresses both defendants rightly admitted through their counsel that the plaintiff is covered by the provisions of the Debtors Relief Law 9/75 enacted to confer relief to debtors stricken by the calamitous events of 1974 and afford them a breathing space to meet their contractual obligations. If Mr. Constantinides knew of this state of the law it would indeed be surprising if he felt so anxious about the discharge of his obligations to defendant 1 as to give him unfettered authority to sell the property as alleged by the defendants.

Constantinides in his evidence admitted that defendant 1 was pressing for payment of the balance though he denied that defendant 1 specifically threatened to sell it. He put the visit of the defendants to his house sometimes towards the end of December 1977 whereas he placed the meeting at the office of Mr. Karas some months later, some time in about March 1978. At his last meeting with defendant

1 the latter did not appear to be unduly anxious to have an immediate payment of the money, being rather concerned to secure interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum as opposed to 5 per cent per annum for which provision was made in the agreement. Mr. Karas confirmed that defendant 1 raised a claim for interest above that stipulated [*287] for in the agreement but stated, as already mentioned, that defendant 1 was as anxious as ever to secure payment of the balance. Mr. Karas, however, confirmed the story of Mr. Constantinides that defendant 1 came to his office on instructions from Mr. Constantinides so as to go through and agree upon their account. Two relations of defendant 1, namely his son-in-law Markos Thoma (D.W.1) and the father of Markos, Thomas Markou (D.W.3) testified that defendant 1 was pressing Constantinides for payment of the balance and that defendant 1 was threatening to sell it if plaintiff continued withholding payment of the balance, a threat that Constantinides refused to take seriously as one may infer from his reaction thereto. Another aspect of the evidence of Thomas Markou worthy of specific mention refers to a conversation he had with defendant 1 after the sale of the property to defendant 2; and it is indeed revealing of the state of mind of defendant 1 his motives and thoughts. Characteristically he told the witness, referring to the sale made to defendant 2: "I sold the land and there is a risk that we may go to prison” (epoulisa to ktima simbethere dje bori na pamen filakin". Certainly this is not a statement expected of someone who feels that he is, as defendant 1 alleged, acting in pursuance of his rights. On the contrary this statement shows the apprehensions felt by someone after a sinister deed.

Costas Constantinides testified that defendant 2 did not give up his approaches to him after his initial refusal to sell. A second approach was made through [*288] advocate Karas and at a meeting at the Office of this lawyer defendant 2 raised his offer to a sum in the region of £14,000 to £15,000. This offer was again rejected whereupon he was asked whether he would be willing to co-operate in the implementation of a scheme for the development of the land to which he replied that he would be studying any plan that might be submitted for the purpose.

Mr. Karas was in no position to say one way or another whether any such discussion took place between Constantinides and defendant 2 at his office whereas defendant 2 denied ever making such an offer though he could not exclude having had a chance meeting with Constantinides at the office of advocate Karas. And the story did not end there according to Constantinides. In May 1978 he was approached by Ioannis Patsalides, an estate agent of Ayia Napa, who made an offer on behalf of defendant 2 for the purchase of the land. In this he is supported by Ioannis Patsalides who testified that defendant 2 had engaged his services and made through him an offer to Constantinides for the purchase of his share in the land for £18,500.

This offer was rejected, the witness intimating to defendant 2 that Constantinides was not willing to sell at that price, mentioning he had already rejected an offer for £22,000.- He plainly told defendant 2 that Constantinides would not be prepared to consider any offer unless it exceeded £22,000.- The reaction of defendant 2 is summed up in the following statement he allegedly made when faced with the persistent refusal of Constantinides to sell the [*289] land to him: He mentioned that once plaintiff was not prepared to sell at £18,500 he would leave the matter at that and he would fix Constantinides in the way he knew.

He would acquire the land without Constantinides gaining knowledge of it: "Afou dhen to dhidi £18,500 afiston ke tha to paro egho me ton tropon pou xero. Tha tou to paro ke dhen tha pari prefan". Defendant 2 denied ever involving Patsalides or asking him to mediate. He maintained that the evidence of Patsalides is fabricated as an act of revenge for recent quarrels they had during the last two to three months. According to defendant 2 they are not on speaking terms. A witness for defendant 1, Thomas Markou, testified that he witnessed not long ago a heated argument between defendant 2 arid Patsalides, at the end of which Patsalides made a threatening statement to the following effect: "Tha sekanoniso alios pos".

All this was denied by Patsalides who maintained that his relations with defendant

2 have always been cordial and friendly, so cordial that very recently defendant 2 sought to engage his services for the sale of newly erected flats belonging to defendant 2, supplying him with the brochure, a copy of which he produced in Court (item 'B’). Defendant 2 maintained that the brochure was furnished to the witness by an employee of defendant 2 without his knowledge and contrary to his wishes.

It is an admitted fact that at no time prior to the sale of the property by defendant 1 to defendant 2 did the defendants or any of them acquaint the plaintiff or [*290] his attorney of their deal nor afterwards for that matter. Everything was done secretly behind his back. In fact the attorney of the plaintiff learned about the transaction from a source other than the defendants some time after its conclusion, in October 1978. Immediately he paid a visit to defendant 1 and defendant 2 successively, accompanied by Lakis Sofroniou (P.W.5), a bank employee who was working under Costas Constantinides when he was manager of the Famagusta brach of Chartered Bank now functioning at Larnaca; also his godfather.

If the evidence of Constantinides and Sofroniou is accepted defendant 1 was impertinent showing gross disregard for the contractual rights of plaintiff threatening to repeat the exercise and terminate unilaterally another contract of sale with a certain Phitos Poetis. The sons-in-law of defendant 1 evinced abusive tendencies and dismissed Constantinides and Sofroniou in a rather abrupt manner. The reaction of defendant 2 was rather synical, as one may discern from this statement: "Afou to ethelete esis yiati dhen to apiasete?" With reference having been made to the aftermath of the sale of the property by defendant 1 to defendant 2 we conclude our summary of the evidence. Below we shall make our findings and thus pave the way for our decision in the case.

Findings

We have seen the parties and their witnesses testify and have gone through the evidence with very great [*291] care the more so because of the gravity of the allegations made against the defendants. On any view of the evidence even if we were to accept their testimony, it would be difficult to reconcile defendants' actions with good faith on their part. The sale of the property by defendant 1 to defendant 2 without any reference to the plaintiff or his attorney and their subsequent silence about the agreement concluded is strongly indicative of what was in the mind of the defendants at the time.

The allegation of the defendants that at their joint meeting with the agent of the plaintiff the latter made an unqualified statement authorizing defendant 1 to sell the property unless paid within a forthnight is, leaving aside for a moment the contradictions and inconsistencies in their versions, hard to fit into the facts of that meeting. Whereas it is virtually admitted that at that meeting Constantinides dismissed the suggestion of selling the property to defendant 2 he summarily authorized defendant 1 to sell the property without referring in any way to the possible terms under which defendant 1 might sell the property, In our judgment the defendants, both of them, concocted the story as to authority having been conferred by Constantinides to defendant 1 to sell in a poor effort to avoid the consequences of their unsavoury conduct.

In our judgment the defendants were, each for his own reasons, highly disappointed because of the refusal of plaintiff, expressed through his agent, to sell the property to defendant 2, defendant 1 because he would be unable to count on early collection of money [*292] owing to him and defendant 2 because the refusal of the plaintiff to sell frustrated his plans to acquire the land in its entirety, and acquisition that would enhance the value of his existing share and would be a vital step in the process of acquiring the whole, an accomplishment that would enable him to put the land to uses of his choice.

We accept the evidence of Constantinides as to the date of the meeting between the three and what was exchanged between them: the meeting took place towards the end of December 2 977 and not later, as suggested by defendants. Defendant 1 kept pressing plaintiff to pay the balance due to him. threatening at times to proceed with the sale of the property apparently meaning to induce thereby the plaintiff to pay him. These threats were made by defendant 1 notwithstanding the fact that he had been told by the advocate of Constantinides, namely Mr. Karas, that he was not entitled to insist on payment of the balance because of the provisions of the Debtors Relief Law 9/75.

Constantinides on the other hand refused to take thes threats seriously probably feeling that the absence of a right on the part of defendant 1 to sell the property would deter him from so doing. Yet it did not and we must now resolve whether he is entitled to damages for breach of contract against defendant 1.

Breach of Contract - Damages

Failure to meet contractual obligations at the time stipulated for in the agreement does not in itself confer a right to repudiate the agreement unless compliance with time stipulations is expressly made of the essence [*293] of the agreement. In the absence of such a stipulation the only way that time can be made of the essence is by giving a reasonable notice to that effect. (See Nicos K. Shakolas v. Sofronios Michaelides and Another

(1967) 1 C.L.R. p. 290; Rightside Properties v. Gray (1974) 2 All E.R. 1169.)

In the present case time was not made of the essence in the agreement between plaintiff and defendant 1 nor did defendant 1 make time of the essence by an appropriate notice. On the other hand the Debtors Relief Law - Law 9/75 conferred express protection to stricken debtors from inability to meet contractual obligations incurred before the tragic events of the summer of 1974, aiming at protecting them from peremptory or unjust repudiations. By section 6(a) creditors of stricken debtors are prohibited from terminating such agreement except in the manner envisaged therein by serving a 3-monthly written notice in the case of contracts relating to the purchase of immovable property. Therefore independently of the fact that time had not been made of the essence, as earlier explained, defendant 1 had no right to terminate the agreement except in the manner envisaged by s.6(a), Law 9/75, something he omitted to do. In their final addresses counsel for both defendants rightly conceded that the plaintiff was a person entitled to take advantage of the provisions of Law 9/75.

In the light of our findings and the principles of the law earlier expounded defendant 1 had no right to [*294] terminate the agreement with plaintiff nor was the agreement ever validly terminated. By selling the property to defendant 2 defendant 1 acted in breach of his agreement with the plaintiff and he is therefore answerable in damages. It may be worth mentioning that the common law right to rescind, even where validly exercised, does not become operative until it is communicated to the purchaser; only after such communication can the vendor recover possession of the land if the purchaser came into possession. (See Lakshmijit y. Sherani (1973) 3 All E.R. 739, 744 (P.C.)).

The measure of damages for breach of contract is regulated by the provisions of s.73(1) of the Contract Law, Cap.

149 that reproduces the common law principles on the subject as formulated in Hadley v. Baxendale (1849) 9 Exch. 341. Recent authorities lay added emphasis on the element of foreseeability at the time of the formation of the agreement as the guiding consideration for determining what is the

resulting damage from breach. (See Heron II 1967) 3 All E.R. 686 and Koufos v. C. Czarnikov Ltd. (1967)3 W.L.R. 1491 (H.L.).) In the case of Lloyd v. Stanbury (1971) 2 All

E.R. 268 the Court dealt specifically with the award of damages for breach of a contract for the sale of land and held that apart from losses recoverable as falling within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the agreement the innocent purchaser may recovery legal costs as well as costs incurred in performing acts in anticipation of finalization of the agreement. We need not in this action consider the principle approved [*295] in Wroth v. Tyler (1975) 1 All E.R. 897, making possible the assessment of damage at the time of trial, because its application is limited to cases where specific performance is refused in the exercise of the Court’s discretion or where specific performance is possible only in a limited way despite the absence of any fault on the part of the plaintiff. (See Grant v. Dawkins (1973) 3 All E.R. 897.) The damages to which defendant 1 is liable for the breach of his contract with the plaintiff is £8,500 that is the difference in value between the contract price and the market value of the land at the time of breach agreed at £18,500.

Procuring a Breach of Contract

Notwithstanding the rejection by Constantinides of the offer of defendant 2 the latter persisted in his efforts to acquire the property and made for the purpose several approaches to Constantinides firstly through advocate Karas and subsequently through commission agent Patsalides, We accept the evidence of Patsalides that he made an offer on instructions from defendant 2 to the plaintiff through his father for a sum of £18,500. Also we accept the evidence of Constantinides that defendant 2 improved on his original offer at a meeting they had at the office of Karas. We reject the evidence of defendant 2 to the contrary and we reject the allegation that witness Patsalides fabricated his evidence out of a

desire to revenge defendant 2. In our judgment relations between [*296] this witness and defendant 2 were excellent and remained so until

Patsalides testified in Court. The reaction of defendant 2 to the rejection of his offer, elicited by the statement made to Patsalides, is informative of the intentions of defendant 2 at the time and his determination to acquire the property, under any circumstances, on terms agreeable to him. The subsequent purchase of the property in the surreptitious circumstances under which it was concluded and the failure to have any communication with plaintiff or his attorney on the matter constitutes evidence indicative of the deliberation with which defendant 2 acted causing the interruption of the contractual relations between defendant 1 and the plaintiff. We are not prepared to make anything of the evidence of either defendant 1 or defendant 2 as to what was exchanged between them before sale. Neither defendant 1 nor defendant 2 impressed us as witnesses of truth. On the contrary we gained the impression that they lied to the Court in their effort to improve their position in the present litigation. We reject the evidence of each defendant as totally unreliable.

In our judgment the following facts are of crucial importance in deciding whether defendant 2 is answerable for procuring a breach of contract:-

(a) The knowledge defendant 2 had of the existence of an agreement between plaintiff and defendant 1. We find as a fact that defendant 2 knew of the existence of a contract between plaintiff and defendant 1. [*297]

(b) The persistence of defendant 2 to acquire the property of the plaintiff.

(c) The reaction of defendant 2 when informed by Patsalides of the refusal to sell at £18,500. The statement made to witness Patsalides offers an insight into the thoughts of defendant 2 and explains his subsequent action. This statement, coupled with the subsequent conduct of defendant 2, are indicative of the determination with which defendant 2 acted in bringing to an end contractual relations between plaintiff and defendant 1. No doubt defendant

1 collaborated in his unsavoury designs. In our judgment the purchase by defendant 2 of the property that defendant 1 had sold to the plaintiff was a deliberate act that caused, to the knowledge of defendant 2, a breach in the contractual relations between plaintiff and defendant 1. This breach of contractual relations was the direct result of the persistence of defendant 2 to acquire the property at all costs; and the purchase itself an act in furtherance thereto.

In the light of the above we hold that defendant 2 is liable for the commission of the tort defined by section 34(1) of the Civil Wrongs, Cap. 148, that is for the unlawful causing of a breach of contract. The ambit and scope of this tort are the subject of

discussion in Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 14th edition at para.792 et seq. [*298] and reference is made to the several

aspects of this tort, a civil wrong that appears to have gained its modern complexion in the decision in Lumley v. Gie (1853) 2 E. & B. 216. We need not embark on a lengthy discussion of the ingredients of this tort or its several elements. Briefly there must be proved that the alleged tortfeasor knew of the existence of the contract and acted with intention to bring it to an end. The knowledge required need not extend to details of all the terms of the

agreement whereas wrecklessness may suffice to establish the necessary intent. In this case we find as a fact that the

conduct of defendant 2 was intentional in every sense of the word. Proof of damage is also an ingredient of this civil wrong but once damage is proved thereafter the award of damages is at large as stressed in British Industrial Plastics v. Ferguson

(1938) 4 All E.R. 504; the Court may award a sum appropriate in all the circumstances of the case without strict reference to the financial loss suffered.

Exemplary Damages

Exemplary damages is an exceptional species of damage that may appropriately be contrasted with compensatory damage unlike which exemplary damages are meant to set an example or provide appropriate punishment; hence this type of damage is also known as punitive damage. Exemplary damages have many features in common with punishment by a criminal Court and can appropriately be described as an extention of the arm of the criminal law in the domain of civil law. Like punishment in a criminal case damage is [*299] fixed by reference to the culpability of the conduct of the defendant and with a view to set an example and thereby avoid repetition of the condemnable behaviour. The scope of exemplary damages was seriously limited by the decision of the House of Lords in Rookes v. Barnard (1964) 1 All E.R. 367. The House decided that exemplary damages are an anomaly and as such it should not be extended. It was held that the award of exemplary damages is permissible only in three case, that is where the defendant is guilty of (a) oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional conduct, being a servant of the government; (b) a tort calculated at the time of its commission to bring a profit to the tortfeasor that is deliberate conduct intended to bring in profit exceeding possible compensation that the tortfeasor may be ordered to pay; and (c) guilty of conduct expressly punishable by statute with exemplary damages. The correctness of the decision in Rookes (supra) was questioned by the Court of Appeal in Broome v. Cassell & Co. Ltd. (1971) 2 All E.R. 187 on the ground that it stood in conflict with earlier decisions of the House. Therefore it was not followed as the Court of Appeal formed the view that it was delivered per incuriam. The Court cited with approval the definition supplied by Mayne And McGregor On Damages, 12th edition, p. 196, 197 shaped on the understanding of the law before the decision in Rookes v. Barnard. The principle that was acknowledged until 1964 to regulate exemplary damages recognized power in the Court to punish tortious conduct that merited [*300] punishment, that is wanton conduct, fraudulent, malicious, violent and cruel conduct as well as conduct embarked upon in contumelious disregard of plaintiff’s righto On appeal the House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and reaffirmed the principles approved in Rookes v. Barnard. (See Cassell & Co Ltd. v. Broome (1972)1 All E.R. 801.)

Lord Devlin in his opinion in Rookes took pains to emphasize that exemplary damages are not the only type of non strictly compensatory damage and drew a distinction between exemplary and aggravated damages, that is compensatory damages awarded on a fairly inflated basis in order to indicate the indignation of the Court at the conduct of the defendant. With this trichotomy of damages we have compensatory, aggravated and exemplary damages. Some of the decisions given before Rookes where the damage bore no direct relationship to the loss suffered, treated by many authors as exemplary damages, could be reconciled with the decision in Rookes by treating them as awards for aggravated damages. This is not possible with all decisions particularly those where the damage awarded is out of all proportion to the loss suffered.

Common Law

- Precededent

The decision in Rookes was critically received in many countries of the commonwealth especially in Australia, Canada and New Zealand. (See Bahner v. Marwest Hotel Co. Ltd. (1969) D.L.R. (3rd) 322 and Fraser v. Wilson (1 969) D.L.R.

(3rd) 531.) The Privy Council in Australia [*301] Consolidated Press v. Uren (1967) 3 All E.R. 523 upheld the decision of the Australian Court departing from Rookes v. Barnard on the ground that before the decision of the House of Lords in the above case the law of Australia had gained a definite shape along the traditional understanding of the law on the subject of exemplary damages. The House found no compelling reasons in Rookes justifying the reversal of the Australian decision. To our understanding the broader principle emerging from the Privy Council decision is that the award of exemplary damages is largely dependent on considerations of public policy recognizing that the Courts of each jurisdiction are best equipped to lay down the policy of the law in their particular countries.

In Cyprus the matter cannot be regarded as having been authoritatively settled notwithstanding the decision of the Supreme Court in Gregoriades v. Kyriakides (1970) 1 C.L.R. 120, and the approval of the decision in Loudon v. Ryder (1 953) 1 All E.R. 741. It seems that the decision of the House of Lords in Rookes v. Barnard was not drawn to the attention of the Court in Gregoriades (supra) nor were the principles favoured therein discussed in the perspective set forth by the House. Further the decision in Gregoriades is not necessarily inconsistent with the principles formulated in Rookes for the damages awarded in Gregoriades might conceivably be graded as aggravated damages.

However there are dicta in a number of cases suggestive of a wider approach and a disinclination on [*302] the part of Cyprus Courts to follow Rookes v. Barnard. particularly in areas where the pre 1964 approach had gained roots. In Savvas Paraskevas v. Despina Mouzoura (1973) 1 C.L.R. 88, the Supreme Court favoured an award of exemplary damages along the traditional lines that is in proportion to the extent of injury to feelings in a case of breach of promise to marry; and there are dicta to the effect that no cogent reasons exist justifying a departure from the understanding of the law on the subject of exemplary damages before 1964. The Pull District Court of Nicosia refused to follow Rookes v. Barnard in I.C.P. Cyprus Limited v. Times Newspapers Ltd. and Others (1972) 4 J.S.C. 455, holding that Gregoriades's case (supra) is necessarily inconsistent with Rookes and therefore Gregoriades's case is binding on the trial Courts. Also in Toumba v. Loutsios (1 975) 1 J.S.C. 115 the District Court of Nicosia awarded exemplary damages along the lines favoured in Loudon v. Ryder (1953) 1 All E.R. 741. We are not required to offer a concluded view as to the applicability in Cyprus of the principles supported in Rookes v. Barnard. If the judgment is regarded as declaratory of fundamental principles of the common law then such principles are applicable in Cyprus by

virtue of section 29(c) of the Courts of Justice Law. On the other hand if the decision is primarily expressive of what

the policy of English law should be on the subject of damages then there would be greater discretion in common law Courts of other jurisdiction to define the policy of the law in a manner best suiting the needs of individual [*303] countries. Certainly, the Privy Council in the case of Uren (supra) found no objection in principle to the application of the law as understood before 1964 on the subject of exemplary damages in Australia where the policy of the law had been consistently defined and for a long time along the up until then traditional understanding of the common law. Also the Privy Council laid stress on the fact that on a subject as sensitive as exemplary damages the Courts of each common law country are best placed to define a policy of the law in such a delicate area, affecting people in their daily pursuits. There is Cyprus authority of long / standing emphasizing the need to apply the principles of the common law in a manner suiting the needs of the country and promoting its social aims. (See Universal Advertising and Publishing Agency v. Panayiotis A. Vouros.19 C.L.R. p. 87 - Katina HadjiTheodossiou v. Petros Koula and Another

(1970) 1 C.L.R. 310.)

If we were required to choose between the two streams of authority our inclination would be to follow the wider approach that makes permissible the award of exemplary damages for tortious counduct that is intrinsically blameworthy deserving punishment. In this way civil law, in addition to the criminal law, retains an effective armoury for the promotion of the ethics of society malleable to the extent of permitting the award of exemplary damages only where conduct is contemptuously out of keeping with acceptable norms of behaviour. In this case we need not finally answer the question because on any view of the [*304] law defendant 2 would be liable to exemplary damages. Certainly he was guilty of cynical conduct aimed at interfering with the rights of the plaintiff and depriving him of the benefits resulting from lawful agreement into which plaintiff had entered into. His motive was the realization of profit in the pursuit of which he showed contemptuous disregard for the rights of the plaintiff. Conduct of this Very kind was expressly envisaged by Lord Devlin in Rookes v. Barnard as deserving punishment by the award of exemplary damages. The wording used by Lord Devlin is such that one might say that he foreshadowed a case like the present when he postulated that the remedy of exemplary damages "extends to cases in which the defendant is seeking to gain at the expense of the plaintiff some object, - perhaps some property which he covets, which either he could not obtain at all or not obtained except at a price greater than he wants to put down. Exemplary damages can properly be awarded whenever it is necessary to teach a wrong doer that tort does not pay". (See p. 411, letters A-C.)

On any misunderstanding of the law there does not appear to be any limitation as to the type of tort in respect of which exemplary damages can be awarded. The relevant consideration is the nature of the tortious conduct, in fact it appears that even non tortious conduct yet resembling it may attract an award of exemplary damages on the pre-1964 definition of the law on the subject. [*305]

In this case the conduct of defendant

1 can be described as outrageous embarked upon in wanton disregard of the rights of the plaintiff calculated to bring profit to defendant 2.

Quantum of Exemplary Damages

Exemplary damages, like a fine, must

be reasonable but effective. In McGregor On Damages, 13th edition, at paragraph 317 et seq. there is a discussion of the considerations relevant to

the determination of the height of an award of exemplary damages as it emerges through a study of decided cases. The gravity of the behaviour sought to be condemned as well as the means of the defendant are relevant and where a profit is realized the magnitude of the profit is a relevant consideration for by an award of exemplary damages it must be demonstrated to the defendants and society at large that such conduct does not pay. Lord Diplock in his judgment in Cassell's case (supra) hints at the relationship between unjust enrichment on the one hand and the amount of exemplary damages. In this case profit was throughout in the mind of defendant 2 and the whole move was calculated to yield profit. It need not be proved as str e ssed in Cassell's case that defendant 2 made an arithmetical calculation of the profit he would derive or that he sought to balance it with the damages he might pay.

Defendant 2 appears to be a well to do person judging from the evidence of witness Antonis Economou, the [*306] secretary of the Co-Operative Society of Frenaros. He appears to be investing heavily in land and counts on making a profit from the exploitation of his investments. Land values at Ayia Napa have been rising steadily, as it appears from the evidence, at a very rapid pace.

In all the circumstances of the case defendant 2 should be adjudged to pay, in addition to compensatory damages, also exemplary damages. Having regard to all the relevant considerations we adjudge him to pay £10,000 by way of exemplary damages. We wish to stress both to defendant 2 and to any one who may be tempted to repeat his unpleasant example that conduct such as his own that tends to undermine the foundations of decent behaviour in ordinary dealings between citizens will not be suffered and the arm of the law is fortunately long enough to supress such conduct. The only consolation is that conduct such as that of defendant 2 is rare in Cyprus; nor shall we allow it to spread. For respecting the legal rights of others is absolutely essential for sustaining a proper climate of confidence and mutual respect in which business dealings and trading generally may flourish for the good of the community as a whole. Lastly we have reflected on the implications of the rule that in a common suit against joint tortfeasors one sum can be awarded by way of exempladamages against both and that should be a sum equal to the one that the least culpable of joint tortfeasors would be required to pay. (See Cassell & Co. Limited v. Broome (1972) 1 All E.R. at p. 817, letters C-G and Egger v. [*307] Viscount Chelmsford (1964) 3 All E.R.. p. 406,411.) This rule is inapplicable to the present proceedings for the defendants are not joint tortfeasors and only defendant 2 will be adjudged to pay exemplary damages.

In the result judgment is given against defendant 1 for £8,500.000 mils with costs. The claim of the plaintiff for the recovery of interest on the amounts paid by the plaintiff to defendant

1 before breach, limited as it was at the final address of counsel, cannot be sustained for the criterion for compensation is the difference between the contract price and the value of the land at the time of breach. You cannot have restoration and compensation at the same time.

(b) Against Defendant 2: (i) £8,500.000 mils damages. It must be noted that this amount coincides with the amount adjudged against defendant 1 by way of damages and cannot be recovered twice.

(c) £10,000.000 mils exemplary damages.

The defendants are further adjudged to pay costs.

Judgment against defendants 1 &

2 for £8,500.- as damages and for £10,000.- against defendant 2 as exemplary damages.