Court allows damages but reduces award due to plaintiff's contributory negligence in stepping on a known well.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe court allowed the plaintiffs' claim for personal injuries but reduced the damages by 50% due to the plaintiff's contributory negligence. The plaintiff, a 13-year-old tenant, fell into a collapsed well in her yard after knowing its existence and having a safe alternative route. The judge found she failed to exercise reasonable care by deliberately stepping on the visible well instead of using the yard gate, thereby sharing liability with the defendants.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IAOccupiers' Liability Act 1957; Negligence Act 1957: A licensee or invitee may recover damages for injuries sustained from a dangerous condition on the premises, but the recovery is reduced if the injured party, having knowledge of the danger, fails to exercise reasonable care for their own safety.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADecisioni correlate
Generato dall'IATesto completo
[*8] 1977 June 30
(DEMETRIOU, S.D.J.)
In the District Court of Paphos
Maroulla S.teliou Menelaou etc. and
Another
Plaintiffs,
v.
Alisavou Sofokli alias alias
Alisavou Sofokli Yiatrou and Others,
Defendats.
(Action No. 532/75)
Negligence - Contributory negligence
- Occupier’s liability - Licensee - Invitee - Dwelling house - Occupied by tenants who have leased a room to plaintiff - Closed well in corner of yard of dwelling house - Collapse of, after plaintiff had stopped thereon - Occupiers guilty of negligence - Plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence, in spite of her age, (13) because she knew of the existence of the well and had no reason to go out of her way in the corner of the yard to step on the well.
Damages - General damages - Personal injuries - 13 year's old school-girl - Femur and thumb fractures and severe contusion of lumbar spine - In bed for 80 days - Walking on crutches for about a month - Visible scar on left thigh - Award of £2000.
E. Komodromos, for the Plaintiffs.
A. Evzonas, for Defendant 1.
E. Panayides, for Defendants 2 and 3.
JUDGMENT
The following judgment was delivered by:-
DEMETRIOU, S.D.J. In the present action the [*9] plaintiffs claim damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff No. 1 when she fell Into a deep well situate in the yard of the house in which she was residing. Plaintiff No. 1 is a student and was 13 years old at the material time attending the second class of Paphos Technical School. She was residing with her brother in a room of a house owned by defendant No. 1 and occupied under a lease by defendants No. 2 and 3.
A description of the house in one way or the other was given by practically all the witnesses who testified in this action and a plan was produced by P.W. 2 in which the house is included. It is registered in the name of defendant No. 1 under Registration No. 15718 of 5.3.1929 under plot No. 1250/1 , Sheet/Plan 51.3.5.9. The house, which is in Kinira street, consists of three rooms, a kitchen a W.C. and a yard. Near the entrance of the yard, there is a well which is 50 ft. deep and as it was no longer in use, it was covered by wooden boards and a layer of cement.
In order to appreciate the evidence further, and acceeding to the application of both sides, I visited the place in quo, thus affording myself the opportunity to have a careful look of the various points of the house referred to in the evidence.
It is an old house which defendant No. 1 received by way of gift from her mother in 1929. When she got married in 1932 she went to live in Nicosia leaving her parents to occupy the house. In 1956 the [*10] father of defendant No. 1 died and her mother left the house to live in Nicosia. The house was then rented to certain people and the mother of defendant 1 was receiving the rent. Eventually, and about sixteen years ago the house was leased to defendant No. 3 at the rent of per month, a rent which he continued to pay until the date of the hearing.
It transpired from the evidence that after her departure from Paphos in 1932 defendant No. 1 never cared for the condition of the house which she never visited, leaving defendants 2 and 3 to be the sole occupants. The rent was originally paid to a relative of defendant No. 1 but for the last four years, it was paid through a Bank in the name of defendant 1.
When defendants 2 and 3 moved in the house, the said well was covered by cement. The well is a round structure made of stones of about 1 ft. above the ground. Next to it there is a small almond tree and a flower called "tylegrafos". As I said, the mouth of the well was covered by a layer of cement the thickness of which was, as put by the witnesses, one finger. Underneath this layer there were wooden boards of similar thickness which according to the evidence were rottened. The one side of the well touched the wall of a room and the other the surrounding wall.
On 18.12.74 at about 5 p.m. plaintiff No. 1 stepped on the cover of the well and as soon as she did so, the cover collapsed and she fell into the well. She was brought up to the surface by firemen who arrived soon [*11] after the accident and was taken to the Hospital as she was severely
injured. She was hospitalized until 21.12.74 when she was taken to the clinic of Dr. Thalis Michaelides (P.W.1) where
she was kept until 19.3.75. The injuries are descriped by P.W.1 to be the following:-
1. Fracture of the neck of her left femur.
2. Comminuted fracture, compound of the shaft of the left femour with separation of large fragment.
3. Fracture of the first phalanx of her right thumb.
4. Severe contusion of her lumbar spine.
According to P.W.1 she was /treated conservatively with traction, through Steinman pins of her left lower limb and immobilization on a special splint and plaster cast was applied to her right thumb. She was operated upon for cleaning up the fracture of the femoral shaft which was infected and for proper apposition of the large separated fragment. After her discharge on 19.3.75 she was followed up as an out-patient. When she left the clinic she could walk only with the aid of crutches. The confinement in bed lasted for about 80 days. During this period she was placed on a special splint with weight traction. She was examined for the last time before the hearing on 3.1.77 and her complaints were of low backache and pain in the left knee especially when she gets tired or in cold weather. There is a visible scar on the left thigh which is tender on touch and in cold weather; the [*12] scar is described to be about 4 or 5" in length and about an inch in width. However there is a depression in the middle of the scar. When she stands or walks for a long time (for about a mile her ankle swells up. The movements of her hip are satisfactory but she feels pain in the right thumb when she writes for a long time and discomfort when she kneedles or uses her hand in similar ways such as embroidering, though there is no restriction in its movement. She added that her right thumb is also numb.
According to the opinion of P.W.1 she had severe pain and suffering during her treatment and she now has a slight limp due to weakness of her left leg.
In cross-examination P.W.1 expressed the view that she will have progress as regards the muscular power of her limp but there is some risk of osteoathritic changes of the hip. He further said that it is a general rule that when there is a fracture in a joint of the bones there is an increased risk of osteoathritis being developed.
After describing the pain she suffered the plaintiff said that when discharged from the clinic she walked on crutches for about a month, then gradually on one crutch and for about one month with a walking stick. She could not catch up with her school work and she cannot squeeze properly with her right hand as a result of which she finds difficulty in washing dishes etc. She cannot run as she used to and still has back-aches rendering her movement to bend down painful. [*13]
Sp much for her injuries, the evidence on which was not seriously challenged. I accept the evidence of Dr. Thalis Michaelides and of the plaintiff No. 1 as regards the injuries with their consequences described by the witnesses. On the basis of these injuries my task is to assess the general damages irrespective of the question of liability. For this purpose I have considered carefully all the medical evidence adduced. I have addressed my mind to the authorities cited by the plaintiff's Advocate . I have also appreciated the difficulty to pin point
particular items and adopt them fully in the case under trial. I am well advised, however, to bear in mind the general principles governing
the assessment of the general damages enunciated in the case of Fletcher v. Autocar and Transporters Ltd., (1968) 2 W.L.R. 743, a case which was cited with approval by our Supreme Court in a number of occasions. (See Vide Antoniades v. Makrides. (1969), 1 C.L.R., 245).
Bearing all the above in mind, I find that a reasonable award by way of general damages, will be an amount of £2,000.-. As regards the special damages, it has been established to my satisfaction that an amount of £532.- should be awarded for medical expenses and £70.- for travelling and other ancillary expenses; making a round figure of £600.-
Thus the total amount which I award on a full liability basis by way of special and general damages is, £2,600.-. [*14]
The next thorny question which has to be determined in this case is the question of liability; that is, were the defendants or anyone of them negligent under the circumstances of this case? The action was pleaded and fought as a case of negligence and as such I intend to approach it in this judgment.
Before dealing with the facts of the case, I propose to make a reference to the relevant section of the Law and direct my mind on the legal aspect of the case, relevant to determine the issue.
Section 51 of the Civil Wrongs Law, Cap. 148 provides that negligence consists of:
"(a) doing some act which in the circumstances a reasonable prudent person would not do or failing to do some act which in the circumstances such a person would do ...”
“Provided that compensation therefor shall only be recovered by any person to whom the person guilty of negligence owed a duty, in the circumstances, not to be negligent."
A duty not to be negligent shall exist in the following cases, that is to say:
"(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"(b) The occupier of any immovable property shall owe such a duty to all persons who are, and to to the owner of any property which is lawfully [*15] in or upon or so near to such immovable property as in the usual course of things to be affected by the negligence.".
The second proviso of the section reads as follows:-
"Provided also that the occupier of any immovable property shall owe no such duty in respect of the condition of or of the maintenance or repair of such immovable property to any bare licensee who is, or the property of whom, is, in or upon such immovable property save only to warn such bare licensee of any concealed danger or hidden peril in or upon such immovable property of which such occupier know or must be presumed to have known.”
“For the purposes of this section ’bare licensee' means any person who lawfully comes upon any immovable property otherwise than –“
“(i) in connection with any business in which the occupier of the property is interested."
According to this section of our Law and the Common Law of England, one may resolve that the occupier of premises has a duty to render such premises reasonably safe for an invitee, who having taken reasonable care and acting within the compass of his invitation is entitled to assume that the premises are kept reasonably safe for him by being kept properly maintained and repaired. [*16]
In Indermeaur v. Dames,
(1866) L.R. 1 C.P. 274 it was held that:-
"an invitee using reasonable care on his part for his own safety, is entitled to expect that the occupier shall on his part use reasonable care to prevent damage from unusual danger, which he knows or ought to know; and that, where there is evidence of neglect, the question whether such reasonable care has been taken, by notice, lighting, guarding, or otherwise, and whether there was contributory negligence in the sufferer, must be determined by a jury as a matter of fact."
A danger may be unusual although the defect giving rise to it is apparent, if the defect could not reasonably be expected to give rise to the danger. The occupier’s liability is restricted to those unusual dangers of which he knew or ought to have known, if he had exercised reasonable care and skill. It is a defence to an action for the breach of this duty to show that the danger was open and obvious to any person using reasonable care on his part for his own safety. Thus, if the injured person had knowledge or notice of the existence of the danger and yet runs the risk through which he has suffered he has no cause of action.
"Knowledge of the danger on the part of the invitee will be taken into account as a circumstance relevant to the question whether [*17] any damage sustained by him is wholly or partly the result of his own fault. Where knowledge is not such as to render the accident solely the fault of the injured party, then it is not a bar to the action but only a ground for reducing the damages."
A.C.Billings & Sons Ltd. v. Riden (1958) AC 240. Lord Somervell referred to this statement in the above case and added:-
"There may be many cases where a plaintiff is free' in one sense to avoid the risk altogether but where it would be reasonable to run the risk. When the plaintiff has full or partial knowledge of the danger the question must always be: Was the injury, in all the circumstances including the plaintiff's knowledge, due solely to his own negligence or was it due solely to the negligence of the defendant or was it due to the negligence of each?”
The apportionment of liability between the parties applies to an action for breach of the common duty of care exactly as to any other action for negligence. (See Clerk & Lindscll, 12th edition para 856).
The duty of care in the above context is imposed on the person in occupation of the premises. This may be the owner in occupation, the tenant or any person who, without being formally a lessee, has [*18] the right to possession of the premises and the right to exclude therefrom all except those who come there by his invitation or permission. (See Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 12th edition p. 14-67). An owner not in possession is under no liability at Common Law to visitors on demised premises.
According to s. 2 of the Civil Wrongs Law Cap. 148 an occupier is defined to mean "any person entitled as against the owner thereof to occupy or use any immovable property and if there is no such person then the owner of such property."
Thus it may be said that, as the law stands to-day, the liability towards persons on premises whether they are there as invitees or licensees or trespassers arising out of the condition of the premises rests, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary,on the occupier.
Defendant 1 has given up possession since 1956. Defendants 2 and 3 became the tenants of the house 16 years prior to the accident and according to the evidence they were the sole occupiers since they took possession of the house. They were depositing the rent with a Bank and defendant 1 did not at any stage exercise any possession of the house in any way.
In view of the provisions of the Law as considered in a number of cases of the English Common Law and in the case of our Supreme Court of Fatma Houssein & Another v. The Estate of the deceased Chrysostomos Christodoulou, 20 C.L.R. volume 1 p. 23 [*19] and all the evidence before me, I find that defendants 2 & 3 are answerable as the sole occupiers of the house whereas defendant 1 is not.
The well in question adjoined the wall of the yard on the one side and the wall of a room on the other to which the mouth of the well extended. It is in evidence that the wooden boards which covered the aperture of the well were rotten and, as it can be inferred from the circumstances, they were not capable of supporting the weight of a human being. The well constituted an unusual danger and the occupiers knew or ought to have known of this danger if they had exercised reasonable care and skill.
Their failure to take reasonable care on the part of the occupiers to prevent damage from this unusual danger to the plaintiff to whom they owed a duty of care not to be negligent renders them liable. The plaintiffs as invitees were entitled to assume that the premises were kept reasonably safe for them by being kept properly maintained and repaired. Admittedly the defendants 2 and 3 let a room to the plaintiffs but from the totality of the evidence it appears that the plaintffs were entitled to make use of the yard as well.
Having found that defendants 2 and 3 were guilty of negligence I shall proceed to examine whether the plaintiff No.
1 was also negligent. The line which I shall follow is that if the plaintiff had knowledge of the existence of the danger and yet she ran the risk then she should also be held liable. [*20]
The plaintiff No. 1 in her evidence said that in the afternoon of 18th December 1974 she was at home expecting her brother and when she realized that he was late to come home, she went out from her room into the yard. She eventually stepped on the cover of the well which collapsed as a result of which she fell into it and sustained the aforementioned injuries. Had she been using reasonable care for her safety she could have very well gone to the gate of the yard and have a look into the street from there. The well was in the corner of the yard and it was out of her way for her purpose. She alleged in her evidence that she did not know what a well is and that she did not know that the said parapet in the yard was a well. She thought that it was a pezoula as she called it and that she saw it for the first time on the day of the accident. Further down, she alleges that she did not wonder what that pezoula was and never asked to find out. She admits, however, that it was visible to anyone. She had seen wells in her village and her father considers both his children to appreciate a danger and to be careful. Eventually, in her evidence, she admits that when she sees a round structure with a cover she understands that it is a well. The parapet, therefore, was visible to the plaintiff No.1 who was a tenant for more than a year plaintiff having moved in, in September 1973.
I have watched her demeanour in Court while giving evidence and I am of the view that she was on many occasions trying to hide the truth. I did not believe her when she said that she had seen the parapet [*21] for the first time on the day of the accident. I find that she had seen this round parapet before her accident and that she knew that it was a well. I find also that she did not take reasonable care for her own safety. When she wanted to have a look in the road to see if her brother was coming, she had all the opportunity safely to walk into the yard towards the gate. She had no reason to go out of her way in the corner of the yard to step on the well, an act which should have made her realize of the danger she was running. Her age in this case does not affect my finding because as I found she knew what a well is and she must have known of the danger by stepping on a closed well. This tallies with the evidence of her father (plaintiff No. 2) who considers her to be a person appreciating the danger.
Having considered all the evidence before me and in the light of the Law as explained above, I find that the plaintiff is also to blame for this accident.
Bearing in mind the circumstances of the case and all the above, I apportion the liability between the plaintiff No.
1 on the one part and the defendants No. 2 and 3 on the other at 50% against the defendants 2 & 3 and 50% against the plaintiff No. 1.
As the amount of £600.- was paid by plaintiff No. 2 and is adjudged by way of special damages I shall give the judgment of such amount in full in favour of plaintiff No. 2 [*22]
Judgment is therefore given for plaintiff No. 1 against defendants 2 & 3 for £700.- and for plaintiff No. 2 against defendants 2 & 3 for £600.-. Costs in favour of both plaintiffs against defendants 2 & 3 to be assessed by Registrar.
Action against defendant 1 is dismissed with costs in favour of defendant 1 against the plaintiffs to be assessed by the Registrar.
Judgment and order
for costs as above.