Landlord appeal dismissed; tenant qualifies as displaced person; court reviews District Officer's rent reduction de novo.

[*479] 1978 May

(PIKIS, P.D.C.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF LARNACA

Androulla Christi,

Applicant,

and

Charitonos Kokkinou,

Respondent.

(Rent Application No. 4/78).

Landlord and Tenant - Displaced Tenants of Residential Property Law, 1976 (4/76) - Hearing before District Officer - Provided rules of natural justice are observed the District Officer may not hold an oral hearing - "Displaced tenant” within section 2 of the Law - Meaning - Jurisdiction of the Court under section 4 of the Law - Meaning.

Chr. Kotromilides, for the Applicant.

M. Louka, for the Respondent.

JUDGMENT

The following judgment was delivered by:-

PIKIS. P.D.C.: - This is an application [*480] by the landlord to set aside the

decision of the Larnaca District Officer, dated 8th December 1977, taken under the provisions of the Displaced Tenants of Residential Property Law (4/76) whereby the rental payable by the tenant was reduced from £40.- (the stipulated rent) to £24.- per month. The only evidence, adduced in support of the application is that of the husband of the applicant who testified, inter alia, that the premises were let to the respondent without knowledge on his part that he was, as alleged, a displaced person in consequence of the events of 1974. On the contrary, he was given to understand that respondent came from Paphos, a statement that he construed as indicating that respondent was not a displaced person. Of course what is material is not whether the owner of the premises or her agent knew of the fact of displacement but whether the tenant is, in point of law, a displaced tenant within the meaning of the law. Mr. Christ is was not in a position to enlighten us either about the age of the premises or the persons to whom it had been let in the past. What he asserted, and there is nothin to contradict him, is that at the time of the Turkish invasion the property was let to the British authorities known as Hirings, at £46.- per month. This witness made a point of stressing that the tenant was not prompt in the payment of rent and had to have recourse to the Court for the recovery of arrears of rent. That of course is a factor extraneous to the issues posing for determination in these proceedings. [*481]

There is no evidence coming either from the owner or the tenant indicating the rental value of the premises. In the absence of such evidence it is difficult, if not impossible, to decide to what extent the decision of the District Officer reflects the rental value of the premises. The only evidence we have on the subject came from Mr. Christis who testified that at the time of letting the premises to the respondent he had an offer from an Arab to let it at £50.- per month but chose the respondent in an effort to aid an officer of the Cyprus army find accommodation at Larnaca. Both this piece of evidence as well as the rental at which the premises were actually let to the respondent sheds some light on the rental value of the premises at the time of its letting to the respondent though it is by no means conclusive. I can take judicial notice of one of the most notorious facts since summer 1974 that there is considerable scarcity of accommodation that has resulted at times to the charging of exorbitant rents, that is rents that have but a remote relationship to what the premises could command in the open market under normal market conditions.

The respondent testified that he had his home at Morphou at the time of the Turkish invasion and that he was a resident of Morphou throughout the decade of 1964 to 1974 with a short break between 1971 to 1973 when he had been transferred to Kythrea. He is an officer of the Cyprus army and as he explained owing to his engagement in military activities at the time of the invasion he had [*482] no opportunity even to carry with him upon displacement some be it household belongings when the family was forced to vacate the area in the wake of the Turkish invasion. His wife comes from Morphou whereat she owned an orange grove of fifteen donums that had begun to be income producing, expected to rise to £1,000.- in 1974. Of the fifteen donums 2½ donums were registered in her name and the remainder was hali land under her occupation by virtue of an arrangement that her father made with the authorities since the days of colonial rule.

Following the invasion the respondent incurred debts of about £1,500.- apparently in an effort to reestablish his shattered household. He disputed the contention of Mr. Christis that he hid the fact that they were refugees and asserted the contrary that the fact was brought home to the owner.

In the light of the evidence before me it is abundantly clear that the respondent and his family were displaced from their residence at Morphou in the wake of the Turkish invasion in conseauence of which they left behind the personal belongings, furniture and fittings and household effects; and this was not the only financial loss to the family. They had to abandon an orange grove at great financial loss.

The Effect of the Provisions of Law 4/76

In his final address learned counsel for the respondent raised a number of points in support of his [*483] submission that the decision of the District Officer is invalid. Firstly he argued that the District Officer did not hear the parties as he ought to have done under the law. This submission is untenable for, according to the evidence of the applicant, the view of the owner were sought and embodied in a written document (exh.3) setting forth the case for the applicant. There is nothing in the law requiring the District Officer to hold an oral hearing and provided the rules of natural justice are observed his decision cannot be faulted on that score; and the rules of natural justice require, where a decision is to be made affecting the rights of citizens, that an opportunity should be given to the persons concerned to put their case before the body responsible for deternination of their rights. (See, inter alia, Wiseman v. Borneman (1969)

3 All E.R. 275: Pergamon Press, re R.E. (1970) 3 All E,R. 535; Selvara,jan v. Race Relations Board (1976) 1 All E.R. p. 12.)

A second point taken on behalf of the applicant is that the respondent is not a displaced tenant within the meaning of the law. Section 2 defines a displaced tenant as a person who had before the Turkish invasion his permanent residence in an area rendered inaccessible because of . the Turkish invasion. It was argued that inasmuch as the applicant was liable to transfer he had no permanent home at Morphou. If the argument of counsel is to be carried to its logical conclusion we should hold that on account of the possibility of transfer the respondent had no permanent home anywhere in Cyprus. [*484]

A series of English decisions defines what constitutes residence and as explained in a number of them the very notion of reside imports permanence. (See 9 Halsbury’s Laws of England (3rd edition) 166-167. See also Stoke-on-Trent, Borough Council of Cheshire County Council, (1913) 3 K.B. 699 - Oldham Election Petition, Baxter's case (1869). 20

L. T. 302.)

In my judgment a person qualifies for the purposes of the law as a displaced tenant provided he had his home in areas occupied by the Turkish army and no longer has the amenity to go back because of the occupation of the place by the enemy army. Given the preamble to the law it would be indeed strange if any other construction was placed on this provision of the law. The aim of this important piece of social legislation is to afford relief to those who were forcibly evicted from their homes in consequence of the Turkish invasion and both the respondent and his family suffered this fate. Therefore as the District Officer rightly decided the tenant is a displaced person within the meaning of the law. Another complaint of counsel that he invoked in support of his submission to fault the decision is that it was not taken within the time limit envisaged by section 3(2) of the relevant law. This is a procedural and not a substantive provision of the law of a directory and not mandatory character, non compliance with which does not invalidate the decision. Conceivably if there is evidence that the delay has caused prejudice to an interested party this may be something to be taken [*485] into account. But no such evidence is forthcoming in these proceedings. Lastly, the jurisdiction of the Court under section 4 of the law on appeal from a decision of the District Officer is not revisional in the sense that the task of the Court is not limited to enquiring into the validity of the decision but is wider in that after hearing the evidence it must/make a determition on what amounts in the circumstances to a reasonable rent given the criteria set out in the law. The proceedings are more akin to an appeal subject to this: The Court may give such weight to the determination of the District Officer as it may deem appropriate in all the circumstances of the case. Neither his findings nor his deliberations are binding on the Court. His conclusions afford prima facie evidence of what the appropriate rent should be in the circumstances of the case.

In the present proceedings there is nothing to indicate that the District Officer went wrong in any direction or that he failed to take into consideration any factor that he ought to have taken, something that might lead him to a wrong conclusion. On the contrary, in the light of the totality of the evidence before me the District Officer's determination cannot be faulted. I adopt it as a valid determination and order accordingly. The application is dismissed, with costs.

Application dismissed with costs.