Cyprus Court dismisses charging order on shares as no local law permits equitable charges on securities.

[*390] 1978 January 31

(STAVRINAKIS, P.D.C.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF NICOSIA

Nicos A. Rolandis,

Applicant,

and

Cyprus Transport Co. Ltd. and Another,

Respondents.

(Application No. 952/76).

Civil Procedure - Execution - Charging order on shares - A mode of execution - No provision in our Law for the creation of equitable charges on securities - A charging order not a matter of Company Law – Rule 3 of the Company Rules of no avail - English Rules cannot be resorted to - No power in Cyprus to make a charging order or order the sale of shares.

D. Liveras, for the Applicant.

E. Odysseos with I. Loizidou (Mrs.), for the Respondents.

RULING

The following ruling was delivered by: -

STAVRINAKIS, P.D.C.:- This is the ruling [*391] of the Court in two applications made by the applicant, the one ex-parte and the other by summons for the charging and sale, respectively, of the shares of defendant No.4 held in four companies made ex-parte respondents in both applications.

INTRODUCTORY: The applicant in the ex-parte application applies -

(a) for an interim order, charging the shares of defendant No.4 in the ex-parte respondents/ Companies, and

(b) an Interim order restraining the Directors and/or the Secretary of each of the ex-parte respondents/ Companies to approve and/or effect transfer of shares standing registered in the name of defendant No.

4 to another person or body corporate.

The application is based on the Rules of the Supreme Court of England, Order 50 Rule 2; the old and repealed Order 46 Rule 1 & 3; Halsbury’s Statutes, 13th Vol., 2nd Ed., p. 366; Pennington on. 'Company Law' 3rd Ed., p. 338; the Courts of Justice Law, 1960, Law, 14/60, and the inherent powers of the Court.

On 15.6.77 the application was presented before the Court and on order was granted as applied on condition of giving security in the sum of £500 and with a direction, that the application by summons to be fixed on 16.7.77. [*392]

On 17.6.77 the applicant filed another application, calling upon defendant No.4 and the ex-parte respondents, to appear before the Court for the hearing of an application whereby the applicant applied for an order for the sale of the shares of defendant No.4 held in the ex-parte respondent Companies. This application was based on the same legal provisions as the ones invoked in the ex-parte application. It was made returnable on 16.7.77; on that day, the respondents appeared through an advocate and opposed the ex-parte application. On 8.11.77 the respondents stated through their advocate that they were opposing the application and that a written opposition, together with an affidavit, was already filed, dated 5.11.77, covering both applications.

The respondents contend that the interim order obtained in the ex-parte application should be discharged as it was wrongly issued there being no provision in our legislation enabling the Court to make such orders. It was stressed that the order was based on an English provision which is not applicable in Cyprus. It was, further contended that as defendants No.4 filed in the appropriate Court Application No. 150/77 under the Debtors Relief (Temporary Provisions) Law, it would be inequitable at this stage for the shares to be sold before the determination of the said application.

The gravamen of the present application is the issue of jurisdiction not in its territorial context but in its context importing the meaning of authority of the [*393] Court to deal with an application of this nature. The applications are based clearly on a foreign legal provision and a legal machinery for which no local express provision is made in our Law,

Mr. Liveras, on behalf of the applicants, argued that the making of a charging order is touching company matters and as such we may have recourse to the English provisions by virtue of the enabling powers contained in Rule 3 of the Company Rules (Subsidiary Legislation of Cyprus Rules of Court, Vol. 2, at p. 279), whereby the English Rules are made applicable in Cyprus in so far as no local provision exists. He went on to say that in any event the Court has inherent powers to deal with the application and make the required order in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction in not leaving a wrong without a remedy.

The other side argued that the Company Rules do not apply and that applications of this nature are based on the Civil Procedure Rules for which there is no provision in our Rules and further that we cannot borrow the English provisions as no such authority is given in the Civil Procedure Rules, similar to the one given in the Company Rules. Further, and in addition to the above, it was argued that even if the Court could issue a charging order the second application for the sale of the shares is, according to the English Rules, premature and should be dismissed. [*394]

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION: With this brief account of the history and nature of the applications and the arguments advanced, I must now proceed to examine the legal issues involved which, having regard to all that has been said during the hearings may be formulated in questions as follows:-

1) Whether a charging order is a mode of execution.

2) Whether a charging order falls within the provisions of the Company Rules.

3) If a charging order is not a company matter, whether we have local provisions and if not, whether we can borrow English provisions.

4) Whether an application for the sale of shares can be made with future effect.

I shall only deal with the remaining issues argued and in particular with the propriety of dealing with the present application in view of the pendency of Application No. 150/77 under the Debtors Relief Law, if I find that the Courts of Cyprus have jurisdiction in issuing a charging order, because if the Court has no authority then any further investigation would be carried out in vain, in abstractum and would amount to an academic research beyond the scope of the duties of the Court.

1) Whether the charging order is a mode of execution:

The determination of this issue is necessary in view of the provisions of Section of the Civil Procedure Law, Cap. 6, whereby the modes of execution [*395] are set out. It follows that if a charging order is a mode of execution then clearly the Courts are not enabled by foreign provisions not expressly applicable in Cyprus to order execution in a manner not covered by section 14 of Cap. 6.

The registration of a judgment under Section 53 of the Civil Procedure Law, Cap. 6, which, at first sight, is analogous to the making of a charging order on shares, was held in Vassiliadou v. Harikli, C.L.R. 1964, p. 274, to be a mode of execution in view, inter alia, of the express provisions of Section 14 of the same Law. It is worth noting that in that case, it was submitted by counsel of the appellant that the registration of a judgment under Suction 53 is not execution but a security for the payment of the judgment debt and that such registration does not confer on the judgment creditor any positive rights on the property but simply prohibits the alienation or charging of the debtor's property.

Having regard to the nature of the charging order, one may say that it does not much differ from the submission made by the learned counsel of appellant in Vassiliadou’s case, but in that case the submission was not upheld, because of the provisions of Section 14(1)(b) of Cap. 6 wherein the lodging of a memo as a mode of execution was expressly included. Prom a mere reading of Section 14(1)* Cap. 6, it is clear that no mention at all is made [*396] for the issue of a charging order on shares held by the debtor and it is arguable whether the submission made in Vassiliadou's case would have been rejected in the absence of the express provision in Section 14(1) of Cap.

6 in conjunction with other express provisions about this particular mode of execution to be found in Sections 57, 62 and 98 of the same Law.

However the facts of that case were different and any further comparison even by analogy might lead to confusion or even erroneous conclusion and, therefore, it is better if the inquiry is focused on the substantive value of making a charging order.

What is the effect of a charging order; it is in plain language described by Pennington in his book under the title ’Principles of Company Law’ at p. 261. It reads:-

"A person who has obtained judgment against a shareholder for an ascertained sum of money may levy execution on his shares registered in the Company's Register of Members by obtaining an order of the Court, charging the shares with payment of the judgment debt. It is made ex-parte in the first instance and the Court makes an order nisi calling upon the shareholder to show why the order should not be made absolute and in the meantime restraining the Company from registering a transfer of shares ...... The effect of the charging order is to give the judgment [*397] creditor an equitable charge on the shares as from the date of the order nisi but he may not take steps to enforce his charge until six months after the order absolute .... At the end of six months the judgment creditor may apply to the Chancery Division by originating summons for an order that the shares be sold and the proceeds of sale applied in payment of his judgment debt but it seems that he cannot obtain a foreclosure order."

The application for the sale of the shares was made in England before 1965 under Order 55 Rule 5A of the Rules of the Supreme Court which provides a mode for realising legal and equitable charges. A similar provision in our Civil Procedure Rules does not exist at least as far as the realisation of equitable charges is concerned. We do certainly have parallel provisions regarding realisation of mortgages but not of charges.

Having obtained a clear picture of what is a charging order and its effect, it may safely be said that the charging order itself does not satisfy the creditors' due unless an order for the sale of the shares is made. However, before a creditor reaches the stage of sale he must create in his favour an equitable charge on the shares by obtaining a charging order absolute. Without this ultimate object, it is questionable whether the charging order absolute is of any value to the creditor. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the charging order is the first [*398] step which will lead to the sale of the shares, the latter, being undoubtedly a mode of execution. In Re: Hutchinson, (1886) 16 Q.B.D., 515, it was held that a charging order nisi is not an execution against the goods of a debtor within the Bankruptcy Act 1914, Section 40, but the

decision of the Court in that case must be viewed strictly and within its proper perspective regard being had to the particular facts of the case and the construction of the specific phraseology of the Bankruptcy Act in question.

The following passage from the judgment of the aforesaid case gives a clear picture of what the Court was called upon then to decide:-

(Page 520) "By Section 45 of the Act of 1883 (Bankruptcy Act), it is enacted that where a creditor has issued execution against the goods or lands of a debtor or has attached any debt due to him, he will not be entitled to retain the benefit of the execution or attachment against the trustee in bankruptcy of the debtor, unless he has completed the execution or attachment before the date of the receiving order and before notice of the presentation of any bankruptcy petition by or against the debtor or of the omission of any available act of bankruptcy by the debtor, if the purpose of the act of an execution against goods is completed by seizure and sale. An attachment of a debt is completed by receipt of the debt; and an [*399] execution against land is completed by seizure or in the case of an equitable interest by the appointment of a receiver "

The judgment was concluded as follows:-

"..... so here it may be that an order nisi under 1 & 2 Vict., C. 110*

Section 14, is a casus omissus; but if we were to treat the expression 'an execution against the goods of the debtor' which has to be completed by seizure and sale as including such an order we should, I think, be legislating to supply an omission and not construing the Act."

It is clear from the above that the Court in Re: Hutchinson, did not say that a charging order nisi is not a mode of execution; it simply held that it is not execution within the specific wording and requirements of a certain Parliamentary enactment. What the Court in the present case has to decide is whether the charging order itself as a necessary step in obtaining the sale of the shares is a mode of execution and the answer to my mind should be in the affirmative. This being so, it is, in my opinion, wrong to separate the first step from the ultimate step, the sale of the shares; the first without the second appears to be worthless and the second without the first impossible.

In Cyprus, we have no provision in our Law for the execution of equitable charges in general. The only [*400] modes of execution are those enumerated in Section 14(1) of Cap. 6; in the absence of any provision enabling either directly or indirectly the supplementation of the list would render any attempt towards that direction an act of legislation and not an act of interpretation. The next step, therefore, is to find out whether there is provision anywhere in our Law enabling the Court to resort to the English provisions assuming always that Section 14 is not exhaustive.

2. Whether a charging order falls within the domain of Company matters:

It is not arguable that on matters where our Company Rules are silent recourse may be had to the English Rules. In this respect, a detailed analysis of Rule 3 of the Coppany Rules is imperative. It reads:-

Rule 3: "The Rules of Court for the time being in force relating to civil actions and the general practice and procedure of the Courts of the Colony (or in default of local provision, the practice and procedure abserved by the Courts in England) shall apply as regards all proceedings in relation to applications to which these Rules relate so far as may be practicable except if and so far as the Law or these Rules otherwise provide."

Having perused with care the

provisions of our Company Rules, I have found nothing in them to even [*401] resemble an application for the making of

a charging order or the sale of shares. Rule 3 makes applicable the practice and procedure observed by the Courts in England but in connection only with proceedings in relation to applications covered by the Rules. The applications to which the Rules relate have no connection whatsoever with the making of charging orders. As I see it under the Cyprus Law there are numerous applications made to the Court. The Rules provide as to the procedure and practice to be followed in making such applications. If our Rules are silent regarding the procedure of any of the aforesaid applications, then recourse may be had to the practice and procedure as observed in England and in no other case. What is missing in the present case, is not the procedure in a recognised and accepted application but the right to make the application itself. what one must look for in England under Rule 3 of the Company Rules is not the right to make the application but only how the right, if had, is to be exercised. The fact that the subject of charging order is dealt, with in the Books on Company Law does not offer a sound justification to resort to the English practice by invoking Rule 3 of our Company Rules because the English Rules relied on by the applicant in this case, are not of exclusive application to shares in a Company. The shares are included in the definition of "securities1", to which the order applies and no doubt the authors of books on 'Company Law" single out the making of a charging order on shares because they are dealing with this specific subject. Finally, the English provisions regarding the [*402] making of a charging order on securities is to be found in the Civil Procedure and not the Company Rules which is at least an indication that the matter is not one of pure Company Law.

At this juncture, I consider it appropriate to make a parenthesis regarding the machinery in realising equitable charges which, as I have already pointed out, is the ultimate object of this mode of execution. The scope of Order 55 Rule 5A is to provide a summary manner for determining a claim arising out of the mortage by applying to the Court not by the issue of a writ of summons but/ by taking out an originating summons. This method is also used to enforce charging orders. It is stated in the Annual Practice 1960 Edition, Vo.1, at p. 1503 (in the note respecting Order 55 Rule 5A under the heading "General Scope of the Rules") that "this Rules enables claim arising out of a mortgage transaction to be decided in a summary manner on originating summons and should be utilised when no defence is anticipated; if proceedings in such cases are commenced by a writ any additional costs incurred will not be allowed".

A similar provision is to be found in our legal system in the Sale of Mortgage Property Law, Cap. 233, making the enforcement of a mortgage possible by application to the District Lands Office instead of to the Court and if recourse is made to the Court by civil action the mortgagee may not recover his costs if in the Court’s opinion the institution of the action was not reasonably necessary. [*403]

Our legal provision constitutes a departure from the practice followed in England at least in so far as the Cyprus Law deals exclusively with mortgages and charges on land and confers on the District Lands Officer's powers which in England are exercised by a Court of Law. Nowhere is to be found in our Law (at least as far as I am aware of) of any similar provisions enabling the enforcement or even the creation of charges on securities and this fortifies my view that not only we have no machinery for enforcing charges on securities but also we have no Law providing for the creating of such charges; once more, it can be repeated tir t this is an alien machinery encompassing all forms of equitable charges most of which fall outside the domain of Company matters.

In conclusion, I am of the opinion and so find that charging orders are not within the domain of Company Law and, therefore, Rule 3 of the Company Rules is not applicable and of no help to the applicant.

3) Whether we have any other provisions enabling the Cyprus Courts to resort to the Englsih Rules:

Although in the Company Rules we have Rule 3 which enables us to resort to the English practice and procedure on matters on which our Rules are silent yet there is no similar provision in the Civil Procedure Rules. None has been mentioned and it was not argued that we can resort to the English Civil Procedure Rules and if so under what authority. Learned counsel for the [*404] applicant relied not only on Order 50 of the Rules (after the amendment effected in 1965) but also on Order 46 Rule 1 (as it stood before the amendment). Order 46 Rule 1 provides for the machinery of making a charging order, the right for which is given by Sections 14 & 15 of the Judgments Act 1838 and Section 1 of the Judgments Act. 1840*. This being so the matter takes a different turn. It is obviously useless to look for the procedure and practice if there is no provision in our Law for the right itself which in England was created by statute. It is well established that the English Law is applicable in Cyprus in so far as the Courts of Justice Law 1960 (14/60), permit; the common law and the principles of equity are applicable in so far as no local provision is made and do not contravene or are incompatible with the Constitution.

It has not been submitted that the right apply for a charging order is common law or equity and understandably so because at first sight they are not. The right is extended to a judgment creditor in England by Parliamentary enactment and as such in order to be applicable in Cyprus, the said Parliamentary enactment must be applicable in

Cyprus under the provisions of Section 29(1)(e) of the Courts of Justice Law 1960, whereby certain Acts of Parliament of

the United Kingdom which were applicable in Cyprus before Independence Day [*405] are stili applicable unless other local provision is made or are contrary to the Constitution. Learned counsel for the applicant was unable to say whether the Judgment Acts of 1838 and 1840 were amongst chose Parliamentary enactments which were in force in Cyprus prior to Independence Day and his inability is fully understandable because painstaking research is necessary to ascertain that. As I am advised, Mr. Mavrommatis, an ex-member of the Judiciary, prepared, not without considerable difficulty, a list of the Acts of Parliament which were applicable in Cyprus prior to Independence Day. I have been furnished kindly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where Mr. Mavrommatis was attached at the time of preparing this work, with a photo-copy of the said list, and on which the statutes in question do not appear

In view of this, I have no doubt that not only we have no local provision for the creation of the right but also we cannot apply English similar provisions either for the recognition of the right or for the machinery for its enforcement.

4) Whether an order for the sale of shares could be made with future effect:

The answer to this question is superfluous in view of the previous findings. Nevertheless, the answer to it is quite simple and clear. Considering the passage [*406] hereinabove cited from Pennington, and regard being had to the tenor of the relevant provisions on which the said passage is based, the order with future effect cannot be made. In fact, the creditor may not take any steps to enforce his charge until six months after the order absolute.

CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS :

In the result, the application, both the exparte and the one made by summons for the sale of the shares, are dismissed and the order nisi discharged. However, owing to the originality of the application, I consider it proper not to made any order as to costs.

Before concluding, I consider it pertinent to seize the opportunity to express the anxiety of the Court and of the legal profession in general as to a lacuna in our Law, regarding the making and execution of equitable charges and in particular shares held in Companies. The reason that such provision is absent from our Law is perhaps due to the fact that very few Companies, public or private, existed in the past and the need for such provision was not considered then necessary. However, during the recent years, the commercial and economic life has been transformed drastically; more and more people nowadays discover the advantages of converting their family business into private or public companies, as a result of which their private fortunes are turned into shares. This makes it

imperative and a pressing necessity that without delay the matter should be [*407] considered by the legislature or other authorities for the filling

up of this gap so that the Law is brought in line with modern trends and the present way of life.

Application dismissed.

No order as to costs.

[*408]

Application No. 952/76.

APPENDIX 'A'

Section 14(1) of Cap. 6 of the Civil Procedure Law:

Methods of execution:

Any judgment or order of a Court directing payment of money may, subject to the provisions of this Law, be carried into execution by all or any of the following means:

(a) by seizure and sale of movable property;

(b) by sale of or making the judgment a charge on immovable property;

(c) by sequestration of immovable property;

(d) by attachment of property under Part VII of this Law; or

(e) by imprisonment of the debtor under Part VIII of this Law. [*409]

Application No. 952/76.

APPENDIX 'B'.

Judgments Act, 1838 - Section 14:

" If any person against whom any judgment shall have been entered up in any of Her Majesty’s Superior Courts at Westminster shall have any government stock, funds, or annuities, or any stock or shares of or in any public company in England (whether incorporated or not), standing in his name in his own right, or in the name of any person in trust for him, it shall be lawful for a Judge of one of the Superior Courts, on the application of any judgment creditor, to order that such stock, funds, annuities, or shares, or such of them or such part thereof respectively as he shall think fit, shall stand charged with the payment of the amount for which judgment shall have been so recovered, and interest thereon, end such order shall entitle the judgment creditor to all such remedies as he would have been entitled, to if such charge had beer made in his favour by the judgment debtor; provided that no proceedings shall be taken to have the benefit of such charge until after the expiration of six calendar months from the date of such order. " [*410]

APPENDIX 'B'

Judgments Act, 1838 - Section 15:

"And in order to prevent any person against whom judgment shall have been obtained from transferring, receiving, or disposing of any stock, funds, annuities or shares, hereby authorised to be charged for the benefit of the judgment creditor under an order of a Judge, be it further enacted, that every order of a Judge charging any government stock, funds, or annuities, or any stock or shares in any public company, under this Act, shall be made in the first instance ex parte, and without any notice to the judgment debtor, and shall be an order to show cause only; and such order, if any government stock, funds, or annuities standing in the name of the judgment debtor in his own right, or in the name of any person in trust for him, is to be affected by such order, shall restrain the Governor and Company of the Bank of England from permitting a transfer of such stock in the meantime and until such order shall be made absolute or discharged; and if any stock or shares of or in any public company, standing in the name of the judgment debtor in his own right, or in the name of any person in trust for him, is or are to be affected by any such order, shall in like manner restrain such public company from permitting a transfer thereof; and that if, after notice of such order to the person or persons to be restrained thereby, or in case of corporations to any authorised agent of such corporation, and [*411] before the same order shall be discharged or made absolute, such corporation or person or persons shall permit any such transfer to be made, then and in such case the corporation or person or persons so permitting such transfer shall be liable to the judgment creditor for the value or amount of the property so charged and so so transferred, or such part thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy his judgment; and that no disposition of the judgment debtor in the meantime shall be valid or effectual as against, the judgment creditor; and further, that, unless the judgment debtor shall within a time to be mentioned in such order show to a Judge of one of the said superior Courts sufficient cause to the contrary, the said order shall, after proof of notice thereof to the Judgment debtor, his attorney or agent, be made, absolute: provided that any such Judge shall, upon the application of the judgment debtor, or any person interested, have full porer to discharge or vary such order, and to award such, costs upon such application as he may think fit. "

Judgments Act, 1840 Section 1 :

"The aforesaid provisions of the said Act (i.e,, Judgments Act, 1836, s.14), shall be deemed and taken to extend to the interest of any judgment debtor, whether in possession, remainder or

reversion, and whether vested or contingent as well in any such stocks, [*412] funds, annuities, or shares as aforesaid as also in the dividends, interest,

or annual produce of any such stock, funds, annuities or shares; and whenever any such judgment debtor shall have any estate, right, title or interest, vested or contingent, in possession, remainder, or reversion, in, to, or out of any such stocks, funds, annuities or shares as aforesaid, which now are, or shall hereafter be, standing in the name of the Accountant-General of the Court of Chancery, or the Accountant-General of the Court of Exchequer, or in, or out of the dividends, interest, or annual produce thereof, it shall be lawful for such Judge to make any order as to such stock, funds, annuities, or shares, or the interest, dividends, or annual produce thereof, in the same way as if the same had been standing in the name of a trustee of such judgment debtor: Provided always, that no order of any Judge as to any stock, funds, annuities, or shares standing in the name of the Accountant-General of the Court of Chancery or the Accountant-General of the Court of Exchequer, or as to the interest, dividends, or annual produce thereof, shall prevent the Governor and Company of the Bank of England, or any public company, from permitting any transfer of such stocks, funds, annuities, or shares, or payment of the interest, dividends, or annual produce thereof, in such manner as the Court of Chancery or the Court of Exchequer respectively may direct, or shall have any greater effect than if such debtor had charged such stock, funds, [*413] annuities or shares, or the interest, dividends, or annual produce thereof, in favour of the judgment creditor, with the amount of the sum to be mentioned in any such order. " [*414]

Acts of Parliament which applied in relation to Cyprus prior to Independence

1. British. Nationality Acts, 1948 and 1958.

2. Army Act, 1955 (and, mutatis mutandis, Air Force Force Act and Naval Discipline Act).

3. Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act, 1933.

4. Visiting Forces Act, 1952.

5. Income Tax Act, 1952.

6. Diplomatic Immunities (Commonwealth Countries and and Republic of Ireland) Act, 1952.

7. Import Duties Act, 1958.

8. Colonial Stock Acts.

9. Merchant Shipping Acts.

10. Ships and Aircraft (Transfer Restriction) Act, 1939. 11. Whaling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1934.

12. Copyright Act, 1956.

13. Seal Fisheries (North Pacific) Act, 1912.

14. Coinage (Colonial Offences) Act, 1853.

15. Coinage Act, 1870.

16. Exchange Control Act, 1947. [*415]

17. Finance Act, 1894.

18. Pensions (Colonial Service) Act, 1887.

19. Isle of Man (Customs) Act, 1932.

20. Colonial War Risks Insurance (Guarantee) Act, 1941.

21. Bankruptcy Act, 1914.

22. Companies Act, 1948.

23. Marriage of British Subjects (Facilities) Acts, 1915 and 1916.

24. Foreign Marriages Act, 1892 and 1947.

25. Colonial Marriages Act, 1865.

26. Indian and Colonial Divorce jurisdiction Acts, 1926 and 1940.

27. Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act,l920.

28. Ordination for Colonies Act, 1819; Colonial Bishops Acts, 1852 and 1853 and Colonial Clergy Act, 1874.

29. Submarine Telegraph Act, 1885.

30. Mail Ships Act, 1891.

31. Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890.

32. Naval Treaties Acts, 1922 and 1937.

33. Naval Prize Act, 1864.

34. Civil Aviation Act, 1949.

35. Medical Act, 1956 and Dentists Act, 1957. [*416]

36. Solicitors Act, 1957.

37. Colonial Solicitors Act, 1900.

38. Wills Act, 1861.

39. Domicile Act, 1861.

40. Colonial Probate Act, 1892.

41. Evidence by Commission Acts, 1859 and 1885.

42. Administration of Justice Act, 1

920 and Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, 1933.

43. Judicial Committee Acts, 1833 et seq.

44. Extradition Acts, 1870 to 1935.

45. Fugitive Offenders Act , 1881.

46. Colonial Prisoners Removal Act, 1884.

47. Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890.

48. United Nations Act, 1946.

49. Maritime Convention Act, 1911 .

50. Official Secrets Acts, 1911 to 1920.

51. Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870.

52. Teachers Superannuation Acts, 1925, 1937 and 1956, and Superannuation (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1948.

53. Superannuation Acts (General). [*417]

APPENDIX 'C'

54. Colonial Officers (Leave of Absence) Act, 1894.

55. Colonial Boundaries Act, 1835.

56. Statutory Declarations Act, 1835.

57. Colonial Letters Patent Act, 1893.

58. Interpretation Act, 1889.

59. Patents and Designs Act, 1907, Patents Act, 1949, and Registered Designs. Act, 1949.

60. Finance Act, 1899.

61. Colonial Loans Act, 1899.

* See Appendix 'A'.

* Judgment Act 1838.

* See Appendix 2.

* See Appendix 2.