Court dismissed landlord's ejectment claim as demolition needs were not exceptional circumstances under Law 31/77.

[*229] 1977 June 21

(PIKIS, P.D.C.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF LARNACA

Monika Santi,

Applicant,

v.

Takis Christoforou,

Respondent.

(Rent Application No. 24/77).

Landlord and tenant - Statutory tenancy - Recovery of possession - Premises reasonably required for purposes of demolition and reconstruction - Not an "exceptional circumstance" within the meaning of section 3 of the Suspension of the Issue and Execution of Ejectment Orders Law, 1977 (Law 31/77).

G. Papatheodorou, for the Applicant.

T. Koumis, for the Respondent.

JUDGMENT

The following judgment was delivered by:-

PIKIS, P.D.C. :The applicant is [*230] the owner of a dwelling house at 43 Archbishop Makarios avenue, Larnaca; originally she prayed the Court for an order of ejectment under section 16 of the Rent Control Law, 1975, maintaining that the premises are reasonably required for the purposes of demolition and reconstruction. The application had been filed on 19th April 1975.

The respondent is a statutory tenant of the aforesaid premises, having first occupied them as a tenant shortly after the Turkish invasion. Before the Turkish invasion the respondent and his family resident at Famagusta, in a house belonging to themselves. His mother-in-law stayed with them for a period of time and then moved to "Tchiakkilero" refugee camp.

Subsequent to the filing of this application the Suspension of the Issue and Execution of Ejectment Orders law was enacted, Law 31/77, suspending the right to issue or execute an eviction order except in the face of what are termed "exceptional circumstances". Therefore the substratum of the application was removed and upon that counsel took the prudent course of submitting a joint statement of facts, relevant to the exercise of the discretion of the Court under Law 31/77, and the Court was invited to rule whether the applicant is entitled to an ejectment order. In this way the parties are saved trouble and expense; indeed this is a compendious way of tackling the problem in hand.

It is the first time I have occasion to examine the scope and ambit of the new Law, 31/77, and should, therefore, be permitted to take some time in order to advert [*231] to the implications of the Law.

Purposes of Law 31/77

The Law was enacted in response to the clamour of thousands of displaced persons for security of tenure of the premises occupied by them by virtue of leases that came into life after the Turkish invasion. The House of Representatives appropriately stepped in and enacted the Law in time to stem a rising surge for the recovery of premises let to displaced persons, wanted either for purposes of reconstruction or in order to secure higher rentals. In both cases the ultimate purpose is to enable owners of land, in the areas under the control of the State, to take an advantage of the once more, beginning to prosper, economy of Cyprus. This has been judged to be socially unjust and morally inequitable. Hence the enactment of Law 31/77, whereby the benefits of statutory tenancies conferred on displaced tenants are not to be taken away, except in the face of exceptional circumstances.

Another vital aim of the Law is to drive home to all concerned that Cyprus society shall not tolerate that the burdens of the Turkish invasion should fall on those who happened to be unlucky enough to reside before the invasion in what are now Turkish occupied areas and that there should be an equitable distribution among the whole of the population of Cyprus of the burdens resulting from the Turkish invasion. And if this is achieved we shall, at the same time, strengthen the oneness of purpose of all Cypriots to restore justice to Cyprus, stressing that we are all, in very many ways, in one and the same boat. [*232]

Now the Law says that no eviction order shall be made unless there exist exceptional circumstances that justify this course. The Law does not define the exceptional circumstances envisaged by legislature, and perhaps wisely so, for it would be imprudent to restrict the discretion of the Court in an area where the aim is to do justice, as understood by the man in the street, in the circumstances of a given case. But the Law does say that in deciding whether there do exist exceptional circumstances the Court should have regard to the totality of the circumstances of the case, naturally meaning thereby circumstances relevant to the tenancy and the personal circumstances of the owner and tenant, including the comparative hardship that would be suffered by the respective parties by an eviction order or by the non making of it.

Exceptional Circumstances

The meaning of "exceptional circumstances", in the context of section 3, Law 31/77, is not particularly hard to discern. It is manifest that it refers to circumstances other than those envisaged by s.l6, Law 36/75, and generally circumstances other than those ordinarily associated, speaking for the case of the owner, with the exercise of his proprietary rights over his property. The circumstances should not be defined in any tight way, but in every case the Court must strive to do justice in the light of the aims of the law and the circumstances and needs of the parties before it. When it comes to balancing conflicting hardship the Court must not overlook that tenants have not only had their income decreased but very often their capital base gone as well. They are the [*233] ones who must, more than anybody else, be placed under the protective umbrella of the State. Justice must not be blind in its path; therefore regard must be given, as well, to the totality of the circumstances of the owner. Here the owners must be reminded that the rising rents - and I can take judicial notice of that fact - in the town of Larnaca since the Turkish invasion, are mostly the result of the influx of thousands of refugees in the town and they should not be allowed to take advantage of the misery of their fellow citizens. They have their immovable property intact and surely as things improve, as we all hope, they will have the opportunity to exploit their property to their use and advantage.

In the present case no exceptional circumstances exist. The owner simply wishes to exploit her property to her advantage. She is not particularly well off or a well off person. She depends on her earnings from the secretarial job she is doing at the Hungarian Embassy; she is single and she resides with her mother. The two of them between them have an income of £99 per month, as opposed to the respondent who earns only £60 per month and has to support his wife, two infant children as well as contribute £1 0 a month for the upkeep of his mother-in-law. And if the tenant is ordered to vacate the premises it is common ground that he will need at least a rental of £¿4.0 per month to secure a letting of comparable prices.

A comparison of the merits of the two sides would leave every reasonable onlooker with the impression [*234] that the one who needs protection is the tenant. Therefore this application is hereby dismissed. There will be no order as to costs mainly because the dismissal of the application is due to a supervening change of the Law.

Application dismissed

No order as to costs.