Court holds Rent Control Law disputes must follow application procedure under s.25, not ordinary action.

[*34] 1977 March 11

(PIKIS, AG. P.D.C.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF LARNACA

Savvas Panayi HadjiSavva, through

his lawful attorney Christakis Christofidi,

Applicant,

v.

Fofo Charalambous Mallottidhou,

Respondent.

(Rent Application No. 15/76).

Landlord and tenant - Practice - Disputes concerning the application of the Rent Control Law, 1975 (Law 36/75) - Should be referred to the Court in the manner envisaged by the Rules made under section 25 of the Law.

Words and Phrases - "Action".

E. Emilianides with Chr. Sozos, for the Applicant.

A. Kramvis, for the Respondent.

DECISION

The following decision was delivered by:-

PIKIS, AG. P.D.C.: A short hut very important [*35] legal point must be resolved touching the validity of the proceedings before me, that being whether an eviction order sought under the provisions of section 16, Law 36/75, can be sought in proceedings raised in the manner envisaged by the regulations made pursuant to the provisions of section

25 of the same Law.

Mr. Kramvis, counsel for the tenant, who raised the issue, argued that the only avenue open to the landlord to pursue the remedy sought is by action and cited, in support of his submission, the provisions of s.l6(l)(a) and 16(3) in 36/75 where reference is specifically nade to an "action" as opposed to the provisions of sections 5, 7(2),

10 and 21(2), specifically providing a procedure by application. It was also argued that the provisions of regulation 12, limiting the right to appeal, to

14 days, is another indication that the legislature intended proceedings under s. 16 to be raised by a writ of summons and not by application.

Mr. Emilianides, counsel for the landlord, took a contrary stand and submitted that the definition of "action", given by the Civil Procedure Rules (0.1, r.2) and the provisions of sections 2, 4 and 25 of Law 36/75 clearly establish a new procedure for the ventilation of all disputes involving the application of Law 36/75 and therefore invited the Court to take cognizance of the substance of the application.

It is manifest, on a consideration of the provisions of s.4(2) of Law 36/75, that the matter in issue has both procedural and substantive aspects inasmuch as a Court established under the provisions of s.4(l) need not adhere to the rules of evidence, a course that would be imperative [*36] if the dispute was brought before the Court by a writ of summons.

Now s.4(l) lays down, perhaps, by a wording not too happily chosen, that all disputes concerning the application of the law must be raised before a Court established thereunder. Therefore the only Court that has competence to take cognizance of disputes involving the application of Law 36/75 is a Court established under s.4 of the law. The procedure before such Court is governed by regulations made under s.25 of the same law, empowering the Supreme Court to regulate by rules the manner of instituting and prosecuting before the Court disputes involving the application of the law. The Supreme Court has enacted rules simplifying, if I may say so, with respect, the procedure that should be followed in comparison to the ordinary process in a way expediting the determination of such cases and in a manner making the law more amenable both to the pocket and the knowledge of the citizen. And this for obvious reasons for law 36/75 is an important piece of social legislation designed to remedy some of the repercussions of the catastrophic events of 1974. Certainly the simplification of the procedure and the relaxation of the rules of evidence is in order with the spirit of the legislature and the basic purposes of the law.

I do not overlook that the word

"action" is encountered in two separate provisions of s. 16, nor the implications of s.16(3) making special provision for the costs that should be collected

in proceedings under s.16. But the word "action" does not, of necessity, imply instituting a matter by means of a writ of summons as the definition of "action" in the [*37] Courts of Justice Law and the Civil Procedure Rules clearly suggests. And so to hold would defeat the intention of the legislature to refer all disputes under the law to a Court established under s.4 with all that this course entails.

In my judgment disputes concerning the application of Law 36/75 should be referred to the Court in the manner envisaged by the regulations, made under s. 25 of Law 36/75. Therefore I shall proceed to hear the substance of the case.

Order accordingly.