Supreme Court reserves judgment on Attorney-General's appeal rights regarding Assizes acquittals under Courts of Justice Law.

[*164] 1978 December 12

(TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P., L. LOIZOU, HADJIANASTASSIOU,

A. LOIZOU, MALACHTOS, DEMETRIADES, SAVVIDES, JJ. )

Attorney-General of the Republic,

Appellant,

and

Andreas Aristodemou Pourris and others,

Respondents.

(Criminal Appeals Nos. 3932-3938).

Criminal Procedure - Appeal - Judgment reserved - Court referred to further legal authorities after judgment was reserved.

L. Loucaides, Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic, with M. Florentzos, for the Appellant.

A. Eftychiou, for Respondents Nos. 1 and 3.

M. Christofides, for Respondents Nos. 2, 4, 6 and 7.

P. Solomonides, for Respondent No. 5.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CYPRUS

Appellate Jurisdiction

IN THE MATTER of the Criminal Appeals Nos. 3932-3938 filed by the Attorney-General of the Republic.

Application by the Attorney-General of the Republic.

LET all persons concerned attend the Supreme Court of Cyprus on the 12th day of December, 1978 at the hour of 12 noon on the hearing of an application by the [*165] Attorney-General, for: A direction of the Court that the hearing on the question raised by the Respondents in the above appeals to the effect that the Attorney-General has no right of appeal in respect of acquittals by the Assizes, be re-opened for the purpose of further argument in relation to the following legal proposition supported by the applicant:

"If it is found that s. 25 of the Courts of Justice Law (14/196O) does not confer with the utmost degree of clarity a right of appeal to the Attorney-General in cases of acquittals by the Assizes, this per se is not sufficient to exclude such right if the section is not capable of a specific alternative reasonable and sensible construction. It is then incumbent on the Court, before deciding to reject the existence of such right to satisfy itself that there is such alternative construction."

This application is based on the inherent power of the Court to hear further argument at any stage of the proceedings before delivering judgment.

The facts relied upon, supported by the record of the proceedings, are as follows:-

After the conclusion of the hearing in relation to the above question and on a review by the Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic of the arguments advanced by Counsel for the Respondents and of the authorities referred to in support thereof the Deputy Attorney-General felt that the above legal proposition (which has not been sufficiently expounded before the Court) was of fundamental importance in deciding the relevant issues. [*166]

The Court and Counsel for Respondents

were informed accordingly by a letter dated 21st November, 1978. In reply the Supreme Court addressed through the Chief Registrar to

the Deputy Attorney-General a letter dated 28th November, 1978.

(L.G.Loucaides)

Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic,

Counsel for Applicant.

21st November, 1978.

Chief Registrar,

Supreme Court,

With reference to the appeals Nos. 3932-3938 filed by the Attorney-General of the Republic, in respect of which the judgment of the Supreme Court has been reserved, I consider it my duty to draw the attention of the Court to the following legal proposition - supported by the authorities hereinafter cited - which seems to be of fundamental importance in deciding the issues raised in the appeals in question:

If it is found that is. 25 of the Courts of Justice Law (14/1960) does not confer with the utmost degree of clarity a right of appeal to the Attorney-General in cases of acquittals by the Assizes, this, in itself, is not sufficient to exclude such right if the section is not capable of an alternative reasonable and sensible construction [*167] It is then incumbent on the Court, in case of rejection of the said right, to specify and explain such alternative construction.

See: Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 12th Ed. p. 160 and in particular the passage from the Vera Cruz case: "If anything be certain it is this, that where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt, with, by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from, merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so."

See also: Maxwell op. cit p. 239 in particular the passage from the case Tuck & Sons v. Priester (1887) 19 Q.B.D 629 p. 638 which refers to the construction of penal sections (a fortiori in our case which does not relate to a penal section):"If there is a reasonable interpretation which will avoid the penalty in any particular case we must adopt that construction. If there are two reasonable constructions we must give the more lenient one. That is the settled rule for the construction of penal sections.”

(The underlining of the above quotations is mine).

See also: The Vera Cruz (1884) 10 App Cas.p.59 at pp. 68, 69. [*168]

Smith v. Brown (1871 ) L.R. 6 Q.B.729 L.J. 1871 p.

214 at pp. 218, 219 (referred to in Maxwell op. cit p. 160).

Re H.P.C. Productions Ltd. (1962) Ch. 466 at p. 485.

You are requested to bring the above to the notice of the Honourable Members of the Supreme Court and inform them, at the same time, that I am prepared to argue orally the aforesaid legal aspect of the case, which I consider of utmost importance to the issues raised in the above appeals. For this purpose I humbly request the re-opening of the hearing of the appeals in question.

L.G.Loucaides,

Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic

Counsel for Appellant.

Copy sent to:

Messrs Manolis Christofides, )

" Andreas Eftychiou ( Counsel for Respondents.

" Panayiotis Solomonides )

NICOSIA: 28th November,1978

Mr. L.G. Loucaides,

Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic,

Nicosia,

I acknowledge receipt of your letter A.G.74/1978 dated 21st November, 1978, in relation to criminal appeals Nos. 3932-3938. [*169]

I am directed to inform you that I have brought to the notice of the Members of the Supreme Court your said letter and that the Court can only take cognizance of what is expounded therein if the hearing of the matter is re-opened; you have, therefore, to apply to the Court in the appropriate manner, with notice, to all other counsel concerned, for a direction that the hearing be re-opened and the Court will then decide as to the course to be adopted in the light of the arguments to be advanced by counsel.

(Sgd.) A.S.Olymbios

Chief Registrar.

Copy to: Mr. Manolis Christofides )

Mr. Andreas Eftychiou ) Counsel for Respondent.

Mr. Panayiotis Solominides)

Counsel heard.

Court: In view of what we have heard from counsel today, we see no reason to go into the matter of the powers of this Court to re-open, at this stage, the hearing of a case of this nature.

We propose to take cognizance of all the references to legal authorities which are contained in the letter addressed to the Chief Registrar by the Deputy Attorney-General on November 21, 1978, and we, also, are ready to take note of any such authorities to which [*170] counsel for the respondents may, in the circumstances, wish to refer us.

Mr. Eftychiou referred to Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, 12th ed., p. 196 and to the case of Corporation of Blackpool v. Starr Estate

Co., Ltd. (1922) 1 A.C. 27, 34.

Mr. Christofides referred to the case of Xenophontos v. Charalambous, 1961 C.L.R. 122, 126 - 127.

Mr. Solomonides did not wish to add anything.

Court: The judgment remains reserved.