Court awards damages to injured child for road accident, reducing sum by child's 25% contributory negligence.

[*78] 1975 October 4

(KOURRIS, S.D.J.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP NICOSIA

Andreas M. Kleanthous, through his nearest

friend and father, Michael Kleanthous,

Plaintiff,

and

Costas Deniotis,

Defendant.

(Action No. 503/75).

Negligence

- Running down case - Lorry knocking down child aged 11 - Whilst wrestling with another child on right berm of road - Children noticed by lorry driver from distance of about 60 ft. - Lorry driver not sounding his horn but driving it to the right - Possibility of danger emerging reasonably apparent - Lorry driver negligent - Contributory negligence - Child negligent to the extent of 25%.

Negligence

- Contributory negligence - Children - Whether they can be found guilty of contributory negligence - Child of 11 years old knocked down by lorry whilst wrestling with another child on right berm of village main road - Held guilty of contributory negligence.

Damages - General damages - Personal injuries - Boy of 11 sustaining serious crushing injury to his right foot - Compound fracture of the second and third metatarsal bones with a wound extending from the dorsum of the foot to the fractured side

- Award of C£500.

Damages - Special damages - Infant child injured in road accident - Whether mother can claim loss of wages for nursing care of child without being a party to the action.

N. Pelides, for the plaintiff,

G. Pelaghias, for the Defendant,

JUDGMENT

The following judgment was delivered by:-

KOURRIS, S.D.J.: The plaintiff, an infant, [*79] is suing through his father and next friend and his claim against the defendant is for special and general damages as a result of a road traffic accident which occurred on 3rd March, 1974, within Kokkinotrimithia village.

There are two conflicting versions before the Court as to how this accident occurred. The one version is that of the plaintiff who gave evidence himself and called another two witnesses in support of his claim and the other is the version of the defendant who gave evidence himself on oath and called no other witnesses.

The evidence of the plaintiff clearly is as follows:-

The plaintiff who was born in June, 1963, and at the time was 10 years and 8 months old, comes from Kokkinotrimithia village. On the 3.3.1974 in the afternoon and at about 4 p.m. he was at the "Enosis Neon Kokkinotrimithias” Club with friends and he decided to go and see his aunt who had just horn a child. He came out of the Club together with his friend Renos Panteli, a child of about 10 years old and they went onto the berm adjoining the road. The plaintiff said that he was walking on the right berm in a northerly direction i.e. to the direction of Mammari village and he was about one foot from the right edge of the road and that his friend Panteli was walking next to him. He went on to say that whilst so walking a car hit his right leg and that he did not see from what direction the car came. Whilst being examined in chief the plaintiff said that when he came out of the [*80] Club, he stood, on the right berm together with his friend Panteli and he looked to the right where there is a coffeeshop to see whether there were any friends of his there and whilst so standing he was hit by the car. In cross-examination when he was confronted by counsel for the defence that he gave two different versions, the plaintiff said that he did not give two different versions and that what he meant was than when he came out of the Club he walked for a short distance with Panteli which he estimated at about 10 meters, then they stopped on the berm to look to the direction of the cafe and it was at that moment that he was hit by the car. In cross-examination went on to say that whilst so standing on the berm and facing the Club so that his back was towards the road, Panteli who was standing to his right shouted to him "Look, there is a car". Pantelis jumped backwards and he (the plaintiff) turned left to see where the car was and in doing so he slipped and fell. His head was towards the direction of the Club and his right foot went on to the right edge of the road and the car hit his foot. He denied that at the time he was playing and wrestling with Panteli and that he suddenly disengaged himself from him and slipped and fell on to the road.

The evidence of Renos Panteli is that when he came out of the Club together with the plaintiff, they crossed the front yard of the Club which is two to three meters and they stood on the right berm; their backs were towards the Club and they were facing the road and were looking at the coffee-shop which is opposite the Club and whilst so standing, he saw a lorry coming from the right at a [*81] distance of about 20 to

25 ft. and as he realized that a collision was imminent, he stepped backwards and he did not see what the plaintiff did and he did not see the actual impact. In cross-examination he said that when they came out of the Club they walked on the right berm for a short distance which he estimated at about 10 to 15 meters and then they stopped on the berm and looked at the coffee-shop. He said that he could not remember if the brother of Andreas called Demetris was with them on the berm at the time of the accident. In a question put by the Court he answered that he thought that the front right wheel of the lorry was covering at the time about half a foot of the berm but he was not sure about it.

The third witness who gave evidence as to the circumstances of the collision is Christodoulos Zintilis who on the 3.3.1974 was driving his motor-car BP 398 within Kokkinotrimithia village and was following motorlorry DF 853 driven by the defendant. He was following the lorry for about 150 meters before the accident. The lorry was driven at a slow speed which he estimated at approximately 15 to 20 miles or even 10 m.p.h. and was keeping the centre of the road. He saw two children standing on the right berm of the road and when the lorry was about 10 meters away from the children, pulled to the right and then he lost sight of the children because his view was obstructed by the case of the lorry and did not see the actual impact. Immediately after the accident he stopped his car and saw that the right wheel of the lorry hit the foot of the plaintiff on the extreme right [*82] edge of the asphalt. He said that the road is straight where the accident occurred and that it is about 14 ft. wide and was following the lorry from a distance of 50 to 70 meters. This witness removed the plaintiff together with the defendant to the Nicosia General Hospital. Zintilis said that the 3rd March, 1974, was a Sunday and there were women sitting on chairs outside their houses and on the road, that there were two cars parked outside the coffeeshop and that there were pedestrians using the road.

The version of the defendant is as follows: He was driving his lorry DP 853 along the road to the direction of Mammari village at a speed of 10 to 15 m.p.h. and was keeping the right-hand side of the road and the right wheels were about 1½ ft. from the right berm. He said that he was keeping the right-hand side of the road because ahead of him and at a distance of 40 ft. there was a left turning and wanted to negotiate the turning and turn left. He saw three children on the right berm and at a distance of one to two feet from the edge of the asphalt playing. When he saw them he was at a distance of about 10 ft. away from them and he realized that one of the children might disengage itself and fall on the road and so he applied the brakes. Whilst he had the brakes applied, one of the children disengaged itself and fell on the road and the right wheel of his lorry hit the right foot of the child who was the plaintiff Andreas Kleanthous. He said that on the berm were the plaintiff, his brother, who is two years older than the plaintiff and another child and that the plaintiff and his brother were wrestling. He said [*83] that the head of the plaintiff was between the legs of his brother.

In cross-examination the defendant said that when he saw the children he was about

60 ft. away from them and that when he was about 20 ft. from them he pulled to the right and drove his lorry to the right side of the asphalt in order to enable him to negotiate a left turning which was at a distance of about 40 ft. away from him. He agreed with counsel for the plaintiff that it was likely that the children might make a sudden move and come into the road and he agreed that a prudent driver would have sounded the horn of his lorry and keep as far away as possible from the children but he said that he thought it best not to sound the horn but to apply the brakes. He said that there were no women sitting outside their houses, but people were sitting outside the coffee-shop and that there were pedestrians before the Club but after he passed the Club the road was clear from any pedestrians or other traffic and that there were only the three children on the right berm. He said that the width of the road is approximately 15 ft. and that the width of his lorry is 7 ft.

This is shortly the evidence of the various witnesses before the Court. The Court had not had the advantage of looking at a sketch prepared by the Police because when the police arrived at the scene the father of the plaintiff told them that he did not want them to investigate into the accident and that he had no complaint about the driver of the lorry. [*84]

The father of the plaintiff gave evidence and said that the reason why he sent the Police away from the scene and the reason why he said he had no complaint against the lorry driver was because at the Hospital he was informed by a doctor that the injuries the child received were not serious and he did not have at that time any intention for pursuing in Court an action for damages in respect of the injuries received by his son.

I propose to deal first with the question of liability and in doing so it is the duty of the Court to weigh and assess the evidence of the various witnesses.

I had the opportunity to watch and listen to the evidence of the various witnesses and I have come to the conclusion that the defendant told the truth and I accept his version. The evidence of the defendant as to the speed of the lorry, the width of the road and the mode of his driving prior to the impact is corroborated by the evidence of plaintiff’s witness Christodoulos Zintilis. Further his evidence that the plaintiff slipped and fell and that his right foot stretched on the road is corroborated by the evidence of the plaintiff himself, although their evidence differed as to what the plaintiff was doing prior to his fall. I was not impressed by the evidence of the plaintiff and his witness Renos Panteli. I made allowances as to the mode they gave their evidence due to their young age, but I cannot discard from my mind that the plaintiff disclosed for the first time that he slipped and fell whilst he was being cross-examined. Also whilst he was examined. [*85] in-chief he gave two different stories as to his movements and position prior to the impact. Further the position of the plaintiff prior to the impact is contradicted by the evidence of his witness Panteli. I accept the evidence. of the defendant that the. plaintiff was wrestling with his elder brother before he slipped and fell.

It is an undisputed fact that the defendant was driving at a speed of 1 0 to 15 m.p.h. that the width of the asphalted part of the road is approximately 15 ft., the width of the lorry 7 ft. and that the point of impact is on the right edge of the asphalt and on the evidence adduced before me, I find the facts as follows:

The defendant was driving his lorry at a speed of about 10 to 15 m.p.h. and keeping the centre of the road. When he was at a distance of about 60 ft. from the children, he saw three children of the. right berm. The plaintiff and his elder brother were playing and actually they were wrestling and the plaintiff was In a stooping position, his head being between the legs of his brother and trying to disengage himself. The other child was Renos Panteli. At a distance of about

60 ft. away from the children there was a left turn and as the defendant intended to turn left, he pulled to the right so that the right wheels of his lorry were approximately 1½ ft. from the berm in order to make room to negotiate the left turn. When he was approximately 10 ft. from the children he realized that one of the children might get disengaged and fell on the road and he thought it best instead of sounding the horn to apply the brakes. Whilst the brakes were applied, the plaintiff disengaged himself, [*86] slipped and fell on the road. The right wheel hit the right foot of the plaintiff which rested on the edge of the asphalt after his fall. The wheel of the lorry did not run over the foot of the plaintiff. The width of the road is approximately

15 ft. and straight, the width of the lorry 7 ft. and the road at the time of the impact was free from any other vehicles or pedestrians using the road.

On the facts as found by me, the question arises whether the defendant was negligent. The principles of negligence are well known and are supported by a number of cases decided both in England and by our Supreme Court. It is sufficient for me to state the meaning of negligence from Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume 28, 3rd Edition, at page 3, where it is stated:

"Negligence is a specific tort and in any given circumstances is the failure to exercise that care which the circumstances demand. What amounts to negligence depends on the facts of each particular case and the categories of negligence are never closed. It may consist in omitting to do something which ought to be done or in doing something which ought to be done either in a different manner or not at all. Whether there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which can be reasonably foreseen to be likely to cause physical injury to persons or property". [*87]

Again in Bingham’s Motor Claim Cases, 7th Edition, it is stated that:

"Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do (Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (1850), 11 Ex. 781 ; 25 L.J. Ex. 212; 4 W.R. 204)".

Mr. Pelaghias appearing for the defendant submitted to the Court that the plaintiff failed to prove negligence on the part of the defendant and that the accident occurred due to the sole negligence of the plaintiff. He argued that when the defendant was driving at a slow speed, he saw the children from a distance of 10 ft. and he realised that they would disengage and he applied the brakes but the plaintiff slipped and fell and the impact occurred. He said that the defendant was faced with an emergency and his reaction to apply the brakes was better than sounding the horn.

Mr. Pelides who is appearing for the plaintiff invited the Court to accept the evidence of the plaintiff and he further argued that even if the defendant’s version is accepted, then the defendant is solely to blame for this accident because he moved to the right and passed closely from the children within a touching distance, as he put it.

I have given the matter my best consideration and I find that the defendant was negligent. The defendant was [*88] driving along a straight road free from any other vehicles or pedestrians on the road and he saw the children wrestling on the right berm from a distance of about 60 ft. and he admitted in cross-examination that there is always a danger when there are pedestrians either adults or children to make a sudden move and come into the road and that a prudent driver in these circumstances must sound the horn to warn them of his approach or drive his vehicle as far away from them as possible. Although the defendant was aware of this danger and particularly the danger was very great in this case because the children were of very young age and wrestling on the berm without paying any attention to the road, nevertheless instead of sounding his horn to call their attention to his presence, not only he did not do that, but further when he was nearer to the children instead of driving his lorry as far as possible to the left, he drove it to the right side of the road without leaving a safe berth of distance. It appears from the width of the road and the width of the lorry that there was ample space before approaching the children to drive as far possible to the left as he could. When he saw the children wrestling on the berm, it was a foreseeable contingency and he anticipated that the children might move on to the road. It was stated in the case of Fardon v. Harcourt-Rivington

(1932) All E.R., Reprint 81, page 83,where Lord Dunedin in the House of Lords enunciated the principle to the effect that if the possibility of danger emerging is reasonably apparent, then to take no precautions is negligence; but if the possibility of danger emerging is only a mere possibility which would never occur to the mind of a reasonable man, then there is no negligence in not [*89] having taken extraordinary precautions.

Having regard to the circumstances of this case, the possibility that the children might move on to the road was reasonably apparent and the defendant ought to have taken precautions. That it was reasonably apparent it appears also from the evidence of the defendant himself. In conclusion, I find that the defendant was negligent because he saw the children wrestling on the berm and he did not sound his horn to call their attention to his presence and also instead of moving his vehicle to the left, he drove to the right, on the wrong side of the road, and nearer to the children without leaving a safe berth of distance.

Although counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the defendant is totally to blame for the accident and that counsel for the defendant submitted that the accident occurred due to the sole negligence of the plaintiff because he slipped and fell at the moment the lorry was passing, I consider it pertinent to examine the question whether the infant plaintiff contributed to this accident or not, since the question of contributory negligence is raised in the pleadings. Before proceeding any further, I would Iike to state the principles of contributory negligence. The leading cases on this point are Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railways Co. Ltd. (1951) 2 All E.R. 448, which was referred to in several judgments of our Supreme Court. This is a Privy Council decision and Viscount Simon at page 450 had this to say: [*90]

"The statement that, when negligence is alleged as the basis of an actionable wrong, a necessary ingredient in the conception is the existence of a duty owed by the defendants to the plaintiff to take due care, is, of course, indubitably correct. But when contributory negligence is set up as a defence, its existence does not depend on any duty owed by the injured party to the party sued and all that is necessary to establish such a defence is to prove to the satisfaction of the jury that the injured party did not in his own interest take reasonable care of himself and contributed, by this want of care, to his own injury. For when contributory negligence is set up as a shield against the obligation to satisfy the whole of the plaintiff's claim, the principle involved is that, where a man is part author of his own injury, he cannot call on the other party to compensate him in full. This view of the matter has recently been expounded, after full analysis of the legal concepts involved and careful examination of the authorities, by the English Court of Appeal in Davies v. Swan Motor Co. (Swansea) Ltd., to which the Chief Justice referred. This, however, is not to say that in all cases the plaintiff who is guilty of contributory negligence owes to the defendant no duty to act carefully. Indeed, it would appear to their Lordships that in cases relating to runningdown accidents like the present such a duty exists. [*91]

“The proposition can be put even more broadly. Generally speaking, when two parties are so moving in relation to one another as to involve risk of collision, each owes to the other a duty to move with due care, and this is true whether they are both in control of vehicles, or both proceeding on foot, or whether one is on foot and the other controlling a moving vehicle".

The other case is Brown & Another v. Thompson (1968) 2 All E.R., p. 708, where at page 709, Winn, L.J. said as follows:

"When it is necessary for a court to ascribe liability in proportions to more than one person, it is well established that regard must be had not only to the causative potency of the acts or emissions

of each of the parties, but to their relative blameworthiness. In The Miraflores and The Abadesa, Lord Pearce said:”

“’the investigation is concerned with 'fault' which includes blameworthiness as well as causation; and no true apportionment can be reached unless both those factors are borne in mind'".

Contributory negligence on the part of children is distinguished from contributory negligence on the part of adults. The position is best stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 28, 3rd Edition, at page 93 where it is stated: [*92]

"A distinction must be drawn between children and adults, for an act which would constitute contributory negligence on the part of an adult may fail to do so in the case of a child or young person, the reason being that a child cannot be expected to be as careful for his own safety as an adult. Where a child is of such an age as to be naturally ignorant of danger or to be unable to fend for himself at all, he cannot be said to be guilty of contributory negligence with regard to a matter beyond his appreciation, but quite young children are held responsible for not exercising that care which may reasonably be expected of them".

The position with regard to contributory negligence on the part of children was dealt with in the case of Gough v. Thorne (1966) 3 All E.R. page 398 where Lord Denning at page 399, letter 'H', said:

"A very young child cannot be guilty of contributory negligence. An older child may be; but it depends on the circumstances. A judge should only find a child guilty of contributory negligence if he or she is of such an age as reasonably to be expected to take precautions for his or her own safety: and then he or she is only to be found guilty if blame should be attached to him or her. A child has not the right sense or the experience of his or her elders. He or she is not to be found guilty unless he or she is blameworthy". [*93]

There are a number of cases in England dealing with the question of contributory negligence on the part of children, suffice it to say that apart from the case I have mentioned above, there is another case, namely Jones v. Lawrence (1969) 3 All E.R., page 267.

In Cyprus where children involved in traffic accidents we have the cases of the Supreme Court, of Costas Shiampetta v. Michalakis Diacou and Another (1974) 10 J.S.C. page 960, and the

case of Andreas D Georghiades v. Charis Loizou and Another, (1974) 12 J.S.C. page 1169. But the facts of these two cases differ from

the case in hand.

There is also a case whose summary of facts appear in the New Law Journal, Volume 124, dated 21.11.74 at page 1084 under the heading of "Negligence". This is the case of Moore v. Poyner which was reported in the "Times", 2nd November, 1974, but I have been unable to trace this newspaper and I have been also unable to trace the full report of this case in any legal reports. In this case the defendant was driving his car in a residential area in which he knew small children played in the streets. The plaintiff aged six ran out of the pathway and was struck by the defendant's car. The Appeal Court reversed the judgment of the trial judge and held that the defendant had not been negligent in not reducing his speed and that he was under no duty to sound his horn, and the Court granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords. I do not propose to rely on this case because I have not before me the full report of this case, and further from the summary of the facts of this case it appears that the plaintiff only knew that children played [*94] in the area whereas in the case I am trying, the defendant saw the children wrestling on the berm.

As I said earlier in my judgment the plaintiff at the material time was 10 years and 8 months old and the question arises whether he had contributed to the accident in question bearing in mind the facts found by me. I am of the opinion that the infant plaintiff contributed to the accident because he was wrestling on the berm at a distance of one to two feet from the road. It appears from the evidence that this road was one of the main roads of the village, and it was used by traffic and therefore the plaintiff should have realized that whilst wrestling might get disengaged and get on to the road, and I find that he did not in his own interest take reasonable care of himself and contributed by his want of care to his own injury. Having regard to his age, the plaintiff was reasonably to be expected to take precautions for his own safety. Having given the matter my best consideration, I find that defendant 1 is 75% to blame for this accident and the infant plaintiff is to blame to the extent of 25%.

The plaintiff was removed to the Nicosia General Hospital and according to the medical evidence he suffered a serious crushing injury to his right foot leading:

(a) Marked swelling and contusion of the foot more pronounced over its dorsal surface.

(b) Compound fracture of the second and third metatarsal bones with a wound extending from the dorsum of the foot to the fractured side. [*95]

(c) Avulsion of skin of an area of 5x3cms. in diameter on the posterior surface of the right foot.

Subsequent local sepsis developed which fortunately responded to serial dressings and antibiotics. The plaintiff stayed as an in-patient at the Hospital for 40 days and after his discharge from the Hospital he underwent treatment for physiotherapy on an out-patient basis for approximately one month.

Dr. Pelides who treated the plaintiff said that the injuries caused loss of soft tissue cover on the dorsal of the right foot and the plaintiff was left with a scaring on the dorsal of the foot which is 5x8cm. and also some deformity of the toes. He said that the deformity of the toes consists in some clawing and he advised that the scar should be excised and cover it with a normal skin, but even then the foot would not recover its pre-injury soft tissue vitality. He said that the fracture healed well and that the present functional impairment consists apart from the aesthetic deficit of mild impairment of the walls, preinjury ability for strenuous exertion, running, jumping etc. Dr. Pelides when giving evidence he relied on his findings when he examined the plaintiff for the last time on 21.5.1974. But the plaintiff when giving evidence he had no complaints about his foot apart from the fact that sometimes he feels it to be numb.

In conclusion, the plaintiff was left with a scaring of 5x8cm. on the dorsum of the foot which even if excised and covered with a natural skin by means of a skin grafting operation, the foot would not recover its pre-injury soft [*96] tissue vitality. The plaintiff also feels his foot sometimes to be numb, and there are two toes slightly deformed in the sense that they are clowed.

Another controversial point was the question of special damages. It has been proved to my satisfaction that the plaintiff incurred C£55.- medical expenses. Regarding the claim of the plaintiff for medicines, he has not satisfied me that he incurred C£25.- medical expenses. He has not been able to produce any receipts, but it is a fact that the plaintiff was taking antibiotics and this is supported by the evidence of Dr. Pelides. Some of these antibiotics he got from the Hospital and other from chemist shops, because they were not available at the Hospital. I think it is reasonable to award to the plaintiff the sum of C£10.- for medicines and another sum of C£10.- for his transport expenses from Kokkinotrimithia to the Nicosia General Hospital and back whilst undergoing physiotherapy.

Regarding the claim under para. 7(d) of the statement of claim Mr. Pelaghias submitted that the mother cannot recover for her loss of wages because she is not a party to the action. Mr. Pelides argued that she is entitled and he cited to the Court the case of Donelly v. Joyce (1973) 3 W.L.R., page

514. I have perused the case cited and I am in full agreement with Mr. Pelides that the mother can claim loss of wages for the nursing care of the infant plaintiff and it is not necessary to be a party to the action. Indeed on the authority of this case she could not have been a party to the action. The mother of the plaintiff did not give [*97] evidence to prove that it was necessary for her to look after the plaintiff during the period for which the plaintiff could not walk. The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff and on the evidence adduced, I am not satisfied that the mother of the plaintiff lost wages for 2½ months whilst looking after the plaintiff. I would have been prepared to allow the sum claimed had there been evidence to the effect that the plaintiff needed someone to look after him and that his mother did not go to her work in order to look after the plaintiff and provide him with the necessary nursing care. I am, however, prepared to allow to the mother of the plaintiff half her wages whilst she was visiting the plaintiff at the Hospital. The plaintiff who is a young child, whilst in Hospital was crying and wanted his mother and I think his mother is entitled to recover any wages lost whilst visiting him at the Hospital. On the evidence adduced, the mother used to visit him at the Hospital during the visiting hours which was between 1-3 p.m. or 4 p.m. every day and I am prepared to allow her half her wages during the period the plaintiff was at the Hospital. The mother of the plaintiff was earning C£1.500 mils per day and as the plaintiff stayed at the Hospital for 40 days, she is entitled to recover half of her wages during that period and I award the sum of C£30.

Now what is the quantum of damages. I regret to say that neither counsel cited to the Court any authorities

concerning the quantum of damages. I have been able to find in Kemp & Kemp on the quantum of damages, Volume 1, 3rd Edition, two cases which bear some similarity to

the [*98] case in hand. The one case is Barrett v. Marshall & Co. Ltd., at page 344, in which the plaintiff was awarded £800.- general damages. In this case the plaintiff was a married woman and her arm was drawn by the rollers right up to the armpit and she sustained considerable injury to the skin of the arm although no bones were broken. The injury necessitated skin grafting mostly on the inner side of the upper arm. The accident had been a horrifying experience for the plaintiff and she had sustained very great pain and for six months after the accident she was fit for light work.

The other case which is an unauthenticated is Butcher v. Southern Foundries, at page 348, in which the plaintiff was awarded £650.- general damages. The plaintiff in this case suffered severe burns on inner aspect of left foot and on outer aspect of ankle, achilley’s tendon and left chin and back of forefoot and he had continuing loss of sensation and occasional pain and difficulty in crouching. Still had scars near sole of foot and top of foot.

In this case I propose to award to the plaintiff a global figure as a fair compensation. Taking into consideration the authorities cited and the injuries which the plaintiffs in those cases suffered and the sums awarded and the years in which they were decided and taking into account the pain, suffering and inconvenience suffered in the light of the medical evidence and the plaintiff’s evidence and bearing the consequential effects of the injuries in plaintiff’s life, I award to the plaintiff the sum of C£500.-. To this sum I add the sum of C£105.- special [*99] damages and there is a total of C£605.-. As the plaintiff has contributed to the accident to the extent of 25%, I deduct the sum of C£151.250 mils, and there is a balance of C£453.750 mils for which sum I enter judgment for the plaintiff.

In the result there will be judgment for the plaintiff for C£453.750 mils (four hundred and fifty three Cyprus pounds and seven hundred and fifty mils) with costs.

Costs to be assessed by the Registrar.

Judgment for plaintiff for

C£453.750 mils with costs.