Court dismisses appeal where trial judge correctly defined 'stricken debtor' and exercised discretion on debt repayment terms.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe Court of Appeal dismissed the appellants' appeal against the District Court's order granting monthly instalment payments for a judgment debt. The appellants argued they were 'stricken debtors' unable to pay due to the Turkish invasion and lack of income, but the trial judge ruled the statutory definition excluded spouses. The appellate court affirmed the trial judge's interpretation of the law and found no error in the discretionary terms imposed for the stay of sale.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IADebtors Relief (Temporary Provisions) Law, 1975 (Law 9/75), section 2; section 3(2): The term 'stricken debtor' contains plain words excluding the debtor's spouse; the trial court's exercise of discretion in granting a stay of sale with instalment terms is reviewed only for error in principle or unreasonableness.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IAGiurisprudenza citata
Generato dall'IADecisioni correlate
Generato dall'IATesto completo
[*480] 1977 March 30
(STAVRINIDES,
L. LOIZOU, A. LOIZOU, JJ.) APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Chrysoulla Savva Neophytou and Another,
Appellants-Applicants,
v.
Andreas Papasplomontos and Another,
Respondents.,
(Civil Appeal No. 5603).
Debtors Relief (Temporary Provisions) Law, 1975 (Law 9/75) - "Stricken debtor" in section 2 of the Law - Definition thereof contains plain words which are not capable of any alternative construction - It does not include the husband or wife of a debtor.
Debtors Relief (Temporary Provisions) Law, 1975 (Law 9/75) - Stay of sale under section 3(2) of the Law - Terms to be imposed, in granting a stay, within the discretion of the trial Court - Principles on which Court of Appeal will interfere with the exercise of such discretion - On the totality of the circumstances of this case the manner in which the trial Court exercised its discretion duly warranted by the material before it and exercised in accordance with the Law.
Court of Appeal - Discretion of trial judge - Reviewing exercise of - Principles governing intervention by Appellate Court.
Ch. Loizou in person for himself and Appellant No. 1.
P. Ioannides, for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT
STAVRINIDES. J.: The judgment of the Court will be delivered by Mr. Justice A. Loizou. A. LOIZOU. J.: The two appellants[*481] borrowed on the 1st November, 1971 jointly from the
two respondents, the sum of £5,000.- with interest at 9 per cent per annum payable on the 30th October, 1972, and secured by the mortgage of their respective houses.
On the 24th October, 1975, judgment was given against them in the District Court of Nicosia in Action No. 2595/75 for the aforesaid sum with interest at 9 per cent as from 5.1.1974 until final payment. Upon the issuing of a writ of execution against their movables the appellants filed in the said Court an application under the Debtors Relief (Temporary Provisions) Law,1975, (Law No, 9/75), (hereinafter referred to as the Law), praying for an order that the aforesaid judgment debt be paid by monthly instalments as follows:
(a) On the 30th March, 1977, the sum of £1,500.- 1
(b) On the 30th March, 1978, the sum of £1,500.-, and
(c) on the 30th March, 1979, the balance thereof.
It was their contention that they borrowed the aforesaid money for purposes of property development and that the income of both of them was affected substantially on account of the abnormal situation, because appellant No, borrowed the said sum on behalf of her husband who is an estate agent and whose income is non-existent on account of the said situation and that appellant No. 2 who is an advocate by profession, was likewise affected and that on account of this situation they have not been able to carry out the property development for which they borrowed the said money. [*482]
The trial Judge concluded that appellant No. 1, a housewife, was not affected by the abnormal situation and therefore she did not come within the meaning of "stricken debtor" as defined in section 2 of the aforesaid Law, inasmuch as it covered only the debtors themselves and not the husband or wife of such debtor, and it dismissed her application.
With regard to appellant No, 2 the trial Judge concluded that his income as a lawyer as well as that from property development with which he was engaged, was affected by the abnormal situation substantially so as to bring him within the definition of stricken debtor and that section 3 of the said Law was applicable to his case. Taking into consideration the criteria set out in the said section and the circumstances of the case, the trial Judge stayed the forced sale of the movables of appellant No. 2 until the 30th September, 1976, and "if he paid on or before that date the sum of £800.- then the compulsory sale to be stayed until the 30th March, 1977, and if he paid on or before that date the sum of £900.- the compulsory sale to be further stayed until the 30th September, 1977 and if on or before that date he paid £1,000 then the compulsory sale to be stayed until 30.3.1978 and if he paid another £1,500.- then a further stay to be granted until 30.9.1978 when on or before that date he should pay any balance due. The aforesaid stay would remain effective, so long as the aforesaid law was in force".
Both appellants filed the present appeal which was argued on two grounds: [*483]
(a) that the trial Court wrongly interpreted the term "stricken debtor" with regard to appellant No. 1, and
(b) the conditions upon which the stay was ordered were unreasonable and contrary to the evidence and incompatible with the income of appelllant No. 2.
"Stricken debtor" is defined in section 2 of the Law as meaning, "any debtor whose work or business has been affected as a result of the abnormal situation to such an extent as to render him unable to meet his contractual obligations out of which the debt arose".
We have been asked on behalf of appellant No. 1 to interpret the definition of "stricken debtor" in such a way as to give effect to the intention of the legislature by choosing from the alternative constructions which are equally open, that alternative which will avoid injustice and keep it within the purpose for which the statute was passed, which is the bounden duty of the Court to adopt, according to the English, authorities cited with approval in the judgment of Triantafyllides, P. in Lordos & Anastassiades and another v. The District Officer of Limassol and another, (1976) 11 J.S.C. p. 1655 at pp. 1662-1666.
Of course these authorities refer to the instances where there are two meanings each adequately satisfying the language of a statute or, as it is sometimes differently put, alternative constructions are equally open to the Court in which case that alternative must be chosen which will not lead to unnecessary injustice rather than choose the one that might produce highly inequitable and unreasonable results. [*484]
We fully agree with this proposition; the question, however, is whether the wording of the definition of "stricken debtor" in section 2 is capable of some other meaning than the one given to it by the trial Judge. The definition refers to the debtor himself, his work or business that has been affected and does not cover the work or business of the husband or wife of the debtor. The definition contains plain words which are not capable of any alternative construction and their literal and simple meaning has to be adopted. It would lead to an absurd situation if we were to accept that the word "debtor" as used in the definition of "stricken debtor" in the context of section 2, includes the husband or wife thereof. This becomes obvious when one thinks of a debtor whose business has been completely ruined as a result of the abnormal situation, but the property of the debtor's wife has not been affected. If we were to give it the interpretation asked by appellant, it means that in such cases, the unfortunate debtor of the example should be found able to meet his contractual obligations out of which the debt arose because of his wife’s economic prosperity. We find no merit in this ground.
With regard to the second ground, a Court dealing with an application for the stay of a sale, must, under subsection (2) of section 3 of the Law take into account -
"(a) whether the debtor is a stricken debtor”;
“(b) the amount of the debt on the date of the application
by the debtor for the stay of the forced sale in relation to the original amount of the debt and the value of the property
in respect of which the application for the [*485] stay of the forced sale is made”;
“(c) the market conditions in respect of the sale of property in the area in which the forced sale is to take place”;
“(d) whether, having regard to all the circumstances greater hardship will he caused by staying the forced sale than by not staying the same and the effect of each of these on the others".
Furthermore, under sub-section (3) of the said section, a Court may "if it deems expedient so to do, order such stay on condition that the debtor shall pay the debt or part thereof by so many instalments and at such intervals and on such other terms as the Court may deem fit in the circumstances of each particular case".
It is obvious that the Court possesses by virtue of sub-section (3) a wide discretion as to the terms which it may generally impose when granting a stay and also as to the conditions with regard to the instalments and their intervals at which they might be payable. The order made by the trial Court being, therefore, a matter of discretion, the onus was on the appellant to satisfy this Court on appeal, that such discretion was wrongly exercised, as it is well settled when a trial Court exercises its discretion properly, this Court will not interfere even if it would have made a different order, had it been dealing with the matter in the first instance.
As stated in the case of Eleni HadjiPetri v. Aletraris (1973) 1 C.L.R. p. 166 at p. 169, "put very briefly the duty of an appellate Court is to set aside such a
decision where [*486] the Court below has erred in principle or where it is satisfied that such decision is improper, unjust or wrong. In this respect useful reference may he made to the decision of the House of Lords in Evans v. Bartlam
(1937) 2 All E.R. 646”.
This case is referred to in the case of Kiarydas Taxi Co. Ltd. V. Komodikis (1976) 7 J.S.C. p. 1101 at p. 1104 where it is pointed out that what was stated in the Evans case was followed, inter alia, in Re O (infants) (1971) 2 All E.R. 744.
With these principles in mind we have approached the material that was before the trial Court and we have not been satisfied that there are any valid grounds which would require our interference with the exercise of the discretion of the trial Judge.
Appellant No. 2 is a practising advocate whose income on account of the Turkish invasion was reduced from £300
- £350 per month to £100 - £120 per month. He is the joint owner with the husband of appellant No. 1 of 15 donums of land in the area of Tseri which they purchased with the £5000.- borrowed from the respondents; he is also the joint owner of another 150 - 170 donums which they purchased for the sum of £40,000 - £50,000,- and their intention was to develop it into building sites. Appellant No. 2 further stated in evidence that he had given instructions to his architects to proceed with the plans for the division of the land owned by him into building sites and he estimated that in about 9 months’ time he would be ready to apply to the [*487] Banks for a loan for the development of the area and in 8 - 9 months they would he ready to pay £1,500.-. He has debts amounting to about £13,000 and he has to receive £16,000 on mortgage. He is also the owner of other property both movable and immovable, including a building site in Ayios Dhometios.
It is obvious that on the totality of the circumstances of this case the manner in which the trial Court exercised its discretion was duly warranted by the material before it and was exercised in accordance with the Law.
For all the above reasons, the present appeal is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed with costs.