Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
Consolidated Glass Works Ltd. v. Friendly Pale Shipping Co. Ltd and Another (1977) JSC 45 Generato dall'IA

Court discharged ship dealing order as plaintiff was not an interested person under the Merchant Shipping Law.

Numero d'incarto Consolidated Glass Works Ltd. v. Friendly Pale Shipping Co. Ltd and Another (1977) JSC 45
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Cipro (CY)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Respinto (Dismissed)

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The court discharged an order prohibiting dealings with a ship because the plaintiff, a mere claimant for damages, was not considered an 'interested person' under the relevant statute. The plaintiff argued for the order's validity, but the court held that having a claim for damages does not automatically confer the status of an interested party required to seek such an injunction. Consequently, the application to set aside the order was rejected, and the original prohibition was lifted.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

Merchant Shipping (Registration of Ships, Sales and Mortgages) Law, 1963, s. 30; An applicant for an order prohibiting dealing with a ship must be an interested person, and a plaintiff claiming only damages for breach of contract or negligence is not necessarily an interested person within the meaning of the section.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
interested person status prohibiting dealing with ship admiralty injunction merchant shipping law interlocutory order discharge imbarcazioni da diporto equipaggiamento marittimo assicurazioni marittime e aeree

Disposizioni normative citate

Generato dall'IA
Merchant Shipping (Registration of Ships, Sales and Mortgages) Law, 1963 (Law 45 of 1963), s. 30
Ships, Sales and Mortgages)Law, 1963 (Law 45 of 1963) - Order prohibiting dealing with ship under s. 30 of the Law - Application
Civil Procedure Law, Gap. 6, s. 4(1)
In any event, and irrespective of what may be argued as regards the application of section 32 of Law 14/60, in view of the provisions of section 4(1) of the Civil Procedure Law, Gap.
Law 14/60, s. 32
In any event, and irrespective of what may be argued as regards the application of section 32 of Law 14/60, in view of the provisions of section 4(1) of the Civil Procedure Law, Gap.

Giurisprudenza citata

Generato dall'IA
Tokyo Marine and Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Fame Shipping Co. Ltd. (1976) 10 J. S. C. 1399
Nemitsas Industries Ltd. v. S. & S. Maritime Lines Ltd. and others (1976) 10 J.S.C. 1542
Nippon Yussen Kaisha v. Karageorgis and Another (1975) 3 All E.R. 282
1542, following Nippon Yussen Kaisha v. Karageorgis and Another (1975) 3 All E.R. 282 and Mareva Compania Naviera S.A.
Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. International Bulkcarriers S.A. (1975) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 509
Generato dall'IA

Ti chiedi come si applica questa sentenza alla tua fattispecie?

Analizza questa decisione insieme alla legislazione federale e cantonale, ai commentari e alla giurisprudenza successiva in Legislator AI.

Apri in Legislator →

Testo completo

[*45] 1977 January

(MALACHTOS, J. )

ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION

Consolidated Glass Works Ltd.,

Plaintiffs,

and

1. Friendly Pale Shipping Co. Ltd.,

2. The ship "Captain Pavlou",

Defendants.

(Admiralty Action No. 26/75).

Merchant Shipping (Registration of Ships, Sales and Mortgages)Law, 1963 (Law 45 of 1963)

- Prohibition of dealing with a ship - Section 30 of the Law - Plaintiff a mere claimant of damages against the owners of the ship for breach of contract and/or for negligence - And has

nothing to do with the ship herself - He is not a person interested within the meaning of the said section 30 - Order prohibiting dealing with the ship made thereunder discharged -Tokyo Marine and Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Fame Shipping Co. Ltd., (1976) 10 J. S. C. 1399 followed.

Merchant Shipping (Registration of

Ships, Sales and Mortgages)Law, 1963 (Law 45 of 1963) - Order prohibiting dealing with ship under s. 30 of the Law - Application

to have it set aside - In the circumstances of this case could be made at any time after the issue of the order.

Merchant Shipping (Registration of Ships, Sales and Mortgages)Law, 1963 (Law 45 of 1963)

- "Interested person" in s. 30of the Law - Admiralty action in rem - Though generally a plaintiff

always has an interest in the property of the defendant that interest does not necessarily make him an "interested person" within the

meaning of the said s. 30.

L. Papaphilippou, for the Applicants.

X. Syllouris with J. Erotokritou, for the Respondents.

JUDGMENT

The following judgment was delivered by:-

MALACHTOS, J.: On the 26th May, 1975, the plaintiff [*46] company issued a writ of summons against the defendants, claiming

as stated therein:

A. A sum of over C£18,000 (eighteen thousand Cyprus pounds) or an amount of o ver 50,000 U.S. dollars (Fifty thousand) damages for breach of agreement and/or duty and/or for negligence during the loading, handling, stowing, care, carriage and discharge of a cargo of soda ash light loaded at Constanza for Lourenco Marques on hoard defendant No.2 ship "Captain Pavlou" property of defendant No.1 company on or about the months of March, April, May and June 1974, as well as compensation with regard to any contribution for salvage and general average as a result of the said carriage which the plaintiff company may be bound to pay.

B. Interest and costs.

On the 13th June, 1975, the plaintiffs on an ex parte application based solely on section 30 of the Merchant Shipping (Registration of Ships, Sales and Mortgages) Law, 1963, Law 45/63, obtained an order of this court prohibiting any dealing with the defendant No.2 ship or any share therein. This section 30 is as follows:

“30. The High Court may, if the Court thinks fit (without prejudice to the exercise of any other power of the Court), on the application of any interested person make an order prohibiting for a time specified any dealing with a ship or any share therein, and the Court may make the order on any terms or conditions the Court may think just, or may refuse to make the order, or [*47] may discharge the order when made, with or without costs, and generally may act in the case as the justice of the case requires; and the Registrar, without being made a party to the proceedings, shall on being served with an official copy thereof obey the same”.

On the 4th July, 1975, when the above order was made returnable, a conditional appearance was entered by counsel on behalf of both defendants and time was given till the 17th September, 1975, to apply to set aside the issue and service of the writ and in case they failed to do so, then the conditional appearance entered should be considered as unconditional.

Counsel for the defendants stated on the above date that he did not object for the order to remain in force subject to the result of the application which would be filed for setting aside theissue and service of the writ. In view of the fact that no step was taken by the defendants to the above direction up to the 17th September, 1975, the conditional appearance entered on 4.7.75, was considered as unconditional. An application, however, for leave to join an additional defendant in the action or in the alternative to issue a third party notice, was filed on behalf of the defendants on the 9th July, 1975. This application was opposed by the plaintiff. We are not concerned with this application at this stage. What we are concerned with is an application which was filed on the 13th November, 1976, on behalf of defendant No.1 company, based on the Cyprus Admiralty Jurisdiction Order 1893, Rules 203 to 212, and on section 30 [*48] of Law 45/63, claiming an order setting aside and/or cancelling the order of the 13th June, 1975 prohibiting any dealing with the defendant 2 ship or any share therein.

The main argument of counsel for the applicant company is that since it is clear from the facts of the case, as they appear in the file, that the plaintiff is not an interested person, within the meaning of section 30 of Law45/63, the original order, could not have been made by the court.

Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, who opposed the

application, submitted that since the defendants on the 4th July, 1975, appeared in the action and a statement was made on their behalf that

they did not object to the

order made by the court on 13.6.75, under section 30of Law 45/63, they were estopped from applying to set it aside at this stage. Furthermore, no good

cause is shown in the affidavit in support of the application to enable the Court to set aside the said order.

He also submitted that as soon as an action in rem in the admiralty

jurisdiction is filed, the plaintiff becomes an interested person within the meaning of section 30 of Law 45/63. Since the present action is a mixed action the plaintiff company should be considered as

an interested person within the meaning of this section. He referred in this respect to the case of "Monica S" reported in

(1967) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 113.

I must say from now that having gone carefully through

this rather long report I found nothing that supports [*49] the above proposition of counsel. It is true that generally speaking a plaintiff always has an

interest in the property of a

defendant hut that interest does not necessarily make him an interested person within the meaning of section 30of Law 45/63 in admiralty actions.

As it appears from the writ of summons the plaintiff company is a mere claimant of damages against the owner company of the ship in question for breach of contract and/or for negligence and has nothing to do with the ship herself. So, the plaintiff is not an interested person within the meaning of section 30 of Law 45/63 (see in this respect the case of the Tokyo Marine and Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Fame Shipping Co. Ltd. (1976) 10 J.S.C. 1399 where the Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. y. Nava Shipping Co. Ltd. (1975) 5 J.S.C. 666 and Verolme Dock and Ship Building Company Ltd. v. Lamant Shipping Co. Ltd. (1975) 11 J.S.C. 1618, were reconsidered).

As regards the submission of counsel for the respondent company that the applicants are estopped from applying to set aside the order as they did not show cause why it should not remain in force when it was returnable on 4.7.75, I think it

cannot stand in view of the clear wording of section 30 of the law which provides, among other things, that the court

"may discharge the order when made, with or without costs, and generally may act in the case as the justice of the case requires".

In the circumstances of the present case the application to set aside the order could be made at any time after the issue thereof. [*50]

Counsel for the respondent finally submitted that although the application for the issue of the order was based, as stated therein, solely on section 30 of Law 45/63, yet the court had power under section 32 of the Courts of Justice Law 1960, Law 14/60, to grant the order and it is immaterial, as he put it, whether the application was based on the one or the other section. Section 32 of Law 14/60 reads as follows:

“32. (1) Subject to any Rules of Court every court, in the exercise of its civil jurisdiction, may, by order, grant an injunction (interlocutory, perpetual or mandatory) or appoint a receiver in all cases in which it appears to the court just or convenient so to do, notwithstanding that no compensation or other relief is claimed or granted together therewith”:

“Provided that an interlocutory, injunction shall not be granted unless the court is satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried at the hearing, that there is a probability that the plaintiff is entitled to relief and that unless an interlocutory injunction is granted it shall be difficult or impossible to do complete justice at a later stage”.

“(2) Any interlocutory order made under subsection (1) may be made under such terms and conditions as the court thinks just, and the court may at any time, on reasonable cause shown, discharge or vary any such order”. [*51]

“(3) If it appears to the court that any interlocutory order made under subsection (1) was applied for on insufficient grounds, or if the plaintiff' s action fails, or judgment is given against him by default or otherwise, and it appears to the court that there was no probable ground for his bringing the action, the court may, if it thinks fit, on the application of the defendant, order the plaintiff to pay to the defendant such amount as appears to the court to be a reasonable compensation to the defendant for the expense and injury occasioned to him by the execution of the order”.

“Payment of compensation under this subsection shall be a bar to any action for damages in respect of anything done in pursuance of the order; and any such action, if begun, shall be stayed by the court in such manner and on such terms as the court thinks just”.

No doubt this section gives very wide powers to every court in the exercise of its civil jurisdiction, and this court in its admiralty jurisdiction is a civil court, to grant an injunction in all cases in which it appears just or convenient so to do.

However, the power of the court to grant an injunction under this section is not in issue in these proceedings. Neither is in issue the question whether this court on the facts of this particular case could make under [*52] this section the order prohibiting any dealing with the ship in question or any share therein.

In any event, and irrespective of what may be argued as regards the application of section 32 of Law 14/60, in view of the provisions of section 4(1) of the Civil Procedure Law, Gap. 6, even if I were to decide on the making of an Order under section 32 of Law 14/60 prohibiting any dealing with the ship in question, or any share therein, I would not have exercised my discretion in granting such an Order.

What was decided in the case of Nemitsas Industries Ltd. v. S. & S. Maritime Lines Ltd. and others, (1976) 10 J.S.C. 1542, following Nippon Yussen Kaisha v. Karageorgis and Another (1975) 3 All E.R. 282 and Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. International Bulkcarriers S.A. (1975) 2 Lloyd's Rep. 509, should be considered as so decided in the particular circumstances of that case and should not be readily extended so that to cover assets other than cash money and, especially, any dealing with a ship or any share therein.

What is in issue in these proceedings is whether this Court could make the Order under section 30 of Law 45/63 on the facts of the present case. As I have already said the respondent company is not a person interested within the meaning of this section and, consequently, the Order made on 13.6.75, has to be and is hereby discharged.

The applicants are entitled to their costs to be assessed at the end of the proceedings.

Order accordingly.