Bailment claim dismissed; defendant discharged burden of proof regarding negligence in handling bailed machinery.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe District Court of Nicosia dismissed the plaintiff's action for damages against the defendant regarding damaged bailed machinery. The court found that while the defendant successfully discharged the burden of proving he exercised ordinary care, the plaintiff failed to provide satisfactory evidence regarding the specific cost of repairs. Consequently, the claim was rejected on both liability and quantum grounds due to insufficient proof of negligence and repair expenses.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IAContract Law Cap 149 s.109; s.1(3) Act of 1934: In a bailment action, the bailee must prove they exercised ordinary care, and damages require satisfactory evidence of actual loss.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IADecisioni correlate
Generato dall'IATesto completo
[*1920] 1974 December 19
(ARTEMIDES, D.J.)
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF NICOSIA
Iordhanis Charalambous,
and
Gregoris Nicola,
(Action No. 5891/73).
Contract - Bailment - Contract of bailment - Standard of care required to be shown by bailee in the handling of the chattel bailed to him - Parties putting their machinery in common use for a joint enterprise - Plaintiff's machinery sustaining damage whilst in the hands of the defendant - Burden of proof on defendant to establish that he took as much care in the handling of the chattel bailed to him as a man of ordinary prudence would in the circumstances take of his own goods - Defendant discharged this burden - Contract Law, Cap. 149 sections 109 and 110.
Chr. Kitromilides, for the Plaintiff.
K. Talarides, for the Defendant.
JUDGMENT
The following judgment was delivered by: -
ARTEMIDES, D. J. : This short case deals [*1921] with the important and interesting subject on the law in regard to bailment and in particular the nature of the contract of bailment and the burden of proof in case of its breach.
The facts of the case are simple and mostly uncontested. The only witnesses are the plaintiff and the defendant who gave evidence in support of their respective case. Having had the opportunity of watching then whilst testifying before me and after sifting their evidence, I find that the true facts are the following; any evidence running contrary to my findings is rejected as untrue and incorrect: The litigants are farmers and in November, 1972, they agreed to put their machinery in common use so that they could more conveniently and efficiently harvest their respective fields, The fields of the plaintiff are situate at Analiontas village and that of the. defendant at P. Lakatamia. When the harvesting of the fields of the plaintiff was completed both the litigants with their machinery would have proceeded to
P. Lakatamia. In this joint enterprise the litigants used a tractor and a sower machine belonging to the plaintiff and another tractor belonging to the defendant. The defendant at about 5.00 p.m. in the night was driving the tractor, which was towing the sower machine from Analiontas to P. Lakatamia to use it on the following morning in his fields. Whilst he was so driving on the main road, he met with a traffic accident at. which an on coming vehicle collided with the sower [*1922] machine which as a result sustained damages. It is the allegation of the plaintiff that the defendant is liable to pay for this damage which is valued at £50.-.
Both counsel agree that at the material time the sower machine was a chattel hailed to the defendant by the plaintiff. Learned counsel for the defendant, has submitted that the plaintiff failed to allege and prove negligence on the part of the defendant in the handling of the chattel, whilst on the other hand the defendant has proved that he was not guilty of any negligence. Learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted, that a plaintiff in an action based on a breach of bailment does not have to allege or prove negligence, in that the burden of proof lies, on the defendant to satisfy the Court that he was not responsible for negligence whilst handling the chattel. This is the position which is created, so the submission of learned counsel for the plaintiff proceeds, by section 112 of our Contract Law Cap.
149. As I have already found, however, no conditions wore agreed between the parties regarding the use of the machinery and therefore no question arises for section 112 to apply in the present case. In my judgment the relevant sections are. 109. and 110 which read as follows:-
(109) “In all cases of bailment the bailee is bound to take as much care of the goods bailed to him as a man of ordinary prudence would, under similar circumstances, take of his own goods of the same bulk quality and value as the goods bailed”. [*1923]
(110) “The bailee in the absence of any special contract, is not responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the thing bailed, if he has taken the amount of care of it described in the last preceding section”.
It would be a disrespect, however, to the learned judges and eminent authors who have developed through the ages the law on this matter, if no reference is made to their judicial pronouncements and writings, because the above sections in our law are no more than a reproduction of the Common law on the matter as same has today reached its final form.
The authorities on the subject of bailment begin very early, centuries ago. In 1703 Sir John Holt C.J. has dealt with the different kinds of bailment in the case of Coggs v. Bernard (1558-1774)All E.R. Rep 1. I will reproduce herein an extract of his judgment which is placed by the learned editors at the heading of the report, The wisdom inherited to us is evident from this citation.
“There are six sorts of bailments. The first is a bare naked bailment of goods, delivered by one man to another to keep for the use of the bailor without reward. This I call a depositum. The bailee is not answerable for loss or damage to the goods in the absence of gross negligence [*1924] on his part. The second is a commodatum, whore a bailor, without recompense, lends a chattel to the bailee for him to use. The bailee is bound to use the strictest care and diligence to keep the goods and restore them to the bailor. The third is locatio et conductio where goods are left with the bailee to be used by him for hire. Here also the bailee is bound to take the utmost care of the goods and to return them when the time of hiring has expired. The fourth is where goods are delivered to another as a pawn. The pawnee must use ordinary cars. The fifth is where goods or chattels arc delivered to another to be carried or have some work done on then. There the liability of the bailee. is as stated infra in the case of carriers. The sixth arises where the bailee is to have no reward for dealing with the goods bailed. If in executing the commission he behaves negligently an action will lie against him”.
In the aforecited learned judgment the different kinds of bailment and the standard of care required of the bailee in the handling of the goods bailed are being discussed In detail. Thus, the standard of care required to be exercised by a bailee depended on the kind of
bailment and all through the [*1925] long development of the law on the matter, the sorts of bailment have been reduced, to two
i.e., the gratuitous bailment and the bailment for reward. The standard of care
required in a case of gratuitous bailment is higher than that of a bailment for reward. In the case of Coldman v. Hill. (1918-1919) All E.R.
Rep. 434, Bankes L.J. had this to say in regard to the burden of proof in a case of bailment for reward at page 438, letter J.
“In both cases the breach of duty arises directly out of the contract of bailment, and the case seems covered by the rule that the bailee must show that the loss of the goods was not due to any fault of his own. In such a case as the present it may be said that the goods are not lost, in the sense of being completely lost, so long as they are recoverable by any reasonable act on the part of the bailee; and it is, I think, in this sense only that a loss without default on his part can be relied on by a bailee as a complete defence to an action for damages for loss of the goods. Care must, of course, be taken not to extend unduly the duty of a bailee by expecting him to take action which may involve him in unreasonable expense or trouble; but no such question arises in this case. As has often been pointed out, the onus of proof in the course of a case [*1926] may be constantly shifting: See per Bowen, L.J., in Medawar v. Grand Hotel_Co. (II), (1891) 2 Q.B. at p. 23. In the present case I think it shifted more than once, but ultimately it rested on the defendant; and, as he did not attempt to discharge it, the plaintiff is entitled to succeed, the appeal must be allowed, and the judgment of the county Court judge restored, with costs here and below”.
In the case of Houghland v. R.
R. Low ( luxury Coaches) Ltd. (1962) 2 All E.R. p. 159, cited to by learned counsel for the defendant, Ormerod L.J, said the following at page 161.
“Supposing that the claim is one in detinue, then it would appear that once the bailment has been established, and once the failure of the bailee to hand over the articles in question has been proved, there is a prima facie case, and the plaintiff is entitled to recover unless the defendant can establish a defence to the satisfaction of the Court; and that, I think, is very clear from the words used by Bankes, L.J., in Coldman v. Hill. In a passage which appears to me to be important in this case, the lord justice says”:
“I think the law still is that, if a bailee is sued in detinue only, it is [*1927] a good answer for him to say that the goods were stolen without any default on his part, as the general bailment laid in the declaration pledges the plaintiff to the proof of nothing except that the goods were in the defendant's hand and were wrongfully detained.......'.
“So far, so good; but, of course, it is, in those circumstances, for the defendant to establish affirmatevely, not only that the goods were stolen, but that they were stolen without default on his part; in other words, that there was no negligence on his part in the care which he took of the goods”.
Section 109 of our Contract Law does not differentiate between a bailment for reward and a gratuitous one in regard to the standard of care required to be shown by a bailee in the handling of the chattel. This position is the. contemporary one as it has so been crystallized by the development of the Common law.
The bailment of the sower machine to the defendant in the present case may be said to be a bailment for which the plaintiff had also an interest in view of the fact that their agreement was to use the machinery owned by both of them in the joint enterprise of the harvesting of their fields. [*1928]
It is therefore apparent from the authorities cited to above, that the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish that he took as much care in the handling of the chattel bailed to him as a man of ordinary prudence would in the circumstances take of his own goods. Before proceeding to deal with the question whether the defendant has discharged his burden of proof, I will deal briefly with another matter in the present cause.
The plaintiff seems to base his cause of action on contract, since he alleges a breach of the bailment. However, the substance of the claim in my judgment is based on the failure of the defendant to take proper care of the chattel bailed, that is, he showed negligence, and as such it is a claim the cause of action of which is based on tort. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the plaintiff should have alleged negligence in his statement of claim, which he does not do so, but the burden of disproving it would be on the defendant. A relevant case on this point is the case of Chesworth v. Farrar and Another (1966 2 All E.R. p. 107, in which Edmund Davies J. said the following at p. 112;-
“In the present case, what is the substance of the claim for failure to take proper care of the plaintiff’s goods and so to be unable to account for them? If, in the circumstances which are required to be assumed, it could be said to be [*1929] equally poised in contract and in tort, I should have held that the plaintiff could rely on that aspect which put her in the more favourable position both under the statutes of limitation and under the action personalis' rule. I find myself, however, compelled to hold that the claim rests basically on the simple fact of possession of the plaintiff's goods and is independent of the circumstances which gave rise to that possession. If this is right, it follows that the claim is one 'in respect of a cause of action in 'tort' and, further, that as such a cause of action survives against the wrongdoer's estate only by virtue of the Act of 1934, it is statute-barred by reason of noncompliance with s.1(3) thereof. In my judgment, accordingly, the first question raised in the special paper must be answered in the affirmative, that is to say, in a manner adverse to the plaintiff”.
The defendant in the present case said that he was driving carefully on the main road with the proper lights on the tractor. When he saw the on-coming vehicle he took to his left hand-side and stopped completely. There was enough space for the on-coming vehicle to pass by the tractor and the sower machine but it came to a collision with it, In the light [*1930] of the above evidence and. since there is nothing to the contrary, I am satisfied that the defendant has discharged his burden of proof and has shown that he was not responsible of any negligence in the handling of the chattel.
I would proceed, however, to deal with the question of damages, in case I am to be held as wrong on the matter of liability.
The plaintiff contends that he paid £50.- for the repair of the damage incurred to his sower machine and he produced the relevant "receipts" for this payment (exhibits 1 and 2). No evidence has been adduced from an expert in regard to the damages, who would connect the two exhibits with the damage caused by the collision to the chattel. Exhibit 2 is not a receipt but a form of declaration by the Company who gave it to the plaintiff that he was indebted to them for the sura of £30.- for spare parts bought by him for his sower machine. This document was given to the plaintiff on the 7th September, 1973, that is about a year after the collision. Furthermore, the plaintiff agreed that in a letter addressed by his advocate to the defendant he claimed £60.- and when he was asked why in his action he claims only £50.- his reply was that the excess of £10.- was for his travelling expenses to and from Nicosia for the present case. The defendant on the other hand alleged, that the plaintiff at a metting they had a few days [*1931] after the collision, told him that he had to pay £15.- for the damage caused on his sower machine. In the light of the above I have no satisfactory evidence with regard to the damage which should he awarded to the plaintiff. It is common ground that the sower machine has been damaged, hut I cannot deliberate and find myself what the proper sum should be for the damages caused on the plaintiff's property, in the absence of satisfactory evidence regarding the actual costs of the repairs.
In conclusion and in the light of the above I would dismiss the plaintiff's action with £24.- costs. Defendant is entitled to withdraw the sum paid into Court.
Action dismissed
with £24 costs.