Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
Yiannakis Papacleovoulou and Another v. The Police (1975) JSC 2047 Generato dall'IA

Court dismisses appeals against remand orders, upholding judge's discretion based on reasonable suspicion of serious crimes.

Numero d'incarto Yiannakis Papacleovoulou and Another v. The Police (1975) JSC 2047
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Cipro (CY)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Respinto (Dismissed)

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The Court of Appeal dismissed two appeals challenging remand orders issued by a lower court judge. The appellants argued the remand was an improper exercise of judicial discretion, but the court found sufficient evidence of their involvement in serious offenses, including transporting stolen arms and membership in an illegal organization. The court ruled that the judge's role at this stage was merely to assess reasonable suspicion for custody, not to make a definitive finding of guilt, thereby validating the successive remand orders.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

Criminal Procedure Act; Remand in Custody Act: The court may only interfere with a judge's discretion to remand if it is not exercised judicially, as the judge need only determine if reasonable suspicion exists pending investigation rather than making a final finding of guilt.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
remand in custody reasonable suspicion judicial discretion successive remands criminal procedure interference with discretion police evidence proporzionalità della detenzione

Disposizioni normative citate

Generato dall'IA
Hasip v. The Police, (1964) C.L.R.48, 64
Tsirides v. The Police, (1973) 8 J.S.C. 984

Giurisprudenza citata

Generato dall'IA
Hasip v. The Police, (1964) C.L.R.48, 64
Tsirides v. The Police, (1973) 8 J.S.C. 984
Generato dall'IA

Ti chiedi come si applica questa sentenza alla tua fattispecie?

Analizza questa decisione insieme alla legislazione federale e cantonale, ai commentari e alla giurisprudenza successiva in Legislator AI.

Apri in Legislator →

Testo completo

[*2047] 1974 June 19

(TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P., STAVRINIDES, HADJIANASTASSIOU, JJ.)

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Yiannakis Papacleovoulou and Another,

Appellants,

v.

The Police,

Respondents,

(Criminal Appeals Nos. 3577, 3578).

Criminal Procedure - Remand Order - Discretion of Court below - Principles on which Court of Appeal interferes with such discretion Sufficient evidence entitling judge to decide that the appellant was implicated in the offences in respect of which his remand was applied for Judge not called upon at such stage to make a definite finding as to whether or not he believes any evidence - He is only examining whether there exist grounds for reasonable suspicion on the basis of which he should remand appellant in custody - Successive remands.

A. Eftychiou, for the Appellants.

N. Charalambous, Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondents.

JUDGMENT

The judgment of the Court was delivered by:-

TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P.: These are two appeals [*2048] by persons who were remanded in custody on June 13, 1974, in relation to related offences.

They both complain that the remand orders were the result of a wrong exercise of the relevant discretionary powers of the judge who made them.

The second appellant, Georghios Papacosta, has according to what his counsel told us - been today remanded in custody for a further period of six days and, as such remand has already been challenged by a new appeal, the appellant wishes to withdraw the present appeal.

In relation to the appeal of the first appellant, Yiannakis Papacleovoulou, we have approached the matter before us in the light of the principle set out in, interalia, Hasip v. The Police, (1964) C.L.R.48, 64, namely that, as a decision as to whether or not to grant an order for remand in custody is the roduct of the exercise of discretionary powers, we can only interfere with it if we are satisfied that the Judge’s discretion was not exercised judicially on the particular occasion; and we have, also, borne in mind what has been stated in the recent similar case of Tsirides v. The Police, (1973) 8 J.S.C. 984.

As it appears from the record before us, there was given evidence by the police before the Court below to the effect that the first appellant has made an oral statement to the police disclosing that he is a member of the “EOKA B” organization, which has been declared to be

an illegal organization; also, that he has, together [*2049] with another person, transported by car arms, which were

stolen from a military camp at Yeroskipou, and hidden them in a vineyard where they were found by the police. We regard such evidence, even though it was denied on oath by the appellant, as sufficient to entitle the judge to decide that there existed reasonable suspicion that this appellant was implicated in the offences in respect of which his remand was applied for; and, therefore, we find no reason to interfere with the decision of the judge. The judge was not called upon, at that stage, to make a definite finding as to whether or not he believed the police evidence or that of the appellant, because he was examining only whether there existed grounds for reasonable suspicion on the basis of which he should remand the appellant in custody.

This was the third remand in custody each for a period of eight days - which had been applied for, and obtained, by the police and it is correct that judges should carefully examine whether there exist sufficient reasons for granting successively one remand order after another in respect of the same offence indeed, the police should bear in mind that when they wish to keep a suspect in custody pending their investigations such investigations should be completed as soon as reasonably possible in the circumstances; but the offences concerned in this case are extremely serious and, moreover, there does not exist the prospect of the police requiring to keep the appellant in custody much longer, because we have been informed today by counsel for the respondents [*2050] that it is intended to apply for a further remand in custody for a period of only three or four days.

In the result both these appeals are dismissed; one having been withdrawn, and the other having failed.

Appeals dismissed.