Guilty plea bars appeal on conviction, but new evidence of innocence allows absolute discharge.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe Court dismissed the appeal against conviction under section 135(b) of the Criminal Procedure Law because the appellant had pleaded guilty at trial. However, new evidence on appeal revealed the appellant was actually driving a car not covered by insurance, meaning he was innocent of the charged offense. Consequently, the Court set aside the sentence and discharged the appellant absolutely to uphold the interests of justice.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IAs. 135(b) of the Criminal Procedure Law; s. 6 of the Probation of Offenders Law: While a guilty plea precludes an appeal against conviction, the interests of justice permit absolute discharge if new evidence proves the appellant was innocent of the offense.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IAGiurisprudenza citata
Generato dall'IADecisioni correlate
Generato dall'IATesto completo
[*2044] 1974 May 30
(TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P., HADJIANASTASSIOU, MALACHTOS, JJ.)
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Demetrios Pierides,
Appellant,
v.
The Police,
Respondents.
(Criminal Appeal No.3569).
Criminal Procedure - Plea of guilty
- Appeal against conviction - Cannot be entertained - section 135 (b) of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155.
Criminal Procedure - Plea of guilty
- Conviction and sentence - Evidence produced before Court of Appeal, but not before trial Court, showing that appellant was innocent of offence for which he was punished - Interests of Justice do not allow overlooking fact of innocence
- Appellant discharged absolutely in the very special circumstances of this ease.
Plea of Guilty - See under ‘‘Criminal Procedure”.
E. Efstathiou, for the Appellant.
N.Charalambous, Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondents.
JUDGMENT
The judgment of the Court was delivered by:-
TRIANTAFYLLIDES. P.: The appellant appeals [*2045] against his conviction of the offence of using a motorcar without being covered by insurance against third party risks, contrary to section 3 of the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Law, Cap. 333; and, also, against the sentence which was imposed on him on conviction of the said offence, namely a fine of £10 and disqualification from holding or obtaining a driving licence for a period of three months.
We agree with counsel for the respondents that in view of section,135(b) of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap 155 - as it was applied in, inter alia, the case of Athlitiki Efimeris ‘‘O Filathlos” and Another v. The .Police, (1967) 2. C.L.R.
249 - the appellant’s appeal: against his conviction cannot be entertained because before the Court below he has pleaded guilty to the offence in question: and it is to be noted, in this connection, that at the trial he did have the benefit of advice of counsel who appeared for him.
Regarding the appeal against sentence, it has been submitted before us that, as the appellant is a school-teacher, he needs his driving licence in relation to his work, because he has to drive from where he lives to his work, in an area where there do not exist other transport facilities; but this matter was not mentioned at all, in mitigation of sentence, before the trial. Court, though in the charge the appellant was described as being a teacher; and there has been cited, by counsel for the respondents, the case of Drakos v. Police,
(1969) 1 J.S C, 127, where it was held that special reasons for [*2046] avoiding disqualification have to be put forward before the trial Court and that they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
We do not intend to disregard the Drakos case; but the present case is clearly distinguishable from it because of a very exceptional feature - not really in the nature of a special reason - namely that the appellant appears to have had a good defence to the charge in respect of which he pleaded guilty: As shown by the certificate of insurance concerning his own car, the appellant was, at the material time, covered by it while driving, also, a motor-car not belonging to him, as in fact he was doing in the present instance, when he was driving a motor-car belonging to accused 2 at the trial, who is not an appellant before us.
As this certificate was not produced before the trial Court we are not now faced on appeal with a situation in which the plea of guilty was inconsistent with the facts as explained to the trial Court and we cannot order a new trial on such a ground; but, the interests of justice, do not allow us to overlook that the appellant was, in fact, innocent of the offence, for which he was punished, as a result of his plea of guilty, and, in the very special circumstances of this case, we have decided to discharge the appellant absolutely under section 6 of the Probation of Offenders Law, Cap. 162: therefore the sentence passed upon him is set aside.
Appeal allowed.