Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
Co-Operative Organization of General Trade (S.O.G.E.K.) Cyprus Ltd. v. The Ship “Blue Sea” (1975) JSC 1879 Generato dall'IA

Court refused joinder of time charterers as defendants in admiralty action, allowing only vessel owners.

Numero d'incarto Co-Operative Organization of General Trade (S.O.G.E.K.) Cyprus Ltd. v. The Ship “Blue Sea” (1975) JSC 1879
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Cipro (CY)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Parzialmente accolto (Partially Allowed)

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The court refused an application to join the time charterers as defendants in an admiralty action for breach of contract, granting the order only for the vessel owners. The plaintiffs argued the charterers had a substantial interest in the cargo, but the court held that resolving the dispute between the original parties would not directly affect the charterers' legal rights or financial position. Consequently, the court determined that the charterers were not a necessary party and their joinder would only complicate the proceedings.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

Rules 29, 30 and 32 of the Cyprus Admiralty Jurisdiction Order, 1893; An intervener must have a substantial interest in the res which may be injuriously affected by the action, and charterers are not automatically deemed persons interested in the action.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
admiralty jurisdiction joinder of parties time charterers intervener rights breach of contract court discretion cargo detention noleggiatore

Disposizioni normative citate

Generato dall'IA
Rules 29, 30 and 32 of the Cyprus Admiralty Jurisdiction Order, 1893

Giurisprudenza citata

Generato dall'IA
The Lord Strathcona (1925) P.143
The Byzantion (1922) 16 Asp. 19
Gurtner case
“If the proposed defendant 2 is not allowed to come in as defendant, what will happen?” to repeat the question posed by Lord Denning, in the Gurtner case (supra) at p.
Generato dall'IA

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Testo completo

[*1879] 1975 December 30

(A. LOIZOU, J.)

ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION

Co-Operative Organization of General Trade

(S.O.G.E.K.) Cyprus Ltd.,

Plaintiffs,

and

The Ship “BLUE SEA” (Owners) now

lying at Famagusta Harbour,

Defendants.

(Admiralty Action No. 5/74).

Admiralty - Practice - Parties - Joinder - Principles applicable - Discretion of the Court - Application to add two further defendants - Applicants not already parties - Action for breach of contract of afreightment - Determination of dispute between present parties will not directly affect proposed defendant 2 in his legal rights or in his pocket - Application to he added as defendant refused - Rules 29, 30 and 32 of the Cyprus Admiralty Jurisdiction Order, 1893.

Cyprus Admiralty Jurisdiction Order, 1893 - Rule 30 - Construction - Intervener - Whether “a person interested in the action” within the meaning of the said rule.

Admiralty - Intervener - Rights of.

Parties - Joinder - Admiralty Action

- See, also, under “Admiralty”.

Intervener - See under “Admiralty”.

Chr. Demetriades, for the Applicants.

Fr Saveriades with S. Charalambous, for the Respondents.

RULING

The following ruling was delivered by:-

A. LOIZOU, J.: This is an application under Rules 29, 30 and 32 of the Cyprus Admiralty Jurisdiction Order, 1893, whereby,” the applicants apply for an order of the Court that [1880] they be joined as defendants in this action upon such terms as shall seem just and that no petition or answer be filed in this action, until this application is heard”.

By this action in rem, the plaintiff Co-Operative Organization claims damages for breach of contract of afreightment and/or damages for failure to deliver the cargo of the plaintiff as per the Bill of Lading and/or for wrongful detention and/or otherwise, and/or damages for unlawful and/or otherwise exercise of lien on the cargo of the plaintiff carried by the defendant in breach of the conditions of the contract of afreightment and/or otherwise.

Applicants No.1 are the owners of’ the defendant vessel, and the plaintiffs, respondents in this application, have no objection to their being joined as defendants but they do object to the joining of applicants No.2, who, as it is stated in the affidavit filed in support of this application, they were at all material times the time charter owners of the said vessel and it is in respect of the joining of applicants No.2 that these proceedings relate.

The plaintiffs-respondents, together with the filing of their action, applied and obtained a warrant for the arrest of the defendant ship. In the affidavit filed in support of that application, it was deposed -

“4. To my best knowledge and belief the plaintiff is a holder of a bill of lading dated 20.12.73 as per charter-party dated 26.11.73 incorporating all the terms conditions and exceptions of the charter-party”. [*1881]

“5. The plaintiff has paid the freight and is the owner of goods consisting of iron steel bars and paid the sum of £113,500.000”.-

“6. The bill of lading were issued by the Master and or owners of the said ship “Blue Sea” but in contravention of the terms of the charter-party dated 26.11.73 which were incorporated in the bill of lading inserted in it arbitrarily and without the consent and agreement, of the plaintiff the following clauses”.

“‘Owners having a lien upon cargo covered by this B/L outstanding amount due under time charter contract with messrs. Mortensen and Lange, dated 4th August, 1972 and addendum thereto’”.

“7. The defendant in breach of above agreement and resting upon the above clause which plaintiff’ did not accept or knew has arbitrarily exercised alien upon part of the cargo of the plaintiff up to the value of £18,000. - not specifying the quantity of cargo of the said lien”.

“8. This lien was exercised by unknown to plaintiff alleged time-Charter owners REEDEREI JONNY WELCH K.S. of HAMBURG, through their “lawyer Mr. Chrysis Demetriades of Limassol”.

“9. The plaintiff has through their advocate protested to the lien imposed by a letter dated 26.1.74 which was handed to master and or owners [*1882] of the ship but was refused and by a telegram dated 28.1.74 and protesting for the lien imposed and calling defendant to waive the said lien holding them responsible for damages”.

“10. Defendant failed to waive the said lien”.

The applicants though disputing many allegations of this affidavit, by their affidavit confirm that the reason why defendant vessel did not deliver part of the cargo was the exercise of a lien by or on behalf of applicants or either of them, as admitted by the said affidavit and that the action brought by plaintiffs against defendant vessel relates solely to the non-delivery of the said cargo, in view of the exercise of the above lien. By paragraph 6 of the said affidavit it is deposed as follows:

“6. I am informed by Mr. Chrysses Demetriades, Advocate handling the case for Applicants and for Defendant vessel, and I verily believe that the Defence to this action would be the lawful exercise of the above lien and that, furthermore”,

“there should be a counterclaim for a declaration that such lien was lawfully exercised and that Applicants are necessary parties which ought to be added as Defendants, in order to counterclaim for the above declaration”.

The three relevant Rules relied upon by the applicants in support of their application, read as follows:

“29. Any number of persons having interests of the nature arising out of the same matter may be joined in the same action whether as Plaintiffs or as Defendants”. [*1883]

“30. The Court or Judge may at any stage of the proceedings and either with or without an application for that purpose being made by any party or person and upon such terms as shall seem just, order that the name or names of any party or parties be struck out or that the names of any person or persons who are interested in. the action or who ought to have been joined either as plaintiffs or Defendants or whose presence before the Court is necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the action be added”.

“31. ………………..

“32. The Court or Judge may order upon what terms any person shall be joined as a party, and what notices and documents, if any, shall be given to and served upon him, and may give such further directions in the matter as shall seem fit”.

In the case of Artemis Company Limited v. The Ship “SONJA”, (1972) 9 J.S.C. p. 116, I had the occasion of reviewing the authorities regarding the principles governing the addition of a defendant either on the application of the defendant or of a person not already a party and I referred to our case of General Insurance Co. Ltd. of Cyprus v. Maroulla Georghiou & Another,(1963) 2 C.L.R. p. 117, and to a number of English authorities, including Amon v. Raphael Tuck & Sons Ltd., (1956) 1 All E.R. p. 273 at p. 277, as well as the case of Gurtner v. Circuit

(1968) 1 All E.R. 328 at p. 331 quoting the passage from the judgment of Lord Denning, M.R., and at p. 1125, I said: [*1884]

“The principle therefore was extended considerably with Salmon L.J. concurring to the effect that the Court has a discretion to add a party to an action at law if the determination of that dispute will directly affect him in his legal rights or his pocket in that he will he bound to foot the bill. Furthermore Diplock L.J. with Salmon, L.J. concurring concluded that a matter was not effectively adjudicated upon within this order unless all those who would be liable to satisfy the judgment were heard; thus not applying the dictum of Devlin, J. in Amon’s case (supra) found at p. 287 where he said”:

“‘The only reason which makes it necessary to make a person a party to an action is so that he may be bound by the result of an action and the question to be settled therefore must be a question in the action which cannot be effectively and completely settled unless he is a party’”.

“Lord Denning M.R. preferred the wider interpretation given to the rule by. Lord Esher M.R. in Byrne v. Brown (1889) 22 Q.B.D. 657 where he said at p. 666”:

“One of the chief objects of the Judicature Acts was to secure that, wherever a Court can see in the transaction brought before it that the rights of one of the parties will or may be so affected that under the forms of law [*1885] other actions may be brought in respect of that transaction, the Court shall have power to bring all the parties before it, and determine the rights of all in one proceeding. It is not necessary that the evidence in the issues raised by the new parties being brought in should be exactly the same; it is sufficient if the main evidence, and the main inquiry, will be the same, and the Court then has power to bring in the new parties, and to adjudicate in one proceeding upon the rights of all the parties before it. Another great object was to diminish the cost of

litigation. That being so, the Court ought to give the largest construction to those Acts in order to carry out as far as

possible the two objects I have mentioned’”.

It has been argued by counsel for the applicants that our Admiralty Rules, do not provide anything about interveners, because Rule 30, is so widely framed, as to include the cases normally covered by Order 9, rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Rules and the case of interveners, under Order 12, rule 24 of the old English Rules of the Supreme Court, with the difference that in admiralty actions in Cyprus, such an intervener - a person, “interested in the action”, is entitled to be made a fullfledged defendant and he can so be added.

In interpreting a particular statutory enactment, one has to look to the meaning of the enactment itself and not to the absence of any provisions, In any event, under Rule 237 of the Cyprus Admiralty Jurisdiction Order, “In all [*1886] cases not provided by these Rules, the practice of the Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice In England so far as the same shall appear to be applicable, shall “be followed”, and the wording of this Rule appears to be wide enough to include the practice relating to interveners. Furthermore, Rule 30 corresponds to the old English Order 16, rule 11, now re-numbered as Order 15, rule 6, in the Revised English Rules of the

Supreme Court. (See Artemis Co, Ltd. v. The Ship “SONJA” (supra), p. 118). If it will help things more, it may be

mentioned that in the Revised English Rules, the provision regarding interveners in admiralty actions, is still preserved and the old Order 12, rule 24, is reproduced, with amendments, in Order 75, rule 17. The object of this rule, as given in a note to it, in the Supreme Court Practice, 1973, is, to enable a person who has a substantial interest in the res to intervene, if this interest may be injuriously affected by the action against the res, and to protect his

interests. The rights of an intervener are limited to the protection of his interest in the res, and, he has no locus standi to raise “issues

which are not material to this purpose”. The authorities given in support of the aforesaid proposition, are, the case of The Lord Strathcona,

(1925) P.143 and The Byzantion (1922): 16 Asp. 19, and it goes on to say that, charterers are an example of interveners. (See British Shipping Laws, Vol. 1, (1964), para. 310 et seq., and Suppt. (1970)).

Looking at the wording of the Rule, as such, I cannot give to it any other interpretation than the one which has been given to Order 16, rule 11, in the [*1887] cases hereinabove set out, from which, principles, I see no reason to depart. The only extension of the meaning of Rule 30 made by the Cyprus Admiralty Jurisdiction Order itself, is to be found in Rule 31 which, clearly says, that for the purposes of the last-preceding Rule underwriter or insurer, shall be deemed to be a person interested in the action, which means, that a normal intervener is not to be deemed a person interested in the action. The instances where intervention was allowed, which I need not repeat, are to be found in the British Shipping Laws, Admiralty Practice, (1964) p. 137, para. 312, which includes charterers. In the circumstances, I have not been persuaded that this application should be granted.

In the first place, the determination of the dispute between the present parties, does not directly affect the proposed defendant 2 in his legal rights or in his pocket, in that, he will he bound to foot the bill. “If the proposed defendant 2 is not allowed to come in as defendant, what will happen?” to repeat the question posed by Lord Denning, in the Gurtner case (supra) at p. 332. They still have their own remedies, as between themselves and the persons with whom they are in conflict, and they still have other procedural means open to them.

The matter in issue between the present parties to the case, is, whether the clause, “Owners having a lien upon cargo covered by this Bill of Lading outstanding amount due under time charter contract with Messrs. Mortensen and Lange, dated 4th August, 1972 and addendum thereto”, was properly inserted and was binding on the plaintiffs, or it [*1888] was arbitrarily inserted, and without their consent and agreement, as claimed by the plaintiffs, and, therefore, not binding on them. The addition of applicants 2 will only complicate, delay and embarrass the proceedings.

Considering all the circumstances of the present case and that in any event this is a matter in the Court’s discretion, I do not propose to grant the order applied for. The application, however, is granted, as far as applicants 1, the owners of the defendant vessel are concerned, for which there has been no objection on behalf of the plaintiffsrespondents and an order is made accordingly, to the effect that the said applicants, be joined as defendants in the aforesaid action. The application is dismissed as far as applicants 2 are concerned, with costs against them.

Order accordingly.