Court upheld ship sale prohibition order as plaintiff's claim could not be satisfied from sale proceeds.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe court upheld an ex parte order prohibiting the defendant company from dealing with the ship 'Giorghios C'. Plaintiffs sought damages for cargo damage, while the defendant argued an imminent private sale would satisfy the mortgagee bank. The court found that even if the plaintiffs won, they could not recover their claim from the sale proceeds, justifying the continued prohibition under the relevant statute.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IAMerchant Shipping (Registration of Ships, Sales and Mortgages) Law, 1963, s. 30; An order prohibiting dealing with a ship may be made where the applicant's claim cannot be satisfied from the proceeds of any sale or alienation of the ship.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IADecisioni correlate
Generato dall'IATesto completo
[*1622] 1975 November 25
(MALACHTOS, J.)
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
Mitsui Sugar Co. Ltd., and Another,
Plaintiffs,
and
The Ship “Giorhios C” and Another,
Defendants.
(Admiralty Action No. 14/72).
Merchant Shipping (Registration of Ships, Sales and Mortgages) Law, I963 Law 45 of 1963) - Prohibition of dealing with ship - Section 30 of the Law - Grounds - on which an order under said section 30 may he made - Immaterial whether intended sale or alienation fraudulent or not - Action for damages to cargo - Defendant company intending to alienate ship - Plaintiffs, if successful, will be unable to obtain satisfaction of their claim out of proceeds of sale Order under said section 30 of the Law.
M. Papas with E. Montanios, for the Applicants-Plaintiffs.
G1. Talianos, for the Respondent-Defendant.
JUDGMENT
The following judgment was delivered byt;-
MALACHTOS, J.: The plaintiffs in this [*1623] Admiralty action, which was filed on 10/3/72, claim against the Defendants .£28,268. the equivalent at the material time of 22,332,447 yen (at the rate of 790 yen to the pound), for damages for sea water damage to a consignment of 2,993,548 metric tons Cuban raw sugar in bulk shipped on board the ship ‘‘Giorghios C”, which is registered as a Cyprus ship and owned by Defendant 2 Company at Matanzas, Cuba, for carriage to Tokyo, which arrived there on or about the 11th March, 1971, and for the delivery thereof to Plaintiffs No, 1 being the Indorsees for value thereof due to negligence and/or otherwise.
On the 24th day of September, 1975, after the close of the pleadings in the action, on an ex parte application, accompanied by affidavit, the plaintiffs obtained an Order against defendant No 2 Company under section 30 of the Merchant Shipping (Registration of Ships, Sales and Mortgages) Law, I963 (45/63), by which the said defendant 2 Company was restrained from any dealing with the said ship. Section 30 of Law 45/63 reads as follows:-
“30. The High Court may, if the Court thinks fit (without prejudice to the exercise of any other power of the Court), on the application of any interested person make an order prohibiting for a time specified any dealing with a ship or any share therein, and the Court may make the order on any terms or conditions the Court may think just, or may refuse to make the order, or may discharge the order when [*1624] made, with or without costs, and generally may act in the case as the justice of the case requires; and the Registrar, without being made a “party to the proceedings, shall on being served with an official copy thereof obey the same’’.
The aforesaid Order was made returnable on 13/10/75 for the said defendants to appear before the Court and show cause why it should not remain in force.
On 13/10/75 it was adjourned by consent to 13/11/75 for mention. In the meantime, an opposition was filed accompanied by affidavit and it was fixed for hearing due to the urgency of the case on the 20th November, 1975.
Counsel for Respondent Company submitted that although the words “any interested person” appearing in section
30 of Law 45/63, include a creditor and not merely persons having proprietory or beneficial interest in a ship, yet in cases of creditors an applicant must satisfy the Court that the Intended sale or alienation of the ship or any shares therein, is fraudulent. I must say straight away that I entirely disagree with this proposition.
The object of section 30 of Law 45/63 is to empower the Court to make a temporary order and preserve the status quo, no doubt taking into account the probable rights of the parties to adjust their permanent rights by other procedures. The foundation of the Order is to protect dealings for a specific time but leaving the Court to impose conditions which, prima facie, protect the person whose dealings are [*1625] prohibited and confine the effect of the order so it will not put the applicant in an over advantageous position (see Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. v Nava Shipping Co. Ltd. (1975). 5 J S C
666 at page 677).
If the Court is satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried at the hearing, that there is a probability that the plaintiff is entitled to relief and that unless the order applied for is granted it shall be difficult or impossible to do complete justice at a later stage, then the order should be granted. It is immaterial as to whether the intended sale or alienation of a ship or any shares therein, is fraudulent or not.
Counsel for the Respondent Company also submitted that the power of the Court under section 30 of the Lawbeing a discretionary power, it should not be exercised in favour of the applicants, taking into account the facts of the present case.
Now, the relevant facts, as they appear in the affidavits in support of both the application and the opposition, as well as from the extensive arguments of both counsel, are shortly as follows:
The claim of the plaintiffs, as I have already said, is for damages and it appears that it is based on sufficient grounds. The ship in question is mortgaged to the Westminster Foreign Bank Ltd. for an amount of 6,180,000 U.S. dollars, which amount is also secured by mortgages of four other ships owned by four other associated [*1626] companies for a common current account with the said bank. From this account all these companies may draw cumulatively up to the amount of the mortgage. It must be noted here that each one of the associated companies is the owner of one ship. It is not in dispute that the Defendant Company owns no other property in Cyprus, though it is alleged in paragraph 9 of the affidavit in support of the opposition, dated 11th November, 1975, that there are other assets of the Respondent Company, which include valid claims for substantial amounts which have arisen in the course of the business of this respondent and in particular, in connection with the employment of the ship and that these claims would take at least two years/before they, are finalised. However, in the Covenant of Mortgage (exhibit 1) it is clear that all these claims are assigned to the mortgagee bank.
It is the allegation of the defendant company that they agreed to sell by private agreement the ship in question, subject matter of this Order, to intended purchasers at the agreed price of 850,000 dollars and that this amount will go to the mortgagee bank, as against the balance of their current account, which is now about 4,500,000 dollars. In a supplementary affidavit, which was filed yesterday on behalf of the defendant company, it is alleged that the ship in question is now under arrest in the port of Visakhapatan in India by the holders of maritime liens and others who have obtained judgments in proceedings in rem against the ship. The amounts owed to the said judgment creditors exceed the sum of 300,000 U.S. dollars. Unless [*1627] the said judgment debts are paid shortly the ship will he sold by public auction in circumstances in which it is unlikely to realise more than 300,000 dollars. The West minster Foreign Bank Ltd. as a mortgagee of the said ship, has accepted to satisfy the relevant judgment debts on the understanding that the ship would thereupon be sold by private sale to an existing purchaser who has contractually agreed to buy the same for 850,000 U.S. dollars.
It is clear, therefore, that the defendant company intends to alienate the said ship and out of the proceeds of the sale thereof the applicants-plaintiffs will be unable to obtain satisfaction of their claim if they are successful, and this is, in my view, contrary to the object of section 30 of the Law.
The relevant facts as they have been stated herein above do not justify the Court to discharge the Order made on 24th September, 1975, and, therefore, it is hereby ordered that the said Order should remain in force till further Order of this Court.
On the question o costs the Order of the Court is that the costs should be costs in cause but in no case against the applicants.
Order accordingly.