Court ruled plaintiff's police statement inadmissible as proceedings were anticipated under Evidence Law s.4(3).
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe District Court ruled that the plaintiff's written statement to a police constable was inadmissible evidence. The plaintiff argued the statement should be admissible as an admission against interest, but the court found proceedings were anticipated at the time of the accident. Consequently, the statement was excluded under Section 4(3) of the Evidence Law, Cap. 9, as it was made by an interested party when legal proceedings were likely.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IASection 4(3) of the Evidence Law, Cap. 9; Section 4(1) of the Evidence Law, Cap. 9; Nothing in this section shall render admissible as evidence any statement made by a person interested at a time when proceedings were pending or anticipated involving a dispute as to any fact which the statement might tend to establish.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IAGiurisprudenza citata
Generato dall'IADecisioni correlate
Generato dall'IATesto completo
[*1576] 1974 January 22
(COLOTAS, D.J.)
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF NICOSIA
Georghios Savva Petsioti,
Plaintiff,
and
Georghios Sana Georgalli,
Defendant.
(Case No. 694/73).
Evidence - Evidence in civil cases - Road accident case - Plaintiff’s statement to Police Constable who was inquiring into the facts of the accident - Proceedings contemplated by plaintiff at time of statement - Statement inadmissible - Section 4(3) of the Evidence Law, Cap. 9 - Nor is statement admissible at common law - Fact that statement was not given •under caution immaterial.
N. Aloneftis, for the Plaintiff.
A. Markides, for the Defendant.
RULING
The following ruling was delivered by: -
COLOTAS, D.J.: The question which the Court [*1577] is asked to determine concerns the admissibility of a written statement made by the plaintiff on 25.1.1973 to a Police Constable (P.W.1) who was inquiring into the facts of the present accident. The question, in particular, is whether or not-assuming the said statement to have been a statement within the meaning of section 4(1) of the Evidence Law, Cap. 9 – the circumstances under which it was made were such as to render the statement inadmissible by reason of the provisions of subsection (3) of the said section.
The statement in question was made by the plaintiff to the Police on an ordinary police form as an “open statement” i.e. without the usual caution being previously administered to the plaintiff. In the statement the plaintiff refers to the facts of the accident and some of its contents are apparently against his interests.
Section 4(3) of Cap. 9 provides as follows:-
“(3) Nothing in this section shall render admissible as evidence any statement made by a person interested at a time when proceedings were pending or anticipated involving a dispute as to any fact which the statement might tend to establish”.
The provisions of subsection (3) are very clear:- When a written statement was made by a person interested at a time when proceedings were pending or anticipated by the maker involving a dispute as to any fact which the statement might tend to establish the said statement cannot be [*1578] admissible as evidence
In the present case there can be no doubt, that the plaintiff, as the one of the two drivers involved in the accident in respect of which he was making the statement, was a person interested at the time of the statement (see Robinson v. Stern (1939) 2 All E.R, 683,;Bowskill v. Dawson and Another (1953). 2 All E.R. 1393, Bearman’s. Ltd. v. Metropolitan Police Etc. (1961) 1 All E.R. 384 W and M.Wood (Haulage) Ltd. v. Redpath (1966) 3 All E.R. 556).
It is further extremely difficult to believe that when the plaintiff was making the said statement was not aware that some sort of proceedings either criminal or at least civil were likely, As Lord DENNING said in Jarman v. Lamber and Cooke (1951) 2 All E. R. 255 at page 260: “When a street accident occurs, as all the world knows, proceedings are to say the least, likely”. (See also Wood case mentioned above). I am therefore satisfied that when the plaintiff was making the statement in question proceedings either criminal or at least civil were anticipated by him.
The fact that the said statement was not taken under caution does not change the situation inasmuch as even in the absence of such caution the mere fact of the accident in which the maker is involved will usually mean thatthe possibility of proceedings is contemplated by him. (See Phipson’s Manual of the Law of Evidence, 9th edition p. 174; Halsbury’s Laws of England 3rd edition, vol. 15, p. 318, Note (r); and Bowskill v. Dawson (above). [*1579]
In view of all the above the said statement is excluded by the provisions of subsection (3) and cannot be admitted in evidence under the provisions of subsection (1) of section 4 of Cap. 9.
The contention of the learned counsel for the defendant that the said statement being in fact a statement containing an admission against the interests of the defendant is admissible under the Common Law and therefore, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (3) it is admissible as coming within the provisions of subsection (6) is I think unfounded. The statement in question is not admissible at Common Law. In this respect I refer to Robinson v. Stern (above) where Goddard L.J. said at pp. 686 - 687:-
“I should like to add a few words showing what, to my mind, is the right meaning to be put upon sect. 1(3). It should be remembered that, before the Evidence Act, 1938, and, indeed, at. common law, there were cases in which written statements made in the past by persons could be admitted as evidence, principally, no doubt, in cases relating to pedigree and cases relating to title. In those cases, however, it was always held that the statement could not be admitted if, at the time it was made, or anterior to the time it was made, there was what was always called in the old cases a lis mota. The reason for that is nowhere better stated than it is by LORD ELDON in Whitelocke v. Baker (1). [*1580] He puts it in this way, at p. 514”:
”All (this class of statements) are admitted upon the principle, that they are the natural effusions of a party, who must know the truth; and who speaks upon an occasion, when his mind stands in an even position, without any temptation to exceed or fall short of the truth’”.
For all the above reasons objection is sustained and the-statement in question is ruled inadmissible.
Order accordingly.