Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
Georghios Arestidou v. The Police (1975) JSC 1491 Generato dall'IA

Criminal appeal dismissed; further evidence refused as uncredible and conviction upheld.

Numero d'incarto Georghios Arestidou v. The Police (1975) JSC 1491
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Cipro (CY)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Respinto (Dismissed)

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal against his conviction for obtaining money by false pretences and refused an application to hear further evidence. The appellant admitted receiving the funds but claimed they were a loan rather than payment for false promises, while the prosecution's witness testified the money was demanded to save the complainant from prison. The court held the new evidence was too vague and uncredible to alter the trial court's finding that the appellant's version was not well capable of belief, thus upholding the conviction.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

Sections 25(3) of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960; Section 146 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155; Section 145(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155; Sections 297 and 298 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154: An application for further evidence on appeal will be refused where the evidence is not credible, too vague, or available to the defence during the trial, and the conviction remains reasonable on the existing record.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
further evidence on appeal credible evidence standard false pretences offence failure to give evidence unreasonable conviction test omissione della contabilità documenti mancanti ammende per infrazione procedurale

Disposizioni normative citate

Generato dall'IA
Section 25(3) of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960
Evidence - Further evidence -- Power to receive further evidence on appeal - Approach of Court of Appeal to the matter - Section 25(3) of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960 (Law 14 of 1960) and section 146 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap.
Section 146 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155
This matter is governed, in general terms, by section 25(3) of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960 (Law 14/’60); furthermore, there existed even before such Law, and still continue to exist, similar powers under section 146 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155.
Section 145(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155
154 - Complainant’s version believed by trial Court - Appellant not denying that he obtained the money, but only circumstances of obtaining - Failure of appellant to give evidence on oath - Conviction not unreasonable having regard to the evidence adduced - Section 145(1) (b.) of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap- 155.
Sections 297 and 298 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154
Obtaining money by false pretences - Sections 297 and 298 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154 - Conviction - See also,under “Criminal Law”.

Giurisprudenza citata

Generato dall'IA
Simadhiakos v. The Police
The principles relating to the exercise of our discretion in such matter have been referred to, and applied in, inter alia, Simadhiakos v. The Police, (1961) C.L.R.
Kolias v. The Police
64, [*1493] Kolias v. The Police (1963) 1 C.L.R.
Pourikkos (No.2) v. Fevzi
52, Pourikkos (No.2) v. Fevzi.
Piotrowska v. Piotrowski
Counsel for the appellant has cited the case of Piotrowska v. Piotrowski,
Vrakas and Another v. The Republic
In the case of Vrakas and Another v. The Republic, (Criminal Appeals Nos.
R. v. Schofield
Counsel for appellant has submitted that this evidence was wrongly accepted as evidence strengthening the case for the prosecution; and he cited the case of R. v. Schofield, 12 Cr.
Generato dall'IA

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Testo completo

[*1491] 1973 August 30

(TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P., STAVRINIDES, MALACHTOS, JJ.)

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Georghios Arestidou,

Appellant,

v.

The Police,

Respondents.

(Criminal Appeal No.3484).

Evidence - Further evidence -- Power to receive further evidence on appeal - Approach of Court of Appeal to the matter - Section 25(3) of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960 (Law 14 of 1960) and section 146 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155 - Evidence sought to be adduced - Not credible in the sense of being well capable of belief - Available to the defence during the trial - Too vague and incapable of having any important effect on the outcome of the case - Application refused.

Criminal Law - Obtaining money by false pretences – Sections 297 and 298 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154 - Complainant’s version believed by trial Court - Appellant not denying that he obtained the money, but only circumstances of obtaining - Failure of appellant to give evidence on oath - Conviction not unreasonable having regard to the evidence adduced - Section 145(1) (b.) of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap- 155.

Criminal Law - Evidence - Failure of accused to give evidence in his own defence - Effect.

Further evidence - See under ‘“Evidence”.

Obtaining money by false pretences - Sections 297 and 298 of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154 - Conviction - See also,under “Criminal Law”.

S. Papakyriacou with C, Tsirides, for the Appellants

Cl. Antoniades, Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondents.

JUDGMENT

The judgment of the Court was delivered by:-

TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P.: The appellant has appealed [*1492] against his conviction of the offence of obtaining money, £10, by false pretences; the false pretences were that he pretended to the complainant, Avgerinos Georghiou of Limassol, that as an employee in the private office at Paphos of the Minister of Interior he could intercede with him in order to put an end to criminal proceedings against the complainant in relation to a charge of carrying a firearm.

The appellant was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment, as from the 27th June, 1973, but he has not appealed against such sentence.

The appellant is a policeman; it is not denied by him that he has never been in the employment of the Minister; nor did he deny that he received £10 from the complainant; but his version, as it was set out, also, in a statement which he made to the police, has been that he received the money by Way of a loan.

At the commencement of the hearing of the appeal we had to deal with an application to hear further evidence on appeal. This matter is governed, in general terms, by section 25(3) of the Courts of Justice Law, 1960 (Law 14/’60); furthermore, there existed even before such Law, and still continue to exist, similar powers under section 146 of the Criminal Procedure Law, Cap. 155.

The principles relating to the exercise of our discretion in such matter have been referred to, and applied in, inter alia, Simadhiakos v. The Police, (1961) C.L.R. 64, [*1493] Kolias v. The Police (1963) 1 C.L.R. 52, Pourikkos (No.2) v. Fevzi. (1962) C.L.R. 283, Felekkis v. The Police, (1968) 11 J.S.C. 1235, and Petri v. The Police, (1968)

4 J.S.C. 368.

Guidance may be derived, too, from the case of R. v. Parks, (1961) 3 All E.R. 633, where the principles applicable in relation to the hearing of evidence on appeal, in a criminal case, under section 9 of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, were stated to he as follows:-

“(i) The evidence sought to he called must be evidence which was not available at the trial”; (ii) the evidence must be relevant to the issues; (iii) it must be credible evidence in the sense of being well capable of belief, and (iv) the Court will, after considering that evidence, go on to consider whether there might have been a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to the guilt of the appellant if that evidence had been given together with the other evidence at the trial”.

The above approach is similarly applicable in civil cases: In Ladd v. Marshall, (1954) 3 All E.E. 745 (which has been

followed in, inter alia, Roe v. McGregor & Sons, (1968) 2 All E.R. 636, Cowling v. Matbro, (1969) 2 All E.R. 664 and Skone

v. Skone and Another, (1971) 2 All E.R. 582) it was stated (at p. 748) that the following conditions must be fulfilled in order to render it proper to allow the hearing of evidence on appeal:- [*1494]

“…. that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial; second, the evidence must be such that, if given, it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, although it need not be decisive; third, the evidence must be such as is presumably to be believed, or in other words, it must be apparently credible, although it need not be incontrovertible”.

In the light of the foregoing, we have considered the evidence sought to be adduced before us:

Firstly, it consists of further evidence to be given by a witness who has already given evidence at the trial; she has sworn an affidavit to the effect that she did not mention before the trial Court that the appellant received the money from the complainant by way of a loan, because she was, allegedly, told by the police that she could not say in evidence anything that was not already contained in her statement to the police; in fact, however, this witness was cross-examined as to the circumstances in which the appellant had got the money and she stated that the complainant had told her that the appellant had taken the money for a certain case (“δια μίαν υπόθεσιν “) , and not as a loar. So, we cannot regard her further evidence, which is sought to be adduced, as credible evidence in the sense of being well capable of belief; therefore, we do not allow her to be recalled before us. [*1495]

Secondly, there is testimony by the husband of the above witness; he was not called at all as a witness before the trial Court, but was mentioned during the trial; therefore, he is a witness who was available to the defence, to be called by it, if it so wished; consequently, on this ground, we disallow the calling of this witness before us.

Thirdly, there are two witnesses who were discovered by the appellant after his conviction. They are co-prisoners of his in the Central Prisons, convicted of offences involving dishonesty, and have sworn affidavits to the effect that they had heard the complainant saying that he had the means “to place policemen behind bars by giving evidence” and they understood that one of the “policemen” was the appellant. We consider this evidence as too vague and incapable of having any important effect on the outcome of the case; moreover, bearing in mind the nature of its source, we cannot treat it as credible evidence.

For these reasons we have decided to dismiss the application for leave to call further evidence before us.

Counsel for the appellant has cited the case of Piotrowska v. Piotrowski,

(1958) 2 All E.R. 729, where a rehearing was ordered after a main witness, who was one of the parties in that case, had admitted that he had given perjured evidence at the trial. That case is obviously distinguishable from the present one and, therefore, we can see no reason to order a new trial, as suggested on [*1496] behalf of the appellant as an alternative course to the hearing of further evidence.

Coming, next, to the merits of the case, we are not prepared to hold, under section 145(1)(b) of Cap. 155, that the conviction is unreasonable having regard to the evidence adduced, especially in view of the fact that the appellant does not deny receiving the £10, but he only denies the circumstances in which he. received them;.and the trial Court has, in fact, believed the complainant’s afore-mentioned version as to how the money was extracted from him by false pretences; it is to be noted, too, that the appellant chose not to give evidence on oath, but he merely made a statement from the dock adopting the version which he had already told the police, namely that the money was given to him as a loan.

In the case of Vrakas and Another v. The Republic, (Criminal Appeals Nos. 3440, 3442, not reported yet*) we have had occasion to deal, on appeal, with the effect in criminal proceedings of the choice by an accused not to give evidence on oath in order to give an innocent explanation when there exists, in view of the circumstances of the case, strong prima facie evidence against him; and we need not repeat today what we have already stated then.

The trial Court has treated as an element against the appellant the evidence of a witness, Pavlou, who stated that he had met the appellant and asked him for the money which he owed to him and to the complainant; this witness, [*1497] according to his evidence, had said to the appellant: “Give me the money which Avgerinos gave you to save him from prison”, and the appellant had replied that he would pay the money to Avgerinos on the following Monday.

Counsel for appellant has submitted that this evidence was wrongly accepted as evidence strengthening the case for the prosecution; and he cited the case of R. v. Schofield, 12 Cr. App. R. 191. That case is, in our view, clearly distinguishable because there the reply of the accused, when charged, was: “Just my luck” and it was held by the Court of Appeal that that was an expression consistent with the disappointment of the appellant for being charged for an offence, and was not, necessarily, an admission of having committed the offence concerned.

In the result, we have no alternative but to dismiss this appeal. But, as it was .stressed by counsel for the appellant that his conviction will have, possibly, very adverse consequences on the career of the appellant, as a policeman, we are not inclined to punish him more by making his sentence run from today and so we make an order that it should run from the date of his conviction.

Appeal dismissed.

* Now reported in(1973) 8 J.S.C. 899.