Legislator Giurisprudenza & Legislazione
Mounise Dervish Eroghlou v. Hussein Ali Chavoush (1975) JSC 1401 Generato dall'IA

Court allows late amendment of defence to plead a point of law regarding will validity.

Numero d'incarto Mounise Dervish Eroghlou v. Hussein Ali Chavoush (1975) JSC 1401
Autorità giudiziaria
Giurisdizione Cipro (CY)
Data della decisione
Esito del giudizio Accolto (Allowed)

Sintesi Legislator

Generato dall'IA

The defendant sought leave to amend their defence after pleadings closed to add a specific point of law concerning the validity of a legacy in a will. While the plaintiff argued this point could have been raised earlier and was unnecessary, the court emphasized that points of law may be raised at any stage. The court granted the amendment to ensure justice, noting the defendant's right to defend a case exceeding £2000 despite potential costs.

Regesto Legislator

Generato dall'IA

Civil Procedure Rules 0.27 r. 1; English Rules of the Supreme Court 0.18 r. 11: The court has the power to allow amendments to pleadings at any stage to determine the real question in controversy or correct defects, even if the amendment introduces a new point of law.

Parole chiave

Generato dall'IA
amendment of pleadings point of law will validity defence amendment civil procedure rules judicial discretion costs assessment rettifica delle detrazioni

Disposizioni normative citate

Generato dall'IA
Civil Procedure Rules 0.25
Civil Procedure - Pleadings - Amendment - Powers of the Court and principles applicable - Action concerning validity of will - Application for amendment of defence after close of pleadings -Granted - Civil Procedure Rules 0.25.
Civil Procedure Rules 0.27 r. 1
- May he raised - in the pleadings - Civil Procedure Rules 0.27 r. 1, 0.19 r.
English Rules of the Supreme Court 0.18 r. 11
13 and English Rules of the Supreme Court 0.18 r. 11.
section 31(b) of the Wills and Succession Law, Cap. 195
It is, thus, apparent that the defendant seeks the leave of the Court in order to be enabled to make use of section 31(b) of the Wills and Succession Law, Cap. 195 which provides; -

Giurisprudenza citata

Generato dall'IA
G.L. Baker Ltd v. Medway Building & Supplies Ltd
Associated Leisure Ltd and Others v. Associated Newspapers Ltd
Cropper v. Smith
in Cropper v. Smith (1884) 26 Ch.
Homeros, Th. Kourtis & others v. Panos K. Iasonides
Yiannakis Pourikkos v. Mehmet Fevzi
25); and was discussed in Yiannakis Pourikkos v. Mehmet Fevzi (1963) 2 C.L.R.
Generato dall'IA

Ti chiedi come si applica questa sentenza alla tua fattispecie?

Analizza questa decisione insieme alla legislazione federale e cantonale, ai commentari e alla giurisprudenza successiva in Legislator AI.

Apri in Legislator →

Testo completo

[*1401] 1975 December 13

(STYLIANIDES, P.D.C., HJI CONSTANTINOU, S.D.J.)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF PAPHOS

Mounise Dervish Eroghlou,

Plaintiff,

and

Hussein Ali Chavoush,

Defendant.

(Action No. 637/72).

Civil Procedure - Pleadings - Amendment - Powers of the Court and principles applicable - Action concerning validity of will - Application for amendment of defence after close of pleadings -Granted - Civil Procedure Rules 0.25.

Civil Procedure -.Pleadings - Point of law . - May he raised - in the pleadings - Civil Procedure Rules 0.27 r. 1, 0.19 r. 13 and English Rules of the Supreme Court 0.18 r. 11.

Pleadings - Amendment - under “Civil Procedure”

Point of Law - Whether, it can be pleaded.

N. Mavronicolas, for the Applicant-Defendant.

A. Chiftchioglou, for the Respondent-Plaintiff.

RULING

The ruling of. the Court was delivered by:-

HJI CONSTANTINOU, S.D.J.: The present action concerns [*1402] the proof of a Will under which the plaintiff claims to be the executrix and the sole beneficiary. The defendant by his defence attacks both the execution and the validity of the Will in question, and, moreover, alleges undue influence fraud or misreprensentation, bad health, no sound mind, memory and understanding, no knowledge or approval of the contents of the Will, fiducial relationship and lack of independent legal advice. The defendant also counterclaims for an order declaring the said pretended Will as null and void/invalid, an Order appointing him as the sole administrator etc.

By his present application, the defendant prays for leave to amend his statement of defence so as to plead, without prejudice to his other pleas, that “the legacy in clause 2 of the said Will is not a valid one as it does not express a definite intention”. It is, thus, apparent that the defendant seeks the leave of the Court in order to be enabled to make use of section 31(b) of the Wills and Succession Law, Cap. 195 which provides; -

“No legacy shall be valid - if it does not express a definite intention”.

The plaintiff-respondent opposes this application alleging

(a) that the purported amendment is strictly a point of law which could be raised even if not pleaded; [*1403]

(b) that the plea prayed for has already been pleaded in paragraph 2 of the statement of claim and is, therefore, unnecessary;

(c) that the application for amendment is not made bona fide but for purposes of delaying the trial, a long time having elapsed since the close of the pleadings; and

(d) that the amendment asked for is misconceived in law and procedure.

As far as the first ground of opposition i.e. “that the purported amendment is strictly a point of law which could be raised even if not pleaded”, the provisions of order 27 rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules are clear: “Any party shall be entitled to raise by his pleadings any point of Law, and any point so raised shall be disposed of by the Court at any stage that may appear to it. convenient”.

The English Order 18, rule 11 also provides:

“A party may by his pleading raise any point of law”. Under the heading: “Effect of the Rule” it is stated: “If a party intends to raise a point of law on the facts as pleaded, it is a convenient course to do so in the pleading”. Further down it is stated. ”In a proper case, the Court will allow a party to amend his pleading so as to raise a point of law ………….” “A point of law, which requires serious arguments should [*1404] be raised in this way under this Rule, and not by a summons under Rule 19”. Also, under the heading “Effect of the Rule” (Rule 18/8) it is stated: “It often is not enough for a party to deny an allegation in his opponent pleading; he must go further and dispute its validity in law or set up some affirmative case of his own in answer to it. It will not serve his turn merely to traverse the allegation: he must confess and avoid it. Thus, if the plaintiff sets up a contract which was in fact made, it will be idle for the defendant merely to traverse (i.e. deny) the making of the contract; he should confess (i.e. admit) that he made the contract but avoid the effect of that confession by pleading the Statute of Frauds or Limitations or section 40 of the Law of Property Act, 1925, or setting up that the contract .has been duly performed or rescinded”.

Furthermore, on this point the provisions of Order 19, rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Rules, are quite relevant: “The defendant or plaintiff, as the case may be, must raise by his pleading all matters which show the action or counterclaim not to be maintenable, or that the transaction is either void or voidable in point of law, and all such grounds of defence or reply, as the case may be, as if not raised would be likely to take the opposite party by surprise, or would raise issues of fact not arising out of the preceding pleadings as, for instance, fraud, prescription or limitation of time, release, payment, performance, or facts showing illegality of any kind, or rendering the claim or counterclaim unenforceable”. [*1405]

From all the aforementioned it is, in the opinion of this Court, clear that the first ground relied on in support of the opposition to the present application cannot he supported, and that, on the contrary, the plea sought to he brought in the defence is warranted.

As far as ground (b) of the opposition is concerned a mere reading of the contents of paragraph 2 of the defence shows that the provisions of section 31(b) of Cap. 195 sought to be brought in it by the present application, are not pleaded. What is pleaded in paragraph 2 of the defence concerns merely the signature appearing on the Will and other requisites of a will, prescribed by section 23 of the Wills and Succession Law, Cap. 195.

Regarding the other grounds relied on in support of the opposition, these relate to the powers of the Court and to the principles which the Courts must have in mind when exercising their powers to grant leave to amend pleadings. In this respect in Tildesley v. Harper, 10 Ch.D. pp. 396, 397 Bramwell, L.J., said:

“My practice has always been to give leave to amend unless I have been satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide, or that, by his blunder, he had done some injury to his opponent which could not be compensated for by costs or otherwise”.

“However negligent, or careless may have been the first omission, and however late the [*1406] proposed amendment, the amendment should be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side. There is no injustice if the other side can be compensated by costs” (per Brett, M.R., Clarapede v. Commercial Union Association 32 W.R. p. 263.

“It is a well established principle that the object of the Court is to decide the rights them of the parties, and not to punish them for mistakes they make in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance with their rights………… I know of no kind of error or mistake, which, if not fraudulent or intended to overreach, the Court ought not to correct, if it can be done without injustice to the other party. Courts do not exist for the sake of discipline, but for the sake of deciding matters in controversy, and I do not regard such amendment as a matter of favour or grace ... It seems to me that as soon as it appears that the way in which a party has framed his case will not lead to a decision of the real matter in controversy, it is as much a matter of right on his part to have it corrected if it can be done without injustice, as anything else in the case is a matter of right” (per Bowen, L.J., in Cropper v. Smith (1884) 26 Ch. D. [*1407] at pp. 710-711, with which observations A. L. Smith, L.J., expressed “emphatic agreement” in Shoe Machinery Co. v. Cultan (1896) 1 Ch. at p. 112).

“It is a guiding principle of cardinal importance on the question of amendment that, generally speaking, all such amendments ought to be made for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties to any proceedings or of correcting any defect or error in any proceedings” (per Jenkins, L.J., in G.L. Baker. Ltd v. Medway Building & Supplies Ltd.,

(1958) 1 W.L.R. p. 1231).

In respect of the question of amendment of a defence in a libel case so as to plead justification in the case of: Associated Leisure Ltd. and Others v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. (1970) 2 All E.R. p. 754 in delivering judgment in the Court of Appeal Lord Denning M.R. at page 757 said: “I start with the principle, well settled, that an amendment ought to be allowed, even if it comes late, if it is necessary to do justice between the parties, so long as any hardship done thereby can be compensated in money”. In the same case Edmund Davies, L.J. at page 758 said: “The all-embracing principle applicable to such a case as the present was enunciated by Bowen L. J. in Cropper v. Smith (1884) 26 Ch. D. 700 at 710, 711. (The classic words used by Bowen L. J. have been reiterated above). [*1408]

Lastly, Vassiliades ex-president of our Supreme Court in Homeros ,Th. Kourtis & others v. Panos K. Iasonides (1970) 9

J. S. C. p. 852 in delivering the judgment of the supreme Court at page 855 said: “We find it unnecessary to deal with the different English cases to which counsel referred, because the power of the Court, to permit or order an amendment of the pleadings is regulated by our Civil Procedure Rules (Or. 25); and was discussed in Yiannakis Pourikkos v. Mehmet Fevzi (1963) 2 C.L.R. p. 24 There can be no doubt that the Court has the power to allow amendment of a party’s pleadings; and that in certain circumstances, such power has also been used for correcting formal mistakes or omissions before judgment”.

In the light of all the authorities mentioned above and having in mind the stage of the proceedings and the contents of the affidavits attached to the application as well as the opposition, there can be no difficulty in allowing the application and the order prayed for is hereby granted.

With regard to costs we considered very carefully the argument put forward by respondent but we find ourselves unable to agree that the defendant must be precluded from defending a case in which the subject-matter is over £2000.- if he fails to pay the costs necessitated by this application. After all it was brought to our knowledge that respondent-plaintiff was adjudged to pay to applicant-defendant the costs of another action on the same subject-matter which had been withdrawn. These costs are still unpaid [*1409] and are payable according to the agreement of the parties and/or their advocates after final determination of this action. The respondent is entitled to his costs in this application, and any costs thrown away. Leave and order as per application granted. Amended statement of defence to be filed within 40 days from today. Applicant to pay the costs of the application and any costs thrown away, such costs to be assessed by the Registrar.

Application granted.