Court dismisses action to set aside consent judgment where fraud allegations were known to plaintiffs and counsel.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe plaintiffs sought to set aside a prior consent judgment and register a building plot, alleging fraud and misrepresentation by the deceased estate administrator. The court found that the alleged fraudulent facts were within the knowledge of the plaintiffs and their own counsel at the time the original judgment was reached. Consequently, the court held that the consent judgment could not be set aside and dismissed the action with costs.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IACivil Procedure Act; Civil Procedure Rules: A consent judgment cannot be set aside where the alleged grounds for fraud or misrepresentation were known to the party and their counsel at the time of the agreement.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IAGiurisprudenza citata
Generato dall'IADecisioni correlate
Generato dall'IATesto completo
[*1387] 1973 October 3
(DEMETRIADES, P.D.C., PAPADOPOULOS, S,D.J. )
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP NICOSIA
1. Nicolas Loizou,
2. Maria Nicolaou Loizou,
Plaintiffs,
and
1. Panayiotis losif,
2. loannis M. Makriyiannis,
Defendants.
(Action No. 2258/69).
Judgment - Consent judgment - Setting aside of - Law applicable - Consent judgment - Sought to be set aside as having being obtained by, inter alia, fraud or misrepresentation - Facts alleged to have constituted fraud or misrepresentation within knowledge of plaintiffs and their counsel at the time of the consent judgment - Action dismissed.
Consent judgment - Setting aside of - See, under “Judgment”.
G. Pittadjis for L. Papaphilippou, for the Plaintiffs.
A. Angelides for G. Tornaritis, for the Defendants.
JUDGMENT
The judgment of the Court was delivered by:-
DEMETRIADES. P.D.C.: The plaintiffs by this action [*1388] claim the following remedies against the administrators of the estate of Michael Ch. Mylonas, late of Nicosia:-
(a) An order of the Court setting aside the judgment and/or the consent of the plaintiffs or either of them given in Actions Nos. 963/62 and 142/63 as having been obtained by fraud and/or misrepresentation and/or perjury and/or under circumstances amounting to fraud and/or misrepresentation and/or obtained as a result of facts that took place after the issue of the said judgment or judgments and which were raised too late to be put before the Court;
(b) A declaration of the Court that the building plot 539, Block ‘B’, Sheet/Plan XXI/55.E., at Aglandjia, belongs to plaintiff No. 2 by virtue of an agreement;
(c) An order of the Court for the registration of the above building site in the name of plaintiff No. 2;
(d) Further and in the alternative damages and/or the value of the said building site;
(e) Damages for fraud and/or misrepresentation and/or perjury by the said deceased;
(f) Legal interest and costs.
By way of counterclaim the defendants claim:- [*1389]
(a) Payment by the plaintiffs of reasonable compensation for the use and enjoyment of the building site, the subject-matter of the action, as from the 14th February, 1969, till the date of the filing of the counterclaim; and/or,
(b) Damages for unjust enrichment and/or order of the Court directing the plaintiffs to vacate and deliver to the defendants the said building site.
Before the hearing of this action started, the parties agreed that the value of the building site, the subject-matter of this action, was at the material time, that is, at the time of the alleged breach of agreement, £1,500.-. Thus, if plaintiffs are successful in their action, they would only be entitled to recover this sum instead of the remedies claimed under prayers (b) and (e) above. In view of this the main or the only issue which is before the Court is that raised by prayer (a) of the indorsement to the writ of summons.
The present action is brought by the plaintiffs against the administrators of the estate of a certain Michael Ch. Mylonas in whose name the disputed plot is registered.
The dispute as to the subject-matter of this action was the subject of litigation some years ago, when the deceased Mylonas filed Action No. 963/62 in the District Court of Nicosia against Nicolas Loizou (plaintiff No. 1 in the present action). Plaintiff No. 2 in the present action, [*1390] Maria Nicolaou Loizou, also filed Action No. 142/63 of the District Court of Nicosia against the said Mylonas.
Action No. 963/62 of the District Court of Nicosia was an action by which the deceased Mylonas claimed, inter alia, an order of ejectment and/or recovery of possession of the building site, plot 539, Block ‘B’, Sheet/Plan XXI/55.E.1. situated at Aglandjia, locality “Anefani”. By counterclaim the defendant, Loizou, claimed for a declaration of the Court that he was the legal user of the land, the subject-matter of the action, by virtue of an agreement between him and Mylonas and further he claimed that he was entitled to use same for a period of 5 years.
By her action Maria Nicolaou Loizou claimed against Mylonas: -
(a) A declaration that plot 539 of Sheet/Plan XXI/55 E.1. situated at Aglandjia, locality “Anefani”, belonged to her by virtue of an agreement;
(b) For an order directing the registration of the said plot into her name;
(c) An order directing the defendant not to trespass in the said plot;
(d) Alternatively damages and/or the value of the said plot which had been given to her in consideration of services rendered by her to Mylonas.
Mylonas by counterclaim claimed:- [*1391]
(a) Free possession of plot 539; and,
(b).Mesne profits for the years 1962, 1963 and upto the handing owner-free by the defendant of the said plot.
The two actions were later consolidated and the hearing started on the 26th May, 1966, before the Nicosia Full District Court; it continued on the 27th May, 1966, when it was adjourned to the 31st May. By this latter date the plaintiff, Mylonas, gave evidence and closed his case. Nicolas Loizou and Maria Nicolaou Loizou also gave and completed their evidence.
When the case went before the Court on the 31st May, 1966, the two counsel appearing for Nicolas Loizou and Maria Nicolaou Loizou made the following statement:-
“Our clients, i.e., Maria Nicolaou Loizou and Mr. Nicolaos Loizou, hereby declare that the plaintiff, i.e., Mr. Michael Ch. Mylonas, is the sole owner of the disputed building site in question and they submit to an order in terms of paragraph 6(a) of the statement of claim”.
(N .B.:- Paragraph 6(a) of the statement of claim reads:-
“6. The plaintiff by reason of the premises claims:-
(a) Recovery of possession of the buildingsite under plot No. 539, block B, sheet/plan XXI/55.E.1, situated at Aglandjia [*1392] village, locality ‘Anefani’).
Delivery of vacant possession on or before 31st August, 1967. Defendants to be at liberty to remove any structures that they themselves have erected or put up in the aforesaid building site.
The counterclaim in Action No. 963/62 is withdrawn as well as Action 142/63.
Mr. George Tornaritis:- Plaintiff who is present accepts the proposed settlement and withdraws claims 6(b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) in Action No. 963/62”.
After the above statement of counsel appearing for the litigants the Court entered judgment in the following terms: -
“Judgment accordingly. No order as to costs. Any previous order as to costs in both actions is deemed to be satisfied”.
It is now the allegation of the two plaintiffs that the first plaintiff was forced to submit to judgment against him and the second plaintiff to withdraw her action because of certain allegations that the deceased made whilst giving evidence. These allegations the two plaintiffs contend were false and amounted to fraud and/or perjury and/or misrepresentation and they could not disprove them as at the time of the hearing a most material document necessary for their case, namely, a file of the District [*1393] officer of Nicosia containing an application for the erection of a structure on plot 539 as well as the plans for this structure, was not available for production before the Court as it was in the Turkish Quarter of Nicosia. This file was produced during the hearing before us and is exhibit No. 1. This exhibit contains an application for the issue of a building permit for the construction of a shed (paranga) on plot Reg. No. B.555 of Aglandjia village, locality “Anefani”, sheet/plan XXI/55.E.1. (On the title deed that is to be found in exhibit No.1, the plot number of this building site is given as 539). The application was made by a certain Michael Ch. Mylonas of Solonos Street, 73, Nicosia, and is dated 26.5.61. The signature appearing on the application is “Μ. Χ. Μυλωνά”.
It is pertinent to say that as it appears from the record in exhibit No.1, the structure to which this application relates had already been built when the application was filed. Further there is no evidence before us, except that of plaintiff No.1, that the signature appearing on this application is that of the deceased.
When reading the statement made by counsel appearing for Nicolas Loizou and Maria Nicolaou Loizou in Actions Nos. 963/62 and 142/63 two things appear to be clear:-
(a) That Maria Nicolaou Loizou withdrew her action No. 142/63 without reserving her rights to bring a fresh action against Mylonas; and,
(b) That both she and Nicolas Loizou admitted that the property belonged to the deceased Mylonas. [*1394]
It is again pertinent to say that at the time both plaintiffs were making their declaration and plaintiff No.2 was withdrawing her action, they both knew of the existence of the application to the District Officer for the issue of a building permit for the erection of a shed on plot
539. They were merely, as their counsel stated, unable to produce it to Court in support of their claims in Actions Nos. 963/62 and 142/63.
The setting aside of a judgment on fresh evidence is set out in paragraph 1670 of Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 22, as follows:-
“An action will lie to rescind a judgment on the ground of the discovery of new evidence which would have had a material effect upon the decision of the court. It must be shown that such evidence is a discovery of something material in the sense that it would be a reason for setting aside the judgment if it were established by proof that the discovery is new, and that it could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered before. A mere suspicion of fresh evidence is not sufficient”.
The Law as regards the setting aside of consent judgments is again stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Ed., Vol. 22, paragraph 1672, and it reads as follows:-
“A judgment given or an order made by consent may, in a fresh action brought for the purpose, [*1395] be set aside on any ground which would, invalidate a compromise not contained in a judgment or order. Compromises have been set aside on the ground that the agreement was illegal as against public policy, or was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation, or non-disclosure of a material fact which was an obligation to disclose, or by duress, or was concluded under a mutual mistake of fact, ignorance of a material fact, or without authority. A compromise in ratification of a contract which is incapable of being ratified is not enforceable; and a compromise which is conditional on some term being carried out, or on the assent of the court or other persons being given to the arrangement, is not enforceable if the term is not carried out or the assent given effectually.
The court may refuse to set aside a compromise when the party seeking to set it aside is guilty of delay in questioning it
Unless all the parties agree, a consent, order, when entered, can only be set aside by a fresh action, and an application cannot be made to the court of first instance in the original action to set aside the judgment or order, except, apparently, in the case of an interlocutory order; nor can it be done by way of appeal”. [*1396]
The question that calls for decision in the present case is what the statement made by counsel amounts to and what the judgment entered by the Court is. The Judgment of the Court, certainly, is not a completed judgment after a final trial. From the record it does not appear that the statement by counsel was made after the litigants had arrived at a compromise. We, therefore, cannot see how the plaintiffs can succeed in their action.
Assuming, however, that the judgment is one falling within one of the two cases mentioned above, we will try to see whether the allegations made by the deceased whilst giving his evidence are fraudulent or misrepresentations or amount to perjury as alleged by the plaintiffs.
The allegations made by the deceased Mylonas in his evidence that are the subject of complaint by the plaintiffs are set out in paragraph 11 of the amended statement of claim and read as follows: -
“(a) I did not give permission either to Maria or her husband to build any rooms on this plot beyond the erection of a temporary shed for the 20 purpose of selling soft drinks and that only for about 3 months.
(b) It is not true that I signed any application or gave my consent in writing for the building of any structure whatsoever on this building site. I never saw any plans concerning the building of a shed”. [*1397]
“Fraud” is summarized by Viscount Maugham in the judgment he delivered in the case of Bradford Third Equitable Benefit Building Society v. Borders, reported in (1941)
2 All E.R., p. 205, (at p.211 A-E), thus:-
“First, there must be a representation of fact made by words, or, it may be, by conduct. The phrase will include a case where the defendant has manifestly approved and adopted a representation made by some third person. On the other hand, mere silence, however morally wrong, will not support an action of deceit. Secondly, the representation must be made with a knowledge that it is false. It must be wilfully false, or at least made in the absence of any genuine belief that it is true. Thirdly, it must be made with the intention that it should be acted upon by the plaintiff, or by a class of persons which will include the plaintiff, in the manner which resulted in damage to him. If, however, fraud be established, it is immaterial that there was no intention to cheat or injure the person to whom the false statement was made. Fourthly, it must be proved that the plaintiff has acted upon the false statement and has sustained damage by so doing”.
“Misrepresentation” is defined in paragraph 1556 of Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 26, as follows:- [*1398]
“What constitutes falsity.
A. representation is deemed to have been false, and therefore a misrepresentation, if it was at the material date false in substance and in fact. For the purpose of determining whether there has or has not been a misrepresentation at all, the knowledge, belief, or other state of mind of the representor is immaterial, save in cases where the representation relates to the representor’s state of mind; though his state of mind is of the utmost importance for the purpose of considering whether the misrepresentation was fraudulent”.
In the light of the above and having in mind that the plaintiffs knew of the existence of exhibit No. 1 that contained an application for the issue of a building permit for the erection of the shed, we cannot see how they could be the victims of fraud or misrepresentations on the part of Mylonas or act upon them. These facts were also known to counsel appearing for them who also advised them to take the course of declaring that the building site; the subject of the action, belonged to Mylonas.
In the circumstances we feel that the present action is different from that of Meek v. Fleming,
(1961) 3 All E.R., 148, in which it was held that -
“Where a party deliberately misled the court in a material matter, e.g., by the concealment of a matter of vital significance even though one that affected the party’s credit and did [*1399] not relate directly to an issue in the action, a judgment obtained or probably obtained by the deception should not be allowed to stand”.
As regards the allegation that .Mylonas committed perjury when alleging that he only gave his permission for the erection of a shed (paranga) and that he did not sign the building permit, we find that the answers we had given to the case of fraud or misrepresentation equally apply here. However, as Mylonas did not give evidence before us, we are not, we find, allowed to assess his, evidence. He may have been telling the truth and further the signature appearing on the application for the issue of a building permit might not be his. We have not before us an. independent evidence that the signature on the application is that of the deceased.
For the above reasons we find that we cannot set aside the judgment entered in Actions of the District Court of Nicosia Nos. 963/62 and 142/63.
In view of our findings, we consider it unnecessary to enter into details as regards the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiffs to prove their case. If, however, we are allowed to say this, neither of the plaintiffs nor any of, their witnesses impressed us as truthful. We have no doubt that the plaintiffs thought of taking the present legal proceedings after the death of Mylonas, in which case their evidence would stand uncontradicted by him and that the witnesses that gave evidence on their behalf came to Court with the only purpose of helping them to recover [*1400] either money from the estate of the deceased or to have the said building site registered in their name.
COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANTS
The defendants have not called evidence to prove their prayers under paragraphs (a) and (b) of the counterclaim and for this reason we consider that they have abandoned their claim.
As regards prayer(c), we feel that as the plaintiffs have failed to prove their claim and that by the judgment given in the consolidated actions Nos. 963/62 and 142/63, which are exhibits before us, (exhibits Nos. 2 and 3 respectively), the defendants have proved their claim and that they are entitled to an order under this paragraph.
To sum up, the plaintiffs’ claim fails and is dismissed. There will be an order directing the plaintiffs to evacuate and deliver to the defendants vacant possession of the building site, plot No. 539, Block ‘B’, Sheet/Plan XXI/55.E.1., at Aglandjia village, locality “Anefani”, forthwith. Plaintiffs to pay the costs of this action. Costs to be assessed by the Registrar.
Action dismissed with costs.