Court rejects extra compensation for mining acquisition where road construction served industry, not direct extraction. Claim dismissed.
Sintesi Legislator
Generato dall'IAThe District Court dismissed the claimants' request for additional compensation beyond statutory rates for land acquired for mining purposes. While the claimants argued that the acquisition for the mining industry warranted extra payment, the court found the notice specified road construction to serve the industry rather than direct mineral extraction. Consequently, the court held that Section 10(b) of the Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law did not apply to grant supplementary compensation in this specific context.
Regesto Legislator
Generato dall'IASection 10(b) of the Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law, 1962; Section 2 of the Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law, 1962: Additional compensation under Section 10(b) is not payable where the acquisition is for mining purposes unless the specific purpose is the extraction of minerals from the surface, not merely facilitating the industry via infrastructure.
Parole chiave
Generato dall'IADisposizioni normative citate
Generato dall'IAGiurisprudenza citata
Generato dall'IADecisioni correlate
Generato dall'IATesto completo
[*1376] 1973 June 16
(PIKIS, AG. P.D.C.)
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF NICOSIA
Djajit Ibrahim Hji Izset and Others,
Claimants,
and
The Republic of Cyprus,
Acquiring Authority.
(Reference No. 19/70).
Compulsory Acquisition - Compensation - Methods of assessment - Direct comparison method - Prerequisites for its application - Whether sales effected after publication of notification - of acquisition can be taken into account - Prices of comparable properties cited by claimants not f in line with market value of similar land in the area - Not adopted.
Compulsory Acquisition - Compensation - Assessment - Purpose of acquisition - Mining - Section 10(b) of the Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law, 1962 (Law 15 of 1962) - Whether compensation over and above that stipulated in s. 10(a) of the law can be awarded.
Statutes - Construction - Construction of s. 10(b) of the Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law, 1962 (Law 15 of 1962).
Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law, 1962 (Law 15 of 1962) - Construction of s. 10(b) of the Law.
A. M. Berberoglou, for the Claimants.
K. Michaelides, for the Acquiring Authority.
JUDGMENT
The following judgment was delivered by:-
PIKIS, AG. P.D.C.: The claimants are the owners, [*1377] in varying shares, of an area of land forming part of two plots of land in the Lefka area, hereinafter to be referred to as plots 11 and 172, compulsorily acquired by virtue of an order of acquisition dated 13th May 1965, preceded by a notice of acquisition published on the 22nd April 1965. The shares of the claimants in the property compulsorily acquired, appear in List ‘B’ attached to the notice of reference.
Though service has been effected on all the claimants in accordance with directions of the Court, given from time to time, only two of the claimants entered appearance and contested the offer of compensation made by the Acquiring Authority and supported by a valuation report filed on the 14th January 1971, supplemented by a subsequent report that was filed on the 25th May 1971.
Claimants 1 & 2 base their claim on a valuation prepared by Mr. Patrikios, a land valuer, in private practice.
Description of the Property.
There is virtually agreement between the two valuers in the description of plot 11; it is common ground that plot 11 is very poor land, many parts of which are rocky, suitable at best for the pasture of livestock. There is a discernible disagreement between Mr. Patrikios and Mr. Vilanides in the description of plot 172, its arability and potential. Mr. Vilanides expressed the view that the soil of plot 172 is practically the same with that of plot 11 and treats only parts of it as marginally better than plot 11. Mr. Patrikios, on the other hand, considers plot 172 as being definetely superior to plot 11 and adopts a higher value compared to plot 11. [*1378]
Purpose of the Acquisition And The Extent Of The Land Acquired. It is specified in the notice of acquisition that the lands were being compulsorily acquired for the purpose of facilitating the mining industry by the construction of a public road, that is the lands were acquired for the construction of a public road to serve the raining industry that is located in the area.
Area Acquired
Plot 11: 3 donums 3 evleks 1,800 square feet.
The area acquired contained 13 pine trees and two wild olive trees. It is conceded by the Acquiring Authority that in consequence of the acquisition an area of one donum and 3,200 square feet will be injuriously affected to the point of being valueless to the owner.
Plot 172: k donums and 2,900 square feet - containing 20 pine trees.
Valuations
Plot 11: Whereas Mr. Patrikios in his valuation report values plot 11 at £80.- per donum, he expressly agreed in his evidence before the Court that the valuation of the Acquiring Authority, respecting plot 11, is fair and reasonable and agreed that the sum of £102.250 mils offered by the Acquiring Authority is a fair and reasonable compensation of the value of the subject property, as at the date notice to acquire was published. Earlier in his evidence he agreed that the sales relied upon for comparison by the Acquiring Authority were a Safe guide to the valuation of plot 11; therefore it may be said that the two valuers are [*1379] in agreement that the loss of the owners regarding plot 11, as at the date notice to acquire was published, comes to £102.250 mils. It is, therefore, unnecessary to make any further reference to the details of the two valuation reports concerning plot 11.
Plot 172: Different opinions were advanced by the two sides, not only in relation to the value of the property compulsorily acquired, but also in connection with the implications of the acquisition on the remaining property, and in particular whether it has become necessary to construct a retaining wall in order to prevent erosion of the soil to which danger the land of the claimants has allegedly been exposed by the construction of the road, envisaged by the acquisition. It is perhaps more convenient to start with this aspect of the valuation of Mr. Patrikios, before examining the contentions of the two valuers as to the market value of the property acquired.
Mr. Patrikios, though not an expert in the field of civil or construction engineering, ventured the view speaking in the light of his own experience and efforts to prevent erosion of private property held by him, that the construction of a supporting wall is necessary in order to protect the property from erosion. The cost of such construction would, in his view, come to £168.-. In the first place, it is debatable whether Mr. Patrikios should be allowed to offer an opinion in a field of expertise, of which he is not a master and does not qualify as an expert in the legal sense of the word. Be that as it may, the opinion of Mr. Patrikios is countered by a very qualified [*1380] man, Mr. Stavros loannides, a civil and construction engineer, who, after visiting the property formed the opinion that the construction of such a wall is unnecessary. Mr. loannides came to this
conclusion, despite the difference in level between the road and the field of the claimants, which at points rises to 10 feet. It is without any hesitation that I accept the opinion of Mr. loannides and find that the construction of the road has not rendered necessary the construction of a retaining wall, as alleged by Mr. Patrikios.
Value per donum of Plot 172
Both valuers rely on the method of direct comparison, which they consider as the most appropriate for arriving at the value of the land compulsorily acquired. There is no doubt that the method of direct comparison where sufficient data are available making comparison with the subject property feasible, is the best method of valuation
as repeatedly stressed in numerous decisions - (See, inter alia, the cases of The Commissioner of Limassol v. Kirzi, 24 C.L.R. 197, Moti and Another v. The Republic (1968) 3 J.S.C. 287). It
has been felt that the method of direct comparison, where direct comparison is possible, is the safest method of finding the value of land and thus ensure that compensation is equal to the loss of the owner, the principle of equivalence being the underlying notion of statutory compensation. (See the cases of Horn v. Sunderland Corporation, (1941) 1 All E.R.480, Rugby Joint Waterboard v. Footitt (1972) 1 All E.R., p. 1057). [*1381]
Though Mr. Patrikios relies on the method of direct comparison, in the course of his evidence supporting his valuation, maintained that the plot 172 had the value he ascribed to it, not only because of the price realised from the sale of the properties relied upon for comparison, but also in consideration of the potential of the land for development into building sites. Ordinarily the potential of the land for development is reflected in the price realised from the sale of property admitting of direct comparison to the subject properties; otherwise the potential of the property for development would be counted twice in computing the compensation payable. Mr. Patrikios primarily bases his valuation on the sale of three plots, viz. 97-99 and 6/1. Plots 97 and 99 were sold in the year 1963 for £70.- and £80.- respectively per donum. On the whole, the two valuers agree that plots 97 and
99 are comparable to the subject property, but disagree in the way they analyse the sale prices of 1963. It is the contention of the valuer of the Acquiring Authority that these sales were fictitious, arguing that they had been concluded among relations, with a view to boosting market values in the area, in the expectation of the land being compulsorily acquired, enhancing thereby the compensation payable to them. Mr. Vilanides formed this view on a consideration of the following factors:-
(a) Plots 97 and 99 were resold in the years 1969 and 1970 respectively, at a price - plot 97 - £20.- per donum and plot 99 - at a price of £26.660 mils per donum. [*1382]
(b) The price fetched from the sale of comparable properties, and in particular plots 115/1 - plot 104 - and plot 9k - and plot 33.
Mr. Patrikios, when confronted with the price fetched from the sale of plots 97 and 99 in 1969 and 1970, agreed that certain adjustments would have to he made in his valuation and inclines to adopt the mean value of the 1963 and subsequent sales, as the yardstick of compensation. In cross-examination, Mr. Patrikios agreed that plot 94 was a superior plot from the view point of agriculture, in comparison to plots 97 and 99. It is not without significance to note that in 1961, part of plot 172 was sold for £6.500 mils per donum.
Although Mr. Patrikios maintained that plot 6/1 is comparable to the subject property, on the whole I agree with Mr. Vilanides that there is hardly room for comparison between this plot and the subject property. In the first Place, plot 6/1 had a frontage on the main Lefka/Kalopanayiotis road of 300 feet, whereas the subject property was at some distance from the main road and was served only by a path. Secondly one-third of this plot was garden land, irrigated from the river, whereas plot 172 was unirrigated. In the light of the totality of the evidence before the Court, the possibility of plot 172 gaining water supply, was, if anything, remote in the extreme.
When a comparison is attempted, it must be ensured that the similarities between properties to be compared [*1383] are real and not illusory. Moreover, the price fetched from the sale of any given plot is not in itself conclusive of the value of comparable property in the area, unless in line with the general trend of market values of similar property in the locality.
Speaking of the sales of plots 97 and 99 in the year 1963, it is without difficulty that I conclude that the price realised was not in line with the market value of similar land in the area. On the other hand, I agree that the sales relied upon for comparison by the Acquiring Authority give an objective indication of values in the area and the sales of these plots in 1969 and 1970 are a more accurate guide to their value at the time.
In principle, there is no objection to the ascertainment of the value of land by reference to transactions after the date of publication of the notification, if they can be suitably adjusted to market conditions on the day of notification so that no element of value unascertainable or unforeseeable at the date of notification is taken into account. (See Cripps on the Compulsory Acquisition of Land, 11th Edition, p.899). In the present case there was hardly any change in market conditions between 1965 and 1970 and, therefore, such subsequent sales can be safely relied upon as an indication of the market value of land at the relevant period.
Having given due consideration to every aspect of the case, as well as the intrinsic circumstances of plot 172, my finding is that the value of land was £30.- per donum. [*1384]
Finally, it was argued by Mr. Berberoghlou that extra provision should be made by way of compensation, on account of the fact that the acquisition was effected for mining purposes, as indicated in the notice to acquire. The point though raised, was far from fully argued. In accordance with Section 10(b), Law 15/62, it is specified that where the acquisition is made for mining purposes, the fact that at is compulsory should be ignored. Speaking for myself, I find it hard to discern the precise meaning of this provision of the Law, except that an effort is made to make some special provision concerning cases of acquisition undertaken with a view to extract minerals to the surface. Looking at the combined effect of Section 2 and Section 10(b), of Law 15/62, there are prima facie two possible interpretations to these provisions of the Law. First it may be argued that the legislator saves any special provision made in any enactment other than Law 15/62 regulating the matter of
compensation payable where an acquisition is undertaken, for mineral purposes. If this interpretation is adopted, before the
dispossessed owner is entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of any such special law, it would have to be established that the purpose of the acquisition was truly for mineral purposes, as defined in such special enactment. Looking at the definition of “mining” and “mine” in Cap. 270, the purpose of the acquisition in the present case could not he said to be for mining purposes. The acquisition envisaged the construction of a road with a view to serving the mining industry and was not undertaken for the purpose of extracting minerals to the surface. [*1385]
One other possible interpretation on the provisions of Section 10(b) is to construe it as meaning that where the acquisition is undertaken for mining purposes, the Court should have a discretion to award compensation, depending on the facts of the case, over and above that stipulated in Section 10(a) of Law 15/62. Upon such construction, the Court would have a discretion to see that an individual owner does not suffer by the alienation of his land merely on account of the fact that he is himself unable to exploit the mineral resources lying under the soil of his land. If this construction was adopted, again no additional compensation should be awarded to the claimant, considering that the acquisition was not undertaken for the purpose of extracting any minerals from the land of the claimants.
Therefore, the submission of counsel that additional compensation should be paid to the claimants, is, in my judgment, ill-founded.
Interest:+ ………………………………………………
Result:-
Plot 11: £102.250 mils.
Plot 172: (Extent 4 donums
- 1 evlek - 2,900 sq.
feet), at £30.- per donum: £133.540 mils, plus £5.- for 20 pine trees.
Order:-
Upon payment to the claimants of the sum of £241.- plus 7% from 13/5/1965, according to the share of each [*1386] claimant, subject to any deductions permitted under the law, the subject property will vest in the Acquiring Authority.
The Acquiring Authority will pay £40.- advocate’s costs and £25.- valuation fees.
Judgment and order for costs as above.
+ On the question of interest see (1975) 1 J.S.C. 34 and
(1975) 5 J.S.C. 711.